For the above reason the
Siddhanta insists on the
employment of the word Syat
(somehow or from a particular point of view) before every judgment or
statement of fact, though in ordinary parlance and composition it is
generally dispensed with. There are three kinds of judgment, the
affirmative, the negative and the one, which gives expression to the idea
of indescribability. Of these, the first kind affirms and the second
denies the existence of a quality, property or thing, but the third
declares an object to be indescribable. A thing is said to be
indescribable when both existence and non-existence are to be attributed
to it at one and the same time. These three forms of judgment give rise to
seven possible modes of predication, which are set out below:
(somehow, i.e., from some particular point of view, a thing may be said to
(somehow the thing does not exist),
(affirmation of existence from one point of view and of non-existence from
(somehow the thing is indescribable),
(a combination of the first and the fourth forms of predication),
(a combination of the second and the fourth forms), and
(a combination of the first, second and fourth forms of judgment).
This sevenfold system of
predication is called the
(literally, the seven-branched), and stands in the same relation to
philosophy as grammar does to speech.
We shall now proceed to
describe the fallacies of the seven kinds of
(stand- points) enumerated above. These are also seven in number, that is
to say one for each Naya.
Taken in the same order as their corresponding
they may be described as follows:
(1) Naigamabhasa, the
fallacy of the
consists in making an actual division in thought between the general and
special properties of things, as for instance to speak of the existence
and consciousness of a soul as if they were two separate things.
occurs when we describe the general properties of a thing as constituting
it solely. For instance it is incorrect to maintain that a tree can be
constituted by the general qualities common to all trees, since an actual
tree will have to be a particular kind of tree, and not the idea of
tree-ness in general.
consists in making a wrong division of species.
arises when we deny the permanence of things altogether. Those
philosophers who hold that there is no "being" but only "becoming" in the
world have fallen into this kind of error.
occurs when we deal with words without regard to their number, gender,
tense, etc. For instance, to take the Hebrew Elohim, which is pluralistic
in form, as representing one individual Being would be an error of the
lies in treating apparently synonymous words, which possess nice
distinctions of meaning as if they all meant exactly the same thing. Pride
and conceit may be taken to be fairly good instances of words, which if
taken to mean exactly the same mental trait, would give rise to this
lies in asserting that the existence of a thing depends on its performance
of the particular function with reference to which alone it has been
described, as for instance to say that a devotee is non-existent because
he is no longer engaged in devotion.
The nature of the
and the Saptabhangi
system of predication having been shown, we now proceed to a general
consideration of the Tattvas.