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First Steps To
Jainism (Part-2)
SANCHETI ASOO LAL
BHANDARI MANAK MAL
Appendix F: Anekanta (Part II)
The Nyaya School :
In the early Nyaya literature also we see
discussions which are representative of the anekanta way of thinking.
Nagarjuna's criticism of the Nyaya categories of pramana and prameya provoked
answers from the author of the Nyayadarsana, and also Vatsyayana, the author
of the Nyayabhasya, which take resort to the non-absolutist method for
refuting the Madhyamika philosopher's attactks. Nagarjuna's argument that the
concepts of pramana and prameya, being interdependent, cannot establish
themselves, is countered by pointing out that there is no logical
inconsistency in viewing the same entity both as pramana and prameya. The
Nyayadarsana, II. 1.16, cites the example of a measure (tula) which is usually
employed to measure other things, but on occasion it is itself measured by
another article of a standard weight. So there is nothing absurd if the same
object is conceived as both pramana and prameya. Vatsyayana, in this
connection, gives a very lucid exposition of the nomenclature of pramana,
prameya, pramata and pramiti. The atman (self, soul ) is called a prameya
because of its being an object of knowledge, but it is also a pramata because
of its being the subject exercising the function of knowing; the intellect qua
the instrument of commotion is a pramana, (while as an object of cognition it
is a prameya) and it is simply a pramiti when it is exercising none of the
functions of 'knowing' or 'being known' (atma tavad upalabdhivisaysayatvat
prameya paripathitah, uplabdhau svatantryat pramata; buddhir
upalabdhisadhanatvat pramanam, upalabdhivisayatvat prameyam; ubhayabhavat tu
pramitih). The expression vibhajya vacaniyah is also found in the bhasya on
II. 1.19 There is thus unambiguously a trend of Nyaya thought, which takes the
school a great way towards the non-absolutist approach of the Jainas. It is
interesting to note in this connection that Udayana, in his Atmatattvaviveka
(pp. 530-1 Bibliotheca Indica Calcutta, 1939), imagines a simpleton who sees,
for the first time in his life, a tusker at the gate of a royal palace and
conjectures; Is it a mass of darkness eating white radish, or a piece of cloud
pouring out white cranes and roaring, or the proverbial benign friend waiting
at the royal gate, or the shadow of what is lying down on the ground, and
counters his conjectures by arguments which are equally fanciful; another
simpleton makes appearance at this point and persuades him of the futility of
all thought about the nature of things. Udayana identifies the Buddhist
absolutists with these simpletons and rejects their speculations as pure
imaginations unworthy of respectable treatment. One should neither go astray
in imagination and wishful thinking, nor give up in despair all attempts at
discovering the full truth from whatever partial glimpses of it one may be
able to get. The Jaina philosopher is in perfect agreement with such trends of
thought as are conductive to the advancement of knowledge and revelation of
truth, and fully supports the realistic approach of Udayana to the problem of
reality.
Umasvati, Siddhasena
Divakara and Mallvadin, Jinabhadra and Kundakunda
We have been till now discussing the stages
of evolution of the doctrine of anekanta in the Agamas and its parallels in
the literature and schools contemporaneous with them. Now we have arrived at
the transition period when the Jaina thinkers were establishing contacts with
their counterparts in the alien systems of thought and composing treatises in
the Sanskrit language which was then the only powerful medium of communication
between the intelligent. The Prakrit was also of course, along with the
Apabhramsa, an important medium. But its influence was gradually waning,
although Siddhasena Divakara's Sanmati and the works of Kundakunda and
Jinabhadra, written in Prakrit in those days were monumental treatises of
abiding value and profound interest.
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Umasvati :
Among Jaina authors of the period of transition, Umasvati stands first and
foremost. His Tattvarthadhigamasutra with Bhasya is a compendium of the
Agamas, which leaves nothing of philosophical importance out of
consideration. Its comprehensive thoroughness can be compared with that of
the Buddhist Abhidharmakosa (with Bhasya) of Vasubandhu. In addition to
giving a summary of the traditional lore, Umasvati gives a critical shape to
the anekantavada through his exposition of the nayas, niksepas and the
nature of the sat (a real), and dravya (substance). He also introduces the
elements of saptabhangi in his own way which is reminiscent of the same in
the Bhagavati Sutra mentioned above. Umasvati is not much concerned with the
non-Jaina views. He raises the question whether the nayas are the proponents
of alien philosophies or independent upholders of opposition, inspired by
diverse opinions, and answers that they are only different estimates
(literally, concepts derived from different angles of vision) of the object
known (Bhasya, I.35 : kim ete tantrantariya vadina ahosvit svatantra eva
codakapaksagrahino matibhedena vipradhavita iti. Atrocyate, naite
tantrantariya napi svatantra matibhedena vipradhavitah, jneyasya tv arthasya'
dhyavasayantarany etani). It is also asserted in this connection that there
is no contradiction between them, just as there is none between different
cognition�s of the same object by different instruments of knowledge, such
as perception, inference, comparison and the words of a reliable person (yatha
va partyaksanumanopamanaptavacanaih pramanaireko' rthah pramiyate
svavisayaniyamat, na ca ta vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan nayavada iti).
This is followed by an elaborate description of the nayas and their
relationship with the epistemological system of early Jainism. Umasvati's
definition of the sat (a real) as consisting of origination, cessation and
continuity (V. 29 : utpada-vyayadhrauvya-yuktam sat) gives the fundamentals
of anekantavada in a nutshell. The dravya (substance) is defined as `what is
possessed of qualities and modes' (V. 37 : guna-paryayavad dravyam),
indicating the relation of identity-cum- difference between the substance
and the modes (including qualities). The nitya (permanent) is defined as
`what does not lapse from being and would not do so at any time' (Bhasya,
I.30 : yet sato bhavan na vyeti na vyesyati tan nityam iti). All these
concepts are brought by Umasvati (Bhasya, I 31) under four heads -
dravyastika, matrkapadastika, utpannastika and paryayastika which appear to
stand respectively for the view points of substance, categories of
substance, the immediate present, and the past-cum-future modes. From the
first view point, negation does not exist (asannama nasty eva dravyastikasya),
because it takes not of only what is existent and positive in character.
Negation appears with the classification of the substance into matrkapadas
(categories), and consequently here we get both affirmation and negation,
(sat and asat), as classification implies both affirmation (inclusion of
lower categories under a higher category) as well as negation (mutual
exclusion of the categories). The utpannastika, being concerned with the
immediate present alone is also the negation of the past and the future and
as such gives rise to the duality of affirmation and negation. Similarly,
the paryayastika, which is the viewpoint of the past and the future, is the
negation of the present, and as such gives rise to the same duality of
affirmation and negation. In the last three cases we also get a third mode
which cannot be described either as sat or asat (na vacyam sad iti, asad iti
va). This is the third bhanga called `indescribable'. Umasvati concludes
this discussion with the statement-desadesena vikalpayitavyam iti- which may
imply the remaining four bangas of the saptabhangi.
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Siddhasena Divakara :
The application of the anekanta principle to
ontological problems raised in the different school of philosophy was made,
most probably, for the first time by Siddhasena. This was done by means of
the nayas "Kapil's (Sankhya) philosophy", says he, "is a statement from the
dravyastika (substatial) standpoint, whereas the Buddha's is a variety of
pure paryayastika (modal) one Kanada composed his treatise from the
standpoint of both (these nayas) : nevertheless, that remained a false
doctrine, as the views propounded therein, each arrogating exclusive
validity to itself, are independent of each other. (Sanmati, III. 48-49). On
the varieties of nayas and their relation to philosophical views Siddhasena
says that the former are as many as there are ways of speech, and the later
as many as there are nayas (III. 47) :
javaiya vayanavaha tavaiya ceva homti nayavaya
javaiya nayavaya tavaiya ceva parasamaya.
His distinction between vyanjanaparyaya
and arthaparyaya also deserves notice. As soon as the substance is subjected
to division, the sphere of modes starts functioning (III.29). Such modes are
twofold-(1) vyanjana modes and artha modes. The former are expressible in
words, while the latter are not. Thus an object is called `man' so long as
it continues to be so, though undergoing change every moment. Here
`man-hood' is a vyanjanaparyaya which is expressible by the word `man' ,
while the changes that occur in him every moment are arthaparyayas which
cannot be expressed in words. An object thus is affable as well as ineffable
(saviyappanivviyappam, 1.35). In Sanmati, I.35-40 Siddhasena enumerates the
seven bhangas almost exactly in the fashion of the Bhagavati Sutra mentioned
above. The full credit of interpreting the Agamas for a new generation and
giving original material for fresh thinking goes to Siddhasena who acted as
a link between the orthodox past and the progressive future. This is indeed
the true function of the propounder of a faith according to Siddhasena
himself. "The person who acts as a logician", says he, "in the domain of
logic, and as a scripturist in the domain of scripture is a true protagonist
of his faith; a person acting otherwise is an impostor".
jo heuvayapakkhammi heuo agame ya agamio.
so sasamayaopannavao siddhamtavirahao anno..
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Mallavadin :
The Dvadasaranayacakra of Mallavadin is an
encyclopaedia of philosophy, where all schools of thought prevalent in those
days are critically examined one by one and superseded by their rivals, thus
making a complete circle with twelve spokes connecting the hub with the
twelve sections of the rim, each section representing particular doctrines
taken up for discussion. The doctrines discussed are linked to the
traditional seven nayas in a novel plan of the wheel of twelve nayas viz.
(1) vidhih, (2) vidhervidhih, (3) vidhervidhiniyamam, (4) vidherniyamah (5)
vidhiniyamam, (6) vidhervidhiniyamasya vidhih (7) vidhiniyamasya vidhinyamam,
(8) vidhiniyamasya niyamah (9) niyamah, (10) niyamasya vidhih, (11)
niyamasya vidhiniyamam, and (12) niyamasya niyamah. The book starts with the
common-sense popular view of things, represented by the first naya called
vidhi (vidhivrttis tavad yathalokagraham eva vastu, p. 11). How does it
concern us whether there is a cause, or an effect : who can make an end of
debate on such issues (pp. 34-35) ? Mallavadin here quotes Sanmati, I. 28,
in support of his contention. The epistemological position of Dignaga is
here criticised as going against the common-sense view of things. Vidhi
stands for `injunction' as in the Mimamsa school. It is only the injection
to do some thing that is valuable and also desirable (arthyo hi kriyaya
evopadesah, p. 45). The second naya called vidhi-vidhi stands for the
particulars in favour of the universal oneness. The absolutist doctrines are
consequently brought within the purview of this naya. The third naya
literally means affirmation-cum-negation of the positive entity. The Sankhya
doctrine of prakrti as subservient to purusa, and the doctrines of divine
creator and the created world represent this naya. The fourth naya, viz.,
vidher niyamah appears to indicate the restriction of absolute freedom of
both the purusa and the karman in the evolution of the worldly process. The
other nayas similarly bring within their purview the doctrines that were
prevalent in those days in order to evaluate their merits and demerits.
About a dozen and a half doctrines are thus discussed and refuted in the
treatise which brought for its author the encomium "anu Mallavadinam
tarkikah" (all logicians are inferior to Mallavadin) from Hemacandra, the
omniscient of the Kali age.
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Jinabhadra :
The activity of Mallavadin was further carried by
Jinabhadra who, in his Visesavasyaka-Bhasya, gave a critical account of the
nayas based on his deep and extensive learning in the Agamas. Here he brings
within purview the problems of the general and the particular, substance and
modes, word and meaning, ultimate truth and practical truth (niscaya-naya
and vyavahara-naya). His treatment of the problem of niksepa is thorough and
penetrating. An evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views is also made
by him in the section called ganadhara-vada and nihnavavada.
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Kundakunda :
A new trend of thought was developed by Kundakunda in his Samayasara,
although his Pancastikaya and Pravacanasara generally uphold the traditional
positions. His treatment of the problems of dravya, guna, paryaya, and also
utpada, vyaya, dhrauvya, is deep and critical. But in his Samayasara,
Kundakunda develops a new idea which appears influenced by Yogacara idealism
and also Vedantic absolutism. The soul is the cause of what is happening
within itself and has no essential relationship with what is happening in
the world outside. The reverse is also true. This cleavage between soul and
matter is explained through niscaya-naya and vyavahara-naya, the former
being the standpoint of truth, and the latter of untruth. The traditional
interpretation of vyavahara-naya as the popular or practical viewpoint and
of niscaya-naya as the factual or scientific standpoint is radically
changed. Scholars have designated this new meaning of the two nayas as the
`mystic pattern' as distinguished from the traditional interpretation which
they call the `non-mystic pattern'. The works of Kundakunda contain both
these patterns, but the `mystic pattern' is the predominant theme of the
Samayasara. In the philosophy of Kundakunda thus the concept of anekanta
acquires a new meaning in that a new vista is now opened up for the
development of the concept of avaktavya (the third bhanga of the saptabhangi)
into a mystic realisation of the nature of truth in its fullness.
These great thinkers have now paved the way
for the advent of the classical period which is the subject matter of the next
section.
The Classical Period :
Samantabhadra, Haribhadra, Akalanka, Vidyananda and Others
The transition period was followed by a
period of intense critical thinking when the Jaina logicians headed by
Akalanka, composed treatises which were of lasting value in the field of logic
and epistemology. Sarvarhasiddhi of Pujyapada Devanandi and the Aptamimamsa of
Samantabhadra provided a firm ontological base to these thinkers who were
responsible for the classical period. We here propose to give a brief account
of the doctrine of anekanta as treated by some of these authors.
a) Samantabhadra :
The Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra provides a
fertile ground for the doctrine of anekanta to flourish. The essence of
anekanta is envisaged as lying in the solution of the contradictory attributes
of features exhibited by an ontological doctrine, or an ethical principle, or
an epistemological theory. Each one of the two members of pairs of
contradictory attributes of features is critically judged with a view to
exposing the difficulties that beset the concept, and then a synthesis of the
two is offered. The Aptamimamsa opens with a vindication (verses 1-6) of the
possibility of the existence of the omniscient. In verse 8 it asserts that the
ethics of good and bad deeds and the existence of life hereafter cannot be
justified without accepting the principle of anekanta. The abolutistic
conception of an unchanging soul is repugnant to the possibility of moral
evolution heading to emancipation. The doctrine of pure affirmation (bhavaikanta)
denies negation and consequently fails to explain the fact of diversity which
is so glaring and patent ( verse 9). The doctrine of pure negation or nihilism
(abhavaikanta), on the other hand, will deprive the nihilist's arguments of
their validity (verse 12). The critics of syadvada cannot again accept
affirmation-cum-negation as the nature of the real in order to avoid these
difficulties, because that would be tantamount to the acceptance of the
doctrine of anekanta on their part. Nor is the position of absolute
inexpressibility' (avacyataikanta) a tenable hypothesis, because in that case
the proposition "the real is inexpressible" will be an illogical assertion on
account of the absolutist character of the inexpressibility (verse 13) :
virodhan nobhyaikatmyam
syadvada-nyaya-vidvisam
avacyataikante py uktir navacyam iti yujyate.
Our text (verses 14-16) then formulates a
correct ontological position by asserting that a real is definitely existent
from one viewpoint 'definitely non-existent' from another, 'definitely
existent-cum-non-existent' from a third, and also definitely inexpressible'
from a fourth viewpoint, though none of these viewpoints should be considered
as absolute and exclusive; one should accept a real as (i) 'existent
definitely' (sadeva) in the framework of its own substance, space, time and
modes, and also as (ii) 'non-existent definitely' (asadeva) in the framework
of alien substance, space, time and modes, because otherwise it would be
impossible to determine the nature of the real; it should moreover be accepted
as (ii) possessed of the dual nature of 'existence' and 'non-existence' in
succession, and also as (iv) `inexpressible' on account of the failure of the
linguistic device to express the pair of contradictory attributes
simultaneously; the remaining three (5-7) bhangas are obtained by combining
the fourth with the first three in their proper context. Here the dialectic of
sevenfold predication (saptabhangr) has been clearly defined by Samantabhadra
by assigning the fourth position to the attribute of `inexpressibility'
instead of the third assigned to it in the Bhagavati Sutra and also by
Sidhasena. The Aptamimamsa now explains the saptabhang of 'existence' and
'non-existence' (verse 17-20). 'Existence' is necessarily concomitant, in the
self same entity with its opposite viz. non-existence, being its adjunct (visesana
counterpart), even as homogeneity is necessarily concomitant with hetero-geneity
(intention to assert difference); similarly, 'non-existence' is necessarily
concomitant, in the selfsame entity, with its opposite (viz. existence); being
its adjunct (visesana, counterpart), even as heterogeneity is con-comitant
with homogeneity (intention to assert identity) :
astitvam
pratisedhyenavinabhavyekadharimni
visesanatvat sadharmyam yatha
bhedavivaksaya
nastitvam
pratisedhyenavinabhavyekadharmini.
viseanatvad vaidharmyam yatha
bhedavivaksaya
An entity is moreover of the nature of
positum as well as negatum (vidheya-pratisedhyatma), exactly as the same
attribute of the subject (minor term) of an inference may be a valid as well
as an invalid probans in accordance with the nature of the probandum to be
proved by it. This is the third bhanga of the Saptabhang of 'existence' and
'non-existence'. The remaining four bhangas are also to be understood in their
proper perspectives. Samantabhadra now explains the nature of a real in the
light of this anekanta dialectic. The real must be an entity which is not
determined by any exclusive property or any absolute character. Only that
which is undefined by a positive or a negative attribute exclusively is
capable of exercising the causal efficiency which is the sole criterion of
reality (verse 21 : evam vidhi-nisedhabhyam anavasthitam arthakrt). The
Buddist fluxist as well as the Vedantic monist are jointly criticised here as
upholding ontological views, which, being truncated and partial, fail to
explain the real in its comprehensives. Neither an absolutely static, nor a
radically dynamic object is capable of exercising the causal efficiency in
spite of all other conditions, external and internal, being fulfilled.
Samantabhadra (verse 22) applies the anekanta dialectic in constructing the
real as a totality of infinite number of attributes (dharmas), each of which
represents the whole entity relegating the others to the status of mere
attributes of that entity :
dharme dharme 'nya evartho dharmino'
nantadharminah
angtive 'nyatamantasya sesantanam tadangata.
He then gives a general instruction to his
readers, proficient in the application of the nayas to follow the same method
of saptabhang to discuss the problems of 'one and many', and the like, that
were prevalent in those days. In fact, he himself discusses the following
additional problems in the text under review : identity and differences,
permanence and flux, cause and effect, reason and scripture, free will and
determinism, idealism & realism, bondage & emancipation.
b) Haribhadra :
The Anekantajayapataka is an important
contribution of Haribhadra to the field of anekanta dialectic, which brings
within its purview the problems of existence and non-existence, permanence and
flux, universal and particular, and describable and indescribable. Among the
doctrines refuted in the treatise, ksanikavada and vijnanavada occupy a
prominent position. All these refutations are made strictly from the
standpoint of Jaina philosophy and sometimes they go to a depth hitherto
unreached by his predecessors. The comparative outlook of Haribhadra enabled
him to unfold the hidden potentialities of the anekanta principle and apply
them in the interest of a comprehensive view of the problems, epistemological
and ontological, that exercised the minds of those days.
c) Akalanka :
The Astasati (commentary on the Aptamimamsa)
of Akalanka provides a most penetrating insight into the niceties of the
doctrine of anekanta. His defence of the doctrine is unique and perhaps
unsurpassed by any predecessor or successor. He unfolds the thoughts of
Samantabhadra in a manner which is comparable to that of Dharmakirti in
respect of Dignaga. The ksanabhangavada of the Buddhists as well as their
vijnanavada are vehemently criticised by Akalanka. His contributions to the
field of Jaina logic and epistemology are most original and unique, and they
set up a norm for the posterity to follow and emulate.
d) Vidyananda :
The Astasahasri (the subcommentary on the
Astasati of Akalanka) of Vidyananda is perhaps the last word on the doctrine
of anekanta. His criticism of the non-Jaina schools is more realistic and
thorough. He brings a number of new topics and schools under the purview of
his refutation. Vidyananda's exposition of nays & niksepas in his
Tattvarthasloka-vartika throws new light on these subjects.
Among the successors of Vidyananda, who made
important contributions to the doctrine of anekanta, the following authors
occupy a position of importance : Prabhacandra, Abhayadeva, Vadideva and
Yasovijaya. The reader is referred to the accounts of the life and works of
these authors given elsewhere in this encyclopaedia.
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