India thinkers wre aware of the distinction of states
in consiousness. The Jainas recognize three forms of consciousness. They
make a distinction between consciousees as knowig, as feetling and as
experiecing the fruits of Karma (karma-phala-cetana) and willng.38
conation and feeling are closely allied. As a rule we have first feeling,
next onation and then knowledge.39 mc Dougall has emphasized that feelig
is the core of al istinctive activity. In fact in al experience there is a
core off feeling, while the cogitive and conative aspects are varying
factors. In the ajitareeya Upanisad there is metion of differet
modes of experiece. Sensation, perception ad ideaation are differet modes
of intellection. Perception and ideation are different modes of
intelection. It recognizes feeling and volition as the other two forms of
experience. The seers of Upanisads give a classification of seven meanta
functuon. 40 At the basis is intellection .the chandogyopanisad
emphasizes the primacy of the will. The Buddhists also recognozed such a
distnction. We have perception or and ocnception, feeling and affection,
and conation or wil. In the Buddhist theory, will is the most dominant
aspect of conscious experience, the basa element of huma oife.
Radhakrishan in his indian phiolosphy suggests the vijnana,
vedana and samskara roughly correspond to knowsedge, feeling and
will.41 childers in his dictionary brings the concept of conation under
samaskara Mrs Rhys Davids believes that, although there is no clear
distinction betwee conation in the pshchlolgialsense and will in the
ethical sense, still in the pritaksas there is consistent discrimaination
between psychlogial importance and ethical imploication.42 professor
stout has given up old tripartite clasification of mental states and
reverts to the ancient bipartite analysis of mind bringing the affective
and conative elements together under the name of interest. Radhakrishanan
syas that if we discard the separation of cognition and make it the
theoretial aspect of contation, we get to buddihist emphasis on contaion
as the central fact of mental life.
In the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory also there is a
description of the mainfestiation of the three aspects of self as
knowledge, desire ad vloition. We have to know a thing before we feel the
wat of it. In order to satisfy the want, we act thus, as Hiriyaa says,
feelig mediates between cognition and conation. Thus the modes of
consciousness have been the probelem of philosophers and psychologists.
There is a genera agreement regardig th ediision of consciousness into
three modes, although deffeet philosophers have emhasized different
aspects in the concrete psychosis. Buddhists have emphasized in the
Chandorya and mariti Upanisads.43 In the Chandogya again we get a
dwscription of the primacy of the will but this has reference to the
cosmic will rather than to its psychological aspect. The Jainas emphasize
the close ralation between conation and feeling. The Nyaya theory
describes the functio of feeling as a mediating factor between cognition
and conation.
III.self-cpscopismess: The teem self-consciousness is
very ambiuous. It may mean conscuousness of the self, as an object igve in
introspectio. In this sense, the self, the empriical ego becoes both an
aspect of experience and also an object of esperience. Self-cosciousness.
It is not an object of knowledge. It is the ultimate subject presupposed
in acts of knowledge. Again consciousness may mean the ultimate eternal
consciousness, which is a metaphysical concept. It is also used in the
emprirical sense as consciouness which is changig.44some of the erlier
philosphers have ot ade a cear distinction between the metaphyusical and
the pschologial sense of consciousness. In the Upaisads, the atman is
described as the basis and the absolute knower, ad how ca the knower
itself be known.45 it cannot becompreheded by intelect. It is the seer
and the knower.46 yet higher intuito. It is knowable as th epratyagatmanma,
apprehended by adhyatmayoga.47 the Buddhists recogize the distinction
between subject and object within the consciousness. They do not believe I
the transcendenta self. Their view of consciousness is like the stream of
consciousness of William James. Yogacaras believe theat self is a series
of caonition or ideas. There is not self apart from cognition. They reeal
neither the self ot the non-self.
Some Nyaya philosophers,
specially the eo-naiyayikas belileced that the sef is an oject of interna
perception manasapratyaksa. The Caishesikas also maintain that,
aoshtough the self is not an object of perception but of infeence, it can
be apprehended by Ypogic intuitin. The samkhya philosophers maintain that
consciousness is the essence of sef. It is self-intuition. Self is
inferred through its reglection in buddhi. But patanjali accepts
the supernorma intuiton of the self through the power of concetration. The
self can know itsef through its reflcetio it its pure sattva and
alsowhe mixed with rajas and tamas by supernormal itution (pratibha-jnana).
So, the pure self can know the emprical self, but the eprirical self
cannot know the pure self. There is the contradiction involved in the
self-being both subject and object and the reflection theorydoes not uch
improe the situatuion. Cacaspati tries to avoid the cotradiction by saying
that transcedental self is the subject, and the empriical self-the object,
of self-apprehension.
According to prabhakara,
self in necessarily known in every act of cognition. Cognition is self-
liminous. it not ony manifests itself but also supports the atma
much as the fame and the wick. Neither the self not the object is sef-
luminous. There can be consuciousness of a object without the consiousness
of the self. In every act of cognition ther eis a direct and immediate
apprehension of te self. But the self can never be known as object of
knowledge. It is ony to be known as a subject it is receled by triputa
samvit.
