The above named examples of this substance (jiva),
men, angles, etc. are examples of it in an impure state. In them the
naturally invisible soul is compounded in a very subtle way with visible,
tangible matter, and is in a sense thereby rendered visible, as water is
colored by the addition of coloring matter. In its pure state the soul is
invisible just as in itself water is colorless.
Thus is the existence of the first kind of substance,
soul, established. And it is not one individual universal great big soul,
but a mass of mutually exclusive, individual souls. We may now sub-divide
SUBSTANCE - AJIVA (NOT-ALIVE)
All the following real things have the common
characteristic of being unconscious. There are five kinds of substance
not-alive, namely :
An ether, the fulcrum of motion (dharmastikaya)
Another ether, the fulcrum of rest, in the sense of
not moving (adharmastikaya)
Time, which is in only a figurative sense a substance
In all these things there is no feeling or
This is well understood in physics and chemistry. Here
the real substance is the ultimate indivisible atom. Matter is made up of
atoms, but the atom is not made up of other units. Atoms as at present
understood by modern chemistry are far grosser than those contemplated by
the Jains. Innumerable atoms as understood by the Jains make, when
combined, the atom of modern chemistry, which is not an ultimate atom.
Ether, mentioned above, is no matter in the Jain view.
Matter has various qualities and relations which these two ethers do not
posses. It is only the Jain philosophy that believes in these two
substances. They are the accompanying causes (hetu) respectively of the
motion of moving things and beings, and of the stationary state of things
and beings that are resting, in the sense of not moving. In each case it
is the accompanying cause without which you cannot do.
Space is that which acts as a receptacle of all the
other substances; and it is not a kind of thing that needs to be
contained. It has not that nature of needing to be contained. It is a
reality, but not matter (pudgala).
Time is not a collection of indivisible inseparable
parts, as are the other five substances. Time is called a substance only
as a matter of convenience. It is really the modification of a substance.
It is the modification of a thing or being by which we know the
anteriority or posteriority of it, the oldness or newsness. And it is a
modification which is common to all the other substances. Time is really
the duration of the states of substances.
DEFINITIONS OF SUBSTANCE
Having mentioned the kinds of substance that there are
in the universe, the next thing will be to give the definition of
substance. The definition must be such that it shall include not only
matter, visible and tangible to the senses, but also spiritual substance
(soul) not cognizable by the senses.
Any substance can be looked upon in four different
ways, and so it shall be defined from each of these four points of view.
This is only possible in thought and not in actual fact.
Substance is that in which the differences of time,
space, and modifications inhere together. This definition is from the
point of view of the permanent nature of the thing. In spite of the
differences in the units making up the mass of any substance, still
there is the unity in the mass. Conscious individuals, for instance, are
not identical with each other, but still there is a mass, soulness; it
is one substance.
Substance is the subject of qualities (guna)
and modifications (paryaya). This definition is from the point of
view of the state of a thing that is, of its changing nature or
modification. The quality stays with the substance, and is constant; the
modifications succeed each other. A particular piece of clay always has
form, but not always the same form. It is never without form; for is a
constant quality; it may be now round, then square; these are
Substance is that in which there are origination,
destruction, and permanence. This definition is from the two previous
points of view taken together. With the origination of a new mode of
existence there was the destruction of the old mode of existence, while
the substance has remained permanent. With the destruction of a house
three is the origination or coming into existence of heap of debris,
while the bricks, etc. are the same. The substance is neither destroyed
nor originated, only the mode of existence; only the relations between
the parts, in this case.
Substance is that which performs a special action.
This is from an ordinary point of view, and would hold good only of a
Substance has now been defined, and each definition is
application not only to matter but also to spiritual substance or soul.
The next thing to introduce is the natures of substance. What are its
NATURES OF SUBSTANCE
There are two kinds of natures found in all substance.
Any real, concrete, existing thing or being, can be looked upon in a
general way or in a particular way; that is to say, it has natures in
common with other things (samanya svabhava), and at the same time
it has natures peculiar to itself (vishesh svabhava). For instance,
this book is matter, in common with all other material things; and at the
same time it is a particular matter, namely, paper.
According to Jainism three is no such thing as matter (pudgala)
or any substance (dravya) only in general; wherever there is matter
(pudgala) it is matter (pudgala) of a particular kind, paper
for instance, not stone; or wherever there is substance (dravya) it
is substance (dravya) of a particular kind, matter (pudgala)
for instance, not space (akasa), space is substance (dravya).
Of the general natures of substance, one is existence (astitva);
another is knowableness (prameytva). This latter differentiates
Jainism from Kant's philosophy: according to Jainism things are knowable.
The general natures are always everlasting; and are not
analyzable. Other natures common to all substance are the fact of being in
one sense permanent, un-created, and indestructible (nitya samanya
svabhava); and the fact of being in another sense perishable (anitya
samanya svabhava); gold may perish as a ring, but it is always
something somewhere. Other common natures are the fact of being one or a
unit, the fact of being many the fact of being separate, and the fact of
being not separate. From the point of view of omniscience the general
natures of a thing are infinite.
Of the particular natures of substance consciousness (cetana)
is one, and belongs only to live substance (jiva). Another
particular nature is the fact of having form, and is peculiar to matter (pudgal).
Another is the fact of containing, which is peculiar to space (akasastikaya).
From the point of view of omniscience the particular natures of a thing
are, like the general natures, infinite.
Everything, then, has its natures, both those peculiar
to itself, and those in common with other things. The next subject in
connection with substance is the ways of knowing it, or the aspects it has
(nayas). One of the functions of philosophy is to advance from the
known to the unknown. The Jain procedure is as follows: Synstatis,
Synstatis comes first: it is the state of mind prior to
analysis; it is the definite cognition of a thing or idea as an isolated
object; that condition of things to which analysis is to be applied. "This
is what is really meant by unity, or identity, of the universe with the
real which many philosophers proclaim."
Analysis comes next: resolving, separating, or
differentiating the parts, elements, properties, or aspects of the object
Synthesis comes last: it is the putting together of the
first vague indefinite cognition with the subsequent analysis to form a
relational unity of a variety of aspects. Thus the next subject, the
consideration of aspects, is introduced.