I.
A clear expression of the Anekanta attitude is seen in Mahavira�s discussions with his
disciples. In the Bhavavatisutra, there is a dialogue between Mahavira and
his disciple Gautama.
� Are the souls
lord, eternal or non-eternal?�
�The souls are
eternal in some respects and non- eternal in some other respects. ��
They are eternal, o Gautama, from the point of view of substance and non-
eternal from the point of view of modes.�
Again, the problem
of body and mind was answered by Mahavira as-
� The body, O Gautama is
identical with the soul and not identical with soul in different resects.�
The application of
the principal of Anekanta can be seen in their analysis of the
metaphysical question concerning the categories. The Jaina theories of
atoms, of space and soul, to mention a few instances, illustrate the
pervading influence of the Anekanta view- point. Atoms are of the same
kind: they can yet give the infinite variety of things, pudgala has
certain inalienable features, but within limits it can become anything
through qualitative differentiation. The transmutation of elements is
quite possible in this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist.
Space is another
instance of a manifold real. It is incorporeal and formless, yet divisible
and its divisibility is spontaneous feature, Abhayadeva develops the
concepts of manifoldness of space as a polemic against the Naiyayika view
of space as one and partless. The souls are individual centres of
experience. Like the Leibnizian monads the soul mirrors the entire
universe within self as a unique centre of experience. The universe it
mirrors is infinitely complex; and its experimental powers must be
manifold commensurate with the complicity of the experienced universe.
In the Anga literature
of the Jainas the doctrine of Anekanta was briefly and incildetally
discussed. But in the commentaries of the Jaina scripture written in
Prakrit it has received grater attention. But when the Sanskrit language
found a place in the Jaina literature, it occupied an important position.
The commentary on the Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati gives an exhaustive
description of the problem. Latter, a systematic exposition of the
doctrine was given by Jaina scholars like samantabhadra, siddhasena
Divakara, mallavadi, pujyapada, Akalanka, vidyanandi and others.
The Anekanta view
does imply the principal of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of
the universe, as given by Kant, although this principal is more implied
than expressly stated in Jainism.
In kantianism as in
Jainism, the principal of reciprocity goes beyond the �coexistence� or the
inter-relatedness of the substances and explains the �dynamical community�
among them. But the Jaina is a thorough- going realist. Anekanta vada is a
theory of reality which asserts the manifoldness and complexity of the
real. In apprehending the complexity of the universe, it has crystallized
itself into the two- fold dialectic of Nayavada and syadvada; and they are
complementary processes forming a normal and inevitable development of the
relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysic.
III.
Anekanta emphasizes that the truth is
many- sided. Reality can be looked at from various angles. Two doctrines
result from the Anekantavada :I) Nayavada and ii) syadvada . Nayavada is
the analytic method investigating a particular stand- point of factual
situation. Syadvada is primarily synthetic designed to harmonise the
different view �points arrived at by Nayavada. Nayavada is �primarily
conceptual� and the syadvada is synthetic and mainly verbal, although this
sometimes maintained that conceptual is also verbal and the verbal method
is so much changed with epistemological characters. The distinction
between the conceptual and the verbal has mainly a reference to the fact
that point of view have to be expressed in language and predicated in
specific forms so as to embody them. The concept is formed from this point
of view.
Naya refers to the point
of view one takes when one looks at the object. A naya is defined as a
particular opinion or a view- point of looking at an object. It expresses
a partial truth about an object as know by a knowing subject. The Jainas
give example of the blind men and the elephant. The blind men feel the
animal and describe it, each in his own way similarly, we look at objects
and describe them in our own way from different angles. Other view- point
are also recognised; and they need to be recognised with each in the
scheme of a fuller and more valid knowledge which is the sphere of pramana.
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