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Up-pravartak
Shri Amar Muni |
Now let us review the first five view-points of the
initial or the precedent thesis:
1) If you believe that 'the proof or the evidence of
the existence of an object is relative (dependent); and then you say that
'there can l e no evidence for the existence of the object', this will be
a contradiction. If you say "As per the opinion of only others this is
relative", then you have thus accepted 'others', and the 'opinion of
others', and they will be proved real and true, not void.
2) "The middle finger is long, the first one is short".
In this manner, you first entertain the concepts of actual 'longness' and
shortness', and then you say "the long and the short objects because of
their mutual relativity are unreal", that is inconsistent.
3) Originally in every object, existence is not merely
relative, because existence is in the form of 'Arthakriyakaritva'.
'Arthakriya' means the action of a substance being
created. In other words it means the creation of an effect. Its 'karitva'
means its causness, the causative power of a substance. In other words,
the power of producing an effect. If long and short as well as similar
objects produce effect in the shape of knowledge, they are real, because
of their productive power. If they are absolutely unreal, they cannot
bring about their knowledge and their cognizable effects.
4) The short finger is called the first finger in
comparison with the middle finger, but not in comparison with a sky-
flower that is void. Similarly, the first finger is short in comparison
with the long finger but not in comparison with a sky-flower, a
non-existent object. Similarly, in respect of the middle long finger, the
first finger is short, but sky- flower is not called short. From this it
is evident that the first finger and the middle finger are real.
5) Since in an object there are countless attributes,
dharmas, natures, qualities, likewise in it there are also relative
dharmas like shortness, longness etc., which are real, which are evident
and which manifest themselves only when there are helping objects to
manifest them. If shortness is not real and if this concept is based
merely on relativity then why is there not in the middle long finger,
shortness of its own and why is it not known to be so? Hence we shall have
to say that in it there is no shortness in respect to its own self, and if
that is so, how did we get that concept? In other words shortness is a
real entity there, but it is manifested only by comparison with a longer
object only (on relativity with another longer object) but not with its
own self.
6) If you say that the concepts of shortness and
longness arise in respect of each other the question arises--"Do the
concepts of both arise simultaneously or gradually"? If you say that they
arise simultaneously then the mutual dependence or relativity is lost!
'Dependence or relativity' means the thing on which it depends or the
thing with which it is related. It must appear previously in a concept.
Here since the point is in regard to the concepts arising at the same
time, where is the question of dependance of relativity? If you say that
both concepts emerge gradually, it means that either of these arising
concepts of 'shortness' or 'longness' will be considered as arising
without dependence. From this it means that the concepts of shortness or
longness are self-arising but not arising dependently. Even our experience
is such that on the accumulation of all causes like sense-contact etc.,
the knowledge of objects like a pot etc., arise independently, and this
knowledge has arisen without any dependence on other objects, and this is
an established fact according to our experience. A child just at the time
of its birth would acquire the first knowledge only thus without
dependence. Therefore this theory that the realisation or knowledge is
always relatively dependent is wrong. Otherwise if two things are not
short and long and if they are equal how can there be the mutual
expectation between such things just as there can be no mutual dependence
between the two eyes.
7) Therefore say that in a substance there are two
sorts of forms viz.,
Independent form, and dependent form. The existence,
individuality, the realness, colour, taste etc., are independent forms, 'indepedent'
in this sense that they are existing and knowable (cognizable) of their
own accord, but not dependent upon others. Thus such independent forms of
substance are self existing and self cognizable - comprehensive of their
own accord. In other words to know these we have not to depend upon any
relative. They are known themselves meaning without any relation to
others. As for example, we know that the finger exists- it is real. In it
there are various forms like existence, realness, pink colour, red colour,
etc. We know each of these without depending upon any relative. We don't
ask here 'The finger has existence and realness in what respect in whose
relation?' No, nothing of the sort; existence means existence, redness
means redness. The finger is existent of its own accord, the finger is
reddish of its own accord. But if the curiosity arises to know is the
finger short or long, then the question arises 'You are asking short or
long in what respect, in whose relation?'
Here comes the second category of dependent form.
'Dependent' in this sense that to know shortness or longness we have to
depend thus upon another relative aspect to be known. 'In whose relation
this finger is asked whether to be short or long'. If the question is of
the first finger, then we can say that it is short in relation with the
second finger, which is long in respect of the first finger'. Thus the
concept of the form of shortness in the first finger is dependent on the
concept of the longness in the second finger and vice versa. Say shortness
and longness to be known are mutually dependent. It means that they are
not self- cognizable but are cognizable (comprehensive) only with respect
to others. In other words for the knowledge of such forms like shortness
and longness, we have to depend upon knowing the other relative aspect and
its comparative form.
In this manner, in a substance the forms like
shortness, longness etc., are dependant on their opponent relative aspect
to be known, whereas the forms like existence, individuality, colour,
etc., are independent forms irrespective of any relative aspect to be
known.
Now, when there is no necessity for any relative aspect
to be known in the case of such independent forms like existence etc., and
as they are self cognizable (means known and dealt with independently) the
theory that "because in this world everything being dependent is null and
void" is repudiated. That means it is proved baseless. In other words the
substances are real and also their forms like existence and colour etc.,
are real, but not void, not illusive like a dream's objects. Even the
dependent forms like shortness- longness are also real; but only forms
cognizability depends upon other relative aspects. In short, the theory of
all void is itself void, known without any despendence but yet on account
of our desire for knowing and for outward comparison for the other
dependent qualities, we try to know them by means of comparison as short
and long. In this manner, if an object has in itself such independent
qualities as reality, colour, taste etc., then knowledge, in the absence
of comparison is not void. Therefore the theory of "All being void" is
baseless.
8) If the existence of anything like shortness etc., is
not independent viz. not self-established then the existence of the short
object also will not be independent, but dependent on others. Now don't
say let it be dependent, because where there is no concept of comparison
with a long finger, at least there remains the reality that 'this is a
finger', and the concept and existence of longness also will be lost
inasmuch as there is the absence of a comparison with a short finger. In
other words, there is a total loss of all conceptual significations and
all the things possessing relative qualities which you believe as void'!
But that is not seen. In that time also, which is devoid of any
comparison, there do exist short and long objects as they were and are
seen also necessarily. From this, independent existence of real objects is
proved.
9) If all are unreal, then even the relativity of
shortness and longness will be proved unreal. If so, how can this
distinction be made? How can the dealing of short and long will prevail
and how can they be authenticated?
Question:
The nature of things is such that they are dealt with
as short and long relatively in relation with others, and you can say that
'then unreality being the same, why is the long not treated or dealt with
as the short'. The reason is that this is the nature of the thing. A
question is improper ragarding nature.
Answer.
Very good, then, from this idea of swabhava of the
thing, which means the nature of ownself not of the other, it is deduced
that the thing is 'sat' namely real, by accepting separately the ownself
and the other. In consequence it amounts to a refutation of sarvasunyata
viz. all-voidness, absolute nihilism.
10) The process of being one thing relative to the
other comprises four items:
(a) the individual person knowing this process of
relativity;
(b) the action of being relative;
(c) the thing to which the object is related; and
(d) the relative object.
Now if all these are unreal, then nothing of these
remain individually special, just as 'this is a person, but not an
object'. If each of these possesses- the specialities of being a person,
or of being an object, or of being the process of relativity etc., in
other words, if the differentiated speciality is attached to each one, it
means that they are real, because in 'all unreal', this differentiated
speciality cannot be attached to anyone. Consequently the theory of
absolute nihilism is refuted, broken to pieces so to say.
Summary:
In this world, objects are of our kinds:
1) (indian writing pg 92 angie) swatch siddha created
of its own accord, without a creator, such as the special creations like
clouds that arise without a creator.
2) (Indian writing pg 92 angie) --paratah siddha
(created by a creator) just as the pots etc., created by a potter etc.
3) (indian writing pg 92 angie) wbhayatah siddha
(created by both one's ownself and the sons etc., born by the couple and
by one's own karmas.
4) (indian writing pg92 an gie) nitya siddha (ever
existent), like the sky etc. This siddha (accomplished) is from the point
of view of creation. From the point of view of knowledge, 'The pot' is
self cognizable. It means, it is knowledge without the knowledge of any
relatives. Whereas shortness and longness are evident dependently (viz.
knowable only on knowing its relative concept.) This differentiation is
not consistent with the nihilistic theory (sarva-sunyata) self cognizable
self-comprehensive.
The Relationship between a Substance and its
Existence:
1. First if you accept the existence of the pot, "The
pot exists" but not as 'it does not exist', and thus after accepting the
pot as existent then if you ask the question "what is the relationship
between the pot and its existence", then by such question, non-existence
or unreality of both is not proved; otherwise why does not such a question
arise in repect of unreal "Donkey-horns"?
2. You say that a pot is unreal and non-existent. There
also the similar question arises: what is the relation between the pot and
non-existence?
(a) If a pot and non-existence are one and the same,
in other words the non-existence is not different from the pot, then
only the pot remains, only the pot is accepted, hut a separate entity
like "Asatta" unrealness is not proved.
(b) If you say both of them are different, a separate
entity of a thing like non-existence is not sound, hence it is baseless.
3. If you are a nihilist, when you know and speak of
nihilism are your words and knowledge of speaking and knowing of your
nihilism different from you? Or are they not different from you? If you
say that they are not different (like the tree and the mango which are not
different then you being not void, not unreal like horse-horn the
existence of knowledge and utterance also is proved to be true. If you say
that they are different from you, then you being different from this
knowledge and utterance, you yourself are proved ignorant and dumb, and as
such how can you prove about your nihilism?
4. Regarding the pot and its existence, the existence
is the dharma quality-attribute or nature of the pot. The nature of the
pot is not different from its container pot, and is different from clothes
etc. Just as the existence of pot is a different entity, so the existences
of clothes etc., are different entities. Then where is the problem of
oneness of all these? Every existence of every object is different.
Therefore, "Whatever exists is a pot", this rule is wrong. If it is asked
"What is here? Pot or non-pot?" then you will have to say "Pot". What is a
pot? It is existent. Just as what is here? Mango or something else. In
answer we will have to say "Mango". What is a mango? Is it a tree or
something else. Then it will be said it is a tree. So just like mangoes,
separate and mutually different existence are established.
1. Of the four alternatives, regarding the utpanna
(created) there is a particular decided one fact.
First of all you place four alternatives for a thing
taking birth in this way; a thing takes birth in which position; the thing
itself being created; uncreated; Both created-- uncreated or in the
process of creation?
Now we would ask, are these four alternatives 'created'
on or uncreated ones? As regards the first point of 'created one' the
alternative is meaningless, because how can we ask about a created one if
a created one takes birth? If you apply alternatives in the case of the
'non-created one why don't you place such alternative in respect of the
non-existent ones like sky-flowers which are also uncreated?
2. In respect of objects like a pot, the question is,
if the are not at all created at any time, why is it so that they are seen
only after the aggregation of the causes like a potter etc., ,and not
before that? In the same manner afterwards when broken by means of a stick
etc., why are they not seen? If they are always uncreated like
sky-flowers, the unseen should always remain unseen.
3. If the knowledge and statements of voidness are
absolutely uncreated, who gave the expression to voidness?
4. The real condition is that a pot being newly
created--, pot taking birth from one point of view is partially created.
From another point of view it is partially uncreated. From a third, it is
both partially created and partially uncreated. From the fourth point of
view, it is partially in the process of being created, and takes birth.
This can be clarified thus:
(a) The pot before birth is in the form of clay, and
the clay is already 'utpanna' a created one. So pot also in its form can
be called 'created' (Utpanna). (b)The pot before birth is not of
pot-shape. So it can be called 'Uncreated' (Anutpanna) as per that shape.
(c)By these two aspects of clay and shape a pot can be called 'created and
uncreated' (Ubhay). (d) The pot just in the process of creation can be
called being created (Utpadyamana).
In respect of these four alternatives, it can be said
that the pot takes birth, already created, uncreated, created and
uncreated both, and being in the process of creation.
Here the Jain theory of Anekantvad--sapekshvad, in
other words the theory of relativity is to be taken into consideration.
According to anekantvad, clay form and particular shape are different and
not different from the pot; different in some respect and not different
from another respect. Here the four alternatives are taken upon the 'not
different' point., e.g. pot is clay itself, hence clay being created
already, the pot also is considered as created.
The pot newly taking birth first as partially created
while it is in the form of clay; and takes birth in a special form first
as an uncreated one because the pot is abhinna, not different from clay
and its special form (round shape). Thinking of existence it is existent
first in the form of clay; it means the pot exists. So long as it has no
special form, then it is not existent in that form with relationship to
form and shape both 'ubhay' i.e., "created--uncreated"; and from the point
of view of the present time, it is while in the process of creation
created also otherwise the process would be fruitless, if considered as
not created.
