Jain World
Sub-Categories of Passions

The doubt regarding the existence of the soul

Dont Despair: Remember Soul
The Second Ganadhara
The Third Ganadhara
The Fourth Ganadhara
  The Fifth Ganadhara
  The Sixth Ganadhara
  The Seventh Ganadhara
  The Eighth Ganadhara
  The Ninth Ganadhara
  The Tenth Ganadhara
  The Eleventh Ganadhara


Shri Amar Muni

Now let us review the first five view-points of the initial or the precedent thesis:

1) If you believe that 'the proof or the evidence of the existence of an object is relative (dependent); and then you say that 'there can l e no evidence for the existence of the object', this will be a contradiction. If you say "As per the opinion of only others this is relative", then you have thus accepted 'others', and the 'opinion of others', and they will be proved real and true, not void.

2) "The middle finger is long, the first one is short". In this manner, you first entertain the concepts of actual 'longness' and shortness', and then you say "the long and the short objects because of their mutual relativity are unreal", that is inconsistent.

3) Originally in every object, existence is not merely relative, because existence is in the form of 'Arthakriyakaritva'.

'Arthakriya' means the action of a substance being created. In other words it means the creation of an effect. Its 'karitva' means its causness, the causative power of a substance. In other words, the power of producing an effect. If long and short as well as similar objects produce effect in the shape of knowledge, they are real, because of their productive power. If they are absolutely unreal, they cannot bring about their knowledge and their cognizable effects.

4) The short finger is called the first finger in comparison with the middle finger, but not in comparison with a sky- flower that is void. Similarly, the first finger is short in comparison with the long finger but not in comparison with a sky-flower, a non-existent object. Similarly, in respect of the middle long finger, the first finger is short, but sky- flower is not called short. From this it is evident that the first finger and the middle finger are real.

5) Since in an object there are countless attributes, dharmas, natures, qualities, likewise in it there are also relative dharmas like shortness, longness etc., which are real, which are evident and which manifest themselves only when there are helping objects to manifest them. If shortness is not real and if this concept is based merely on relativity then why is there not in the middle long finger, shortness of its own and why is it not known to be so? Hence we shall have to say that in it there is no shortness in respect to its own self, and if that is so, how did we get that concept? In other words shortness is a real entity there, but it is manifested only by comparison with a longer object only (on relativity with another longer object) but not with its own self.

6) If you say that the concepts of shortness and longness arise in respect of each other the question arises--"Do the concepts of both arise simultaneously or gradually"? If you say that they arise simultaneously then the mutual dependence or relativity is lost! 'Dependence or relativity' means the thing on which it depends or the thing with which it is related. It must appear previously in a concept. Here since the point is in regard to the concepts arising at the same time, where is the question of dependance of relativity? If you say that both concepts emerge gradually, it means that either of these arising concepts of 'shortness' or 'longness' will be considered as arising without dependence. From this it means that the concepts of shortness or longness are self-arising but not arising dependently. Even our experience is such that on the accumulation of all causes like sense-contact etc., the knowledge of objects like a pot etc., arise independently, and this knowledge has arisen without any dependence on other objects, and this is an established fact according to our experience. A child just at the time of its birth would acquire the first knowledge only thus without dependence. Therefore this theory that the realisation or knowledge is always relatively dependent is wrong. Otherwise if two things are not short and long and if they are equal how can there be the mutual expectation between such things just as there can be no mutual dependence between the two eyes.

7) Therefore say that in a substance there are two sorts of forms viz.,

Independent form, and dependent form. The existence, individuality, the realness, colour, taste etc., are independent forms, 'indepedent' in this sense that they are existing and knowable (cognizable) of their own accord, but not dependent upon others. Thus such independent forms of substance are self existing and self cognizable - comprehensive of their own accord. In other words to know these we have not to depend upon any relative. They are known themselves meaning without any relation to others. As for example, we know that the finger exists- it is real. In it there are various forms like existence, realness, pink colour, red colour, etc. We know each of these without depending upon any relative. We don't ask here 'The finger has existence and realness in what respect in whose relation?' No, nothing of the sort; existence means existence, redness means redness. The finger is existent of its own accord, the finger is reddish of its own accord. But if the curiosity arises to know is the finger short or long, then the question arises 'You are asking short or long in what respect, in whose relation?'

Here comes the second category of dependent form. 'Dependent' in this sense that to know shortness or longness we have to depend thus upon another relative aspect to be known. 'In whose relation this finger is asked whether to be short or long'. If the question is of the first finger, then we can say that it is short in relation with the second finger, which is long in respect of the first finger'. Thus the concept of the form of shortness in the first finger is dependent on the concept of the longness in the second finger and vice versa. Say shortness and longness to be known are mutually dependent. It means that they are not self- cognizable but are cognizable (comprehensive) only with respect to others. In other words for the knowledge of such forms like shortness and longness, we have to depend upon knowing the other relative aspect and its comparative form.

In this manner, in a substance the forms like shortness, longness etc., are dependant on their opponent relative aspect to be known, whereas the forms like existence, individuality, colour, etc., are independent forms irrespective of any relative aspect to be known.

Now, when there is no necessity for any relative aspect to be known in the case of such independent forms like existence etc., and as they are self cognizable (means known and dealt with independently) the theory that "because in this world everything being dependent is null and void" is repudiated. That means it is proved baseless. In other words the substances are real and also their forms like existence and colour etc., are real, but not void, not illusive like a dream's objects. Even the dependent forms like shortness- longness are also real; but only forms cognizability depends upon other relative aspects. In short, the theory of all void is itself void, known without any despendence but yet on account of our desire for knowing and for outward comparison for the other dependent qualities, we try to know them by means of comparison as short and long. In this manner, if an object has in itself such independent qualities as reality, colour, taste etc., then knowledge, in the absence of comparison is not void. Therefore the theory of "All being void" is baseless.

8) If the existence of anything like shortness etc., is not independent viz. not self-established then the existence of the short object also will not be independent, but dependent on others. Now don't say let it be dependent, because where there is no concept of comparison with a long finger, at least there remains the reality that 'this is a finger', and the concept and existence of longness also will be lost inasmuch as there is the absence of a comparison with a short finger. In other words, there is a total loss of all conceptual significations and all the things possessing relative qualities which you believe as void'! But that is not seen. In that time also, which is devoid of any comparison, there do exist short and long objects as they were and are seen also necessarily. From this, independent existence of real objects is proved.

9) If all are unreal, then even the relativity of shortness and longness will be proved unreal. If so, how can this distinction be made? How can the dealing of short and long will prevail and how can they be authenticated?


The nature of things is such that they are dealt with as short and long relatively in relation with others, and you can say that 'then unreality being the same, why is the long not treated or dealt with as the short'. The reason is that this is the nature of the thing. A question is improper ragarding nature.


Very good, then, from this idea of swabhava of the thing, which means the nature of ownself not of the other, it is deduced that the thing is 'sat' namely real, by accepting separately the ownself and the other. In consequence it amounts to a refutation of sarvasunyata viz. all-voidness, absolute nihilism.

10) The process of being one thing relative to the other comprises four items:

(a) the individual person knowing this process of relativity;

(b) the action of being relative;

(c) the thing to which the object is related; and

(d) the relative object.

Now if all these are unreal, then nothing of these remain individually special, just as 'this is a person, but not an object'. If each of these possesses- the specialities of being a person, or of being an object, or of being the process of relativity etc., in other words, if the differentiated speciality is attached to each one, it means that they are real, because in 'all unreal', this differentiated speciality cannot be attached to anyone. Consequently the theory of absolute nihilism is refuted, broken to pieces so to say.


In this world, objects are of our kinds:

1) (indian writing pg 92 angie) swatch siddha created of its own accord, without a creator, such as the special creations like clouds that arise without a creator.

2) (Indian writing pg 92 angie) --paratah siddha (created by a creator) just as the pots etc., created by a potter etc.

3) (indian writing pg 92 angie) wbhayatah siddha (created by both one's ownself and the sons etc., born by the couple and by one's own karmas.

4) (indian writing pg92 an gie) nitya siddha (ever existent), like the sky etc. This siddha (accomplished) is from the point of view of creation. From the point of view of knowledge, 'The pot' is self cognizable. It means, it is knowledge without the knowledge of any relatives. Whereas shortness and longness are evident dependently (viz. knowable only on knowing its relative concept.) This differentiation is not consistent with the nihilistic theory (sarva-sunyata) self cognizable self-comprehensive.

The Relationship between a Substance and its Existence:

1. First if you accept the existence of the pot, "The pot exists" but not as 'it does not exist', and thus after accepting the pot as existent then if you ask the question "what is the relationship between the pot and its existence", then by such question, non-existence or unreality of both is not proved; otherwise why does not such a question arise in repect of unreal "Donkey-horns"?

2. You say that a pot is unreal and non-existent. There also the similar question arises: what is the relation between the pot and non-existence?

(a) If a pot and non-existence are one and the same, in other words the non-existence is not different from the pot, then only the pot remains, only the pot is accepted, hut a separate entity like "Asatta" unrealness is not proved.

(b) If you say both of them are different, a separate entity of a thing like non-existence is not sound, hence it is baseless.

3. If you are a nihilist, when you know and speak of nihilism are your words and knowledge of speaking and knowing of your nihilism different from you? Or are they not different from you? If you say that they are not different (like the tree and the mango which are not different then you being not void, not unreal like horse-horn the existence of knowledge and utterance also is proved to be true. If you say that they are different from you, then you being different from this knowledge and utterance, you yourself are proved ignorant and dumb, and as such how can you prove about your nihilism?

4. Regarding the pot and its existence, the existence is the dharma quality-attribute or nature of the pot. The nature of the pot is not different from its container pot, and is different from clothes etc. Just as the existence of pot is a different entity, so the existences of clothes etc., are different entities. Then where is the problem of oneness of all these? Every existence of every object is different. Therefore, "Whatever exists is a pot", this rule is wrong. If it is asked "What is here? Pot or non-pot?" then you will have to say "Pot". What is a pot? It is existent. Just as what is here? Mango or something else. In answer we will have to say "Mango". What is a mango? Is it a tree or something else. Then it will be said it is a tree. So just like mangoes, separate and mutually different existence are established.

1. Of the four alternatives, regarding the utpanna (created) there is a particular decided one fact.

First of all you place four alternatives for a thing taking birth in this way; a thing takes birth in which position; the thing itself being created; uncreated; Both created-- uncreated or in the process of creation?

Now we would ask, are these four alternatives 'created' on or uncreated ones? As regards the first point of 'created one' the alternative is meaningless, because how can we ask about a created one if a created one takes birth? If you apply alternatives in the case of the 'non-created one why don't you place such alternative in respect of the non-existent ones like sky-flowers which are also uncreated?

2. In respect of objects like a pot, the question is, if the are not at all created at any time, why is it so that they are seen only after the aggregation of the causes like a potter etc., ,and not before that? In the same manner afterwards when broken by means of a stick etc., why are they not seen? If they are always uncreated like sky-flowers, the unseen should always remain unseen.

3. If the knowledge and statements of voidness are absolutely uncreated, who gave the expression to voidness?

4. The real condition is that a pot being newly created--, pot taking birth from one point of view is partially created. From another point of view it is partially uncreated. From a third, it is both partially created and partially uncreated. From the fourth point of view, it is partially in the process of being created, and takes birth. This can be clarified thus:

(a) The pot before birth is in the form of clay, and the clay is already 'utpanna' a created one. So pot also in its form can be called 'created' (Utpanna). (b)The pot before birth is not of pot-shape. So it can be called 'Uncreated' (Anutpanna) as per that shape. (c)By these two aspects of clay and shape a pot can be called 'created and uncreated' (Ubhay). (d) The pot just in the process of creation can be called being created (Utpadyamana).

In respect of these four alternatives, it can be said that the pot takes birth, already created, uncreated, created and uncreated both, and being in the process of creation.

Here the Jain theory of Anekantvad--sapekshvad, in other words the theory of relativity is to be taken into consideration. According to anekantvad, clay form and particular shape are different and not different from the pot; different in some respect and not different from another respect. Here the four alternatives are taken upon the 'not different' point., e.g. pot is clay itself, hence clay being created already, the pot also is considered as created.

The pot newly taking birth first as partially created while it is in the form of clay; and takes birth in a special form first as an uncreated one because the pot is abhinna, not different from clay and its special form (round shape). Thinking of existence it is existent first in the form of clay; it means the pot exists. So long as it has no special form, then it is not existent in that form with relationship to form and shape both 'ubhay' i.e., "created--uncreated"; and from the point of view of the present time, it is while in the process of creation created also otherwise the process would be fruitless, if considered as not created.