According to
Prabhakara, self is necessarily known in every act of cognition. Cognition
is self-luminous. It not only manifests itself, but also supports the
atmana much as the flame and the wick Neither the self nor the object is
selfluminous. There can be conciseness of an object without the
conciseness of the self. In every act of cognition there is a direct and
immediate apprehension of the self. But the self can never be known as
object of knowledge. It is only to be known as a subject. It is revealed
by triputa samvit.
The Jaina holds
with Prabhakara that cognition is always apprehended by the self.
Cognition reveals itself, the self and its object. Every act of cognition
cognizes itself, the cognizing subject and the cognized object. But the
Jaina denies that consciousness alone is self-luminous. He regards self as
non-luminous. Self is the subject of internal peception. When I feel that
I am happy I have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an
object of internal
perception, just
as pleasure can be perceived though it is without form.. "Oh Gautama, said
Mahavira, "The self is pratyaksa even to you. The soul is cogninable even
to you". [48] Again, unlike the view of Prabhakara, the Jainas hold that
it is the object of perception, and it is manifested by external and
internal perception. To the question 'how can the subject be an object of
perception ?', the Jaina replies that whatever is experienced is an object
of perception.
William James made
a distinction between the empirical self, the me, and the transcendental
self the I. The self is partly the known and partly the knower, partly
object and partly subject. The empirical ego is the self as known, the
pure ego is the knower. "It is that which at any moment is conscious"
Whereas the me is only one of the things which it is conscious of. But
this thinker is not a passing state It is something deeper and less
mutable.[49] Prof. Ward holds that the pure self is always immanent
inexperience, in the sense that experience without the experient will be
unintelligible. It is also transcendental, in the sense that it can never
be the object of our experience.[50] The Jainas were aware that
consciousness of self is not possible by ordinary cognition. Therefore,
they said, it is due to internal perception.
Self-consciousness
does not belong to the realm of pure con-sciousness which is foundational
and without limitation. That is the cetana which is the essential quality
of the soul. But when we descend to the practical levels the realm of
vyavahara, we find the distinction between subject and object in
consciousness. The question whether the self is perceived by direct
experience like the internal perception of the Jainas, or by the immediate
intuition, (pratibha jnana) of the Vedantins, is raised as a consequence
of this distinction. In all this, the question is answered from the
empirical point of view. On this basis. we may say that there are two
aspects of consciousness: a) pure and transcendental consciousness, and b)
ernpirical consciousness. Atman is pure consciousness. Jiva is
consciousness limited by the organism. Atman is the subject of
consciousness. It is also the object of internal perceptions but only in
the sense that it is immanent in consciousness though not clearly cognized
as object. Jiva is both the subject and the object of consciousness,
because it is the cognizer as well as the cognized.
IV. The Atama
theory of knowledge is very old and probably originated in the
pre-Mahav1ra period.[51] The Jnana pravada formed a pair of the Parvasruta
which formed a part of the ancient literature. Jinabhadra, in his
Visesavasyakabhasya, quotes a Purva Gatha on jndna.[52] There seems to
have been no difference of opinion between the followers of Parsva and
Mahavira regarding the division of knowledge. Both of them accept the
five-fold distinction of knowledge. The Agan as have also presented the
five divisions of knowledge.
Knowledge is
inherent in the soul, but owing to perversity of -attitude arising out of
the veil of Karman, we may get wrong knowledge, ajnana. Knowledge is
perfect when the veil of Karmans totally removed. It is imperfect even
when there is partial subsidence or destruction of Karman. The soul can
get perfect knowledge directly when the veil of Karma is removed. That is
Pratyaksa jnana. But eirlpirical knowledge, experience of this world. is
possible with the help of the sense organs indirectly. Such knowledge was
called paroksa jnana. Matijnana (sense experience), and Srutajnana
(knowledge due to verbal communication), are paroka jnana; while Avadhi
(extra sensory perception) Manahpai-yaya (telepathy), and Kevalajnana
(omniscience), here called pratyaksa.[53] But later, in
order to bring the
Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems o�
Indian thought, they modified their Conception of Pratyakasa and Parolisa
Jnana. In the Anuyogadvara Sutra, we find a change in terminology. Mati
and Sruta began to be called pratyaksa as they were possible through the
operation of the sense organs. Jinabhadra calls the two sarnvyavahara
pratyaksa.[54] Alongside of Jaina, we have direct intuition of the object.
It is Darcana. Darsana has similar subdivisions. The general
classification of knowledge and intuition mentioning their perversities,
is shown in Table I on next page. The subsidence and destruction of the
veil of Karman is a necessary condition of knowledge and intuition. Wrong
knowledge is characterized as samsaya (doubt), viparyaya (perversity), and
anadhya. vasaya (wrong knowledge caused by carelessness and
indifference). Owing to the lack of discrimination between the real and
the unreal, the soul with wrong knowledge, like the lunatic, knows things
according to its own urhirns. Perversity of attitude veils the faculty of
perception and knowledge, and knowledge becomes vitiated. It becomes
ajnana.[55]
Pratayaksa : We
may now consider sense perception or pratyaksa jnana, as the Nandisutra
4-5 calls it. It is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sense
organs and the manas. Hemacandra describes in the Pramanamimamsa that
pratyaksa is that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He analyses
the various definitions of pratyaksa of other schools and shows that they
are not adequate. The Naiyayika definition of perception as unerring
cognition which is produced by the sense object contact and the like, he
asks, which is not of the nature of cognition, function as efficient
instrument for the determination of the object? The Buddhists have given a
definition of perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual
construction and is not erroneous. But Hemacandra says that this
definition is irrational since it has no bearing on practical activity. It
has no pragmatic value. Jaimini defines perception as that which is
engendered
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in the mind of a
person upon the actual contact of the sense organ with the object. This
definition is also too wide, since it overlaps such cognition, as doubt;
and illusions also occur as a result of sense contact. The older exponents
of the Samkhya school define perceptual cognition to be modification of
the sense organs such as the organ of hearing. But sense organs are devoid
of consciousness, therefore, their modifications cannot be conscious.
If, on the other
hand, it is assumed to derive its conscient character from its association
with a conscious principle like the self, then the status of the organ of
knowledge should be accorded to the self. Therefore, Hemacandra said
perceptual cognition is immediate and lucid.[56] In Platos, dialogue,
Theaetetus, Socrates said that, `if knowledge and perception are the same,
it leads to an impossibilty, because a man who has come to know a thing
and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it and that
would be a monstrous conclusion.[57] In the Nandisutra a distinction is
made between indriya-pratyaksa and anindriya-pratyaksa. Indriya-pratyaksa
is cognition which is immediate and direct and arises out of the operation
of he five sense organs. There are, therefore, five types of sense
perveption-the visual, aditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory. The
experience that does not need the sense organs and is immediate may be
called extra-sensory perception. It is also pratyaksa, because it is
immediate and direct. It is of three types avadhi, manah-parydya and
kevala-pratyaksa. The old Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge born with
the help of the five senses as well as the manas may be called matijiana.
But in indriya-pratyaksa they included knowledge born of the five sense
organs, as the mind is not for them exactly a sense organ. It is a
quasi-sense organ. Umasvati defines matijnana as knowledge caused by the
senses and mind, since mind is a quasi-sense, no-indriya.[58] The
commentator Siddhasenaganin mentions three types of mati: (i) knowledge
born of the sense organs, (ii) knowledge born of the mind, and (iii)
knowledge due to the joint activity of the sense organs and mind.[59]
However, from the Bhasya of the Tattvarthasutra the find that Matijnana
can be distinguished into different types, as (i) knowledge due to sense
organs, little sense perception; (ii) knowledge due to the mind only.
like cinta; (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the mind and the
senses. Memory and recognition can be included in Matijnana. Sense
perception (indriya-pratyaksa), as a species of Matijnana is of five types
based on the nature and function of the five sense organs.[60] The five
senses possess he capacity of sense experience because the Cognition of
the stimulation must be conditioned by the relevant instruments. The Jaina
analysis of sense perception has a great psychological significance,
although perception was a logical and metaphysical problem for the Jainas
as for other Indian philosophers. In fact, even in the West, philosophers
were first busy with the logical and the metaphysical analysis of the
problem of perception, but with the advancement of psychology as a science
may have realized that perception is more a problem for psychology.
Bertrand Russell says that, 'the problem of perception has troubled
philosophers from a very early date. My own belief is that the problem is
scientific, not philosophical, or, rather, no longer philosophical. [61]
