This leads to the conclusion. But according to the modern Naiyayikas, liege or the middle term cannot be the operative cause of inference. It cannot lead to the conclusion except through the knowledge of vyapti. Hence, they say that the knowledge of vyapti should be taken as a special ground (karana), of inference. Vyapti does directly lead to the conclusion. It has for its function the synthetic view of the middle term as related to the major term, on the one hand, and of the minor term, on the other.      This is liriga paramarsa. In this, the middle term is considered thrice. Hence, it is maintained by the modern Naiyayikas that, while knowledge of the vyapti is a special cause of inference, linga paramarsa is the immediate cause of the conclusion. Some modern Naiyayikas, in fact, say that linga paramarsa is the operative cause of the conclusion.   Bradley�s analysis of inference presents a similar picture. The premises, or the data, and the process of inference consist in joining them into a whole by ideal construction. However, as Chatterjee points out, liriga paramarsa is not an essential condition of all inference although it may make an inference most cogent and convincing. In the case of inference for oneself, we do not require more than the major and the minor premise to arrive at the conclusion. There is a natural transition of thought from the premises to the conclusion.   In the case of inference for others, we have to state the identity of the middle term occurring in the two premises and exhibited in the third premise which relates the same middle term to the minor and major terms.

          Thus, it is generally agreed that inference is a mental process, and the validity of inference is based on psychological and logical grounds. The validity of inference depends on the knowledge of the universal relation between the major and the middle term. It is also based on the perception of the relation between the middle term and the minor. Perception of the minor term as related to the middle term, and the recollection of the universal relation between the major and the middle term, lead to the conclusion of the relation between the minor term and the major. This is the picture of the psychological ground of inference as presented by the Jainas and other Indian philosophers. VIcDougall showed that all deductive reasoning involves appreciative synthesis, although it is merely association. It is a process of �mediate apperception�. In fact, he says, all types of reasoning are processes of �mediate apperception�. They all make use of the �middle term�, and this use oi the middle term is the sole and essential feature of reasoning, in which it differs from other mental processes.

Structure of the Syllogism

 All systems of Indian philosophy agree in holding that the syllogism represents the typical form of expressing inference for others. However, logicians are not agreed as to the number of propositions constituted in a syllogism. Propositions are called avayavas. Some logicians say that there are ten propositions in a syllogism. For instance, according to the old Naiyayikas and also according to some Jaina logicians like Bhadrabhahu, a syllogism consists of ten propositions. But Vatsyayana states that all the ten members of syllogism are not logically necessary, although they may express the psychological process of inference. Logicians generally agree that a syllogism has five members. Gautama mentioned five members of the syllogism: (i) pratijnd the first statement, or an assertion of what is to be proved, for instance, �the hill is fiery�, is pratijiza. It sets forth the thesis of enquiry. The suggestion presented controls the process of inference from the very start; (ii) hetu, states the presence of the middle term. It gives the ground (sadhana), or the means of truth. For instance, it states dhurnat, �because of smoke�; (iii) udaharana states the universal relation between the major and the middle term and gives examples in support of its contention. It is a combination of the deductive and inductive processes. It may be compared to Aristotle�s major premise with the establishment of the universal proposition by means of examples. It presents an inductive process in stating examples. Dr. Seal writes that the third member of the syllogism combines and harmonizes Mill�s view of the major premise as a brief memorandum of like instances already observed with the Aristotelian view of it as universal proposition and a formal ground of induction; (iv) upanaya, the application of a universal proposition with its examples to the subject for the minor term of the inference. It may be called the minor premise of the syllogism. This may be affirmative or negative; (v) nigamana, the conclusion; it states, �therefore the hill is on fire�. What is provisionally presented in the pratijna is finally accepted in the conclusion. The Samkhya and Vaisesika systems accept the five membered syllogism. But the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins do not accept the five membered syllogism. According to them, a syllogism does not require more than three members to carry conviction. The two essential conditions of valid inference are the vyapti and the paksa dharmata, the presence of the middle term and the minor term. Therefore, they contend, the three propositions would be sufficient to give full force to the syllogistic inference. The three propositions may be the first three like pratijna, hetu and udaharana, or they may be the last three, like uddharana, upauaya and nigamana. The Buddhists go further than the Mimarnsakas and reduce the syllogism to two propositions only. This is analogous to the enthymeme in Western logic.

          Among the Jaina logicians, Bhadrabahu seems to be in favour of ten membered syllogisms, as we have mentioned earlier. In his Anasyaka Niryukti he describes the ten propositions constituting a syllogism. They are constituted by the pratijiid, hetu and their vibhakti and vipaksa. Similarly, nka;iksa and akanksa pratisedha are the constituent propositions in such a syllogism. Radhakrishnan says that Bhadrabahu here adopts the double method of proof. When an argument is put forward, for instance, to prove the nor.-eternity of sound, the counterproposition is asserted and denied by means of the statement. How ever, Bhadrabahu says that the number of propositions in a syllogism depends on the caliber of the person to whom it is addressed. Accordingly, it may be a ten-membered syllogism or a five-membered syllogism. Neither of these alternatives need be rejected. �We reject neither�. In the Pramanamimamsa, Hemacandra describes the nature of the five propositions constituting a syllogism. Bhadrabahu�s contention that the extent of the constituent propositions depends on the ability of the persons to whom it is addressed, has great psychological importance. It implies that the inference is limited by the capacity of the individual�s understanding of the argument presented. Siddhasena Divakara mentions five members in a syllogism. However, Das Gupta says that, regarding inference, the Jainas hold that it is not necessary to have five propositions in a syllogism. It is only the first two propositions that actually enter into the inferential process. (vide Prarneya kamalarrurrtanda, pp. 108-109.). When we make an inference, we do not proceed through the five propositions. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining a matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference.

Aristotle�s syllogism is a purely formal and deductive form of inference. We have seen that, in Indian thought, a distinction between deductive and inductive inference is not made. An inference in Indian thought is both formally and materially true. Aristotle�s syllogism begins with the major premise, and then it proceeds to apply the universal proposition to a particular case. According to the Jainas and also in all Indian thought, we first get the pratijna or the proposition to be proved. From the psychological point of view, we do not, in fact, proceed in Aristotle�s way. We do not begin with the universal proposition and then apply the universal proposition to a particular case, unless it is to be a deliberate form of reasoning formally presented. It would be psychologically correct to say that we first begin by stating what is to be proved, and then find reasons to prove it. Aristotle�s syllogism has more of a logical than a psychological status. W. E Johnson says that it is commonly supposed that premises are propositions first presented in thought, and that the transition from these to the thought of the conclusion is the last step in the process. �But, in fact, the reverse is usually the case, that is to say, we first entertain in thought the proposition that is technically called the conclusion and then proceed to seek for other propositions which would justify us in asserting it. A conclusion may, on the one hand, first present itself to us as potentially assertable, in which case the mental process of inference consists in transforming what was potentially assertable into a proposition actually asserted�.




          The nature of empirical experience was discussed in the last chapter. It was, by the earlier philosophers, called paroksa. Later philosophers, trying to adjust the original views with the prevailing concepts of pratyaksa and paroksa called it samvyavahara pratyaksa and made it arise from the contact of the sense organs and the manas. But the empirical way of knowing may, at the most, give us knowledge of the things of the world through the instrumentality of the sense organs and mind. As such, according to the Jainas, it is not a direct experience. It does not give us knowledge of reality. The Jainas believe that the soul is pure and perfect, and omniscient. But through the obscuration of the soul by the karma, the knowledge that the soul has is obscured and vitiated. Once the veil of karma is removed, the soul knows directly. That is pratyaksa. The knowledge acquired through the sense organs and the manas is knowledge obtained indirectly by means of external sources. The Jainas, therefore, said that such experience is paroksa, or what they later called samvyavahara pratyaksa We have, however, the possibility of getting direct and immediate experience without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the manas. The soul directly cognizes as it is freed from the veil of karma. This is pratyaksa. It may be called supernormal perception. Modern psychical research recognizes some such phenomenon and calls it extra-sensory perception.

          The problem of supernormal experience is not new. Indian philosophers were aware of supernormal perception. Many of them made a distinction between lacckika pratyaksa, empirical perception, and alaukika pratyak.sa, supernormal perception. All schools of Indian philosophy except the Carvakas and the Mimamsakas believe in supernormal perception. The Carvakas do not accept any other source of know ledge than sense perception. The Smarhsakas also deny the possibility of supernormal perception, because, according to them, the past, the future, the distant and the subtle can be known only by the injunctions of the Vedas. Supernormal perception is not governed by the general laws of perception. It transcends the categories of time, space and causality. The facts of empirical experience cannot explain the nature of supernormal perception. However, the Indian treatment of supernormal perception is more descriptive than explanatory. It is not based on experimental analysis. The Indian philosophers arrived at the conception of supernormal perception through speculation and the higher intuition: Very often, the whole theory of the gradation of supernormal perception is built on the basis of the transcendental experience of the seers. The Nyaya Vaisesika, the Samkhya Yoga, the Vedanta, the Buddhist and the Jaina schools of thought believe in supernormal perception, although they have given different descriptions of the experience. According to the Nyaya Vaisesika schools, perception is distinguished into laukika and alaukika. On the basis of the philosophy of the prakyti and the purusa, the Sarhkhya philosophers maintain that supernormal perception can cognize past and future objects, which are really existent as respectively sub-latent and potential. Patanjali thinks that ordinary mental functions can be arrested by constant practice of meditation and concentration. Samadhi is the consummation of the long and arduous process of inhibition of the bodily functions, concentration and meditation. The Vedantists accept Patanjali�s view regarding supernormal perception.

          In the West, modern scientists have begun to take more interest in such perception, although they call it paranormal, and not supernormal perception. It is also often called extra-sensory perception. The Society �for Psychical Research has carried out investigations on this problem. It is now recognized that cognition�s independent of the senses are possible. Such phenomena as clairvoyance, telepathy and the like have been recorded to prove the possibility of the occurrence of extra-sensory perception. But such psychical research is entirely modern.� It was founded in 1882. Myers and Henry Sidgwick were the nucleus of research in this field. William Barest, the physicist, was also a member of the Society. Many eminent philosophers and psychologists took keen interest in the investigation of extra-sensory perception. Prof. Bergen, C. D. Broad, L. P. Jacks, H. H. Price and R. H. Thouless are among the supporters of this type of investigation. However, interest in the study of extra-sensory perception may be said to be very old. The first recorded psychical research in the West was carried out under instructions from King Crocuses in the sixth century B.C. Wanting to test the powers of the Oracles, he sent embassies with instructions to ask what the King was doing at that time. But it was only in the 19th century that systematic study of this problem was started with the establishment of the Society for Psychical Research, The aim of the Society is to approach these various problems without prejudice or prepossession of any kind and in the spirit of exact and unimpassioned inquiry.

          Going back to the Indian philosophers of the past, we find that there has been a general recognition of the fact that normal perception through sense organs and mind is not all. In the Nyaya Philosophy, specially beginning with Gatigesa, the distinction between normal and supernormal perception has been recognized. However, in alaukika pratyaksa the objects are not actually present to the senses, but are conveyed to it through an extraordinary medium. There is, in this, a special sense object contact, alaukika sannikarsa. There are three types of supernormal perception , (i) Samantha laksanu, in which we perceive the generality in the individual members of a class, for instance, we perceive the universal poutiness in the perception of individual pots. (ii) Janna laksana, in which we perceive an object which is in contact with the senses, through previous knowledge of itself, for example, when we see a piece of sandalwood there is also a perception of fragrance. This may be compared to what Stout, Ward and Wundt call �complication�.  But it would be difficult to call such forms of perception supernormal.� In fact, some psychologists would say it is a kind of implicit inference, although Stout, Ward and Wundt would think of it as a form of perception. However, such perception does not involve anything supernormal. (iii) yogaja pratyaksa, intuitive apprehension of objects, past, future and distant, through some supernormal powers generated in the mind by spiritual concentration.  For those who have attained spiritual perfection such perception is constant and spontaneous. In the case of others who are yet to reach perfection, it requires concentration or dhyana, as a condition. Chatterjee says that we may mention, as cases in point, the theological ideas of eternity and omniscience or intuition in the philosophy of Spinoza and Schelling. Yogaja pratvaksa has a great bearing on the phenomena of extra-sensory perception like Clairvoyance, Telepathy and Pre-cognition. However, yogaja pratyksa may be called supernormal perception. Jayanta describes the nature of yogic perception. The yogi can perceive a past, future, distant or subtle object. He can perceive even Jayanta Bhatta says that a yogi perceives all objects in a single intuition. Similarly, Bhasaryaina defines yogic perception as direct and immediate apprehension of objects which are distant or past, future or subtle.?, Prasastapada divides yogic perception into two types, (i) yukta pratyaksa, in which we get perception in ecstasy, and (ii) viyukta pratyaksa, which implies perception of those who have fallen off from ecstasy. Bhasarvajna also makes a similar distinction. Those who are in a state of ecstasy can perceive their own selves, the selves of others, akasa, time, atoms and manas. Those who have fallen off from ecstasy can perceive subtle, hidden or remote things through the contact of the self, (manas), and senseorgans, with the object by means of a peculiar power due to meditation. Similarly, Neo-Naiyayikas make a two-fold distinction, between yukta pratyaksa and vyanjana pratyaksa. In the latter case, the individual getting the perception is still endeavoring to attain union with the supreme being. Prasastapada mentions arsa jnana as a kind of yogic perception. It is an intuitive apprehension of all objects, past, present and future, and also of dharma owing to the contact of manas with the self and a peculiar power, dharma, born of austerities. It is sometimes said that arsalnaha and yogic perception are different, because arsa-jnarra is produced by the practice of austerities, while yogic perception is produced by meditation. However, both are supersensuous in nature. But the Mimamsakas and the Jainas do not accept the possibility of yogic� perception because it cannot be either sensuous or nonsensuous. It cannot be sensuous, as it is not produced by contact of the sense organs and the rnanas. Sense organs cannot come into contact with the past, the future and the distant object. Nor can yogic perception be produced by the mind alone, as the mind, without the help of the senseorgans, is capable of producing only mental states like pleasure and pain. It is not also possible to maintain that the external sense organs can apprehend objects, without coming into contact through the powers of medicine, incantation and the practice of austerities, because the senses are limited in their sphere. They cannot transcend their natural limitations even when they attain the highest degree of perfection by intense meditation. Therefore, the Mimarisaks say, yogic perception cannot be sensuous, as sensuous knowledge cannot apprehend past, future and distant objects. Similarly, if yogic perception can perceive what was apprehended in the past, it would be mere recall or a form of memory. But if it cognizes more than what was perceived in the past, it is illusory, as it apprehends something which has no real existence. If yogic perception were perceptual in character, it could not transgress the general conditions of perception, as it must be produced by the contact of the sense organs with the object.

          The Jainas also do not accept the possibility of yogic perception as presented by the Nyaya Vaisesika Schools. The Jainas say that sense organs are limited in their sphere and cannot be freed from their inherent limitations. Even the sense organs of the yogis cannot apprehend supersensible objects like atoms. The peculiar power of dharma born of meditation cannot be of any use to the sense organs in directly apprehending supersensible objects. Dharma can neither increase the capacity of the sense-organs, nor can it merely assist the sense organs in their function of apprehending supersensible objects. Sense organs in themselves cannot apprehend supersensible objects.

          The Nyaya Vaisesika _ Schools _ maintain that the manas can get simultaneous cognition of objects past, future and distant with the help of dharma born of yoga. But the Jainas say that the manas, which is regarded as atomic in nature, Cain never enter into relation with all the objects of the world simultaneously. But it is contended that, if the mind of a yogi can apprehend objects not simultaneously but successively, yogic perception would not be different from ordinary perception. Therefore, the Jainas say, yogic perception in the sense presented by the Nyaya Vaisesika is not possible. Perception of all the objects of the world can never be produced by the external sense organs or by the mind even though aided by the peculiar power of dharma born of meditation. The Jainas contend that it is the self which is responsible for such cognition. The self apprehends all the objects of the world independently of the sense organs and the mind when the veil of karma is progressively removed. 

The Jaina View of Supernormal Perception 

          The Jaina account of supernormal perception, is based on the Jaina metaphysics of the soul. In its pure state, the soul is perfect, simple and unalloyed. It is pure consciousness. But when it gets embodied, it moves in the wheel of samsara and experiences the things of  the world and its pleasures and pains. The sense organs are the windows through which the soul gets empirical experience. They are the instruments by which empirical experience is possible. But when the veil of karma is removed, the soul gets pure experience. The Jainas believe that the soul is inherently capable of perceiving all things with all their characteristics. But this capacity is obstructed by the karmas which obscure real knowledge. Because of such obstruction by the knowledge-obscuring and other kaznnas, it gets only an imperfect knowledge of the objects of the world. The nature and extent of the knowledge the soul gets will depend on the nature and extent of the obscuring veil. But the knowledge of the soul is never totally obstructed by the veil, even as the light of the sun or the moon is never totally obstructed even by the darkest clouds. There is always some glimpse of the external world however imperfect it may be. Complete destruction of the veil of karma gives perfect knowledge and omniscience.

          On this basis, the Jainas divide pratyczksa into two kinds, (i) samvyavahara pratyaksa, empirical perception which was originally called paroksa, and (ii) pdramarthika pratyaksa, transcendental perception. Empirical perception is what we get in every day experience. It is of three kinds; it may arise (i) from the sense organs, (ii) from the mind, which is a quasi-sense organ, or (iii) from the sense organs and the mind. But as for transcendental perception, the self gets this experience without the help of the sense organs and the mind. It gets the experience directly when the veil of the karma obscuring the knowledge is removed. This is a form of supernormal perception. It was called pratyasa, because it is the direct experience of the soul without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the mind. It is of two kinds: (i) imperfect, incomplete, or vikala, and (ii) perfect, complete, or sakala.  Vikala, is divided into two types, (i) avadhi (clairvoyance) and (ii) manahparyaya (telepathy). Perfect transcendental perception is omniscience. It is kevala. This is the stage of supernormal perception. It is the perfect knowledge of all the objects of the world through the complete destruction of the relevant obscuring karmas. It is like the divine omniscience presented by the Nyaya Vaisesika schools-and--by Patatijali. -But the Janis do not-believe in the existence of God. For them, the soul itself is perfect and divine and each individual soul an attain perfection and omniscience by completely destroying the karmic matter which is an obstacle to the perfect knowledge. When the veil of karma is destroyed, the soul realizes its omniscience.-, According to the Jainas, the soul is inherently capable of cognizing all things together with all their characteristics irrespective of spatial or temporal distinctions. It is only because of the karmic veil that this capacity is obscured. But it is possible that the veil of karma may not all be destroyed although the relevant knowledge-obscuring karma may be removed. Such annihilation of karma may be by degrees According to the degree of annihilation of karma, the degree of supernormal perception also varies. Omniscience occurs when there is complete. destruction of the obscuring veil.  But when there are differences in the destruction of these veils the two varieties of supernormal perception, avadhi and manalrparya,va, occur. However, the Jainas believe that supernormal perception in the form of avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala are not dependent on the instrumentality of the sense organs and the manas. Only normal perception needs the help of the sense organs and the manuals? .The sense organs have no function in the case of supernormal perception. It may also be said that, even in the case of empirical perception like mati and sruta, the role of the sense organs is subordinate, because the-sense organs serve to eliminate the veil of karma which obscures the knowledge of the _object. However, they have their own function, because in the absence of these, empirical perception would not be possible. Bhutabali, in his Mahabandha, sees the instrumental role of the manas in the naanah paryaya jnana. But this view need not be taken as representative. Akalanka_ _in-templates, in this case, manas as Atman. In this sense, the Jnaina view of supernormal perception is different from, the , crlaulcilca pratvaksa of the Naiyayikas. The forms of alaukika pratyksa are produced by supernormal contact, alaukika-sannikarsa. In this, there is a special type of contact with the sense object. But  the Jainas do not accept such a special type of sense object contact. The sense organs are limited in sphere. They do not have the capacity of coming into contact with supersensible objects. The sense organs have no function in the case of supernormal perception, as they cannot cognize the past, future and distant objects. Therefore, empirical perception signifies direct and immediate apprehension of gross objects produced by the contact of the organs with the objects determined in time and space and by merit (punya) and demerit (pdpa). Supernormal perception is direct and immediate cognition of all objects past, future and distant. Recent psychical research shows that those who are endowed with supernormal powers grasp the secret thoughts of other individuals without using their sense organs. They also perceive events more or less remote in space and time. In-supernormal perception, Trans-spatial and Trans-temporal. relations are apprehended. There is an �elsewhere� in which the order of things would be different. We do not come across the �elsewhere� by means of empirical experience, because, in this, we become aware of the external world by means of bodily sense organs which have been specially developed to reveal it and nothing else. We may understand this when we realize that our organs of sense perception are narrowly specialized to serve biological and practical ends, and that our normal consciousness is also largely specialized.

          We have seen that the Jainas say that supernormal perception is really pratyaksa, or direct apprehension obtained by the soul when all the impediments are removed. Supernormal perception has been classified as (i) avadhi, (ii) marrahparyayci, and (iii) kevala. The distinction between vikala and sakala pratyaksa has also been mentioned. The three forms of supernormal perception mentioned by the Jainas may appear, Tight appoints out. . to-be- dogmatic. However, it may be noted that the vital source of the Jaina theory of knowledge lies in this conception. If the soul has the capacity to know, it must know independently of any external conditions. Distance, spatial or temporal, is not a hindrance to the soul.?

          C. D. Broad says that forms of supernormal cognition may be classified as follows: We may divide them into (i) supernormal cognitions of contemporary events or of contemporary states of mind, and (ii) super normal cognitions of past or future events or past or future things or persons. Under the first heading, we can include clairvoyance and telepathy. In the second type, we may include supernormal cognition of past events, for instance, knowledge of the past as claimed by Miss Moberley in her book An Adventure, and supernormal precognition, knowledge of the future, as is claimed by Dunne in his book, An Experiment with Time. The analysis here will be restricted to the study of clairvoyance and telepathy with reference to avadhi and mauahparyaya. Then a brief survey of omniscience, or kevala jiana, as the Jainas have presented it, will be given. Other forms of extra-sensory perception like mediumship, automatic writing and poltergeists have been of interest to modern psychical research. Flew analyses the forms of extra-sensory perception into spontaneous phenomena, psychical and mental, and mediumship, physical and mental. However, these forms of extra-sensory perception do not come within the purview of this discussion. 


Avadhi jnana is a form of supernormal perception. It is pratyaksa, or direct perception, because the soul gets direct apprehension of the object  without the help. of the sense organs and the mind. In this, we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense organs and the mind. In this, we apprechend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense organs. However, in avadhi we perceive only such things as have form and shape This can be compared with clairvoyance, which modern psychical research calls a form of extra-sensory perception. Things without form, like the soul and dharma, cannot be perceived by avadhi. Clairvoyance of this type differs with different individuals according to their capacity, developed by them through their merit. Owing to the varying degree of destruction and subsidence of the karmic veil, the individual can perceive supersensible objects in different degrees. The highest type of avadhi can perceive all objects having form. The Jainas interpret the capacity of perception in avadhi jnana in terms of -space and time. They have developed a technique of mathematical calculation of the subtleties of time and space. Regarding space, cmadhi jnana can extend over a space occupied by innumerable pradesas of the size of the universe. With reference to time, it can perceive through innumerable points of time both past and future. Avadhi can perceive all modes of all things. But it cognizes only a part of the modes of things according to the degree of intensity of perception. The lowest type of avadhi can perceive an object occupying a very small fraction of space, e. g., the angula. Regarding capacity in terms of time, the lowest type of avadhi can last only a short time, a second. It cannot extend beyond a second. Similarly, it cannot know all the modes of objects.� It can only cognize a part of the modes.  Thus, avadhi, which may be compared to clairvoyance, differs with different individuals according to the capacity of the persons perceiving. The capacity is, in turn, determined by the relative merit acquired by the persons.

          Modern psychical research has provided many examples of such persons. Experimental investigation has been carried out in this field. For instance, Prof. Rhine and his colleagues at Duke University carried out experiments with a pack of zener cards and arrived at astonishing results. Perception beyond an opaque wall, precognition and fore-knowledge have been of great interest to para-psychology. Even Kant was greatly interested in ostensible clairvoyance, by Swedenborg, with reference to Queen Lovisa in 1761 and his clairvoyant cognition of the Stockholm fire. Dreams which foretell events may also be included-in such forms of perception. The Society for Psychical Research has collected many such instances. For instance, the Hon. J. O. _ Connor, about ten days before the Titanic sailed, saw in a dream that the ship floating in the sea, keel upwards, and her passengers and crew swimming around. In another case, a lady dreamt that her uncle had fallen from horseback and died. She also dreamt he was brought home in a wagon. �There in my dream the wagon came to the door. And two men, well-known to me, helped to carry �the body upstairs. I saw the man carrying the body with difficulty, and his left hand hanging down and striking against the bannisters, as the men mounted the stairs�. Later, the dream recurred thrice, with all the details unchanged. This was followed by her uncle�s death in exactly the same situation as she had dreamt, and he was carried home in the same way with his left hand hanging and striking against the bannisters as the men mounted the stairs. In our country, we get many instances of dreams and such forms of perception is necessary.

          To turn to ancient., Indian - thought, Prasastapada and Jayant Bhatta say that, though yogis can perceive all objects past, future and distant, even ~ ordinary persons like us are not entirely devoid of such perception. Some men have the power of perceiving the future. On rare occasions, we get a flash of intuition, as for instance, when a girl perceives in her heart of hearts that her brother will come to-morrow.- These may be included under the form of avadhi perception. However, they cannot be called supernormal perception. They are extra-sensory or para-normal perception, yet not abnormal mental phenomena. The Jainas also do not make avadhi form of supernormal perception in this sense, because, according to them, beings living in hell, and even the lower organisms, are capable of possessing avadhi, although, in general it may be included in the supernormal perception. Modern psychical research is also aware of the possibility of such a form of perception in the higher vertebrates.  In the commentary on verse V of Dravvasgdigraha, Ghoshal says that avadhi jnana is psychic knowledge which is directly acquired by the soul without the instrumentality of the mind and the senses. He cites knowledge in a hypnotic state as an instance of avadhi. But it would not be correct to compare avadhi to knowledge in a hypnotic state, although the description of avadhi as direct cognition without the help of the sense organs and the mind would be correct. The hypnotic state is a state of hyper-suggestion and an abnormal mental state. In this sense, avadhi cannot be called a state of hyper-suggestion and it would not be proper to reduce avadhi to an abnormal mental state.

          The Jainas have given a detailed analysis of avadhi and of beings who possess avadhi. According to the Jainas, heavenly beings and beings in hell possess avadhi naturally. They are endowed with it from birth. It is bhava pratyaya in them, possibly because they do not possess bodily sense organs like human beings. In the case of human beings as well as five-sensed lower organisms, avadhi is possible owing to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant veil of karma. It is acquired by merit. Therefore, it is called enapraty aTa.2. Thus, human beings and the lower organisms have to acquire avadhi by effort, while the beings residing in heaven and hell get it naturally. Visesavasyakabhasya gives a detailed description of avadhi from fourteen points of view and its varieties with reference to temporal and spatial extension.? Panc astiknyasara, divides avadhi into three types with reference to spatial extension, desavadhi, paramavadhi and sarvavadhi. All three are conditioned by psychic qualities, but desavadhi is also conditioned by birth in the case of heavenly beings and beings in hell. Desavadhi is a very limited faculty of perceiving things beyond sense perception. Paramavadhi is a higher form of perception which is not confined to a limited space and time. But sarvavadhi is the perfect faculty which perceives all things. Desavadhi_ is divided into two types, gunapratyaya and bhavapratyaya, with their subdivisions. Nandisutra gives six varieties- of  avadhi, which are possible in the ease of homeless ascetics. It also mentions subdivisions 

[Please see the Table in file name �Page No. 135  is Table�] 

of these. A table of classification of avadhi according to the Nandisutra is given Tin table No. VIII. The first variety, for instance, is arrugarni avadhi. It is clairvoyance, which continues to exist even if a person moves elsewhere. Ananugami avadhi is the opposite of this. Vardhamaua avadhi is that which increases in extensity and extends in scope and durability as time passes. Hiyamana is opposed to this. Avasthita is a steady form of avadhi which neither increases nor decreases in scope or durability. The sixth form of avadhi is anavasthitha. It sometimes increases and sometimes decreases in intensity. Such classifications of avadhi with their subdivisions have a psychological significance. It is possible that clairvoyant cognition may differ in different individuals in respect of intensity and durability of experience and the extent of the objects perceived by the individual. There are instances in which some persons get occasional flashes of perception, as in the case of a girl who got the intuition that her brother would come. In some other cases, clairvoyance is more or less steady, and it recurs very often. The Society for Psychical Research has collected many instances of such perceptions. The scope of clairvoyant cognition with reference to the objects cognized varies with the sensitiveness and extent of contact of the subliminal consciousness. Different persons can perceive different objects with different degrees of clarity according to their capacities. The Jainas have said that the lowest type of avadhi can perceive objects occupying a very small fraction of space like the angula. The highest, type of avadhi can perceive all objects having form. However, avadhi cannot perceive all the modes of all things.

          The psychic phenomenon called �French sensitiveness�, sometimes called as �psychometry�, may be included as a form of although in psychometry the mind and the sense organs do play their part. There may be physical contact with the object. However, physical contact serves only as an occasion to create a �a psychical rapport�. The role of the object coming in contact with the hand of the person would seem to be rather to canalize the sensitive faculty and concentrate it in the right direction, though we have no information as to how it happens. Dr. Osley gives many instances in which persons having this capacity have given detailed descriptions of the past or the future by merely touching the hand or even by touching a paper written by the person. He gives an experience which he had. An event in his �life, an accident, was foretold twice. The man who described the future accident gave a vivid picture of the accident, of the man, a baker, bleeding and things strewn about. The accident occurred exactly as it was predicted. Tyrrell cites many such instances. Dr. Osley says that, if we are to take the language of the permanently metagnomic subjects literally, one might think...... that they perceive realities as if by a paranormal optical sense outside time and space. They grasp from an ultra-material plane and see things as they would occur. - There seems to be one major difference between the description of perception given .by Dr. Osley and the nature of avadhi. We have seen that avadhi does not make use of the sense organs and the mind. But Osley describes the phenomenon as perception of realities �as if by a paranormal optical sense outside space and time.� This is not very clear. However, the optical sense outside time and space need not refer to the functions of the physical sense organs. Moreover, Dr. Osley says that the perception is as if by a paranormal optical sense. C. D. Broad admits that clairvoyance is non-sensuous perception. He interprets an experiment with red cards in the following terms: �We shall have to suppose that the clairvoyant has, from infancy, been continuously though unconsciously apprehending directly all those objects which he has also been cognizing indirectly through sight and touch. Then we can suppose that an association would be set up between, e.g. the conscious experience of seeing an object as red and the unconscious experience of directly apprehending it as having that intrinsic characteristic which makes it selectively reflect red-stimulating light-waves. Suppose that, on some future occasion, such an object, though no longer visible, is still being directly but unconsciously apprehended by the clairvoyant. He will still apprehend it as having that intrinsic characteristic, whatever it may be, which has now become associated in his mind with the visual appearance of redness. Consequently, the idea of it as a red-looking object will arise automatically in his mind, and he will announce that the unseen object is red�. Whatever may be the explanation of clairvoyant cognition, it cannot be denied that such experiences are facts. Eminent philosophers like Sidgwick, Price and Broad have admitted the existence of such clairvoyant experiences. 

Mana hparyaya

          Now we come to the next form of supernormal perception, called by the Jainas manahparyaya. The Jaina concept of manahparyaya is based on their doctrine of mind. We have seen that mind, according to Jainas, is a particular material substance composed of a specific form of varganus, or group of atoms, It is composed of an infinite number-of atoms called manovarganas. There are fine atoms. The finer atoms form the karma. Next in fineness come the manovarganns. They occupy less space. The other groups of atoms form the subtle and the gross body. The modes of the mind are different states emerging into acts of thought. Every state of our mind is a particular mode of mind. As our states of thought change, the mind also changes. Every mode of thought is reflected in the mind substance. Direct experience of such modes of mind substance working in other individual minds is called manahparyaya. Avasyakaniryukti gives a brief description of the nature of manahparyaya knowledge. Manhparyaya cognizes objects thought of by the minds of other people. In the Visesavasyakabhasya, we get a description of the manahparyaya jnana. A person possessing manahparyaya directly cognizes the mental states of others without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the mind.s We have seen that Bhutabali admits the instrumentality of manas in this experience, but his view is not generally accepted.

 In Western thought, such a form of cognition was called �thought transference.� But, as Tyrrell says, since the name gives a wrong suggestion that something was being transferred through the space, it is not adequate. Myers coined the phrase �telepathy� for describing such experiences. Tyrrell gives many instances of telepathic cognition. He also mentions instances of collective telepathy which he calls collective telepathic calculations. In Apparitions, published by the Society for Psychical Research, many interesting examples of telepathic cognition are recorded. It is not possible to go through the many instances of telepathy which Western scientists have recognized.

          Coming back to the Jaina view, we find that manahparyaya, telepathic experience, is not easy to get and is not common. A certain physical and mental discipline is a condition for getting their power of intuition. In the Avasykaniryukti we read that manahparyaya is possible only for human beings of character, especially for homeless ascetics. Human beings acquire this capacity through merit and by the practice of mental and moral discipline, In the Nandisutra there is a detailed description of the conditions of the possibility of manahparyaya in the case of human beings. Manahparyaya is possible only in this karmabhumi, this world of activity, this empirical world. Even the gods are not competent to possess manahparyaya.      Only gifted human beings with a definite span of life can acquire this faculty. Some conditions have to be fulfilled and some discipline has to be undergone by human beings for acquiring manahparyaya. The conditions for the possession of manahparyaya are: (i) the human beings in the karmabhumi must have fully developed sense organs and a fully developed personality. They must be paryapta; (ii) they must possess the right attitude, (samyagdrsti). As a consequence, they must be free from passion; (iii) they must be self-controlled and they must be possessed of rddhi, extraordinary powers.

          Thus, telepathic cognition is not possible for all beings. Only human beings can acquire it. It is conditioned by a strict physical and mental discipline. The person possessing it must necessarily be a hermit, or homeless ascetic. His character must be of a high type. The discipline and the occult powers attainable by the yogis mentioned in the Patanjali Yoga are analogous to the qualifications of human beings possessing manahparyuva. But Siddhasena Divakara says that lower organisms possessing two or more sense organs are also found to strive by means of attraction or repulsion; therefore, they are possessed of mind. It would, hence, be proper to extend the scope of manahparyaya to such lower organisms. It would be improper to postulate manahparyaya as a separate category of knowledge. In this connection, we may refer to modern psychical research in telepathy described by Rhine says that it is possible to find instances of the possibility of such perceptions in the case of lower animals, especially the higher vertebrates. Several experiments have been carried out in this connection and several instances have been quoted. But the traditional Jaina view does not accept the possibility of manahparyaya in the case of the lower animals. It restricts the scope of such cognition to human beings. 

Objects of Cognition in Manahparyaya

          Although there is among the Jainas, general agreement on the nature of manahparyaya, the Jaina philosophers are not agreed regarding the objects of the cognition possible in this experience. Various views have been presented. Jinabhadra states that one who possesses manahparyaya perceives the states of mind of others directly. But external objects thought of by the minds of others are only indirectly cognized through inference. Hemacandra, commenting on the statement of Jinabhadra, says that a man may think of a material object as well as of a non-material object. But it is impossible to perceive a non-material object directly except by one who is omniscient. Therefore, one who is possessed of manahparyaya, telepathic cognition, knows external objects thought of by others only indirectly, by means of inference. The function of telepathy is restricted to perceiving mental states, like thoughts and ideas, of others. External objects are the content of these mental states. They are not possible to be cognized directly in manahparyayti. They are known indirectly by inference, as they are associated through the media of states of the mind, although such knowledge is not of the type of ordinary inference. Hemacandra also supports this view of restricting telepathy to cognition of mental states of others. He says that cognition of external objects thought of by others is indirect, as it is by necessary implication from the perception of thoughts which are not possible without objects. On the other hand, Unlasvati says that manahparyaya cognizes states of mind and material objects thought of by the minds of others. The mind undergoes a process of change while thinking, and the object content of this process is intuited by marrahparyaya. One who is possessed of manahparyaya knows only a fractional part of the objects of clairvoyance. He knows a greater number of the states of the material objects that form the content of the invisible process of the mind. Thus, according to Umasvati, the scope of telepathy is larger, because it includes cognition of external objects thought of by others in addition to mental states. But Siddhasena Divakara seems to interpret this statement of Umasvati in the light of the view presented by Jinabhadra. He says that objects are cognized indirectly through inference. However, this does not seem to be the proper interpretation of Umasvati, because we have seen that objects forming the content of the mind are directly cognized. The statement of Umasvati lends itself to this interpretation. We now come to a third view regarding the object of manahparyaya. This view is presented by Pujypada Devanandi. He says that  external objects are also intuited by manahparyaya. Manahparyaya is a form of pratyaksa in the traditional sense of the term. It is independent of the instrumentality of the sense organs and the mind. It does not involve inference, which depends on the sense organs such as eyes and also on the information of others.s According to his view, manahparyaya has wider scope, as it cognizes external objects directly. We may say it includes avadhi, or clairvoyance, also. There is agreement as to the nature of manahparyaya as pratyaksa, but regarding intuition of external objects there has been a difference of opinion. We have seen that Jinabhadra does not accept the possibility of direct cognition of external objects in manahparyaya. He introduces inference for explaining this kind of cognition. Pujyapada Devanandi has widened the scope of manahparyaya by including direct perception of external objects also. Akalanka says that states of the mind are only the media through which external objects are intuited. Umasvati accepted the direct perception of external objects thought of by others in manahparyaya.

          The question of the scope of manahparyaya is not psychologically significant. Those who accept telepathy as a form of supernormal� experience do not make such a distinction. Telepathy is primarily concerned with cognition of the thoughts of others. It was, therefore, called �thought transference�. In this, the mental states of others are intuited. But the objects forming the content of the mental states are not excluded from the scope of telepathic cognition, although it is not explicitly mentioned. However, it would also be possible to maintain that cognition of objects forming the content of the mental states may be included in the field of clairvoyant experience, because clairvoyance cognizes objects which are beyond spatial and temporal relations. 

Classification of Manahparyaya

          Sthananga recognizes two varieties of manahparyaya as rjumati and vipulamati. Umasvati makes a similar distinction. He says that rjumati is less pure and it sometimes falters. Vipulamati is purer and more lasting. It lasts up to the rise of omniscience. We also get such an account in Paneastikayasara. Rjumati gives a direct intuition of the thoughts of others, while in vipulamati the process of knowing the ideas of others is manifested in an irregular way. Pujyapada Devanandi describes the nature of manahparyaya as intuition of the objects of the activities of the sense organs. He says that vipulamati knows less objects than rjumati, but whatever it knows it knows perfectly and vividly; vipulamati is more penetrating and more lucid than rjurnati.