The ancient Indian philosphers were faced with
problems concerning the instrumenta nature of the mind. It was generally
believed that like other sese organs, mind was also a sense orga, and the
instrumet of the soul. In the Upanisads we fine references to the
mind as one of the organs alongs with the other sense and motor organs (jnanenduiyas
and Karmendriyas) 29 prasna Upanisad mentions manas
as a central organ. Reference to the manas as the dirver of the ten organs
I the Mairti Upanisad may also be noted. Orthodox Hindu philsophy
accepts mind as the internal organ. There were some philosophers who made
buddhi, ahamkara and manas together to consitute the interna
organ atahkarana. But Jayanta believes that mind is an internal organ.
Similarlu, vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahamkara cannot be
regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya Vaishesikea philosophers regarded mind
as the internal organ. But Gautama didi not include it in the list of
sense organs. Kanada is also silent. Vitsysyan inclides manas under the
senses. He calls it the inner sense by with we apprehend the inner states
by the instrumet of the maas. Vatsyayaa believes that mind is as
good a sense orga as the eye and the like , thought there are cetain
differencaes. But the Jainas believed that the mind is a no- indriya
In the sense tha tit is different from the fice sese organs. Its
sense contents and functions are not entirely idetical with those of
indriyas. The prefix here does not mean not but is at times renderd as
isa. It is a quasi sense organ. Still they accept the instrumental
fucntion of the mind. In the Gommatasara : Jivakanda we get a
descriptio of mind as the no-indriya. It is through the mind that
meta knowledge and mentao activity arise. But in the case of the mind
there is no external manifestatio as in the case of other sense organs.
The function of mind is assimilative.30 Thepramana mimamsa
describes mind as the thing, which grasps everything. In the vrtti
of the same it is said, the �mano� nindriyam iti no
indriyam iti a ucyate�. 31 In the Rattavarthasutra, the
function mind, which is anindriya, is described as the sruta
congnition.the second function is the mati and its modifications.32 it
is caed the organ of apprehension of all objects because all sense
experiences are apprehended by the mind. The Jainas accepted the
insrtumental nature ( karanatva) of the mind. But it is said that
the karana is of two types � bahya karana and
antahakarana ad eve the dravya- manas is described as the
atahkaraa, the internal organ. Being the internal organ it is
different from the other sense organs.33 however such a dwescripiton of
need not be interpreted in the sense that acording to the Jaina view,mind
is not a sense organ; in fact it is more thatn s sense organ. It is
sarvarthagrahanam, at is stated in the
praanamimamsa.
ii. In the Dravyasamgradha, Nemicandra says
that soul in its pure form has the quality of conciousness. Brahmadeva,in
his commentary, writes that fro the ultimate points of view, Jiva is
distingushed by its quality of consciousness. 34 It is most direct and
nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most immediately
aware.
Consciousness has been the most important of
discussion for philosophers, psychologists as wel as scientists. Attempts
have been made to solve the problem from various angles. In the
Aitareya Aranyaka, an effort is madae to understand th diffenent
stages of the development of consciousness I the universe. In the
evolution of herbs, trees and all that is animal, he atman is
gradually developing. In the herbs, only sap is seen; in the animated
beings, citta is sees; in man there gradual development of atman ,
for he is now endowed with prajna.35 similarly, I n the
Chandogyopanisad, prajapati describes the progressive identification
of atma with body cnscuousness. The psycho- physiologial method is adopted
in the Taittiriya.36 finally , the atman as jananamaya
ad aanadamya is emphasized. The Jaina cassification of the Jivas
places the problem of the evolution of consciousness on the scienitfic
basis. Jivas have bee classified into one, tow three, four and ifve
sensed according to the number of the sense organs possessed by the Jivas
possessing the five seses are divided into those havig mind and those
without mind. It is now realized that the rise of consciounness is late in
the evoluton of life, from physical evloution to the evloution of life
mind and conscounsness.
Cetana as a sundmental quality of the soul is pure
consciousness, a king of fame without smoke. This consciousness is
eternal, although it gets manifested in the course of the evolitionary
porcess of life in the empirica sense. This emprital cnsiousness arises
from the cotact of the sense organs with the obejcts. Centana in its pure
form gets emobdied with the Atama and ces into contact with empriical life
with the sense organs and objects. It manifests itself in the form of
jana and darsaa. Jnana and Darsaa are therefore aspetcs of cetaa ad
cetana is the springboard froj which they arise. It is like the flood
of light in which objects are iluminated .it is the psychic background and
the psychic halo of cogition in its two aspects jnana and darsana.
Cetana, thererore is the light of conscounsess that the soul possesses
ad throught this lifht the cogition of objects arises.
The analysis of the states of consciousness has been
an important problem for philosphers as well as the psychologists
Consciounsesss has three aspects- the cognitive, the affective and the
conatie. They are modes of consciousness. It perceiveing, belieceing or
otherwise appreheding, that sch and a thing exists ad has characteristics�
one�s attitude is cognitive. In the aggective attitude oe is either
pleased or displeased about it and tries ot alter it I some respect. This
attitude is conative.37 but stout says that though these three modesof
consciousness are abstracty ad analyticaly distince phases I a
concretetion from each othe r. mind is an organic unity ad its activites
have the ackisest degree of organic inter-action. However, in every
psychosis oe of the aspects may be predominat. In the pleasure of pursuit,
feetling presupposes cotaion. Sometimes feeling is dependent on certain
conative attitude invloved in the perceputal process. Similar reciprocity
is found in conation and cogition.
