FUNDAMENTALS OF JAINISM

BY

CHAMPAT RAI JAIN

BARRISTER‑AT‑LAW

Author of THE KEY OF KNOWLEDGE, THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT, ETC.,

Translator of The Ratnakranda Sravakachar

(A REVISED EDITION OF "THE PRACTICAL PATH")

VEER NIRVAN BHARTI

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MEERUT‑250 002 U.P. (INDIA)

Published with the help of:

L. NANAG RAM JAIN

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1100 Copies

Vir Nirvan Samvat 2500

Year 1974

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LIBRARY EDITION

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PREFACE

(FIRST EDITION)

'The Practical Path' is a companion volume to my earlier work, 'The Key of Knowledge', to which the reader is referred for fuller information on the subject of comparative theology, and for a general survey of the basic principles of religion. The object of the present volume is to point out the practical, scientific method of self‑realization, as laid down by the Jaina Tirthankaras who rose to the highest height of perfection with its aid. I have, therefore, refrained from repeating what I have already said in 'The Key of Knowledge', though no effort has been spared to make the present volume as self‑contained and complete in its own department as possible.

It is conceivable that the detailed information on the subject of Karma and other matters contained in the following pages might prove a little too tiresome for a certain class of critics; but obviously no details are too many for a proper study of a subject, and the mind which feels confounded with fullness of detail is never of the scientific sort, but only a frivolous one. There is no department of science, which can afford to dispense with detailed knowledge; nor can ought, but palsy of intellect result from unscientific thought. For this very reason, it has not been found necessary to refer to the non‑Jaina systems of Yoga, as they mainly content themselves with general discourses on abstract propositions about the method of self‑realization. Mystic in thought and tendency, they are seldom, if ever, clear or exact enough to enable one to know precisely what to do in a given situation, and are not only useless and dangerous to experiment with, but also foster much unholy superstition and spirit of mystification in the minds of men by their veiled and obscure hints and innuendoes.

HARDOI: C. R. JAIN

1st October 1916.

This is a reprint of the Book "The Practical Path" written by Late Shri Champat Rai Jain Barrister‑at‑Law. Out of ten chapters in the old book only first nine chapters have been included in this edition and the book has been re‑named as "Fundamentals of Jainism". there is great dearth of an Authenticated book on the Jainism in English as such Veer Nirvan Bharti, with blessings of Pujya Mahamuni Shri 108 Vidyanand Ji, decided to reprint this book. This is the Vth publication of Veer Nirvan Bharti and we hope in the present book, readers will understand easily the Principles of Jainism.

Sunder Lal Jain

President

CONTENTS

CHAPTERS

INTRODUCTION

'THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY'

THE TATTVAS

II. THE NATURE OF KARMA

III. ASRAVA

IV. BANDHA

V. SAMVARA

VI. NIRJARA

VII. MOKSHA

VIII. STAGES ON THE PATH

IX. DHARMA IN PRACTICE

‑‑‑‑‑ COMPARATIVE ANTIQUITY OF JAINISM

FORWARD

The late lamented Champat Rai Jain was a Bar‑at‑Law by profession; but he is better remembered on account of his numerous publications in English as a deep scholar of Comparative Religion. The Kew of Knowledge is his Magnum Opus. His comprehensive study of Comparative Religion and his deep understanding of Christianity and Islam he brought to bear on his study of Jainism. The result has been remarkable. In fact he can be looked upon as one of pioneers who introduced Jainism to the western world in a catching and effective manner. We owe to him a number of books in English dealing with the Householders Dharma, the Sannyasa Dharma, etc. His Practical Path or Practical Dharma is a neat exposition of Jainism, as a way of life. The present book Fundamentals of Jainism is based on the Practical Path of the late C. R. Jain from which some portions are omitted. The opening Chapter gives what can be called the method of understanding reality, or the AnekantaVada, which is rightly called 'intellectual Ahimsa' of the Jainas. The subsequent chapters give details about the fundamental principles of Jainism. They indicate how the mundane spirit can get rid of the shackles of Karma and steadily attain spiritual perfection following the stages on the path detailed here. The chapter dealing with Dharma in practice lays out what needs to be followed day‑to‑today by one who wants to lead a religious life.

This is indeed a useful book, which goes a long way to explain Jainism both to a lay reader and to an earnest student of comparative religion. It is but natural, therefore, that this brochure is blessed by Muni Shri Vidyanandaji.

The Publishers deserve our gratitude for its timely publication when we are celebrating the 2500th Anniversary of the Nirvana of Bhagawan Mahavira.

University of Mysore

Mysore; October 2, 1974

A.N. Upadhye

"There is evidence to show that so far back as the first century B.C. there were people who were worshipping Rishabh Deva, the first Tirthankara. There is no doubt that Jainism prevailed even before Vardhamana or Parsvanath. The Yajurveda mentions the names of three Tirthankaras‑‑‑‑ Rishabha, Ajitnath and Aristanemi. The Bhagavata Puran endorses the view that Rishabha was the founder of Jainism."

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan

Indian Philosophy Vol. I, P. 287

Introduction

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY (ANEKANTVAD)

The very first thing the follower of Jainism is required to impress upon his mind is the fact that the path of salvation consists in Right Belief, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, called the three Jewels by the Jaina philosophers.

It is a self‑evident truth that the successful achievement of an object of desire depends on the scientific validity of the means employed for the purpose; and equally evident is the fact that in all our pursuits and occupations we only resort to those methods of securing the end in view which have a causal connection with its accomplishment. The universal Law of Cause and Effect, thus, is the determining factor of all human, that is to say rational, activity, and it is obvious that nothing but confusion, disappointment and discomfiture, to say nothing of the pain and suffering which inevitably follow the baffled endeavors of mankind to secure some object of desire, can result from a disregard of this self‑evident truth. The truth is that chance has no voice in the order of nature, and cannot be relied upon as a rational method of securing any desired end.

The law of cause and effect also holds good in the region of spiritual science, notwithstanding its emphatic denial by semi‑trained theologians at times. For, were it otherwise, spiritual emancipation would have to fall within the uncertain domain of chance, and the method of the attainment of the ideal of the soul would be deprived of its rational basis of efficacy, leaving mankind to grope in the darkness of uncertainty and doubt by no means a happy predicament.

The necessity for right knowledge* (*It is interesting to note in this connection that almost all the rational religions of the world also lay stress on the necessity for knowledge as a pre‑requisite of Moksha. Thus the "rite Janna na Mukti' (no salvation without knowledge) of the Vedas is directly confirmed by 'Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free' (John, VIII. 32) of Jesus, and, implying at least by, 'he dieth not who giveth (his) life to learning' The sayings of Muhammad) of the Prophet of Islam.) cannot, therefore, be overrated. In respect of right belief also it is evident that it is essential to the utility of knowledge, since belief signifies a cessation of doubt, and also since people only live up to their beliefs. Right conduct also is a necessary condition to the attainment of final emancipation, for no desired results are possible without the doing of the right thing at the right moment.

The subject of inquiry, or knowledge, in so far as spiritual emancipation is concerned resolves itself into the nature of that beatific condition and of the causes, which stand in the way of its attainment. These in their turn involve the nature of that beatific condition and of the causes, which stand in the way of its attainment. These in their turn involve the nature of existing realities, or substances, and their interaction. We thus get the following seven Tattvas (essentials or objects of knowledge):

(1) Jiva (intelligence or living substance),

(2) Ajiva (matter and other non‑intelligent substances),

(3) Asrava (the influx of karmic matter), (4) Bandha (bondage),

(5) Samvara (the stopping of Asrava),

(6) Nirjara (the gradual removal of karmic matter),

(7) Moksha (the attainment of perfect freedom).

The would‑be aspirant for Moksha has to understand the nature of these Tattvas, the knowledge of which is a condition precedent to the acquisition of that well balanced state of mind, which is designated by the word belief or faith.

In this connection it is necessary to point out two of the pit‑falls of philosophy into which almost all the non‑ Jaina metaphysicians have fallen unconsciously. The first one has reference to the idea of a beginning of the world process, and the second relates to the philosophy of stand‑ points on which the greatest stress has been laid by Jaina Acharyas.

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY - WORLD PROCESS

In respect of the world‑process, it is obvious to every thinking mind, that philosophy is concerned with the determination of the nature of things, and that the starting point of all rational speculation is the world of concrete reality which is presented to the individual consciousness through the media of senses. A philosopher takes, in the first instance, the world as he finds it, and aided by the methods of analysis and research, reduces the perceptible phenomena to their simpler components, so that when he arrives at simple elements, he knows them to be the eternal causes of the ceaselessly shifting panorama of form and shape, which constitutes our universe. Beyond these eternal causes or realities, it is impossible to proceed, because being simple in their nature they cannot depend, for their existence, on any thing else; in other words, their own individual natures alone are the causes of their existence individually. It follows from this that however far back we may go in time, no beginning of simple elements can be discovered or conceived, so that we never arrive at a point in the life‑story of nature when they were not. This is a death blow to the idea of a beginning, and its force will be felt by any one who seriously puts himself the question: how can a simple (non‑compound) substance be brought into existence? It should be remembered that a simple substance, or reality, differs from a compounded effect of simple elements in so far as it is not the product of two or more substances, but is not analyzable, unbreakable, indestructible thing in itself. Creation of these simple realities from pure nothing is out of the question, because nothing is devoid of all qualities including existence and substantiality.

If any one still wishes to adhere to the notion of a creation of all things from naught, let him put to himself the question, how can the different elements possibly owe their existence to one source? This would convince him that `nothing' can never be turned into a concrete, substantial `something' by means of any process whatsoever.

The conclusion we arrive at, then, is that the idea of a beginning of the elements is not entertained in philosophy. Now, since there are no air‑tight compartments to keep these elements separate from each other, and since the world‑ process is the result of the interaction and functioning of the different substances and elements, it follows that no starting point can be discovered for a general commencement of the universe. This amounts to saying that the idea of a creation is altogether untenable in philosophy.

SAPTABHANGI SYSTEM

We now come to the philosophy of stand‑ points which is the first step in scientific metaphysics. Any one who has at all bestowed a thought on the nature of philosophy, must have arrived at the conclusion that it aims at the perfection of knowledge to emancipate humanity from `the slavery of superstition and awe of nature's might, and that knowledge itself signifies nothing other than a sense of familiarity with the nature of things as they exist in the world. Now, everything in nature exists in relation to a number of other things, and is liable to be influenced by them in different ways. Besides, all things present different aspects when looked at from the point of view of their nature and when studied in respect of the forms they assume under the influence of some other thing or things. Furthermore, when they are described by men, they are generally described from a particular point of view, though the unwary are led to imagine this one‑sided description of their nature as exhaustive, many even falling into the pitfall of logical 'suicide' by basing their deductions on a set of rules or formulas which are applicable to facts gleaned from a particular stand‑point, but not to any other. We can observe for ourselves the nature of confusion which is likely to result from an ignoring or mixing up of different stand‑ points by means of the two following illustrations:

(1) Let us take for our first illustration the famous text, Jiva is Brahman (soul of God), which certain people preach without the least possible qualification. But obviously the statement is true only in so far as the natural qualities of the soul are concerned; it is not true in respect of the present manifested condition of an ordinary Jiva who must exert himself in the right direction to attain to his natural purity. As water in its essence is pure gaseous matter, so is a Jiva, with regard to his pure natural qualities, a perfect God; but as water, as water, cannot be said to be air, so cannot a Jiva involved in the samsara be said to be pure Brahman. This illustrates the effect of a one‑sided absolutism of thought which ignores all other points of view; and its far‑reaching consequences can be seen in the monistic speculations of certain philosophers who have based their system of metaphysics on the natural attribute of the soul, altogether ignoring the standpoint of evolution. These gentlemen, unable to explain the different conditions of beings and things arising in the course of their evolution, have actually found themselves forced to describe the world as an illusion, pure and simple.

(2) Our second illustration is intended to emphasize the effect of confounding the different standpoints. Suppose we say: 'Here is a jar of iron; if we remove its iron‑ness, it will cease to exist.' This is a perfectly true statement, as any body can see for himself. But if we now say: `Here is a jar of x; if we remove its x‑ness, it must cease to exist.', the conclusion might be true in some cases, and not in others, for x may represent only such non‑essential qualities or things as butter, or some living being's name. Obviously, a jar containing butter would never cease to exist by the removal of its contents, nor would one belonging to a person ever become a non‑entity by changing hands' and yet it is perfectly permissible, in speech, to say ' a jar of butter' and 'a jar of John'. This one instance suffices to illustrate the nature of confusion, which is likely to result in philosophy by indiscriminately mixing up, or confounding, the results of research made from different points of view. `This is a jar of iron', is a statement, which is true from the point of view called dravyarthika Naya, which takes into consideration the substantive attributes of things, while `the jar of butter', 'the bucket of John', and thee like, have no reference to the nature of the substance or substances of which the jar or the bucket might be made, but only describe them in respect of their contents or owner's name.

There are seven principal stand‑ points, which are employed by men in their description of things. These are:

(1) Naigama (the non‑distinguished) which describes things without distinguishing between their general and special properties.

(2) Sangraha (the collective) which deals exclusively with the general qualities of things.

(3) Vyavahar (the particular) is the standpoint of particularity. The difference between the Sangraha and the Vyavahar Naya lies in the fact that while the former describes things in respect of their general properties, the latter only concerns it self with their particular attributes.

(4) Rijusutra (literally the straight, hence the immediate) studies things as they exist in the present, and without regard to their past and future aspects.

(5) Sabda (literally the verbal, hence the point of view of a grammarian) pays exclusive attention to number, gender, tense, etc., of the words employed.

(6) Sambhiruda is the stand‑ point of an etymologist who distinguishes between synonymous words on etymological grounds.

(7) Evambhuta, literally such like, hence the point of view which describes things by words expressing their special functions, e.g., to call a man a devotee because of his being engaged in devotion.

These are the main kinds of Naya; and it is clear that each of them, taken by itself, is insufficient to impart full knowledge of things, and has to be taken as furnishing only partial information about their nature. They are current because of the practical requirements of human intercourse and the usage of society, which would be thrown into a state of chaos if lengthy descriptions were insisted upon, instead of short words, to describe things. Philosophy, which aims at the perfection of knowledge, however, cannot afford to follow the conventions of men designed to expedite their intercourse with their fellow beings, and must get hold of the actual truth by combining the results of investigation made from different points of view. A thorough insight into the philosophy of stand‑ points is also necessary to estimate the true value of the statements of our predecessors in the field of metaphysical research. Mankind would find, that almost all the confusion of thought, and we might also say the animosity existing between the followers of different religions, would cease to exist as soon as they would test the scriptural text which most of us blindly adhere to with the aid of the touch‑stone of Naya Vada (the philosophy of stand‑points). If they would only insert the word 'somehow' before any scriptural or prophetic, statement, they would find their minds becoming trained in the right direction to inquire into the stand‑point of the prophet who made any particular statement. The word somehow' (Syat is Sanskrit) would show that the statement was made from a particular point of view, and would at once direct the mind to find out what that stand‑point is. It would also enable us to reconcile many a seemingly contradictory statement in the scriptures of the same creed as well as in those of different faiths; for it does often happen. that a statement which is wrong from one particular point of view, is not so from another, e.g., one observer might say that a bowl full of water contains no air, both being right from their respective stand‑points since water is only gaseous matter in its essence though manifested in the form of a liquid substance owing to the action of atoms of hydrogen and oxygen on one another.

For the above reason the Jaina Siddhanta insists on the employment of the word Syat (somehow or from a particular point of view) before every judgment or statement of fact, though in ordinary parlance and composition it is generally dispensed with. There are three kinds of judgment, the affirmative, the negative and the one, which gives expression to the idea of indescribability. Of these, the first kind affirms and the second denies the existence of a quality, property or thing, but the third declares an object to be indescribable. A thing is said to be indescribable when both existence and non‑existence are to be attributed to it at one and the same time. These three forms of judgment give rise to seven possible modes of predication, which are set out below:

(1) Syadasti (somehow, i.e., from some particular point of view, a thing may be said to exist),

(2) Syannasti (somehow the thing does not exist),

(3) Syad asti nasty (affirmation of existence from one point of view and of non‑existence from another),

(4) Syadavaktavya (somehow the thing is indescribable),

(5) Syadasti avaktavya (a combination of the first and the fourth forms of predication),

(6) yannasti avaktavya (a combination of the second and the fourth forms), and

(7) Syadasti nasty avaktavya (a combination of the first, second and fourth forms of judgment).

This sevenfold system of predication is called the Saptabhangi (literally, the seven‑branched), and stands in the same relation to philosophy as grammar does to speech.

We shall now proceed to describe the fallacies of the seven kinds of Naya (stand‑ points) enumerated above. These are also seven in number, that is to say one for each Naya. Taken in the same order as their corresponding Naya, they may be described as follows:

(1) Naigamabhasa, the fallacy of the Naigama Naya, consists in making an actual division in thought between the general and special properties of things, as for instance to speak of the existence and consciousness of a soul as if they were two separate things.

(2) Sangrahabhasa occurs when we describe the general properties of a thing as constituting it solely. For instance it is incorrect to maintain that a tree can be constituted by the general qualities common to all trees, since an actual tree will have to be a particular kind of tree, and not the idea of tree‑ness in general.

(3) Vyavaharabhasi consists in making a wrong division of species.

(4) Rijusutrabhasa arises when we deny the permanence of things altogether. Those philosophers who hold that there is no "being" but only "becoming" in the world have fallen into this kind of error.

(5) Sabdabhasa occurs when we deal with words without regard to their number, gender, tense, etc. For instance, to take the Hebrew Elohim, which is pluralistic in form, as representing one individual Being would be an error of the Sabdabhasa type.

(6) Sambhirudabhasa lies in treating apparently synonymous words, which possess nice distinctions of meaning as if they all meant exactly the same thing. Pride and conceit may be taken to be fairly good instances of words, which if taken to mean exactly the same mental trait, would give rise to this fallacy.

(7) Evambhutabhasa lies in asserting that the existence of a thing depends on its performance of the particular function with reference to which alone it has been described, as for instance to say that a devotee is non‑existent because he is no longer engaged in devotion.

The nature of the Naya and the Saptabhangi system of predication having been shown, we now proceed to a general consideration of the Tattvas.

THE TATTVAS

The first two of the Tattvas deal with the nature and enumeration of the eternal realities, elements or substances of nature, and the remaining five with the interaction between two of these substances, namely, soul, or spirit, and matter. There are six simple substances in existence, namely, Spirit, Matter, Time, Space, Dharma and Adharma. Of theses spirit or soul‑substance, called Jiva in Jainism, is to be distinguished from the remaining five, called Ajiva, on account of the quality of intelligence with which it is endowed and of which the other substances are devoid. A substance is to be distinguished from a body or thing, in as much as the former is a simple element or reality while the latter is a compound of one or more substances or atoms. There may be a partial or total destruction of a body or thing, but no substance can ever be annihilated. Substance is the substrate of qualities which cannot exist apart it, for instance the quality of fluidity, moisture, and the like only exist in water and cannot be conceived separately from it. It is neither possible to create nor to destroy a substance, which means that there never was a time when the existing substances were not, nor shall they ever cease to be. From another point of view substance is the subject of modifications. Every substance has its characteristic function, as for instance the special function of Jiva is to know. Every substance is either atomic, that is composed of atoms, or is only one, indivisible expanse of existence. Dharma, Adharma and Space have no parts in their structure, that is to say are non‑atomic, while Jiva, Matter and Time consist of an infinite number of individuals, atoms and units respectively. There is an infinity of Jivas (souls) each of which is an individual in its own self, and possesses the potentiality of perfect or right faith, unlimited knowledge, infinite happiness and absolute power. Its nature is freedom which, when obtained, becomes the source of its great joy. In its modifications, it is the subject of knowledge and enjoyment, or suffering, in varying degree, according to its circumstances. The soul is not possessed of sensible qualities, and cannot be perceived with the senses. It has no permanent form of its own till it attains nirvana, when its form becomes fixed once for all and for ever. Like a semi‑fluid jelly, it assumes the form of the body in which it might happen to be in soul for the time being.

Matter is a non‑intelligent substance consisting of an infinity of particles or atoms, which are eternal. These atoms are possessed of sensible qualities, namely, taste, smell, color, and sparse* , (*Sparse means touch which is of eight kinds) , and sound also arises from their agitation in certain forms. Atoms form the material basis of all kinds of physical bodies from the most sukshma (subtle) to the grossest. They also combine with the soul when they obstruct its natural properties, thereby holding it in bondage.

Time is the cause of continuity and succession. It is of two kinds, Nishchay and Vyavahar. The former of these is a substance, which makes simple units revolve on themselves, thus giving rise to the idea of progress or change in the same place, that is continuity; but the latter in only the measure of duration, and depends on the succession of regularly recurring events of a universal type.

Dharma and Adharma are the two substances, which are helpful in the motion and stationary states of things respectively, the former enabling them to move from place to place and the latter to come to rest from the condition of motion.

Space is the substance which finds room for all other substances and things.

Four of these substances, namely, Time, Space, Dharma and Adharma, though necessary for the world‑process, play no important part in the scheme of spiritual evolution. We shall, therefore, pass on to a consideration of the nature of the interaction between spirit and matter, without stopping to describe the remaining substances any further.

THE NATURE OF KARMA (Karma ka swroop)

EMANCIPATION FROM BONDAGE

When Jesus of Nazareth propounded the proposition* (*See John, VII. 32) "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

His interlocutors failed to understand the nature of freedom, which the knowledge of truth was to carry to their hearts. It was their ignorance of the nature of spiritual bondage, which prevented them from grasping the true sense of the messianic observation. They looked upon freedom from only the political point of view, and had never thought of the true or spiritual freedom with which religion mainly concerns itself. They had then to be told, that freedom signified emancipation from the bondage of sin, but it is not clear, whether they fully comprehended the messianic speech even then, for even today it is difficult to believe that the full significance of the terms freedom and bondage has been adequately grasped by the humanity at large. Be this as it may, the important question for us is not whether the interlocutors and followers of Jesus understood his purpose or not, but what is the true significance of the terms freedom and bondage in the science of religion?

It is obvious that there is no concrete substance or thing to correspond to the word sin when used as a noun; the word expresses a pure mental abstraction, and conveys the idea of wrong‑ doing. The bondage of sin, thus, is clearly the thralldom of actions, i.e., karmas (actions or deeds), which is to be shaken off in order to bring the state of natural freedom of the soul into manifestation.

THEORY OF TRANSMIGRATION

It must be borne in mind that there can be no bondage to pure mental abstractions, or purely wordy concepts; the word signifies some kind of real fetters, not, indeed, consisting of chains of iron, but of a very subtle and invisible material. It is well to know that nothing but force, in some form or other, is capable of holding things in the condition of slavery, and that no kind of force can be conceived apart from a substance or material of some sort. The bondage of sin must, then, be a bondage of `matter, and the obtainment of freedom must consequently imply the destruction of bonds and the removal of the particles of foreign matter from the constitution of the soul.

This is precisely what is implied in the theory of transmigration, which undoubtedly, was well known to and accepted by every rational religion in the past. It is, however, in Jainism alone that we find it placed on a scientific foundation, and though the scriptures of other creeds contain allusions to it, these allusions are nearly always couched in mystic or unintelligible language and are never explained on lines of rational or scientific thought. This is one of the facts which explain the reason why the followers of certain religions, including Christianity, do not now accept the doctrine of re‑birth, and range themselves against the creeds which preach it.

That the theory of transmigration is a truth of philosophy will be readily acknowledged by any one who would study the nature of the soul and of the causes upon which depends its ensoulment in a body of matter. As regards to the former, that is the nature of the soul, it is sufficient to state that the qualities of feeling, willing and knowing, which are the special attributes of consciousness, are not to be found in matter, and must, for that reason be the property of a substance which differs in toto from it. The simplicity of the soul is proved by the fact that no one ever feels himself as many, which shows that the subject of knowledge, feeling, perception and memory is not a reality composed of many atoms or parts, but a simple individuality. Soul, then, is a reality, which is not indebted to any other substance for its existence, and as such must be deemed to be eternal and uncreated. This amounts to saying, that the line of existence of every soul merges in infinity both in the past and the future, so that each and every living being has a history of his own, however much he might be ignorant of the events of his earlier lives in his present incarnation.

In respect of the causes of the ensoulment of a Jiva in the body of matter, it is to be observed that in its natural purity the soul is the enjoyer of perfect wisdom, unlimited perception, infinite power and unbounded happiness, which, in the absence of a restraining force or body of some kind, must be deemed to be manifested in the fullest degree in its nature. The idea of such a perfect being descending to inhabit a body of flesh and thereby crippling its natural unlimited perfection, in a number of ways, is too absurd to be entertained for a moment. It follows from this that the soul did not exist in a condition of perfection prior to its present incarnation, and that the existence of some force capable of dragging Jivas into different wombs is a condition precedent to their birth in the several grades of life. But how shall we conceive force operation on soul and dragging it into an organism, if not as the action of some kind of matter? It is, therefore, clear that the soul must have been in union with some kind of matter prior to its birth in any given incarnation.

So far as the nature of matter which is found in union with the soul in its pre‑natal state is concerned, it most obviously must be of a very sukshma(fine) quality, since the fertilized ovum, which roughly speaking, is the starting point of the life of an organism is itself a very minute, microscopic structure. The body of this fine material, called the Karman sartor (the body of karmic matter), in technical language of the Jaina Siddhanta, is the cause and instrument of transmigration, and, along with the one called `the taijasa* sarira (body of radiant wonder), (*The electric body taijasa arira is a necessary link between the other two bodies of the soul- the Karma and the audarika, the body of the gross matter. The necessity for a link of this kind is to be found in the fact that the matter of the Karman sarira is too sukshma fine and that of the audarika too gross to allow any direct or immediate interaction between them and that an intermediate type of matter is required to connect them with each other.) is a constant companion of the soul in all its different forms assumed in the course of its evolution in the samsara. Both these bodies undergo changes of form from time to time, there by leading to different kinds of births; they are destroyed only when Moksha is attained, which means perfect freedom of the soul from all kinds of matter.

The necessity for the existence of the shuttle body Karman sarira would also become clear by taking into consideration the effect its absence would have on the soul of a dead man, i.e. a disembodied spirit. Obviously the absence of all kinds of limiting and crippling influences would at once enable such a disembodied soul to manifest its natural perfection in the fullest degree, making it the equal of Gods and the enjoying of the supreme status of Paramatma (god) at a stroke. Death, then, instead of being the dreaded foe, as it is considered now, would be the greatest benefactor of all kind of living beings, and the attainment of supreme bliss, to say nothing of omniscience, omnipotence, and all those other divine qualities and powers which men associate with their gods, would be possible with the greatest ease, not only to every virtuous Jiva, but to every rogue, rascal and sinner as well. Even the act of murdering a fellow being would have to be regarded as a highly meritorious deed, and suicide acclaimed as the shortest cut to the heaven of the highest divinity. Dogs and cats and the whole host of creeping things and the like would also, on such a supposition, find their differences of development abolished at a stroke. The path of salvation, too, would no longer consist in Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, but would lie on the point of the butcher's knife or through the friendly grave of a cannibal's stomach.

The absurdity of the proposition need not be dilated upon any further; it is a sufficient refutation of the notion that death effects a complete severance between spirit and matter, and shows that the Karman sarira never leaves the soul till perfection is attained. The question, when was the Karman shareer formed for the first time does not arise; it could only arise on the supposition that a perfectly pure spirit had descended or condescended to enter into bondage, but this has been already seen to be an non- entertainable hypothesis. It follows from this that all the souls now involved in bond ‑‑and their number is infinite‑‑ have always been in an impure and imperfect state. There is nothing surprising in this conclusion, `for just as gold is found in a mine in an impure condition without any one having ever deposited the pure metal there, so are souls to be taken as having existed in a condition of impurity from all eternity.

The only possible counter‑hypothesis of the renewal of bondage by the order of any extra‑supreme God is met by the argument that there can be no possible ground for distinction between one pure spirit and another. Since the qualities of substances do not vary to suit individual whims, all pure spirits must possess the same attributes. Hence, there can be no such thing as a God of Gods. On the other hand, if it be said that the Supposed extra supreme body is a pure spirit plus some thing else, that would make his being a compounded organism which experience and observation prove to be liable to disintegration and decay. Furthermore, a perfect God must be presumed to be above longings of every kind, and cannot, therefore, be credited with the unholy desire of imposing fetters of pain and misery on his brethren.

Lastly, when we look into the nature of this extra‑ supreme deity of modern theology we only discover him to be personification of karmic energy and power. It has been made clear in 'the key of Knowledge' that the gods and goddesses of the several systems of theology which are flourishing in our midst today are only the personifications* certain mental abstractions and forces of a psychic or occult type. (*See also 'The Permanent History of Bharata Varsha', by K. Narayana Iyer.) If the reader has read that book, he would not find it difficult to understand that the following passages disclose the attributes of the karmic force, the regulator of the destinies of all kind of beings involved in the samsara, rather that the qualities of a perfectly blissful being such as a Siddha Atma (perfect Soul) must necessarily be:

(1) "I create ....evil." ‑‑Isaiah, XLV. 7.

(2) "Wherefore I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live." ‑‑Ezekiel, XX.25.

(3) "It repented the Lord that he had made man on earth and it grieved him at his heart." ‑‑Genesis, VI 6.

(4) "Whosoever slayeth Cain vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold." ‑‑Genesis, IV,15.

(5) "I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generations of them that hate me.' ‑‑Deut. V.9

We could cite many other similar passages from the scriptures, but it would serve no useful purpose to multiply authorities. So far as the Vedas are concerned, they are intelligible only on the hypothesis of a wholesale personification of occult powers and metaphysical abstractions. The Hindu Puranas even attribute deception to their godhead, such as his appearing in the form of a beautiful female at the churning of the ocean, where he not only prevented the Asura from drinking the nectar of immortality by making them fall in love with his female form, but also immediately slew Rahu, who, perceiving the fraud that was being practiced, had managed to secure a drop of the life‑giving amrita (nectar of life).

None of these attributes are appropriate to the godhead, but they are fully in harmony with the personification of karma, as the lord or master of the destinies of living beings. The word Ishvara, the popular name of the deity in Hinduism, only signifies, in its literal sense, powerful, able, capable, hence, a lord or master.

The truth of the matter is that the moderns have completely lost sight of the fact that the theological god, or Ishvara, is a pure impersonation of karma, and, therefore, feel baffled in the presence of such statements as those already quoted from the Bible and the Quran. It is this impersonation of karmic power, as the ruler of the world, which stands in the way of progress by demoralizing the hearts of men with unholy superstition and awe of his supreme sway, irresistible might and vindictive unforgiving nature.

To revert to the point under consideration, it is now clear that a pure spirit cannot possibly be compelled to re‑ enter the bondage of 'sin' when once it has attained to perfection, and that the condition of none of the souls now involved in the samsara has ever been that of perfect purity at any time in the past.

ASRAVA

Asrava signifies the influx of matter into the constitution of a soul. As Moksha cannot be attained without the removal of the last particle of matter from the soul, knowledge of the process which causes the inflow of fresh matter and of the means to check it with is a necessity which cannot be exaggerated.

Every action that is performed by living being in the samsara is always in relation to some kind of matter. Whether we enter into intercourse with the outside world through the media of senses, or indulge in mental or moral speculation in the seclusion of our private apartments, or carry on any other kind of activity, in each and every instance we only traffic in matter some of which is being constantly absorbed by the soul. Even when fresh matter does not come from outside, there is always a sufficient amount of it present in the physical organism itself to be absorbed by the soul. Every action opens the door to certain kinds of particles of matter, which may immediately enter into union with the soul, and modify the structures of its two invisible bodies, the Karman and the taijasa. This is the case generally with all kinds of actions. Even when meritorious deeds, short of the natural functioning of pure spirit, are performed, there is no stoppage of the process of the karmic influx; only the soul then assimilates particles of matter whose fruit is pleasant, instead of those, which bear evil consequences. For the difference between virtue and vice is precisely the same as that between a gold and an iron chain; they both tend to prolong the bondage of the soul though in one case it is not quite unpleasant, while in the other it may be, and, in the worst cases, actually is, intolerable. The natural functioning (self‑contemplation) of pure spirit differs from Punya (virtue) in so far that while the exercising of the functions of pure spirit does not imply the negativity of the soul in the least degree, and, therefore, is unaccompanied by the Asrava of matter, virtuous actions are only calculated to render captivity pleasant and agreeable to the soul. Thus, virtue is as much a cause of bondage as vice from the stand‑point of him, who aspires for perfect liberation.

Certain types of mental attitude strikingly demonstrate the operation and effect of Asrava on the soul. Such, for instance, is the case with mental depression when the soul is literally weighted down by a kind of sukshma (fine) particles of matter. The same is the case with excessive grief, a general tendency towards pessimism, and the like. What seems to happen in such cases is that certain kinds of feelings weaken the intensity of the rhythm of the soul, exposing it to the influx of the particles of matter from its physical organism itself. As an oily surface soon becomes covered over with dust, so does the soul attract to itself and is depressed (from pre‑down, and pressum to press) by a large number of particles of matter from within its own outer encasement of flesh. It is to be borne in mind that the soul's association with the outer body of gross matter is not of the same type as that with the Karman Shareer, for while it becomes intimately fused with the particles of finer matter of which that subtle body is made, there is no such fusion in the case of the gross body. The idea of the association of the soul with its three bodies may be partially grasped by likening it to oxygen and the matter of the Karman sarira to hydrogen which combine together to form water. If we now throw some coloring matter into the liquid, formed by the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen, we should have an idea of the form of the taijasa Shareer. The position occupied by these two bodies in relation to that of gross matter is something like that which comes into existence by holding the volume, or mass, of colored liquid in a sponge, so that the liquid saturates every portion of the sponge without actually becoming fused or united with it. There is, however, this important, distinction to be drawn between the sponge and the physical organism that while the former is an independent article, the latter is only organized by the soul which is to become en-soul in it.

To return to the influx of matter into the soul, the idea of Asrava through the senses can be easily understood if we put ourselves the question: who feels the sensations of taste, smell, color, touch and sound which are received through sense‑organs? Is it, for instance, the tongue that enjoys the relish of food, or the soul? Obviously the soul; for if its attention is exclusively engaged elsewhere it is not only not conscious of the taste of food but may also fail to take conscious cognizance of the quality of eatable put before it. It follows from this that while the bulk food passes into the stomach through the gullet, some finer particles of its relish reach the soul through the glands of taste and the nerves connected with them, enabling it to feel and enjoy the taste of each morsel. Hence, when these relish‑particles do not come in contact with the soul it is not cognizant of their presence. The same is the case with the feelings of pain and pleasure and with the bodily sensations in general; these, too, are not felt if the mind is busy elsewhere. These facts unmistakably point to some kind of material Asrava with every sensation and feeling. The same conclusion is to be arrived at by a study of certain kinds of mental states, for the process of controlling such passions as anger, greed, and the like, clearly points to the exertion of will on some kind of matter, while their complete eradication means neither more or less than a complete annihilation of their causes, i.e., the freedom of mind from some kind of foreign material whose presence was responsible for their existence and recurring recrudescence. Whether we regard our passions and emotions as the states of our consciousness or as so many kinds of rhythms of the soul, or in any other way, it is certain that a simple substance like the soul or consciousness can never, by itself, be the basis of so many different kinds of states of rhythms some of which are undoubtedly antagonistic to one another. Hatred and love both, for instance, cannot be the natural functions of the soul, so that if the latter be the normal state of our consciousness, the former must owe its existence to something else. Matter, the only other substance which enters into interaction with the soul, then, is the substance whose influence is responsible for the abnormal types of emotions and passions. Its fusion with spirit gives rise to disposition, and renders the soul liable to experience different kinds of affections according to the varying circumstances of life. The two opposite types of feelings known as de‑light (literally, intense lightness) and depression (mental 'heaviness'), also furnish strong evidence in support of Asrava, for the former conveys the idea of the removal of a kind of weight from the soul, while its antithesis, the latter, implies the imposition of some sort of burden on it. Hence, if our language is to be true to nature, we must acknowledge that it is not purely the weight of words, ideas or circumstances which makes us experience the unpleasant feeling known as depression of spirits, nor the cessation or removal there of which serves as an occasion for delight.

The truth is that when the soul becomes negative in consequence of some ungratified desire, it is exposed to the Asrava of matter in a marked degree, and, consequently, feels de‑pressed in the literal sense of the word. Similarly, when its desires are gratified, or voluntarily abandoned, its condition of negativity comes to an end, and some of the particles of matter, which had flowed in on account of the slackening of the intensity of the rhythm of life, are mechanically dispersed, giving rise to the feeling of de‑ light.

As a result of the foregoing discussion, it may be stated that Asrava always signifies the influx of matter into the substance of the soul, and that the soul remains subject to it so long as the rhythm of life remains slackened by the attitude of receptivity,. This is due to the influence of desires for material thing, for the soul is perfection itself in its natural purity, but the entertainment of desires leads it to depend on the objects thereof, throwing it into an attitude of expectancy and uneasiness. Pure intelligence by nature, the Jiva is affected by its beliefs, so that the expectation of joy, comfort or help from outside itself instantly impairs its natural buoyancy and strength. It is this condition of expectancy, which may be called receptivity or negativity. This harmful attitude, as stated before, is forced on the soul in consequence of its desires for intercourse with, and traffic in, matter from which it expects to derive pleasure, or joy, in some form or other. In reality, however, the soul is perfect and blissful by nature, so that its desires for the enjoyment of matter only betray its ignorance of its own true natural perfection. Thus, any kind of activity, physical, mental or moral, is a cause of Asrava, no exception being made even in the case of actions performed carelessly, since they point to the presence of an attitude of carelessness which is quite incompatible with self‑consciousness.

The causes of Asrava may now be enumerated categorically. They are:‑‑

(1) Mithyatv, i.e., wrong belief or faith

(2) Avirati, i.e. moral failings,

(3) Pramad, i.e., negligent conduct, or lack of control,

(4) Kashaya, or passions, and

(5) Yoga, or the general channels of inflow.

Of these, the first class consists of five kinds of mithyatv, namely,

(i) One‑sided absolutism, which insists on the absolute accuracy of knowledge obtained from one point of view alone;

(ii) Untrue attribution of a quality to a being or thing;

(iii) Entertainment of doubt about the truth;

(iv) Failure to distinguish between right and wrong; and

(v) The notion that all religions are equally true.

The second division includes:

(i) Hinsa, that is, injuring another by thought, word or deed,

(ii) Falsehood or perjury,