Jain World
Sub-Categories of Passions - Jain View of Life








The ancient Indian philosphers were faced with problems concerning the instrumenta nature of the mind. It was generally believed that like other sese organs, mind was also a sense orga, and the instrumet of the soul. In the Upanisads we fine references to the mind as one of the organs alongs with the other sense and motor organs (jnanenduiyas and Karmendriyas) 29   prasna Upanisad  mentions manas as a central organ. Reference to the manas as the dirver of the ten organs I the Mairti Upanisad  may also be noted. Orthodox Hindu philsophy accepts mind as the internal organ. There were some philosophers who made buddhi, ahamkara and manas together to consitute the interna organ atahkarana. But Jayanta believes that mind is an internal organ. Similarlu, vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahamkara cannot be regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya Vaishesikea philosophers regarded mind as the internal organ. But Gautama didi not include it in the list of sense organs. Kanada is also silent. Vitsysyan inclides manas under the senses. He calls it the inner sense by with we apprehend the inner states by the instrumet of the maas. Vatsyayaa believes that mind is as good a sense orga as the eye and the like , thought there are cetain differencaes. But the Jainas believed that the mind is a  no- indriya  In the sense tha tit is different from the fice sese organs. Its sense contents and functions are not entirely idetical with those of indriyas. The prefix here does not mean not but is at times renderd as isa. It is a quasi sense organ. Still they accept the instrumental fucntion of the mind. In the Gommatasara : Jivakanda we get a descriptio of mind as the no-indriya. It is through the mind that meta knowledge and mentao activity arise. But in the case of the mind there is no external manifestatio as in the case of other sense organs. The function of mind is assimilative.30 Thepramana mimamsa describes mind as the thing, which grasps everything. In the vrtti of the same it is said, the �mano� nindriyam iti no indriyam iti a ucyate�. 31  In the Rattavarthasutra, the function mind, which is anindriya, is described as the sruta congnition.the second function is the mati and its modifications.32   it is caed the organ of apprehension of all objects because all sense experiences are apprehended by the mind. The Jainas accepted the insrtumental nature ( karanatva) of the mind. But it is said that the karana is of two types � bahya karana and antahakarana  ad eve the dravya- manas is  described as the atahkaraa, the internal organ. Being the internal organ it is different from the other sense organs.33   however such a dwescripiton of need not be interpreted in the sense that acording to the Jaina view,mind is not a sense organ; in fact it is more thatn s sense organ. It is sarvarthagrahanam,  at is stated in the praanamimamsa.

      ii. In the Dravyasamgradha, Nemicandra says that soul in its pure form has the quality of conciousness. Brahmadeva,in his commentary, writes that fro the ultimate points of view, Jiva is distingushed by its quality of consciousness. 34   It is most direct and nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most immediately aware.

      Consciousness has been the most important of discussion for philosophers, psychologists as wel as scientists. Attempts have been made to solve the problem from various angles. In the Aitareya Aranyaka, an effort is madae to understand th diffenent stages of the development of consciousness I the universe. In the evolution of herbs, trees and all that is animal, he atman is gradually developing. In the herbs, only sap is seen; in the animated beings, citta is sees; in man there gradual development of atman , for he is now endowed with prajna.35  similarly, I n the Chandogyopanisad, prajapati describes the progressive identification of atma with body cnscuousness. The psycho- physiologial method is adopted in the Taittiriya.36  finally , the atman as jananamaya ad aanadamya is emphasized. The Jaina cassification of the Jivas places the problem of the evolution of consciousness on the scienitfic basis.  Jivas have bee classified into one, tow three, four and ifve sensed according to the number of the sense organs possessed by the Jivas possessing the five seses are divided into those havig mind and those without mind. It is now realized that the rise of consciounness is late in the evoluton of life, from physical evloution to the evloution of life mind and conscounsness.

      Cetana as a sundmental quality of the soul is pure consciousness, a king of fame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal, although it gets manifested in the course of the evolitionary porcess of life in the empirica sense. This emprital cnsiousness arises from the cotact of the sense organs with the obejcts. Centana in its pure form gets emobdied with the Atama and ces into contact with empriical life with the sense organs and objects. It manifests itself in the form of jana and darsaa. Jnana and Darsaa are therefore aspetcs of cetaa ad cetana is the springboard froj which they arise. It is like the flood of light in which objects are iluminated .it is the psychic background and the psychic halo of cogition in its two aspects jnana and darsana. Cetana, thererore is the light of conscounsess that the soul possesses ad throught this lifht the cogition of objects arises.

      The analysis of the states of consciousness has been an important problem for philosphers as well as the psychologists Consciounsesss has three aspects- the cognitive, the affective and the conatie. They are modes of consciousness. It perceiveing, belieceing or otherwise appreheding, that sch and a thing exists ad has characteristics� one�s attitude is cognitive. In the aggective attitude oe is either pleased or displeased about it and tries ot alter it I some respect. This attitude is conative.37 but stout says that though these three modesof consciousness are abstracty ad analyticaly distince phases I a concretetion from each othe r. mind is an organic unity ad its activites have the ackisest degree of organic inter-action. However, in every psychosis oe of the aspects may be predominat. In the pleasure of pursuit, feetling presupposes cotaion. Sometimes feeling is dependent on certain conative attitude invloved in the perceputal process. Similar reciprocity is found in conation and cogition.