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Book of Compassion




  Consideration of aspects or ways of knowing things

Man as he actually Is



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  First stage of development
  Second stage of development
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  Fourth stage of development Part-1
  Love (Daya)
  Soiling of the right attitude

Scale of living beings

  Means whereby the right attitude maybe obtained

Thirty-five rules of conduct


Fourth stage of development-part-2


Fifth stage of development


Twelve special rules of conduct


Sixth to fourteenth stages of development

  Synthesis or Recapitulatiion


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The above named examples of this substance (jiva), men, angles, etc. are examples of it in an impure state. In them the naturally invisible soul is compounded in a very subtle way with visible, tangible matter, and is in a sense thereby rendered visible, as water is colored by the addition of coloring matter. In its pure state the soul is invisible just as in itself water is colorless.

Thus is the existence of the first kind of substance, soul, established. And it is not one individual universal great big soul, but a mass of mutually exclusive, individual souls. We may now sub-divide substance not-alive.


All the following real things have the common characteristic of being unconscious. There are five kinds of substance not-alive, namely :

  1. Matter (pudgalstikaya)

  2. Space (akasastikaya)

  3. An ether, the fulcrum of motion (dharmastikaya)

  4. Another ether, the fulcrum of rest, in the sense of not moving (adharmastikaya)

  5. Time, which is in only a figurative sense a substance (kala)

In all these things there is no feeling or consciousness.


This is well understood in physics and chemistry. Here the real substance is the ultimate indivisible atom. Matter is made up of atoms, but the atom is not made up of other units. Atoms as at present understood by modern chemistry are far grosser than those contemplated by the Jains. Innumerable atoms as understood by the Jains make, when combined, the atom of modern chemistry, which is not an ultimate atom.


Ether, mentioned above, is no matter in the Jain view. Matter has various qualities and relations which these two ethers do not posses. It is only the Jain philosophy that believes in these two substances. They are the accompanying causes (hetu) respectively of the motion of moving things and beings, and of the stationary state of things and beings that are resting, in the sense of not moving. In each case it is the accompanying cause without which you cannot do.


Space is that which acts as a receptacle of all the other substances; and it is not a kind of thing that needs to be contained. It has not that nature of needing to be contained. It is a reality, but not matter (pudgala).


Time is not a collection of indivisible inseparable parts, as are the other five substances. Time is called a substance only as a matter of convenience. It is really the modification of a substance. It is the modification of a thing or being by which we know the anteriority or posteriority of it, the oldness or newsness. And it is a modification which is common to all the other substances. Time is really the duration of the states of substances.


Having mentioned the kinds of substance that there are in the universe, the next thing will be to give the definition of substance. The definition must be such that it shall include not only matter, visible and tangible to the senses, but also spiritual substance (soul) not cognizable by the senses.

Any substance can be looked upon in four different ways, and so it shall be defined from each of these four points of view. This is only possible in thought and not in actual fact.

  1. Substance is that in which the differences of time, space, and modifications inhere together. This definition is from the point of view of the permanent nature of the thing. In spite of the differences in the units making up the mass of any substance, still there is the unity in the mass. Conscious individuals, for instance, are not identical with each other, but still there is a mass, soulness; it is one substance.

  2. Substance is the subject of qualities (guna) and modifications (paryaya). This definition is from the point of view of the state of a thing that is, of its changing nature or modification. The quality stays with the substance, and is constant; the modifications succeed each other. A particular piece of clay always has form, but not always the same form. It is never without form; for is a constant quality; it may be now round, then square; these are modifications.

  3. Substance is that in which there are origination, destruction, and permanence. This definition is from the two previous points of view taken together. With the origination of a new mode of existence there was the destruction of the old mode of existence, while the substance has remained permanent. With the destruction of a house three is the origination or coming into existence of heap of debris, while the bricks, etc. are the same. The substance is neither destroyed nor originated, only the mode of existence; only the relations between the parts, in this case.

  4. Substance is that which performs a special action. This is from an ordinary point of view, and would hold good only of a special substance.

Substance has now been defined, and each definition is application not only to matter but also to spiritual substance or soul. The next thing to introduce is the natures of substance. What are its natures?


There are two kinds of natures found in all substance. Any real, concrete, existing thing or being, can be looked upon in a general way or in a particular way; that is to say, it has natures in common with other things (samanya svabhava), and at the same time it has natures peculiar to itself (vishesh svabhava). For instance, this book is matter, in common with all other material things; and at the same time it is a particular matter, namely, paper.

According to Jainism three is no such thing as matter (pudgala) or any substance (dravya) only in general; wherever there is matter (pudgala) it is matter (pudgala) of a particular kind, paper for instance, not stone; or wherever there is substance (dravya) it is substance (dravya) of a particular kind, matter (pudgala) for instance, not space (akasa), space is substance (dravya).

Of the general natures of substance, one is existence (astitva); another is knowableness (prameytva). This latter differentiates Jainism from Kant's philosophy: according to Jainism things are knowable.

The general natures are always everlasting; and are not analyzable. Other natures common to all substance are the fact of being in one sense permanent, un-created, and indestructible (nitya samanya svabhava); and the fact of being in another sense perishable (anitya samanya svabhava); gold may perish as a ring, but it is always something somewhere. Other common natures are the fact of being one or a unit, the fact of being many the fact of being separate, and the fact of being not separate. From the point of view of omniscience the general natures of a thing are infinite.

Of the particular natures of substance consciousness (cetana) is one, and belongs only to live substance (jiva). Another particular nature is the fact of having form, and is peculiar to matter (pudgal). Another is the fact of containing, which is peculiar to space (akasastikaya). From the point of view of omniscience the particular natures of a thing are, like the general natures, infinite.

Everything, then, has its natures, both those peculiar to itself, and those in common with other things. The next subject in connection with substance is the ways of knowing it, or the aspects it has (nayas). One of the functions of philosophy is to advance from the known to the unknown. The Jain procedure is as follows: Synstatis, analysis, synthesis.

Synstatis comes first: it is the state of mind prior to analysis; it is the definite cognition of a thing or idea as an isolated object; that condition of things to which analysis is to be applied. "This is what is really meant by unity, or identity, of the universe with the real which many philosophers proclaim."

Analysis comes next: resolving, separating, or differentiating the parts, elements, properties, or aspects of the object of cognition.

Synthesis comes last: it is the putting together of the first vague indefinite cognition with the subsequent analysis to form a relational unity of a variety of aspects. Thus the next subject, the consideration of aspects, is introduced.