Jain World
Sub-Categories of Passions
Section - I
Section - II
Section - III
Section - IV
Section - V
  Section - VI

Section - VI



VI.1. The opposite of it, is Abhasa of the same.


Commentary: In this Chapter, the fallacies will be taken up and described. We have mentioned before hand the nature, number, objects and result of Pramana. The opposite of these will be fallacies of these. The fallacies of Pramana are described in Aphorisms 2-54, those of number are described in aphorism 55; those of object are described in aphorism 61 and those of result in aphorism 66.


VI.2. Pramanabhasas (fallacies of Pramana) are non- cognizance by one's own-self, knowledge of what has already been known, doubt etc.


VI.3. Because (such knowledge) does not establish its own object.


VI.4. As (for example), the knowledge of another person, the knowledge of a thing previously known, the knowledge of touching grass of a person moving, the knowledge whether this is a post or a man etc.


Commentary: By the word "doubt etc." in the aphorism, Samsaya (doubt), Anadhyavasaya and Viparyaya are meant. These have been thoroughly described in the commentary on aphorism 3 section I of this work.


VI.5. Like Samjukta Samavaya (co-inherence) of eye and juice in a thing.


VI.6. When Pratyaksa is accepted in (things) not clear, we have its fallacy e.g. cognizance of fire by the followers of the Buddhist philosophy from sudden vision of smoke.


VI.7. In Paroksa (accepted) in clearness, (we have) its fallacy (Paroksabhasa) e.g. knowledge derived from the senses as accepted by the Mimasakas.


VI.8. Smaranabhasa (fallacy of memory) is the knowledge in one of another e.g. when we (falsely recognise) Jinadatta as Devadatta.


Commentary: Fallacies of each of the subdivisions of Pratyaksa viz. Smriti, Pratyabhijnana, Tarka, Anumana and Agama are described in Aphorisms 8, 9, 10, 11-50 and 51 of this section.


Smriti or smarana (recollection) has been defined in Aphorism 3 of section III. We see Jinadatta. Later on when we see him again, we recognize him to be that Jina-datta. This is smriti or recollection. But if we have remembrance of Devadatta when we see Jinadatta, this will be a fallacy of recollection (Smaranabhasa).


VI.9. Fallacy of Pratyabhijnana is the knowledge of "this is that" in things bearing similarity or knowledge or similarity in the identical thing e.g. in the case of twins.


VI.10. Knowledge of concomitance in objects not related is fallacy of Tarka.


VI.11. The following are fallacies of Anumana.


Commentary: Anumana has been defined in Aphorism 14 of Samuddesa III. Anumana is employed by using Paksa, Hetu and Dristanta. Fallacies of these viz. Paksabhasa, Hetvabhasa and Dristantabhasa with their subdivisions will be described in the

following aphorisms.


VI.12. Among them Paksabhasa (fallacy of the minor term or thesis) is Anista (un-accepted) etc.


VI.13. Anista (un-accepted) is (the view of) Mimamsakas that sound is mometary.


VI.14. It is established that sounds can be heard by the ear.


VI.15. Opposition (may exist) from Pratyaksa, Anumana, Agama, popular acceptance and one's own words.


VI.16. In these subdivisions, Pratyaksa-vadhita (opposed to Pratyaksa) may be exemplified by "Fire is not hot as it is a thing e.g. water".


VI.17. Sound is without modification as it is something caused e.g. a pitcher.


VI.18. Dharma will produce grief after death as it is subservient to beings like Adharma.


Commentary: This is an example of the fallacy Agama-vadhita. In all sastras, it is accepted that pursuit of Dharma will produce happiness after death and Adharma will cause misery. If we try to establish by inference that Dharma will produce misery after

death, it will be an example of Agama-vadhita Anumana (i.e. inference as opposed to the sastras).


VI.19. A human skull is pure as it is a part of the body of an animal like a conch-shell or oyster.


Commentary: This is an example of Loka-vadhita Anumana or inference opposed to public understanding.


VI.20. My mother is barren because she does not conceive in spite of connection with male like women famous as barren.


VI.21. Hetvabhasas are Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikantika and Akinchitkara.


VI.22. Asiddha is that whose existence is wanting to Paksa and which is not definitely established.


Commentary: Asiddha Hetvabhasa is of two kinds: Svarupasiddha and Sandigdhasiddha.


These will be described in the aphorisms which follow.


VI.23. "Sound is perishable because it can be seen by the eyes."


VI.24. Because it does not exist at all in its self.


VI.25. When there is uncertainty, if one says to a man of inferior intellect `Here is fire because there is smoke.'


VI.26. He has doubt owing to the existence of vapour etc. in the collection of many elements (earth, water, etc., and he cannot definitely ascertain whether it is smoke or vapour).


VI.27. To (the follower of) the Sankhya (philosophy) : `Sound is perishable, because it is caused (by some one).


VI.28. Because he does not know (or accept) it.


VI.29. Viruddha (Hetvabhasa) is concomitance with the opposite of the major term e.g. sound is not perishable because it is caused.


VI.30. In anaikantika (Hetvabhasa), (Hetu) residues also in Vipaksa (in addition to being in Paksa and Sapaksa).