Jo na
pamananayehim, nikkhevenam nirikkhade attham.
Tassajuttam
juttam, juttamjuttam ca padihadi. (32)
To one, who
does not ascertain the meaning (of a word) by Pramana, Naya and Niksepa,
appears what is proper to be improper and what is improper to proper. (32)
Nanam hodi
pamanam, nao vi nadussa hidayabhavattho.
Nikkheo vi uvao,
juttie atthapadigahanam. (33)
Knowledge is
pramana : naya is view-point of the knower, the way of knowing is called
Niksepa i.e. reasoning to understand the proper meaning of the text. (33)
Nicchayavavaharanaya, mulabheya nayana savvanam.
Nicchayasahanaheum, pajjayadavvatthiyam munaha. (34)
The real point
of view (Niscaya-naya) and the empirical point of view (vyavahara-naya)
are the two fundamental types of view-points (nayas). The dravyarthika
naya (substantial point of view) and the paryayarthika-naya or the modal
point of view are the two means for comprehending the real nature of a
thing. (34)
Jo siya
bheduvayaram, dhammanam kunai egavatthussa.
So vavaharo
bhaniyo, vivario nicchayo hoi. (35)
The empirical
point of view (or the Vyavahara-naya) is fragmentary i. e. it does take a
thing as whole but concentrates on its units only. The opposite of it is
called the real view-point which takes a comprehensive view and takes into
consideration the thing as a whole. (35)
Vavharenuvadissai, nanissa carittam damsanam nanam.
Na vi nanam na
carittam, na damsanam Janago suddho. (36)
From the
stand-point of vyavahara-naya it is said that a knower is possessed of
conduct, faith and knowledge, but in fact (that is, from the stand-point
of niscaya-naya) he possesses neither knowledge nor conduct, nor faith but
is purely of the form of a knower. (36)
Evam
vavaharanao, padisiddho jana nicchayanayena.
Nicchayanayasida puna, munino pavanti nivvanam. (37)
Know that the
empirical point of view is contradicted by the real point of view. The
saints who take recourse to the real point of view (Niscaya-Naya) attain
salvation. (37)
Jaha na vi
sakkamanajjo, anajjabhasam vina u gaheum.
Taha vavaharena
vina, paramatthuvaesanamasakkam. (38)
Just as it is
impossible to explain things to a non-Arya without taking recourse to a
non-Aryan language, similarly it is impossible to explain the ultimate
truth without taking recourse to vyavahara-naya. (38)
Vavaharo'bhuyattho, bhuyattho desido du suddhanao.
Bhuyatthamassido khalu, sammaitthi havai jivo. (39)
It is said that
the empirical point of view does not explain reality as it is, while the
real point of view explains it as it is. He' who takes recourse to the
reality as it is, attains the right faith. (39)
Nicchayamavalambanta, nicchayato nicchayam ajananta.
Nisanti
caranakaranam, bahirakaranalasa kei. (40)
Those who have
recourse to the real point of view only and does not know it correctly,
being negligent regarding to the minor rule of external conduct spoil the
whole discipline i,. e. major and minor code of conduct. (40)
Suddho
suddhadeso, nayavvo paramabhavadarisihim.
Vavaharadesida
puna, je du aparame tthida bhave. (41)
Reality can be
understood properly by those who have realized the highest truth: but for
those who are in a lower state it is proper to expound the reality through
the empirical point of view. (41)
Nicchayao
dunneyam, ko bhave kammi vattai samano.
Vavaharao ya
kirai, jo puvvatthio crittammi. (42)
Verily, it is
very difficult to know the mental states of monks; therefore the criterion
of senionrity in the order of monks should be decided by practical
vie-point i.e. standing monkhood. (42)
Tamha savve
vi naya, micchaditthi sapakkhapadibaddha.
Annonnanissiya
una, havanti sammattasabbava. (43)
Hence all the
nayas (view-points), so long as they remain confined to their own
respective stand-points, are perverted, but when they are mutually
dependent on one another, they verily become true. (43)
Kajjam
nanadiyam, ussaggavavayao bhave saccam.
Tam taha
samayaramto, tam saphalam hoi savvam pi. (44)
Conduct,
knowledge atc. are right one when they satisfy general rules as well as
the exceptional conditions. They should be practised in such a manner that
they become fruitful. (44)
