V
THE VEDANTA
PHILOSOPHY
1. The whole Vedanta
philosophy is based on the Upanishad portion of the Vedas. The
Chhandogya Upanishad contains several allegories, which have
become the starting point of the philosophy.
There is, for example, a
dialogue in the Chhandogya Upanishad between a young student Shwetaketu and
his father Uddalaka Aruni, in which the father tries to convince the son, that
with all his theological learning, he knows nothing and then tries to lead him
on to the highest knowledge, the Tatvmai or `thou art that'. The father
said to him, "Shwetaketu, go to school, for there is none belonging to our
race, darling, who not having studied, is, as it were, a Brahman by
birth only.
He began his apprenticeship
with a teacher when he was 12 years of age. He returned home when he was 24,
having then studied all the Vedas‑ conceited, considering him well- read and
very stern. His father said, to him, " Shwetaketu, as you are so conceited,
considering yourself so well read and so stern, my dear, have you asked for
that instruction by which we hear what is not audible, by which we perceive
what is not perceptible, by which we know what is unknowable." "What is that
instruction, Sir?" he asked. The father replied,� My dear, as by one clod of
clay all that is made a clay is known, the difference being only a name
arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay; and as, my dear, by
one nugget of gold all the is made of gold is known, the difference being only
a name arising from speech, but the truth being only a name arising from
speech, but truth being that all is gold; and, as my dear, by one pair of nail
scissors all that is made of iron is known, the difference being only a name
arising from speech, but the truth being that all is iron. Thus, my dear, is
that instruction." The son said, "Surely those venerable men (my teachers) did
not know that. For if they had known it why should they not have told it me?
Do you, Sir therefore, tell me that."
The father said, "In the
beginning, my dear, there was that only which, is, one only without a second.
Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not, one only
without a second; and from that which is not, that which is was born. But how
could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born of that which is
not? No, my dear, only that which is, was in the beginning, one without a
second. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire. That
fire thought, may I be many, May I grow forth. It sent forth water. Water
thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth. It sent forth fire.
That fire thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth water. Water
thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth earth (or food).
Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food is then produced. From water
alone is eatable food produced. As the bees, my son, make honey by collecting
the juices of descant trees and reduce the juice into one form, and these
juices have no discrimination, so that they might say, I am the juice of this
tree or that tree, in the same manner, my son, all these creatures when they
have become merged in the true (either in deep sleep or death) know not that
they are merged in the true. Whatever these creatures are here, whether lion
or a wolf or a boar or a worm or a midge or a gnat or a mosquito, that they
become again and again. Now that which is the subtle essence, in it all that
exists has its self. It is the true. It is the self, and thou, O Shwetaketu,
art it."
"Please, Sir, inform me still
more", said the son. "Be it so, my child," the father replied. "These rivers,
my son, run the eastern like the Ganges to the East, the western like the
Indus to the West. They go from sea to sea, i.e., the clouds lift up the water
from the sea to the sky and send it back as rain to sea. They become indeed
seas. And as those rivers, when they are in the sea, do not know, I am this or
that river, in the same manner, my son, all these creatures when they have
come back from the true know not that they have come back from the true.
Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a mosquito, that they
become again and again. That which is that subtle essence, in it all that
exists has its self. It is the true. It is the self, and thou, O Shwetaketu,
art it."
"Please, Sir, inform me still
more," said the son. "Be it so, my child," the father replied. " If some one
were to strike at the root of this large tree here, it would bleed but live.
If he were to strike at its stem, it would bleed but live. If he were to
strike at its tip, it would bleed but live. Pervaded by the living self that
tree stand s firm, drinking in its nourishment and rejoicing. But if life (the
living self) leaves one of its branches, that branch withers, if it leaves the
whole tree, the whole tree withers. In exactly the same manner, my son, know
this. This body indeed withers and dies when the living self has left it; the
living self never dies. That which is that subtle essence, in it all that
exists has its self. It is the true. It is the self, and thou, O Shwetaketu,
art it."
"Please, Sir inform me still
more," The son said. "Be it so, my child," the father said. Place this salt in
water and then wait on me in the morning." the son did as was commanded. The
father said to him, "Bring me the salt which you placed in the water last
night," The son having looked for it found it not, for of course it was
melted. The son having looked for it found it not, for of course it was
melted. The father said, "Taste it from the surface of the water. How is it?"
The son replied, " It is salt." "Taste it from the middle, How is it?" "It is
salt" "Taste it from the bottom. How is it?" The son said, " It is salt." The
father said, " Now leave the vessel and sit by my side." He did so. The father
asked, "Where is the salt? Do you see it?" The son said, " I do not see it but
it is in the water." The father said, " Here also in this body you do not
perceive the true, my son, but there indeed it is. That which is the subtle
essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the self,
and thou, O Shwetaketu, art it."
"Please, Sir, inform me more."
"Be it so, my child. If a man is ill, his relatives assemble round him and
ask‑ dost thou know me? Now as long as his speech is not merged in the mind,
his mind in breath, his breath in heat, heat in the highest Godhead, he knows
them. But when his speech is merged in his mind, his mind in breath, breath in
heat, and heat in the highest Godhead, he knows them not. That which is the
subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the
self, and thou, O Shwetaketu, art it."
2. I told you last time that
the Vedanta philosophy is based on the Upanishads. The ritual of
the Vedas was considered the Karmkand or the work portion, the
Upanishads constituted what is known as Gyankand or the knowledge
portion in so far as it propounds a certain theory of the world. I also told
you that Mimamsa was a system of ritualism which gave a correct interpretation
of the ritual of the Veda and the solutions of doubts and discrepancies
in regard to Vedic texts caused by the discordant explanations of
opposite schools. Just as the ritualistic portion of the Vedas became
object of comment by Jaimini, the author of the Mimamsa so did
Badarayana comment on or rather composed aphorisms based on the Upanishads.
3. The Vedanta
philosophy has its two chief supporters Shankara and Ramanuja. Both of them
rest their doctrines on the Upanishads. In Shankara's opinion the Upanishads
teach as follows:
(a) Whatever is, is in reality
one; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahma or Parmatman
(the highest self). This being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is
pure being or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought
Chaetanya, gyan. Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahma
as its attribute but constitutes its substance. Brahma is not thinking being,
but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever
qualities or attributes are conceivable can only be denied of it. But if
nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the
world by which we see ourselves surrounded and in which we ourselves exist as
individual beings? The answer is that Brahma is associated with a certain
power called Maya or Avidya. This power cannot be called
'being', for 'being' is only Brahma; nor can it be called' not‑being' in the
strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world. It is
in fact a principle of illusion, the non-definable cause owing to which there
seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences.
Being associated with this principle of illusion Brahma is enabled to project
the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his
incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of animate and
inanimate beings. Maya thus constitutes the Upadan (the material
cause) of the world, or if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that
Maya belongs to Brahma as Shakti, we may say that the material
cause of the world is Brahma in so far as it is associated with Maya.
In this latter quality Brahma is more properly called Ishwar (the
Lord).
Maya
under the guidance of the Lord modifies itself by a progressive evolution into
all the individual existences distinguished by special names and forms, of
which the world consists; from it there spring in due succession the different
material elements and the whole bodily apparatus belonging to sentient beings.
In all those apparently individual forms of existence the one indivisible
Brahma is present, but owing to the particular adjuncts into which ( ) has
specialized itself it appears to be broken up‑it is broken up, as it were‑
into a multiplicity of intellectual or sentient principles, the so called
Jeev (individual or personal souls). What is real in each is only the
universal Brahma itself, the whole aggregate of individualizing bodily organs
and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and
distinguish one Jeev from another, is the offspring of Maya and
as such unreal.
The phenomenal world or world
of ordinary experience Vyvehar thus consists of a number of individual
souls engaged in specific cognition's, volition's and so on and of the
external material objects with which those cognition's and volition's are
concerned. Neither the specific cognition's nor their objects are real in the
true sense of the world, for both are altogether due to Maya. But at
the same time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain Buddhist
schools according to which nothing whatever truly exists but certain trains of
cognition acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond for external
things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate
as much reality as the specific acts, whose objects they are.