POSITIVE SIDE OF CONDUCT�CULTIVATION OF
VIRTUES: We now turn to the consideration of the positive side of
conduct. According to
1 B. G. III.
4a. 2 Ibid III. 34. 3 Ibid II. 62.
4 Ibid. II. 63.
5 Ibid. VI. 34, 35.
6 Ibid. III. 41. 7 Ibid. III. 6. 8
Jnana. XXII. 23.
9 Ibid. XXII. 28.
10 Pp. II. 136.
11 Ibid. II. 140.
(Translation vide UPDHYE Intro. P. 19) 12 Jnana.
16 Jnana. XXIII.
30; Istopa. 7.
Upanisad, charity and compassion are to be practiced,' in addition to
self-control. The observance of austerity, charity, simplicity of
behaviour, non-violence and truthfulness have been enjoined by the
Chandogya.2 Some Upanisads speak of celibacy also.3
The Taittiraya Upanisad enunciates a number of practices but finally
decides in favour of the study of the sacred scriptures, as constituting
penance and the highest virtue.4 When the pupil takes leave of his
teacher after the studies, he is advised to speak the truth, to respect
the law, not to be negligent of the study of the sacred scriptures, and
not to deflect from welfare, from the means of thriving, and from duties
to gods and fathers. He is further advised to offer to the
teacher the wealth the latter desires, and then, marry and procreates
He should regard his mother, father, teacher and guest as gods, perform
faultless actions, and imitate only the noble conduct of his teacher.
He is required to show respect to highly disciplined Brahmins, and to
offer gifts to them with faith, magnanimity, meekness, awe and proper
understanding. Again, if doubt creeps in as to the pursuance of any
course of action, the best way is to follow the conduct of those
Brahmins who are devout, compassionate, careful thinkers and lovers of
virtues7 or the divine endowments mentioned in the Gita may be put into
different categories in order to facilitate comparison with the Jaina
enumeration. The first group may comprise the turning away from the
objects of the senses, and the controlling of speech, body, mind and
understanding. The second may include charity, sacrifice, tranquillity,
universal compassion, pure devotion, and the Acarya Upasana. The third
may be taken to embrace non-violence, truthfulness, non-acquisition,
renunciation and absence of fault-finding. It may also include
freedom from lust, anger, pride, greed, fear, enmity and force. The
fourth may include forgiveness, gentleness, purity, austerity, modesty,
scriptural study, spiritual knowledge, simplicity of behaviour and wise
apportionment of knowledge. The fifth may be taken to embrace insight
into the evils of birth, death, old age and sickness. It may also
involve meditation, resplendence, abstemiousness, endurance, steadfast�
Up. V. 2, 3. 2
Cha. Up. III. 17,
Ka. Up. I. 2. 15; Pra. Up. I. 1, 15.
Tai. up. I.
Tai. Up. 1, 11. 6Ibid. 1, 11.
XIII-7 to 11.; XVII-1, 2, 3.; XVI 11-51
various places we have followed
Translation of the
ness, non-attachment, spiritual experience,
liking for solitude, disliking for crowd, absence of fickleness, purity
of mind, freedom from attach�ment and aversion and equal-mindedness to
all happenings, desirable and undesirable.
Further, three types of
austerities namely Sattvika, Rajasa and Tamasa, have been recognized by
the Ota. 1) The Sattvika austerity is�again of three kinds, namely, the
bodily,' the vocal2 and the mental.3
2) The austerity which is performed for the sake of
ostentation or with a view to capturing respect, honour and reverence is
Rajas.l 3) That which is pursued under delusion, and to torture one's
ownself or to harm others is Tamasas Next come three types of
charity. 1) That which is given out of duty, with proper
consideration of place, time and recipient and without any expectation
of return is Sattvika gift.6 2) The Rajasa is that which is given
unwillingly or by hurting oneself, with the hope of return or with
selfish designs.7 3) The offering which is made with despise,
without proper respect and without any regard for time, place and
recipient is Tamasa in kind.8 Likewise renunciation admits of
a threefold classification. 1) The performance of the acts of
sacrifice, charity and austerity, and other prescribed actions after one
has renounced attachment to, and yearning for, their fruits has been
regarded as Sattvika renunciation.' 2-3) The abandonment of prescribed
actions out of ignorance and sheer fear of pain is called the Tamasa and
Rajasa types of renunciation respectively.10
Comparing with the Upanisads, we find,
that Jainism too recognises scriptural study as the best of the
austerities." The householder who observes Brahmacaryanuvrata,
Satayanuvrata and Atithisamvibhagamata roughly follows all the duties
that the Upanisadic teacher instructs his disciple. To compare with the
Gitd, the groups first to four may be compared with the various virtues
prescribed in Jainism; namely, the
1 bodily: purity, continence,
non-violence, simplicity of
behaviour and adoration to
the gods, the Brahminas, the wise and the spiritual guide.
Z vocal: scriptural study and the
inoffensive, beneficial and true words.
3 mental: serenity, silence, self-control, evenness
of mind, and purity
B.G. XV1 1-14 to
4 B.G. 17-18.
S Ibid. 17-5, 6,
7 Ibid. 17-21.
9 B.G. 18-6.
10Ibid. 18-7. 8.
three Guptis (control of mind, body and
speech), the control of five senses, the causes of the auspicious Asrava,
the sixteen kinds of reflections (already discussed elsewhere), freedom
from passions, the five vows of
Ahimsa, Asteya, Brahmacarya, Aparigraha and Satya along with
their various reflections to strengthen them, and the ten Dharmas of
forbearance, modesty, simplicity of behaviour, contentment, truth,
self-restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment and celibacy.
The fifth group may be compared with some of the incentives to spiritual
life' and with the importance -of knowledge, conduct, study, meditation
and austerity,2 and also with solitude, endurance, observance of
evenness in pleasure and pain, and conquest of attachment, aversion and
infatuation.3 The Sattvika austerity may be compared
roughly with the internal austerity as propounded by Jainism. The extent
of austerity in the Gata does
not correspond totally to the external and the internal austerity of
Jainism. The sole purpose of austerity is to unfold the divinity
within. Hence Rajasa and Tamasa austerities have
no meaning in the view of the Jaina. The
vow of Atithisamvibhaga Vrata4 answers to the Sattvika charity of the
Gita. It is important
to note that all the auspicious observances should be made without
deceit (mdya), perversity
(mithya) and desire for
worldly benefits (nidana).5
Though the yearning for worldly fruits has been condemned, the
desire for spiritual betterment has been appreciated.6 It is to be borne
in mind that in contrast to the Upanisads and the
Gita, Jainism regards Ahimsa
as the guiding principle from which all the virtues can be derived. The
Upanisads speak more in favour of truth than anything else.
SIDE OF CONDUCT-MEDITATION: Next to be
considered is Yoga or meditation and devotion. The importance of Dhyana
(medi�tation) is seen when the
Mundaka Upanisad pronounces that the immaculate nature of God
can be realised neither by sight, nor by speech, nor by any other sense,
nor by austerity, nor by any actions, but only through meditation after
the purification of inner being.7 The great
transitoriness of things (Anityanupreksa); (2) Incentive of
inescapability from death (Asravnanupreksa). (3) Incentive of
transmigration (Sathsaranupreksa); (4) Incentive of bodily impurity (Asuci-anupreksa),
Milld. 968. 3
Ibid. 950, 816, 880. 4
21, 38, 39.
Ibid. VII. 18. b
Amitagati 8rava. 20, 21, 22.
Up. III, 1, 8.
away only through meditation upon God and by entering into His being,
says the Svetas'vatara Upanisad.1 According to the
Bhagavad-Gita, in order to ascend the sublime heights the Yogi has
to banish all desires and all longing for possessions; he has to curb
the mind and the senses, and then in solitude has to meditate on the
supreme self by fixing the mind on the Atman without allowing anything
to is tract it. 2 The Moksapahuda says that he who is
desirous of crossing the formidable ocean of Samsara meditates upon the
pure self after re�nouncing all passions, detaching himself from all
worldly engagements, and observing silence.3 The tree of worldly
existence cannot be eradi�cated by the Dravyasramana who is occupied
with the pleasures of the senses, but it is capable of being rooted out
by the Bhavasramana with the axe of meditation.4
Just as a lamp which is unobstructed by
wind continues to glow in a
well-surrounded house, so the lamp of meditation in the absence of the
wind of attachment keeps illuminating in the heart of the Bhavasramana.
5 The Paramatmaprakas'a
tells us that the Atman which is incapable of being known by the Vedas,
the astras and the senses is accessible only to pure
meditation.6 Notwithstanding the observance of moral
discipline, the performance of austere penance's and extensive
scriptural study, the success in spiritual life is incapable of being
achieved without the pursuance of meditation.7 Then there are
certain pre-requisites of Yoga or meditation enunciated. The place is
required to be pleasing to the mind and free from sounds; watery resorts
should not be aching to the eyes. The ground need be even, clean
and free from pebbles, fire and sand. One should select for practice
a place in the still recesses of a caved. According to the Gita,
the Yogi should set his firm seat in a clean place, neither too'
high nor too low, covered with sacred grass, a deer-skin and a cloth,
one over the other, for practicing Yoga.9 The Jfiandrnava
supplies a long list of places which are to be avoided, and which
are to be preferred for the practice of Dhyana.10
our purpose it will suffice to say that those places which are
disturbing, captivating, unpleasant; and those which are noisy on
account of crows, owls, asses, dogs, and the like, and those which are
vitiated by thorns, uneven stones, bones, blood, etc., as well as those
Up. I, 1, 10. 2
B.G. VI-10, 23,
Pa. 26 to 28.
7Amita. 9rava. 96.
Up. II, 2, 10.
XXVII 23 to
29; XXVIII 1 to 7.
that might counteract meditational efforts
should be rejected; and mountains, caves and other solitary places
should be chosen., The Yogi should fix his seat on a wooden
plank, Sila, ground or sandy
place.2 We may point out here that a deer skin will be used
neither by a householder nor by a Muni according to the Jaina tradition.
Regard�ing the posture and the process of meditation, one should keep
the three parts of the body in equilibrium and control the senses so as
to enable one to concentrate on Brahman.3 The
important thing is that the mind should be adequately restrained.4 The
supreme Symbol `Om' has been prescribed for meditations. The
bow of `Om' and the arrow of soul sharpened by devotion set on it should
be directed by concentra�ted attention to pierce the mark of
Brahman.6 As regards posture, the Gita tells us that having
practised the vow of celibacy, and attained fearlessness, serenity, and
control of the mind, the Yogi should hold the body, head and neck erect
and motionless, and by looking fixedly at the tip of his nose without
being distracted in any way he should turn to the supreme self.
7 Only those who are moderate in tourings and in taking food,
restrained in actions, and regulated in sleep and waking succeed in
Yoga. Though the efBcacy9 of `Om' has been recognised, it
has not been enjoined as a means of meditation as in the Upanisads. The
Jndndrnava tells us that any convenient posture subscribing to
mental control should be adopted:l0 After turning away the senses from
their objects, casting aside attachment and aversion, and acquiring an
equipoised state of mind, the Yogi should fix his mind on the
forehead." Besides, the nine other places have been enjoined for
practising meditation; viz., the two eyes, the two ears, the tip of the
nose, the mouth, the navel, the head, the heart, the palate, and the
place between the two eyebrows. 12 Symbols have been suggested for
meditational purposes. The Dravyasa mgraha declares that the
Namokara Mantra and the other imparted by the Guru should be utilized
for the practice of meditation. 13 The Moksapahuda
proclaims that meditation should be instituted after restraining food,
posture and sleep. 14
XXVII. 21 to 34., Sat.
Vol XIII. p. 66.
Jndna. XXVIII. 9.
~ve. Up. II. 2, 8.
Ibid. II 2,
Up. II. 2,6.
B.G. VI 13, 14.
Ibid. VI. 17.
9 Ibid. VIII-13.,
Jnand. XXVIII. 11.
11 Ibid. XXX
POSITIVE SIDE OF
CONDUCT-DEVOTION:- As regards devotion, the
mentions Upasana and Bhakti to God and the Guru as necessary for
realisation. We may summarise Professor RANADE's version regarding
devotion in the Upanisads, "It is only in the
Bhagavad�vitd that the dry
intellectualism and speculative construction of the Upanisads
disappear."' In the Gita
Saguna devotion, as differentiated from Nirguna one which is
difficult for the mundane souls, has been envisaged as a means for the
realisation of the supreme which is incapable of being attained either
by the Vedas or by austerities, or by gifts, or by sacrifices.
One-pointed and unswerving devotion is indispensable to the transcending
of the three Gunas.3 But of the four types of Bhaktas,
namely, the sufferer, the seeker for knowledge, the person who is eager
for wealth and the wise, the last is the best of all because of his
impersonal and absolute devotion.4 Again, the
Gita says that even of the
Yogis, as distinguished from those engrossed in mere external
asceticism, intellectual knowledge and rituals, the greatest is the
devotees Hence, devotion cannot be dispensed with for higher ascension.
The recognition of Bhakti as an integral constituent of the sixteen
kinds of reflection, its inclusion in the six essentials of the
Muni,7 in the daily life of the householder in the form of Jinapnja,
Samayika, Vaiyavrttya etc., are the illustrations of the emphasis laid
by Jainism on devotion as indispensable to spiritual advancement. The
Moksapahuda tells us that
divested of the Atman, externalism, extraneous penance's, scriptural
learning, observance of the manifold rules of conduct-all ' these are
preposterous and' puerile. He who is devoted to the Deva and the
Guru, and who is devoted to ascetics following right conduct and
pursuing meditation is established in the path of liberation.9
Saguna Bhakti may be equated with the aforementioned types of devotion
and Nirguna one, with the supreme meditation, which is not only
difficult, but also not possible in the initial stages of Yoga. The
distinguished Yogi's devotion will be free from the three Slays, namely,
Maya (deceit), Mithya (perversity),- and Nidana (desire for worldly
Constructive Survey of
Upanisadic Philosophy, p. 198.
ZBG. XII-2, 5., XI-53,
VI-46, 47. 6 We have
already enumerated these. 7We have dealt with these in the
Mo. Pu. 99, 100. 9Ibid.
lower types of devotees of the Gita may be said to possess Nidana Salya
according to Jainism.
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND MYSTICAL EFFECTS
OF YOGA AND THE ELEMENT OF GRACE:
Clear complexion, sweet voice, the emission of good smell, extraordinary
decrease in excretions, the possession of light and healthy body and
freedom from sensual indulgence-all these are the physio�logical effects
of Yoga or deep meditation., The spiritual effect consists in
the disintegration of all sorrows and bonds, which results in the
re�alisation of the Brahman, the universal se1f.2 But before this
attainment may ensue, divine grace is essential. The
tells us that the Atman manifests
itself only to him whom it chooses.3 "It implies that man's
endeavors after a full-fledged realisation of God may always fall short
of the ideal, unless grace comes from above."4 The Gita does not
speak of the physiological effects of Yoga. Those who succeed in the
practice of Yoga attain to the mystical effect of realising supreme
peace. And, those who fail, on account of the imperfect practice of
Yoga, are born in heaven, then in the house of prosperous persons or in
the family of Yogins, and ultimately seek salvation by means of fresh
endeavours and the revival of previous impressionists It is
necessary to seek God's grace before one hopes to reach the
pdhuda pronounces that meditation on
the Svadravya, i.e., on the unique, eternal and pure Atman, as
distinguished from the Paradravya, i.e., from the things other than the
Atman, leads to emancipation, the path of the Tirthamkara.7 If
deliverance is not attained owing to
certain imperfections, heaven is indubitably attained. Then after
returning from there and again after pursuing right belief, right
knowledge and right conduct, one will attain liberation. Such a
person in this world gets endowed with knowledge, endurance, prosperity,
health, contentment, strength, and handsome body.9 The theory of grace
from Divinity is foreign to Jainism.l0 As there is no God over
and above the Tirthamkaras, and they too have gone beyond attachment and
aversion, divine grace, in view of the Jaina, is a contradiction in
terms. It is only meditational efforts that eventually lead one
1 9ve. Up. II, 2,
13. Z Ibid. II,
2, 14, 15.
3 Mu. Up. III, 2; 3. Ka.
Up. I, 2, 23. 4
Constructive survey of Upanisadic Philosophy. p. 345.
5 BG. VT-15, 41 to
XVIII-56, 58, 62. 7
17 to 19.
Jnana. LXI 26, 27. 9
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERFECTED SAGE:
After ortraying the comparison and
the contrast between the Jaina view and the views of the Gild and the
Upanisads concerning the pursuance of right conduct in its various
aspects, we now propose to represent the similarities and
dissimilarities in the conception of perfected mystic or the ideal sage
as propounded by Jainism, the Gita and the Upanisads. We are concerned
with the characteristics which a mystic has evolved in his person by
virtue of his strenuous striving after the spiritual path. First, he has
banished and brushed aside all the desires from the' texture of his own
self because of his exclusive occupation with the accomplish�ment of the
supreme desire, namely, the realisation of the Atman, thus seeking
consummate satisfaction in the self by the self., His
undertak�ings exhibit destitution from desire.2 On account of his
self-control, renunciation of all Parigraha and desires, and conquest of
all the senses, he escapes and eludes the bondage despite his
performance of actions,3 for the benefit and guidance of mankind.4
In other words, he remains uncontaminated by the fruits of actions like
the leaf of lotus which does not get polluted by water.5 In
short, the perfect Yogi sees action in inaction and inaction in action.6
We find concordance on this point when Jainism announces that the
consummate mystic has extirpated the inimical passions depriving the
self of highest attainments along with the conceptual transformations of
the mind and rests satisfied with the Atmanic experience.
mental, vocal and physical actions are neither impelled by desire nor
born of ignorance.8 The activities of standing, sitting,
walking and preaching, knowing and seeing are not the results of desire,
and consequently they are incapable of enmeshing the self in bondage.9
Just as a mother educates her child for its benefit and a kind physician
cures diseased orphans, so also the perfected mystic instructs humanity
for its upliftment and dispenses spiritual
suffering humanity. l o He is the leader of man-kind. l l
Secondly, the crowning experience of the mystic has made possible the
termination of all sorrows, since the mystic experiences the self
Ka. Up. II.
3. 14.; Mu. Up. III. 2. 2.; B.G. II. 55.
2 B.G. IV.
IV. 21; V. 7. 4lbid. III. 25.
= Cha. Up. IV.
B.G. IV. 18. 7
Svayambhu. 67. Bo. Pd. 40.
8 Svayarrobhic. 74.
9 Svayambhu. 73.
Niyarrra. 173 to 175. 10Svayambhu. 11, 35. 11
According to Jainism, he has put an end to a11 sorrows because he has
destroyed all attachment to the objects of the world. Thirdly, Jainism,
Gita, and the Upanisads
concur with one another regarding the fact that by virtue of self-realisation
or establishment in Brahmanic experience, the perfect mystic has
transcended the dualities of friends and foes, pleasure and pain, praise
and censure, life and death, sand and gold, attachment and aversion.2
Fourthly, in view of the
Kathopanisad and the
the tangles of the heart of the
perfected mystic are unravelled.3 In other words, on account of his
arriving at the acme of realisation, the mystic is freed from all doubts
whatsoever. According to Jainism, the mystic has intuitively known all
the objects of the world, owing to the outright removal of all the filth
of karman;4 consequently the invasion of any doubt is out of
question.5 Fifthly, he who has ascended the mystical
heights has necessarily identified himself with evenness and equanimity
and kept himself away from the accumulation of the detrimental elements
of Punya and Papa.6 The
opines that the Arahanta has
transcended Punya and Papa etc., and equanimity follows from this by
implication.7 Sixthly, the
and the Gita recognise that the
excellent mystic experiences illimitable bliss.8 The
pronounces that the Yogi after making
conceit, deceit, anger and pride extinct, and after attaining pure
nature realises happiness par-excellence.9 Seventhly, the
state of the saint who has achieved culmination in Yoga, is totally
opposed to the persons pursuing ordinary life. What is night for a11
beings is the time of waking for the perfected soul; and what is waking
time for all beings is the night for the sage who has attained
According to Kundakunda, the true
Yogi sleeps in Vyavahara, while he is awake in his own work of self
realisation. i i The
tells us that the unwise sleep, the sages always awake.l2
Samantabhadra speaks that being impelled by the desire to live and
enjoy, the commonplace persons work hard in the day, and getting
B.G. It. 65;
V. 26. L Up. 7.; Mu. Up. III. 1. 2.
III. 41. ; Svayambhu. 10.; Ka. Up. I. 2. 12.; B.G.
VI. 7, 8, 9.; II. 56, 57.
II. 3, 15., My. Up. II. 2, 8. 4
Pra va. I. 15.
II. 50.; V-19.; Mu. Up. III. 1, 3.
Pa. 30. 8
Ka. Up. I. 2, 13.; B. G. VI.
IoB.G. II. 69.
Mo. Pd. 31.
3, 1, (P 28).
tired, they resort to
sleep at night; but the mystic keeps awake day and night in the process
of self-purification and self-realisation without being overwhelmed by
indolence, inertia and looseness.' In spite of all this happy
concurrence, the fundamental difference that remains is that the mystic
according to Jainism, though having full experience of the Atman, does
not experience it everywhere like the mystic of the Upanisad and the
Gita. Eighthly, the saint who has ascended the sublime heights is like
an impenetrable rock. Anything dashing itself against it shatters
itself. In a similar vein, he who persecutes such a holy personage
causes ruin to himself.2 Samantabhadra says that desolation and
perdition stare one in the face who calumniate such lofty spirits.3
Ninthly, the Mundakopanisad tells us that a man who wishes to be
prosperous should adore the mystic who has realised thC1 self.
Jainism affirms that the pious name of the mystic serves
as an aid for the accomplishment of auspicious and desired purposes.5
Tenthly, there exists nothing which is required to be achieved by that
mystic who takes delight in the self and who is content and satisfied
with the self. He does not need any of the things of the world for any
interest of his.6 In view of Jainism the saint has done what ought to
have been done by resorting to pure meditation.7
DIFFERENT SYSTEMS: We now turn to the ethical concepts of the systems
like Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya-Yoga, Pnrva�Mimalhsa, Vedanta of Samkara
and lastly early Buddhism. Though these systems except the early
Purva-Mimamsa conceive liberation as the Summum Bonum of human life,
they differ widely in expounding its nature. Some schools of thought
describe it negatively as freedom from sorrows and suffering, as an
escape from the trammels of Samsara, while the others . describe it as a
positive attainment of hippies or bliss. The champions
the former _view_ are the Vaisesikas, the early
Naiyayikas, the Samkhya-Yoga and some among the later Mimamsakas, and
the early Buddhists. Of the latter view are the Jainas, the later
Naiyayikas, the Wlimamsakas, and the Advaita-Vedantins. Not only these
systems differ in the nature of deliverance, but also they show
Svayarnbhu. 48. '- Cha. Up. i. 2, 8.
Mu. Up. 3,
1, 10. 5
6 B. G. III.
17, 18.; qve. Up. II. 2. 14. 7
divergence in the
possibility of its attainment here or elsewhere, in this world or
hereafter. The former is styled Jivanmukti, while the later is
Videhamukti. Jainism, Advaita Vedanta, Samkhya-Yoga and Buddhism
subscribe to both the above mentioned views, while the Nyaya-Vaisesika
and the Mimamsa recognise the latter view to the exclusion of the
former. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, the self is an independent
principle having for its qualities desire, aversion, volition, pleasure,
pain and cognition., These qualities are not the eternal
associates of the self but emerge when the self acquires bodily form.
Thus consciousness or knowledge etc., are adventitious qualities of the
self,2 consequently dis�appearing when it attains liberation. Since
pleasure is incapable of being experienced without being tainted with
pain, the emancipated condition implies the absolute cessation of both.
Uddyotakara puts forth that for the experience of everlasting pleasure
in the redeemed state, everlasting body is requisite, since experience
is not possible without bodily mechanism.3 From the enunciation
of Uddyotakara it follows that re�lease while living in this body is out
of question. But both Uddyotakara, and Vatsyayana give credence to a
stage corresponding to Jivanmukti, "such a person will not be divorced
from his physical or mental adjuncts; but narrow love and hate will have
disappeared from him altogether with the selfish activity that proceeds
from them. "4
We may add here that the negative
concept of liberation was soon rejected by the later Naiyayikas like
Bhasarvajna and others and the positive idea of freedom as blissful
state superseded the former one.5 The Purva-Mimamsaka thinkers like
Jaimini and Sabara were not concerned with the problem of ultimate
release, but regarded heaven as the highest end of man. But the later
Mimamsakas like Kumarila and Prabhakara occupied them�selves with
liberation as the ideal of life. Like the Nyaya-Vaisesika,
consciousness and other mental states are not regarded as inherent in
the soul by the Mimamsakas. Hence liberation is devoid of
pleasure and pain.6 Some other Mimamsakas hold that emancipation is not
merely a state free from pain, but it is also one of eternal
These conceptions of
liberation correspond to the two aforementioned
1 N. Su. [. 1. 10.
N. Su. Bhasya.
I. 1, 10.
1. 1, 1. IV. 1.
Outlines of Indian Philosophy. p. 266.
Nyayasara. pp. 39-41.;
cf. N. Su. Bhasya..
I. 1, 22.
Sastradipikd. p. 188.ss
7Sdstradipika, pp. 126-127. Manameyodaya. pp. 87 to 89.
views advocated b the Naiyatikas. The
Samkhya-Yoga represents the negative conception of liberation, but
consciousness has been conceived here as the essence of individual self
and not a separable quality as in the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the
Purva-Mimamsa. Mukti is not the manifestation of bliss, since the Purusa
is free from all attributes.1 When discrimination arises, Prakrti does
not forth-with free the Purusa, for, on account of the momentum of past
habits, its work continues for some little time.2 This is Jivanmukti.
Atdeth the jivanmukta attains disembodied liberation which is a state of
absolute and complete freedom from suffering.3 According tot he Advaita-Vedanta
of Samkara, Moksa consists in the identification of individual self with
the Brahman, the universal reality, the essence of the universe. it is
not merely the absence of miser, but a positive state of bliss. this
state is capable of being achieved even in this world while one is
having the body. We shall deal with the Buddhist conception of Nirvana
subsequently while dealing with the four noble truths of Buddha. Jainism
views the attainment of infinite knowledge, infinite bliss etc., as
necessary correlates of emancipation. The concept of Tirthmkara
illustrates he possibility attaining diveinsttus even when the physical
frame continues. we have already dwelt upon this conception in a
previous chapter. the state of Videhamukti is to attain Siddhahood.
AVIDA IN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS: Before
dwelling upon the process of ascending the sublime heights, we first
propose to reckon with the principle responsible for the ills and
maladies of the mundane career. Such a principle s staled Avid
recognised b all the stems of Indian philosophy except the materialists.
it keeps the self moving in the cycle of ebiths and eclipses the happy
aspects of life. though the function of Avidya has been unanimously
recognised as casting a veil over the true nature of things, yet the
nature has been diversely conceived in conformity with the metaphysical
position upheld by them. to being with the Nyaya school, Moha which is
not other than Mithajana is the sole cause of worldly career.4 it
engenders Raga (attachment) and Dvesa (aversion) which occasion the
threefold action of mind, body and speech.5 This Pravrtti (volitional
activity) entails merti (Dharma) and demerit
1 Samkhyapravacana Sutra. V. 74.
(vide RADHAKISHNAN, I.P. Vol. II. p. 313).
2 S.K. 67 (Trans. RADHAKRISHNAN,
I.P. Vol. II p. 313)
3 Ibid. 68. 4 N. Su.
Bhasya. IV. 1.3. 5 Ibid. IV. 1.6.
(Adharma) which accumulate in the self to
act as the condition for the creation of new body in the next birth out
of the material elements.1 This birth is accompanied with suffering.
Regarding the nature of Mighya-jnana Vatsyayana says: Delusion (moha)
consists in upholding the notself for the self. it is the erroneous
knowledge that 'I am the bounder its inference the self identifies
itself with the body, the sense organs, the mind the feelings and the
congintions.2 The vaisesika has bot developed nay independent theory of
nescience and follows the naya school of thought. according tot he
Purva-Mimasa, the performance of Nisiddh and kama Karmas and
non-performance of Nitya and Naimittika Karmas are the causes of
bodnage.3 in view of the Samkhya-Yoga the non-discrimination between
Purusa and Prakrti is the root cause of all our anguish and affections.
the confusion between the two is due to nescience (Avida) on account of
which one apprehends noneternal as eternal, impure as pure, sorrow as
pleasure, and non-soul as soul.4 According to the ogadarsana, Avida is a
Klesanad is the root of other four Klesas, namely, Asmita (egoism), Raga
(attachment), Dvesa (aversion) and Abinivesa (desire for life).5 To
identify falsely the Purusa and Budhi is Asmita (egoism),6 o to believe
Purusa as the doer and the enjoyer is egoism.7 Raga (attachment) is
indulgence in pleasure after the revival of the previous one.8 Devasa (
aversion) is anger in the previous pain.9 The apprehension of losing the
body and the objects of pleasure on account of death is Adhinivesa. 10
Thus Klesas perpetuate the world process and its sorrows and
sufferings. we ma point out her that these five Klesas correspond to the
five Viparasass (perversions) of the Samkhya Karika namely Avida-Tamal
Asmita-Mohoa, Raga-Mahamoha, Dvesa-Tamisra, Abhinivesa-Andhatamisra.11
According to Samkara, Avidya implies the super imposition of the objects
upon the self-illuminating subject and the superimposition of subject
upon the object, as 'I am this' and this is mine. "It is due to this
mutual superimposition of the Atman and the un-Atman that there arises
N. Su. Bhasya. III. 2.60.
N. Su. IV. 2.1.: N. Su. Bhasya.
IV. 2. 1. Introduction. p. 762-763.
RADHAKRISHNA, I. P. Vol. II.
Y. Su. II. 5, 24.
Ibid. II. 3, 4.
Y. Su. & Bhasya. II. 6.
Y. Su. and Bhoja Vrtii. II. 6.
Y. Su. II. 7.
Y. Su. & Bhasa. II. 8.
Y. Su. and Bhoja vrtti. II. 9.
S. K. 48.; Y. Su. & Bhasya. I.
the practical distinctions of ordinary and
vedic life, pertaining to knowledge and it s objects, prohibitions and
injunctions, as also pertaining thoMoksa."1 We postpone the treatment of
the Buddhistic conception of Avidya to a late set, while we shall deal
with the four noble truths of Buddha. here we may simply point out that
Avidya, acquiring to Buddhism, consists in reading suffering as
happiness, a series of states of self as an abiding self, momentariness
as permanence. in accordance with Jainism, the worldly existence is
conditioned b Mithyadarsana, Mithyajnana, and Mithacaritra. these three
are responsible for the perpetuation of the worldly career. mithadarsana
is wrong attitude or belief, Mithyajnana is wrong knowledge and
Mithyacaritra is wrong conduct. it is not Mithyajnana that is at the
root of Sasmara but Mithyadarsana, i.e., non-belief in the eternal
principle of self as difffern4et from the body etc. Due to this
non-belief knowledge and conduct become unauthentic i.e., in the absence
of spiritual orientation, even profound knowledge and disciplined
conduct are incapable of leading to superb heights. in the systems
referred to, Avidya is snonmous with perverted knowledge, hence the
latter exclusively causes mundane existence. but this is unacceptable to
the Jaina in view of his aforementioned threefold conditions of bondage.
ATTAINMNT OF LIBERATION:
We now turn to deal with the process of attainment of Moksa, the
veritable end of life. all the stems are one in assuming right knowledge
as an authentic condition for the accomplishment of liberation, though
the Purva-Mimamsa adds the performance of certain Karmas ( actions) to
it. with the Nyaya-Vaisesika the true knowledge of the sixteen
Padarthas2 is indispensable for emancipation. this may be reduced to the
recognition of the fact that by the employment of the means of knowledge
of the self as distinguished form the noon-self precedes the state
devoid of pleasures and pain. inteh Samkha-Yoga it is the discrimination
Vedanta Explained. Vol. I. p.
The sixteen padarthas are:-
(1) Pramana (Prataksa, Anumana, Upamana, and
Sabda), (2) Prameya (Atmasarira, Indiria, Artha, Buddhi, Manas, Pravrtti,
Dosa, pretyabhava, phala Duhkha, and Apavarga), (3) Samsaa, (4) Praojana
(5) Drtanta (6) Siddhanta (7) Avayava (8) Tarka (9) Nirnaya (10(\) Vada
(11) jalpa (12) Vitanda (13) hetvabhasa (14) Chala (15) jati (16)
Nigrahasthana. ?See N. Su. I. 1. 1.; N. su. I. 1. 3.; N. Su. I. 1. 9.
Purusa and the actions of Prakrti that leads
one to salvatin.1 Teh Samkhya Karachi as "the Knowledge that "I am not"
(naham) leads to release.2 This is simply the expression of the result
of discrimination. The School of Purva-Mimamsa lays stress on the
abstention from Kamya (optional) and the Pratisiddha (Prohibited )
Karmas and the performance of Nitya (obligatory) and Naimittika
(conditional) Karmas to avoid becoming entangled in the miseries of
Samsara. but the Prabhadkara school of Mimamsa explicitly gives
acceptance to the need for Jnana as a means of relase.3 According to
Samkara, deliverance is effected b true knowledge of one's own identity
with the Brahman. the self is really brahman, but owing to Avidya it is
oblivious of its innate glory and magnificence which can berestored by
veritable knowledge of the fact that 'I am Brahman' in the view of the
Buddhist the knowledge of the four noble truths propounded by Buddha is
essential for achieving Nirvana.4 The right knowledge we have referred
to should not be confounded with theoretical knowledge. it should be
elevated to the level of intuition by resorting to a certain process
called oga. the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Vedanta prescribed the
threefold5 way for securing intuitive knowledge name, 1) Scriptural
study and the guidance of a competent Guru (sravana), 2) reflection on
what has been read and auhg to attain firm conviction of truth (manana),
3) meditation upon the real nature of self (nididhasana). The nature of
truth realised is different in the two systems. in addition to this the
Naya-Vaisesika6 refers to the eight-fold path enjoined by the Samkhya-Yoga
to know the truth. the Purva-Mimamsa also endorsee theis.7 The Advaita
Vedanta prescribes four pre-requisite8 conditions of Brahma-JHnana,
namely, 1) the discrimination between what is abiding and what is not
abiding, 2) Nonattachemnt to the mundane and extra-mundane objects of
pleasure and pain, 3) Possession of tranquility, restraint, dispassion,
endurance, alertness and faith, 4) the desire for final liberation. in
the words of Dr. Date, "the spark o Caitana in man cannot be kindled
into the flame of spiritual life and felt to be continuos with Brahmanic
Y. Su. & Bhasya & Bhoja Vrtti.
II. 25, 26.
S. K. 64. (Trans. vide
Radhakrishnan I. pp. 309 Vol. II.)
Prakarnana Panjika. p.
157. 4 ani-III. 61-6.
N. Su. IV. 2. 38.; 47 to
49. 6 N. Su. IV. 2. 46.
Prakarana panjika. pp. 154 to
Vedanta Explained, Vol. I. p.
unless sincer3e moral efforts and emotional
meditations are resorted to".1 Devotion in Samkara, as has been pointed
out by Dr. Date, in the newly published volume of he first time in the
history of Vedantic interpretations, refers to the living mastic "Who
has himself realised the brahman and who, therefore, can be called a
concrete, personified, saguna incarnation or Avatara of brahman."2 To
compare the above systems with the vies adduced by the jina, it is not
right knowledge alone that is responsible for emancipating the self form
wooly existence as such, but right belief and right conduct should also
be added to the cause of Moksa. Jinism as that the other systems also
recoginisse that just after the dawn of enlightenment the sould does not
renounce the body on account of the persistence of Prarabdha Karmas.3
hence a separate effort is re3quisite to dispel them and that effort is
Caritra in the from of two types of Sukla Dhyana. thus in addition to
right knowledge and right belief, right conduct should also be admitted
the direct means to salivation. in view of this the recognition of
Vidyanandi that the existence of enlightened personages in the world
will be inexplicable if right knowledge alone is regarded as the cause
of emancipation is justifiable.4 We ma point out here that b Dr. Date's
interpretation of Devotion, Samkaa's vie has come very close to Jainism,
though not metaphysically yet spiritual. Jainism subscribes to the view
of craya Bhakti which is devotion to a living Guru. the Bhavaphauda
tells us that the Atman should be meditated upon after knowing it from
the Guru.5 The Dravyasamgraha points out that meditation should be
conducted not he syllables imparted by the Guru.6 We need not go into
the details to the ethics of Nyaya-Yaisesika, Vedanta, purva-Mimamsa,
inasmuch as, in the first place, they have not developed an independent
the of 4ethics, and secondly, they remained dependent on the Upanisads,
the Gita and the Yoga system for ethical process. the ethics of the
former two have already been dealt with. we shall now dwell upon the
eight-fold path of Yoga and the four noble truths of Buddha, since they
are closely comparable with the Jaina Acura.
EIGHT-FOLD PATH OF YOGA: To begin
with the Yoga, the term Yoga does not sign if and sort of conjunction or
union of the self with the other reality like God or the Absolute, but
implies the arrest and
1 Vedanta Explained, Vol. II. p.
535. 2. Ibid. Vol. II. p. 524.
3. T. Slv. p.
66. 4 T. Slv. p. 72.
5. Bhava Pa.
64. 6 Drava. 49.
negation of mental modifications,1 the
practical discrimination between the Purusa and prakrti,2 and the
attainment of, and establishment in, the original nature of Purusa.3
These three implications are not separate from one another. one leads to
the other without being incompatible. another meaning scribed to the
word Yoga by patanjali is indicative of the process to achieve the above
ideal.4 The equivalent expression in Jainism for the term "Yoga" into he
sense of the highest state is Suddhopayoga, Samadhi and Dhana, where in
the conceptual ter4ansformatins of the mind occurring in the form of
auspicious and inauspicious deliberations are stopped and negated into
heir entirely on account of the fat that he self has established itself
exclusively in its own intrinsic purity and excellence. The practical
discipline to be adopted for this highest ascent is staled Criteria (conduct)as
compared with the other meaning attributed to 'Yoga' as has been shown
above. The actualisation of such a state is not a bed of roses, as ma
perhaps be conceived, but necessities an arduous and persistent effort
not he part of the Sadhaka. the most general and fundamental discipline
required to ascended the sublime heights consists in developing
de4tachment ( vairagya) and in adhering to incessant practice (abhasa).5
Teh former comprises the spirit of denial from indulging in the
attractions of the world or the pleasures of the heaven;6 the latter
signifies the endeavor to proceed on the logic path for curbing the
unstable nature of find and that too for a long time without any break.7
Vairaga is negative in character, while Abhyasa is positive. the former
includes wholesle turning form the objects of the transitory world,
whereas the latter induces the self to pursue the yogic path. the twelve
reflections (anupreksas)8 enunciated by the Jaina Acaryas are potent
enough to engender the spirit of detachment from the sordid ways for the
world and to give impetus for the constant application of one's won
energies to higher life. Thus Vairagya and Abhyasa summarise the whole
Yogic movement. patanjali enjoins eight-fold means of Yogic process, the
constant and single minded devotedness to which bears the fuit in the
form of emancipation after the filth of nescience is wiped out.9 The are
1) yama, 2) Niyama, 3) Asana, 4) Pranaama, 5) pratyahara, 6) Dharana, 7)
Dhyanai and 8) Samadhi.10.
1 Y. Su. I. 2. 2 Ibid. II.
25, 26. 3 Ibid. I. 3.; IV. 34.
4 Y. Su. & Vrtti-II. 1. 5 Y.
Su. I. 12. 6 . Su. Bhoja Vrtti. I. 15.
7 . Su. I. 13, 14. 8 T. Su. IX.
7. 9 Y. Su. Bhasya & Vrtti. II. 28.
10 Y. Su. II. 28.
1) Yama is of five kinds.1 (a)
Ahimsa (non-injuy) (b) Satya (truthfulness) (c) Asteya (non-stealing)
(d) Brahmacara (celibacy) (e) Aparigraha (non-acquisition). The
pronouncement of patanjali that these yamas may bear the credit of
Mahavratas2 when they transcend the limitations of kind, space, time,
and purpose indicate the possibility of the limited or partial Vratas.
besides, we may derive by implication that Patanjali is inn favour of
ascetic life, inasmuch as the life of the householder inevitably
presents certain stumbling blocks in the was of observing Mahavratas.
hence the life of asceticism constitutes an indispensable discipline of
the yogic process. the Vasa-Bhasya pronounces Ahimsa to be at the root
of both Yama and Niyama and further tells us that Yama and Niyama are
pursued to observe Ahimsa in its pure and unadulterated form.3 These
Mahavratas are in perfect agreement with he Mahavratas4 prescribed for a
Jaina monk along with Ahimsa as the basis5 which we have already dealt
with. the Anuvratas are for the householder. it is not possible to guess
the find of Patanjali regarding the limited character of vows from his
Sutras, but Vyasi seems to have included the killing of animals etc.,
for some purpose or the other under partial vows, which spirit is quite
repugnant to Jainism. 6 Jainism observes that the householder should
refrain form the himsa of mobile beings.7
2) Niama. It is also of five
kinds8 (a) Sauca (purit). (b) Samtosa (contentment) (c) Tapa
(austerities), (d) Svadhyaya (scriptural study) (e) is varapranidhana (
deveotion to God). The sadhaka who has purged his mind of sins
cultivates the above mentioned positive virtues. The Jaina Acaryas
prescribe a number of virtues to be assimilated by the aspirant, namely,
forbearance, modesty, straightforwardness, puri from greed, truth,
self-estuarine, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment, and celibac.9
Svadhyaa has been included in internal austerity, while devotion, in
Stuti and Vandana. We have already explained the number of practices
observed by a saint, hence they need no reiteration. the statement of
patanjali10 that when the aspirant finds himself under the sway of
sinful Houghton he should throw them aside by reflecting on their evil
consequences in order to regain firmness in the virtues path, may be
compared with the pronouncement of the Tattvarthansutra11 that for
1 Y. Su. II. 30. 2 Ibid. II.
31. 3 Y. Su. & Bhasya. II. 30.
4 Ca. Pa. 30, 31.; Acara. II. 15.
5 Sarvartha. VII. 1.
6 Y. Su. & Bhasya. II. 31. 7 Ca. Pa.
24. 8. Y. Su. II. 32.
9 Ta. Su. IX. 6. 10
Y. Su. II. 33, 34. 11 Ta. Su. VII. 9.
the proper maintenance of the vows one
should reflect on the afflictions that ma befall here and hereafter as a
result of not observing them properly or violating them.
3) Asana and 4) Pranayama. Steady
and comfortable posture is Asana.1 Rhythmical and Regulated breathing is
Pranayama.2 The importance of posture has also been recognised in
Jainism. the Mulacara tells us that the saint engaged in study and
meditation is not subjected to sleep and passes his night in some caves
after having seated himself in the postures of padmasana, or Virasana
and the like.3 The karttikeyanupreksa and the jnanarnava prescribe
decoration postures to practise medittion.4 We have already dealt with
these. Pranayama has not found favour with Jainism. this recognition may
be corroborated by the enunciation of Subhacandra that Pranayama acts as
a barricade to the saint aspiring to emancipation, on account of the
acquisition of supernormal powers by it,5 though he ecognises its
importance for the development of concentration.6
5) Pratyahara. It implies the
withdrawal of the senses from their natural objects of attractions.7
this may be compared with the control of five senses as one of the
Mulagunas of the Jaina monk8
these five constitute the moral
and the intellectual preparation of the saints who move higher on the
spiritual path. the external and internal distractions a this stage lose
all their potency to seduce the aspirant. nevertheless, certain
obstaclesmay intervene and imperil his advancement. the are: 1) Vyadhi
(sickness)�disturbance of physical equilibrium, 2) Styana (languor)� the
lack of mental disposition for work, 3) Samsaya (Indecision)�thought
debating between the two sides of a problem, 4) pramada
(heedlessness)�the lack of reflection on the means of samadhi, 5) Alasya
(Indolence)�inertia of mind and body owing to heaviness, 6) Avirati
(sensuality)�the desire aroused when sensory objects possess the kind,
7) Bhranti darsana (false, invalid notion)�false knowledge, 8)
Alabdhabhumikatva (inability to see reality because of psychomental
mobility), 9) anavasthititva (Instability which hampers the stability of
mind, in spite of achieving Yoga Bhumi).9 This
1 Y. Su. II. 46. 2 Ibid. II.
49. 50. 3 Mula. 794, 795.
4 Kartti. 355; Jnana. XXVIII. 10 5 Jnana.
XXX. 6, 11.
6 Ibid. XXIX. 1. 7 Y. Su. II.
54, 55.. 8. Mula. 16.
9 Y. Su. & Bhasya. I. 30. (Trans. partly
from 'Yoga, Immortality and Freedom' by Micrcea Eliade. p. 381.)
concept of obstacles may be compared with
the twenty two Parishes in Jainism but the details do not correspond to
each other. the cultivation of friendship with the prosperous,
compassion towards the unhappy, commendation for the meritorious and
indifference towards the vicious have been revcoginsed as aids to mental
purification.1 The Tattvarthasutra also prescribes universal friendship
with the living beings in general, commendation for the virtuous,
compassion for the distressed, and indifference towards the immodest, in
order to facilitate the proper observance of the vows.2
6) Dharana, 7) Dhyana and 8)
Samadhi. These are the "three stages of one and the same process of
concentration on an object."3 "the are so much alike that the Yogin who
attempts one of them (Dharana) cannot easily remain in it and sometimes
finds himself quite against his will slipping over into Dhana or
Samadhi. it is for this reason that these last three yogic exercise have
a common name�Samyama."4 Dharana is fixation of mind on a particular
object.5 Dhyana implies the continuos flow of thought on that object.6
When Dhyana becomes free from the distinctions of subject, object and
the process of meditation we have Samadhi.7 this Samadhi admits of
two-fold classification, Samprajnata and Asamprajnata, or Sabija and
Nirbija or Slambana and Niralambana. Jainism does to distinguish between
Dhana and Samadhi rather it included these under Sukla Dhana and
Asamprajnata Samadhi, with the consummation of Ekatva Vitarka type of
Sukla Dhyana. here The soul, according to janism, attains omniscience;
this is embodied liberation. the disembodied liberation is arrived at by
the last two types of Sukla Dhyana, Suksmakria Propitiate and
In spite of these certain
resemblance's, there are fundamental differences without mystical was
adopted by the Jaina monk. yoga system has not recognised the
impressiveness of mystical conversion, probably confuse amoral with
mystical conversation, the impotence of initiation by a Guru, and the
necessity of seeking his guidance at every step, the possibility of fall
from certain heights, i.e., dark-nights of the soul, the
1 Y. Su. & Bhasya. I. 33.
2 Ta Su. VII. 11. 3 Yoga of he Saints. p. 87.
4 Y. Su. III. 4 (Trans. vide Yoga, Immortality and Freedom. p. 70). 5 Y.
Su. III. 1. 6 Ibid. III. 2. 7 Y. Su. &
significance of Pratikramana, and
pratyakhyana. All these factors are of enormous impotence for mystical
FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS OF BUDDHA : We
now proceed to early Buddhism. the attitude of Buddha towards life may
be judged b the statement; "One who indulges in theoretical speculation
on the soul and the world while he is writhing in pain, behaves like the
foolish man with a poisonous own plunged into his flank, whiling away
time on idle speculation regarding the oaring, the maker and the thrower
of the arrow, instead of trying to pull it out immediately. "1 hence Dr.
RADHAKRISHNAN rightly remarks: "We find in the early teaching of
Buddhism three marked characteristics, an ethical earnestness, an
absence of an theological tendency and an aversion to metaphysical
speculation2 his promulgation of the four noble3 truths which concerns
suffering (duhkha) and its cause (duhkha-samudaya), its removal (duhkha-nirodha)
and the way to remove it (duhkhanirodha-marga) sums up his entire
ethical outlook." out of the seven Tattvas in jainism the five Tattvas,
which are designated as Asrava, banddha, Samvara, Nirjara and Moksa may
be compared with these four noble truths proclaimed by Buddha. Bandanna
Tattva corresponds to suffering; Asrava to its origin; Moksa answers to
its removal, and Samovar and Nirjara, to the way to remove suffering.
The firs noble truth is concerned
with the experience of universal suffering. Birth, old age, disease,
death, bewailing, association with the unpleasant, an craving that is
unsatisfied, separation from the pleasant all are painful and fraught
with misery. in short, the five aggregates�Rupa, Vijnana, Vedana, Samjna
and Samsakara-are painful.4 According to jainism karmic bondage am be
equated with suffering.
Buddh'as Second noble truth, the
cause of suffering may be explained taking recourse to his doctrine of
dependent origination which signifies that the existence of everything
is conditional. the existence of suffering (jara-marana) is on account
of birth (jati) which is due to the will-to-be born (bhava) which is
gain de to clinging (upadhana) which again is due to craving (trsna)
which aging is due to feeling or sense experience (vedana), which again
is due to sense-object-contact (sparsa), which again is due to the
six-organs-of-conniption (sadayatana) which is
1 Majjhima-Nikaa-Sutta, 63, (WARREN. p. 120.
vide An Introduction to Indian Philosoph.)
2 Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. p. 358.
3. Ani. III. 61. 6.; D. Ni. XXII. 4.5.
4. D. Ni. XXII. 4. 5.
due to name and form (ndma
rupa), which is due to
which is due to
and which are lastly due
to ignorance (avidya).
Thus the root of the whole
world process is beginnings Avidya. "This process of origination is
beginnings and Avidya (ignorance) and Trsna (craving) are the parents of
this process. Trsna (craving) is the mother, and Avidya (ignorance) is
the father.", "One under the sway of Avidya mistakes the
impermanent for the permanent because of one's delusion about truth."2
says "To be ignorant of the true nature of "I" and of the
four noble truths" constitutes Avidya.3 According to Jainism,
Samparayika Asrava which is due to Mithyadarsana (wrong belief)
Mithyajnana (wrong knowledge) and Mithyacaritra (wrong conduct) is at
the root of the world-process.
Third noble truth is concerned with the cessation of suffering or the
attainment of Nirvana. With the elimination of the cause, the effect
must pass away. The word Nirvana literally implies `blowing out' or
cooling. The former suggests annihilation, while the latter, only the
dying out of hot passion. The recognition of the fact that Buddha got
enlightenment and that he preached for the upliftment of humanity goes
to prove that Nirvana cannot be extinction. It is simply the destruction
of passions. The reason for the uncertainty of the nature of Nirvana in
early Buddhism is that the answer to the question was not regarded as
ethically important.4 "Buddha's silence might just mean that
the state of liberation cannot be described in terms of ordinary
experience".5 When not inclined to commit himself to any
definite view on the subject Buddha used to say (e.g. in the
that Nirvana connoted
nether existence nor non-existence separately nor did it mean both or
neither of them at once. It was indescribable in language."6
"But being opposed to annihilations, he taught also in negative terms,
that Nirvana was putting an end to the ills of life and that it was
equivalent to escape from a world enveloped in the flame of desire,
i.e., the extinction of all desires of attachment, aversion and delu�
Lankavatara Sutra p. 138. (vide
Studies in Jaina Philosophy. p. 127).
Sntra-$asya. p. 35.
(vide Tatia. Op.
Cit. p. 127.)
p. val. I. p. 416. 4
Potthapada Sutta. IX. 3.
Article "the teaching of Buddha by speech and
silence" Hibbert Journal April, 1934 (vide DUTTA
&, CXNTTEXJEE An
Introduction to Indian Philosophy. p. 128.)
History of Philosophy:
Eastern and Western p. 166.
not only negative but positive also.
"It is a ,state of serenity, equanimity and passionless self-possession.
It cannot be described in.
terms of ordinary experiences; the best way of understanding it in the
light of our imperfect experience is to think of it as a relief from all
painful experience from which we suffer."2 The later Buddhist teacher
Nagasena tried to convey to, the Greek king (Milinda) the idea
of the blissful character of Nirvana
with 'a series of metaphors.3 According to Jainism, Moksa is the-
attainment of infinite knowledge, infinite bliss,
infinite power, etc. Jainism
definitely describes the nature of Moksa without
ambiguity as the cessation of all
mundane misery and the
positive bliss. There is thus little difference between the 3aina and
the Buddhist views: The Yogin of Brahmins, the Tirtham�kara of Jainism,
and the Arhat of Buddhism, all these sail in the same boat. In spite of
all these resemblance's the denial of self in Buddhism is the major
difference that remains between Jainism and Buddhism.
The Fourth noble truth is concerned with the way to remove
has been prescribed by Buddha
namely, 1) Right view
(sam3aditihi), 2) Right resolve
Right Who (sammavaca), 4)
Right -conduct (samrruzkammanta), 5) Right livelihood (samma-ajiva), 6)
Right effort (sarnmavayama), 7)' Right mindfulness (sammasati), 8) Right
concentration (sammasamadhi). The Right view consists in the acquisition
of the knowledge of four noble truths The , Jaina conduct also commences
from the cultivation of right belief or
right attitude but the content
differs. 2) Right resolve embraces renuncia�tion of attachment or
ill-feeling towards others and of committing any injury to them.6
3) Right speech is the
relinquishment of falsehood, backbiting, harsh-language, and frivolous
talk7 4) Right conduct con. silts in
stealing and sensual gratification.8 5) Right livelihood implies the
earning by honest means.8 6) Right effort signifies four sorts of
endeavor: (a) not to allow fresh evils, (b) to strive to efface existing
evils,, (c) to make effort to develop new good ideas, (d) to
adhere to the maintenance and the development of existing good ideas or
virtues. l o Right mindfulness implies the constant remembrance or
contemplation of the nature of body, mind, harmful mental states like
His. of Phil.: E: and IY. p. 167. 2
Introduction to Indian Philosophy.
p. 128. 3
to Indian Philosophy. p. 128.) 4
D: Ni..XXII. 5. Trans. Introduction
to Indian Philosophy, pp. 129
D. Ni. KXII:
Ibid. 10 Ibid.
malice, indolence of
mind and body, agitation of mind and body, and sensation of pleasure and
pain. This helps the aspirant to remain detached from all the objects of
the world and to avoid bondage to the mundane existence. 8) Right
concentration: Four stages of concentration have been recognised. In the
first stage, the aspirant having detached himself from lust and from
evil dispositions, concentrates on reasoning and investigation and
experiences joy and peace born of detachment. In the second stage he
suppresses all reasoning and investigation and abides in a State of joy
and ease born of concentration. In the third stage, he renounces the joy
and peace born of concentration and abides in the consciousness of the
bliss of equanimity. In the fourth stage he enters into a State of
pure self-possession and equanimity without pain and without ease. This
is a stage of absolute cessation of all suffering. Besides all these,
the Brahniajdla Sutta and Samannaphala Sutta give a number of
virtues to be practised by saints. All these may be included under 1)
Ahimsa 2) non-stealing; 3) continence; 4) truthfulness with a11 its
deaths of avoiding back-biting, harsh speech, useless gossip, and of
speaking sweet, faultless, useful, precise and benevolent words;
5) taking meals once a day before noon; 6) abstinence from gold
and silver, uncooked corn, cattle, women, servants, decorated bedding,
and the like; 7) non�decoration of body; 8) non-engagement in useless
fables of kings, thieves etc.; 9) non-indulgence in the mundane science
of palmistry, astrology, astronomy, and miraculous feats. 10) complete
control of five senses; 11) carefulness in walking, eating evacuating
bowels, etc.; 12) content�ment in clothing and begging. Adoring himself
with these characteristics the saint sits for meditation in a secluded
place. These virtues are practi�cally similar to those pursued by Jaina
monks. Three stages of right concentration may be compared with the two
types of Sukla Dhyana, namely, Prthaktva-Vitarka and Ekatva-Vitarka. The
consummation of the second Sukla
Dhyana may be compared
with the fourth stage of concentration. This is Arhat state or
embodied state of liberation. The disembodied state is the result of the
other two types of gukla Dhyana.
The Jaina and the Western Types of Ethical
SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER: In the
previous chapter we have, in the first place, dwelt upon the ethical
views as propounded by the Rg-veda
and the Brahmanas, and evaluated the Upanisadic contents in
the light of the Vedic hymns. Secondly, we have dealt with the nature of
the moral ideal as advocated by the Gita and the Upanisads. Thirdly, we
have pointed out the nature of the obstacle preventing a man from
realising the ideal, and have dealt with the distinctions between the
converted and perverted souls, and the importance of Guru for impart�ing
spiritual wisdom. Fourthly, after dealing with the incentives to
spiritual life we have explained the importance of faith, knowledge, and
conduct for surmounting the obstacles to the moral and the spiritual
betterment. Fifthly, the negative side of conduct consisting in sweeping
away sins and passions, in subduing the senses, in restraining the mind;
and the positive aspect comprising the cultivation of virtues along with
devotion and meditation, have been dealt with. Sixthly, the
characteristics of the ideal sage have been expounded. Seventhly, the
nature of the ethical ideal according to the important schools of Indian
philosophy, the nature of the causes responsible for the ills and
maladies of the worldly existence, and the process of the attainment of
the mystical end have been explained. And lastly, we have dwelt upon the
eightfold path of Yoga and the four noble truths of Buddha.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ETHICAL SPECULATION IN THE
WEST: Before the appearance of the Sophists, the Greek philosophers
engaged them�selves in cosmological enquiries. The pre-sophistic
philosophy merely encountered ontological problems. The Sophists who
flourished in the fifth century 13.e.
diverted their attention towards human conduct. Thereby they
shifted the interest from the nature to man. This made the Sophistic
teaching exclusively humanistic. But this sort of turn was not abrupt.
"The naive and fragmentary utterances of sage precepts for conduct, in
which nascent moral reflection everywhere first manifests itself, supply
a noteworthy element of Greek literature in the "gnomic" poetry of the
7th and 6th centuries before Christ; their importance in the development
of Greek civilization is strikingly characterised by the traditional
enumera�tion of the "seven sages" of the 6th century; and their
influence on ethical thought is
sufficiently shown in the references that Plato and Aristotle make to
the definitions and max-,ms of poets and sages."' But the transition
from such utterances to moral philosophy is quite as late as the
origination of the Sophistic speculation. Thus the Sophists may be
regarded as the pioneers in ethical science. The ethical specula�tion of
the Jainas can be easily traced to a divine personality of the 23rd
prophet, Parsvanatha, who is believed to have lived in the 8th century
though the Jaina tradition claims a remote antiquity for the
com�mencement of its philosophy.
THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROACH:
The normative science of ethics
investigates the ultimate end of human conduct or what is known as the
Summum Bonum or the supreme good of human life. In the words of Prof.
Aristotelian view, the primary subject of ethical investigation is all
that is included under the notion of what is ultimately good or
desirable for man; all that is reasonably chosen or sought by him, not
as a means to some ulterior end, but for itself."2 Thus
ethics is required to be distinguished from positive sciences, inas�much
as it does not describe but evaluates. It estimates human conduct in
terms of rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness and the like. The
term conduct is another name for voluntary and habitual actions. It
signifies deliberate actions. These deliberate actions presuppose
persons performing them in accordance with some end in view. The actions
may be right or wrong, the persons may be virtuous or vicious and lastly
the end may be good or bad. "Moral virtue may be defined generally as
the habitual tendency to pursue, always and with conscious�ness, the
best attainable ends."; Again, the performance of deliberate
actions entails, either directly or indirectly or in the both ways, the
satisfaction of one or more human interests. But the science of ethics
might lose all significance, if the mere existence of such interests in
human nature would yield warrant for their gratification. At the outset,
it may appear that ethical inquiry is unnecessary and frivolous, but
this view must needs be abandoned in view of the following
considerations. 4 First, the satisfaction of all interests of
the individual is impossible. Hence preference must be given to some
interests by keeping in view some principle of ethical selection.
Secondly, the transgression of a
~ Outlines of the
History of Ethics, p. 12.
Outlines of the
History of Ethics, pp. 1-2.
Ethics, p. 18.
Ethics, pp. 5-6.
certain limit in case of some interests not
only proves to be subversive of their own satisfaction but also hampers
the gratification of other interests. For example, too much indulgence
in bodily appetites leads to bodily and mental ill-health and thereby
interferes with other interests also. Thirdly, the interests of the
different members of a society may be incompatible with one another;
hence this necessitates the application of some ethical principle to
arrive at practical harmony. The first two causes
to lime light the need for an Individual ethics, and the third, for the
Social ethics. The problems that present themselves before us are
therefore: 1) the problem of the ethical Summum Bonum and 2) the problem
Since the dawn of
ethical consciousness in the West, diverse approaches have. been made in
the field of moral investigation. We shall confine our attention however
to the solutions given by the Sophists, Socrates, the Socratic schools,
Plato, Aristotle, Utilitarian, and Kant;� and then we shall compare
their views with the Jaina view.