Jainworld
Jain World
Sub-Categories of Passions
Section - I
Section - II
Section - III
Section - IV
Section - V
  Section - VI

Section - III

 

 

III.1. The other variety of Praman is Paroksa.

 

III.2. (Paroksa) consists of varieties Smriti, Pratyabhijnana, Tarka, Anumana and Agama and is caused by Pratyaksa etc.

 

III.3. Remembrance (Samiti) is of the form "it is that" produced by the raising up of previous experience.

 

III.4. As for example, "This is Devadatta".

 

III.5. Pratyabhijnana is the deduction following from Darsana and Smriti e.g. this is verily that, this is like that, this is different from that, this is opposite to that etc.

 

III.6. As for example, this is that Devadatta.

 

III.7. A Gavaya is like a cow.

 

III.8. A buffalo is different from a cow.

 

III.9. This is far from this.

 

III.10. This is a tree etc.

 

III.11. The knowledge of universal concomitance arising from finding and not finding, is Uha (or Tarka).

 

III.12. Such as, this exists when that exists and this does not exist when that does not exist.

 

III.13. For example, smoke exists only in fire and when there is no fire, there is no smoke.

 

III.14. Anumana (inference) is the knowledge of Sadhya (the major term) from Sadhna (the middle term).

 

III.15. Hetu (or Sadhana or Linga) is that which is fixed in concomitance with Sadhya.

 

III.16. Avinabhava (or Vyapti i.e. universal concomitance) is the rule of co-existence or the existence of one following the other (being related as cause and effect).

 

III.17. Sahabhava exists in objects co-existent or in objects Vyapya and Vyapaka.

 

III.18. Karma-bhava exists in cases when one follows the other or in the case of cause and effect.

 

III.19. This is ascertained by Tarka (Universal concomitance).

 

III.20. Sadhya is what is desired and what is Abadhita (i.e. opposed to Pratyaksa etc.) and what is not Siddha (already established).


III.21. The word "Asiddha" has been used in defining Sadhya so that the doubtful, the false and the not understood may become Sadhya.

 

III.22. The words "Ista" and "Abadhita" have been used so that what is not desired and what is opposed to Pratyaksa etc. might not be (included in the definition of) Sadhya.

 

III.23. In the case of an adversary, "Ista" is not required like "Asiddha".

 

III.24. The intention to explain exists only in the speaker.

 

III.25. Sadhya is a Dharma and sometimes it is Dharmi in which there is the abode of the Dharma.

 

III.26. This is also known as Paksa (the minor term).

 

III.27. Dharmi is well known.

 

III.28. When it (Dharmi) is established by Vikalpa, the Sadhya consists of existence and non-existence.

 

III.29. The omniscient exists. Horns of the ass do not exist.

 

III.30. When (a Dharmi) is established by Pramana or by both (i.e. by Praman and Vikalpa), it is characterised by having the Dharma as Sadhya.

 

III.31. As for example, this place has fire; sound is transient.

 

III.32. In universal concomitance, the Sadhya is only Dharma (and not Dharmi).

 

III.33. Otherwise, it (i.e. universal concomitance) cannot happen.

 

III.34. The Paksa (minor term) is used though it is understood (from Pratyaksa) to dispel doubts regarding the abode of Sadhya (major term) when it is a Dharma.

 

III.35. As for example, Upanaya is used to explain the Dharma of Sadhana (the middle term, sign or mark) in the Dharmi containing Sadhya.

 

III.36. Is there any one who does not use a Paksa to substantiate after mentioning the three kinds of Hetu (Middle term)?

 

III.37. These two only are the limbs of Anumana (inference) and not the Udaharana (illustration).

 

III.38. That (Udaharana) is not the cause of understanding the Sadhya because, the aforesaid Hetu works there (as the cause).

 

III.39. (That Udaharana) also is (not necessary) for establishing the universal concomitance (with the Sadhya). That (universal concomitance) is established from the opposition to its adverse (character).

 

III.40. A Udharana deals only with particular but Vyapti deals with universal concomitance. If that is not understood, the fault of Anavastha will arise, as recourse to another example will have to be made.

 

III.41. (This Udaharana) cannot remind the universal concomitance, because such a reminiscence arises from the use of Hetu of that kind (which is connected with previously understood knowledge of the connection between smoke and fire.

 

III.42. This (Udaharna) only raises a doubt in establishing Sadhya (e.g. fire) in the Dharmi (e.g. mountain) containing Sadhya (e.g. fire).

 

III.43. Otherwise, why should there be Upanaya (application) and Nigamana (conclusion)?

 

III.44. These (Upanaya and Nigamana) are not parts of that (Anumana) because by mentioning the Sadhya and the Hetu in the Dharmi containing the Sadhya, no doubt exists.

 

III.45. (The establishment e.g. fire) is got from the support of the limb of Anumana named Hetu (e.g. smoke) as this (Hetu e.g. smoke) is connected with the Sadhya (e.g. fire).

 

III.46. These (Dristanta or illustration) etc. may be for understanding of those who have little knowledge and for this purpose may be discussed only in the Sastra, but these are quite unfit to be used in logical discussions.

 

III.47. The Dristanta is of two kinds, being with Anvaya and Vyatireka.

 

Commentary: It has been mentioned that Dristanta, Upanaya and Nigamana are not parts of Anumana. But in the previous aphorism it was stated that these may be discussed in the Sastra for teaching students. So in this and the next two aphorisms the two kinds of Dristanta, and in aphorisms 50 and 51 Upanaya and Nigamana are explained.

 

III.48. Where the Sadhana is shown as always concomitant with Sadhya, that is (an example) of Anvaya Dristanta.

 

III.49. Where the absence of Sadhana is mentioned through the absence of Sadhya, that is (an example) of Vyatireka Dristanta (illustration).

 

III.50. Upanaya is the application (asserting the existence) of the Hetu (in the Dharmi after a knowledge of concomitance).

 

III.51. Nigamana is the (conclusion) of the Pratijna (Proposition).

 

III.52. This Anumana is of two kinds:

 

III.53. Svartha and Parartha.

 

III.54. Svartha (Anumana) has already been defined.

 

III.55. Parartha (Anumana) arises from words touching that (Svarthanumana).

 

Commentary: Anumana is of two kinds, Svarthanumana and Pararthanumana. The former variety has been defined in aphorism 14 of the third samuddesa (Section) of this work viz. "the knowledge of Sadhya (the major term e.g. fire) from Sadhana or

Hetu (the middle term e.g. smoke) is Anumana." Pararthanumana arises through words of another.

 

III.56. The words expressing this (Parathanumana) is also Pararthanumana as these (words) are the cause of that (knowledge arising in Pararthanumana).

 

III.57. That Hetu is of two kinds: Upalabdhi and Anupalabdhi.

 

Commentary: We have already mentioned that universal concomitance can be expressed in two ways viz. affirmatively called Anvaya e.g. 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' or negatively called Vyatreka e.g. where there is no fire there is no smoke.' The first kind of Hetu is known as Upalabdhi and the second Anupalabdhi.

 

III.58. Upalabdhi is subdivided into Vidhi and Pratisedha. Anupalabdhi also (is subdivided into the same two kinds).

 

Commentary: In Upalabdhi Hetu, the Sadhya may be of two kinds Vidhi and Pratisedha. These two kinds of Sadhya also can  exist in Anupalabdhi Hetu. It should not be said that in Upalabdhi the Sadhya is only in the form of Vidhi and in Anupalabdhi, it is in the form of Pratisedha.

 

The Upalabdhi and Anupalabdhi Hetus are subdivided into two kinds each: those which prove the existence of a fact (Vidhi) and those that prove the non-existence of a fact (Nesedha).

 

A Hetu may also be of Viruddha (contradictory) nature implying existence of a fact which is incompatible with the Sadhya e.g. there is no fire in this pitcher, because it is full of water; or it may be of Aviruddha (non-contradictory) nature such as in an

argument which is not based on any fact incompatible with the existence of Sadhya e.g. there is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it.

 

III.59. Aviruddha Upalabdhi is of six kinds in Vidhi (existence of fact) viz. Vyapya, Karya (effect), Karana (cause), Purvachara, Uttarachara and Sahachara (coexistent).

 

Commentary: Upalabdhi in Vidhi will be explained in Aphorisms 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 70 respectively.

 

III.60. From Rasa (juice), one thing is inferred and from that, Rupa (form) is inferred. Those who accept this, accept also some Karana as Hetu where there is no other Karana to obstruct the potency of (the Karana or cause).