1. SANKHYA
Gandhi bases his account of
the Sankhya system on the version of it that we find in the Sankhya Sutras
(a version not essentially different from that found in the Sankhya Karika and
one entitled to be treated as 'Classical Sankhya'). Students of Indian
Philosophy attach importance to the Sankhya system for diverse‑nay, mutually
opposite‑reasons. Those inclined to favor idealism (if the Advaita Vedanta
type, say) emphasize the fact that according to Sankhya the world of
day‑to‑day experience (in it capacity as an evolute of Prakrit) is real
to a soul‑in‑bondage (i.e. a soul‑under‑ignorance) but unreal to an
emancipated (i.e an enlightened) soul; those inclined to favor realism
emphasize the fact that according to Sankhya prakriti, the root‑cause
of the world of day‑to‑day experience, is a reality co‑eternal with the
multiplicity of souls.
As a matter of fact, the
Sankhya philosopher's position on the question is considerably obscure, it
being really difficult to make out as to what he precisely means by his thesis
that prakriti evolves itself in the form of the world of day‑to‑day
experience for a soul that is in bondage while it ceases to do so for a soul
that is emancipated. With this obscurity in the background we can easily
follow Gandhi's account of the Sankhya system. Gandhi gives prominence to the
Sankhya philosopher's contention that the world of day‑to‑day experience
evolved out of prakriti is not an illusory appearance and that the
souls are many in number, a contention directed against two fundamental theses
of Advaita Vedanta. But he raises pointed objection against the Sankhya
position that Buddhi ('intellect' in Gandhi's translation) is a product
of prakriti (which in turn is a physical entity) while ahankara
('self‑consciousness' in Gandhi ji's translation) is a product of Buddhi.
The functions that the Sankhya philosopher assigns to Buddhi and
ahankara will be assigned to soul by Gandhi (rather by the Jaina
philosopher) and the latter must have noted that the former's way of speaking
paves the way for the Advaita Vedantist's dismissal of a soul's individuality
as an illusory appearance. For Buddhi and ahankara represent the
essence of an individual's individuality, and if they have nothing to do with
soul the conclusion certainly follows that soul has nothing to do with an
individual's individuality; and this conclusion couple with the thesis that
all physical phenomena whatsoever are illusory naturally leads to the Advaita
Vedanta position that the sole existing reality is one soul. Of course, Gandhi
must have also realized that the functions attributed by the Sankhya
philosopher to Buddhi and ahankara cannot be the functions of a
physical entity (as Buddhi and ahankara allegedly are), for to
concede that possibility will mean embracing materialism. Be that as it may,
Gandhi made an honest attempt to place before his audience the picture of an
Indian system of philosophy that is partly idealist, partly realist, partly
materialist. And if it is the realistic aspects of the Sankhya teaching that
chiefly received Gandhi's attention it is not because Gandhi was himself a
realist but because the 'classical Sankhya' is actually a realistic system of
philosophy on the whole. One more point. Gandhi well observed that in an
Indian system of philosophy the metaphysical and ethic ‑religious matters
invariably go hand in hand, but he also knew that the importance attached to
these two in different systems is differently proportioned. And consequently
in his exposition of a system of Indian Philosophy Gandhi would endeavor to
remain loyal to the spirit of the original in this respect. Thus he treated
Sankhya as a philosophical system chiefly devoted to theoretical problems
while touching upon the problems of practice as well; (on the contrary, he
treated the Yoga of Patanjali as a philosophical system chiefly
devoted to practical problems while touching upon the problems of theory as
well). That is why Gandhi begins his lecture on Sankhya by telling us that the
Sankhya philosopher aims at a cessation of the threefold miseries while in the
course of his exposition he incidentally tells us as to what according to the
Sankhya philosopher is the nature of moksa and what the means of
attaining it, for the rest his concern is with the metaphysical tenets of the
Sankhya system.
2. YOGA
Gandhi rightly noted that the
Yoga system of philosophy‑ more properly, the system of philosophy
propounded by Pantanjali in his Yoga Sutras‑ differs but
little from Sankhya so far as theoretical questions are concerned; what
distinguishes Yoga is its over‑all preoccupation with practical matters. Hence
we find Gandhi too almost exclusively discussing practical matters throughout
his lecture on Yoga. But the practical matters taken into consideration by the
Yoga system are of a somewhat peculiar nature. The Yoga philosopher (rather
the Yoga adept) aims at developing the capacity to concentrate his mind on one
subject of the exclusion of everything else‑and ultimately to concentrate it
on `nothing'. A rough equivalent for `concentration of mind' is `cessation of
mental modifications (Skt. Citta vrtti‑ nirodha)' and whatever
theoretical problems interest a Yoga philosopher mostly arise in the course of
his inquiry into the precise nature of citta, citta‑vrtti and citta‑vrtti‑nirodha.
For the rest he is busy discussing the practical measures to be devised in
order to develop the capacity for `concentration of mind' (or discussing the
miraculous capacities that a practicing yogi allegedly comes to
acquire). Gandhi's exposition of Yoga therefore begins with a brief
account of citta, citta‑vrtti and citta‑vrtti‑nirodha; then is
considers the nature of the eight yogangas (or `means of yoga'‑ i.e.,
means for developing the capacity for concentration of mind), and lastly the
miraculous capacities that one allegedly comes to acquire as a result of
concentrating one's mind on this object or that. Now the first two yogangas
happen to be yam and niYams (in Gandhi's translation
`forbearances' and `observances') and the various sub‑species of them happen
to be various virtues of character. Thus the five yams are `abstaining
from killing (ahimsa)', `abstaining from falsehood (satya)',
`abstaining from theft (asteya)', `austerity (tapas)', `study (svadhyaya)'
and `resignation to God (Isvarapranidhana)'. Hence the consideration of
these two yogangas provided Gandhi a good opportunity to express his
views on a number of ethical questions. Of course, in his exposition Gandhi
did not want to deviate from what was actually said or implied in the Yoga
writings; but when he found that a particular position adopted by the Yoga
philosopher was not worth dilating upon he simply mentioned it and passed on.
This attitude becomes particularly striking in the later parts of his
exposition‑ that is, in the course of his exposition of the remaining six
yogangas and of the miraculous capacities allegedly acquired by a
practicing yogin. In these parts we are able to know a good deal as to
what the Yoga philosopher has to say on the questions under consideration but
pretty little as to what Gandhi himself feels about the matter. But one thing
is certain. In his own way Gandhi was thoroughly convinced that as a result of
controlled `concentration of mind' (and the allied yoga exercises) one can
come to acquire supra‑normal capacities of body and mind; this becomes clear
not only from the occasional comments made by him in the course of his present
lecture on Yoga philosophy but also from his numerous other lectures on the
subject of yoga which were later on published under the title `The Yoga
Philosophy'. Perhaps, Gandhi would not therefore endorse the following
stricture passed by Max Muller against that part of the Yoga Sutras
where the miraculous powers allegedly acquired by a practicing yogi are
enumerated: ``... we get more and more into superstitions, by no means without
parallels in other countries, but for all that, superstitions which have
little claim on the attention of the philosopher, however interesting they may
appear to pathologist", (The six systems of Indian philosophy, p. 351). But
then Max Muller had himself gone on to add; ``These matters, though trivial,
could not be passed over, whether we accept them as hallucinations to which,
as we know, our thinking organ (organs?) are liable, or whether we try
essential part on yoga philosophy and it is certainly noteworthy even
from a philosophical point of view, that we find such vague and incredible
statements side by side with the specimens of the most exact reasoning and
careful observation'' (Ibid., p. 352) Moreover, the acquisition of miraculous
capacities was not considered even by Gandhi to be the true aim of yoga
practice; for in his eyes this aim was `self‑culture' as he understood it.
3. NAYA (AND
VAISESIKA)
For reasons partly technical
and partly ideological the Naya‑Vaisesika system yet remains
`under‑studied' by the students of Indian Philosophy‑Indian as well as
Western. On account of their logical rigor‑ as also on account of their highly
evolved technical terminology ‑even the elementary Naya‑Vaisesika
texts are tough enough to scare the novice. Another reason for the comparative
neglect of the system lies in the content of its teaching. The Naya‑Vaisesika
philosophy is a type of empirical realism and as such it is opposed to the
transcendental idealism of Advaita Vedanta‑ the system patronized by a
majority of scholars working the field of Indian philosophy. Max Muller's
attitude was typical. "While in the systems hitherto examined," he says,
"particularly in the Vedanta, Sankhya and Yoga, there
runs a strong religious and even poetical vein, we now come to two systems,
Naya and Vaisesika, which are very dry and unimaginative, ...
businesslike exposition of what can be known, either of the world which
surrounds us or of the world within..." (The Six Systems, p. 362). Gandhi, who
was himself a man of deeply religious temperament, and who must have been
alive to the fact that the Naya‑Vaisesika system pays scant heed
to the problems of ethics and religion, could not ditto Max Muller's sweeping
condemnation of the system, not only because the condemnation was so sweeping
but also because Gandhi's own general philosophical standpoint was realistic
rather than idealistic. But as things stood, Gandhi did not think it
worthwhile to say much (maybe he had not think it worthwhile to say much
(maybe he had not much to say) about the philosophical teachings of the
Naya‑Vaisesika system, and what we have from his pen is a barest
outline of the sixteen topics (technically called Padarthas) whose
consideration exhausts what may be called the Naya philosophy and of
the seven categories (again, technically called Padarthas) whose
consideration exhausts what may be called a Vaisesika philosophy.
4.
MIMAMSA
Gandhi did not consider
Mimamsa to be a system of philosophy but a system of ritualism, and that
is why he just takes note of it and then passes on to the system to be taken
up next. As a matter of fact, Mimamsa is both a system of philosophy
and a system of ritualism. But the philosophical literature emanating from the
Mimamsa school belongs to the same broad category (and broadly presents
the same type of difficulties before a student) as does that emanating from
the Naya‑Vaisesika school. Nay, a serious study of the Naya‑Vaisesika
philosophy is impossible without a serious study of the Mimamsa
philosophy (just as it is impossible without a serious study of the Buddhist
philosophy as expounded by the school of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti). Be that as
it may, we too take leave of Mimamsa and proceed on the Vedanta.
