Jivaraja Jaina Granthmala, No. 20

JAINA VIEW OF LIFE

BY

T. G. Kalghati, M.A., Ph.D.

Reader in Philosophy, Karnatak University,

and Principal, Karnatak Arts College, Dharwar

General Editor

Dr. A. N. Upadhya & Dr. H. L. Jain and Pt. Kailaschand Shastri

Published by

LAL CHAND HIRACHAND DOSHI

Jaina Sanskriti Samraksaka Sangha, Sholapur.

First Edition 1969

Second Edition 1984

GENERAL EDITORIAL

In this brochure are presented eight essays on different aspects of Jainism. The Anekanta attitude is really the saviour of philosophical positions which are-being pushed to the brink of extinction by extremists. Syadvada and Nayavada, the two wings of Anekanta, are the effective instruments for bringing out the secrets of reality by reconciling extreme alternatives. Jainism accepts both Spirit and Matter as real. The spirit or Atman has been subjected to deeper analysis in the three-fold distinction of bahir-, antar- and parama- atman. It is an embodiment of knowledge. the fivefold classification (mati, sruta, avadhi, manahaparyaya and kevala) of which is of special interest for an epistemologist. The concept of Kevala-jnana envisages an ideal type of knowledge for the functioning of which there are no temporal and spatial limits. Karma, as conceived in jainism, is a subtle variety of matter which is in association with spirit from beginningless time. It has evolved itself into an automatically functioning Law and shapes the destiny of the spirit. It is by the termination of the Karmic association through austere life and self concentration that the Atman passes through various stages of spiritual progress (gunasthana) and attains its innate nature, the fullest effulgence of knowledge. This course of progress is the veritable path of religion, full of rigorous discipline in thought, word and act: this constitutes the ethical code of Jainism, based on Ahimsa which is the highest criterion for judging the mutual relations in the realm of living beings. It is by correctly understanding reality and by leading the life of self-discipline, according to the stage to which one belongs, that one realizes the highest spiritual status, summum bonum.

Thus it will be seen how these essays, though independent in themselves, have an inherent connection between them. They give us in brief the Jaina View of Life and should enable readers to appreciate an important undercurrent of India's phiIosophical heritage.

Dr. T. G. Kalghatagi is a keen investigator in philosophy. It is extremely good of him to have brought his equipment in the philosophical study to bear upon Jainism in its various aspects. We are thankful to him for giving this volume for publication to the Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala.

Within a short time after the death of our earlier President, Shriman Gulabchand H]Rachand Ji (on 22-1-1967), the Sangha suffered an irreparable loss (on 23-6-1968) in the sad demise of Shriman Manikchand Virachandaji who worked hard for the Sangha from its inception. His zest for life, courage of conviction and firm actions were a strength to the Sangha.

We are grateful to our President, Shriman Lalchand Hirachandaji for his enlightening guidance in all our deliberations. Heavier responsibilities have devolved on the broad shoulders of Shriman Walchand Devchandaji who is helping us in every way for the progress of the Granthamala. We are so thankful to him.

Kolhapur,

Jabalpur

A. N. Upadhye

H. L. Jain

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Man is 'homo sapiens'. He has built civilizations and destroyed them too. Magnificent empires were built, mighty in their day. It was difficult to doubt their power. But their day is done and their courts 'the lion and the lizard keep'. We have seen the phenomenal advancement of science in our own day. As we gaze at the incredible rapidity of scientific progress we are losing touch with the spiritual side of man. We are on cross-roads of life, between two worlds; ' one dead and the powerless to be born' . We see everywhere social and political chaos. There is distrust and frustration, and for a decade or more we have lived on the brink of another world war more disastrous than the earlier too, which would mean total destruction of human race. Whether it would mean pralaya we do not know. But when it comes we can only see the broken bits of civilization, if we are to survive this catastrophe. And all this is due to a wrong approach to the understanding of the problems of life and experience.A new kind of a materialism is being emphasised today where in we pay exclusive attention to material comforts and ignore the higher values. But to understand life and nature we have to transcend the narrow partial points of view and adopt a synoptic view of life. We have to realize that others' points of view have also to be considered and respected. Dogmatic approach of looking at the problems leads to intolerance and then to violence. Jainas have preached the synoptic view of life in their theory of Anekanta. It emphasises the catholic outlook towards life. Intellectual nonviolence, respect for other points of view are the key-note of this doctrine, and that would be a panacea for all the ills of our social

and political life today. Jainism is an ancient religion which prevailed even before Vardhamana Mahavira, the twenty-fourth and Parsva the twentythird Tirthamkaras. It is a pre-Aryan religion coming from the Sramana current of thought, and sramana thought was prevailing in India long before the Aryans came to this country The antiquity of Jainism as reflecting the Pre-Aryan thought of the upper class of North-Eastern India has now been established beyond dispute. Jaina tradition is unanimous in making Rsabha the first Tirthamkara as the founder of Jainism. Long before the Aryans reached the Ganges or even Sarasvati. Jainism had been taught by prominent saints or Tirthamkaras, prior to the historical twentythird Parsva of the eighth or ninth century B. C. Many Western scholars like Jacobi Vincent Smith Forlong and Zimmer have accepted the Pre-Aryan prevalence of Jainism. Radhakrishnanaccepts the view that Jainism prevailed in India even before Parsva and Vardhamana, the last two Tlrthamkaras. Hiralal Jain has interpreted the mention of Kesi and Kesi Rsabha in the Rgveda as referring to the first Tirthamkara. When Buddhism arose Jainism was already an ancient sect with its stronghold near about Vaisali which was visited and admired by Buddha.

The Anekanta outlook of the Jainas pervades their entire philosophy and life. The whole texture of Jaina philosophy and ethics is woven in the Anekanta attitude. We have accordingly analyse in this treatise some of the conceptions in Jaina philosophy and ethics as rejecting the Anekanta outlook. Jiva has been considered from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, it is pure and perfect, and from the phenomenal it is the agent and the enjoyer of fruits of Karma. Our experience can be graded into levels as the sense and the supersensuous experience. Jiva in its empirical existence is involved in the wheel of Samsara through the Yoga (activity). This involvement is beginningless, though it has an end. The end is freedom from the wheel of life and the attainment of Moksa. For this we have to remove the Karma that has accrued to the soul. The Jainas have worked out an elaborate theory of Karma almost making it a science. The Anekanta view pervades the analysis of Karma. Karma is a substantive force. It is material in nature. It consists of fine particles of matter which are glued to the soul as soot to the surface of the mirror. The influx of Karma leads to bondage of Jiva to the wheel of life. This bondage of soul to Karma is determined by the i) nature (prakrti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhagha) and quantity ( pradesa) of Karma. Karma has its psychological aspect also in the Bhava karma.

Moksa is to be achieved through the triple path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. The belief in the Tattvas is the right faith, knowledge of the real is right knowledge and freedom from attachment and aversion is right conduct. The path of virtue is the path which leads to self-realization. The five Vratas are fundamental for the Jainas. However, the practice of the Vratas and the ethical life have been graded in two levels as duty of a muni (ascetic) and the life of sravaka (lay follower). 'The purpose is to realize the highest gradually and with ease. In this analysis of ethical concepts we find the application of the spirit of Anekanta.

The same can be found in their interpretation of Ahimsa as an ethical principle. The Jaina attitude to the conception of God expresses the spirit of Anekanta. The Jainas are against the Theistic conception of God. But each soul in its pure and perfect form, is divine. Still the 'Tirthamkaras are worshipped not because they are gods but because they are human, yet divine -- to be kept before us as ideals for emulation. Apart from the worship of the Tirthamkaras, we find a pantheon of gods as a social survival and a psychological necessity.

Life is to be considered as a struggle for prefection. We do not get ready made views. We have to look at life through many coloured glasses and as a “vale of soul making". This is the picture of Jaina outlook on life as presented in this book. It may, perhaps, give a discrete picture. The purpose has been to see some of the problems in the light of synoptic point of view as expressed in the Anekanta.

The metaphysical elements of Jainism have not been discussed in detail as the main object of this work has been to present the Jaina view of life. However, principle of asrava, bandha, samvara and nirjara have been incidentally woven in the texture of the scheme while describing the entanglement of the soul in samsara and the efforts to attain Moksa. Jiva and Moksa are the prius and the end of the noumenal world. We have studied them at length.

This problem has been engaging my attention for some time past, and it has developed in the form of this book at the inspiration and guidance of Dr. A.N. Upadhye of Kolhapur. I gave a synopsis of this work in my talk at the Jaina Boarding at Kolhapur during the Paryusana festival in 1963. I have made use of two chapters from my earlier book Some Problems in Jaina Psychology. I am grateful to the Registrar, Karnatak University, Dharwar for permitting me to use this material from my previous book I have incorporated in this book some of my articles already published in different philosophical Journal by retouching them here and there to form a part of this book.

I am grateful to the Editors and Publishers of these Journals for their permission to use my articles in the book. I must express my gratitude to the late Professor Charles A. Moore, of the University of Hawaii, Honolulu (U. S. A.) for permitting me to use my article Thc Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy published in Philosophy East and West, a Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought, Volume XI, Numbers 3 and 4 July,October-1965. I have intended, in this book, to weave out some of my papers published earlier so as to bring out a coherent picture of the Jaina view of life as expressing the Anekanta outlook. I must express my sense of profound gratitude to Dr. A. N. Upadhye for all the encouragement and guidance he has given me. I thank the authorities of the Jaina Samskrti Samraksaka Sangha, Sholapur, for publishing this work. I thank my colleague Shri S. R. Gunjal, M.A., M.Lib.Sc. for assisting me in going through the proofs.

Dharwar

31.3 69.

T. G. KALGHATGI

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

I have pleasure in presenting the second edition of the Jaina View of Life. I am greatful to the scholars of the Jaina Studies for their kind appreciation. In this edition I have revised some portions of the papers included in the first edition. I have added the following papers in this edition – 1. Right understanding – some hurdels, published in studies in Indian Philosophy (L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1981) and 2. Jaina Mysticism published in the procedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress 1961 - 1965.

I am greatful to The Jaina Samskrit Samrakshaka Sangha, Solapur for having got the book published in the second edition. I sincerely thank M/s. Manohar Printing Press, Dharavad specially Shri Ravi Akalwadi, for the dareful and fine printing of the book.

‘Ratnatraya’

Savanur Nawab Plots

Dharwad 580008

20-2-1984

T. G. Kalghati

Ret. Professor of Jainology and Prakrits

University of Mysore.

SYNOPTIC PHILOSOPHY:

Meaning of philosophy -- philosophy in India -- historical survey -- a priori way leading to Absolutism far removed from the common sense -- empiricist way -- logical positivism -- leading philosophy to the brink of extinction -- the way out to be found in the synoptic philosophy as expressed in the Anekanta view of the Jainas.

1. Plato and Aristotle have traced the beginnings of Philosophy to the feeling of wonder which arises in the mind of man when he contemplates on the nature of things in the world.[1] But wonder at the level of primitive men is in the instinctive stage and does not give rise to higher speculation. It is only at a higher level when man has gained command over nature does philosophy begin. It is the fruit of society's maturer age. As Hegel said, philosophy makes its first expression when experience and thought have fully matured in their process. The owl of Minerva does not start upon its flight till the evening twilight has begun to fall.

Philosophy is a reflection on experience in order to comprehend the ultimate reality. We may say it is a synoptic view of life. It is, in the lines of Mathew Arnold, to see life steadily and to see it whole. In a narrower sense it is academic pursuit of the solutions of the ultimate problems of life.

Philosophy is not merely an unusually obstinate effort to think consistently, not a construction of a super-strucure of thought, nor is it a mere collection of noble sentiments. For Plato and Bradley philosophy was the knowledge of reality, of that which is. For the Logical Positivists the function of philosophy is only linguistic analysis. Philosophy, however, would not be complete except as a synoptic view of life, as a world view. In this sense alone can philosophy be a guide to life.

In India, philosophy was and has been well grounded in life. It has permeated the lives of the people. It has never been a mere academic pursuit nor a luxury of the mind. It was intimately connected with life. It is to be lived. Mundaka Upanisad speaks of 'Brahma Vidya' as the basis of all knowledge.[2] Kautilya makes philosophy the lamp of all sciences. Philosophy has been called darsana in the sense of the spiritual perception and vision of the seers, and the highest triumphs of philosophy are possible only to those who have achieved in themselves a purity of the soul.[3]

Realization of the Atman is the highest end in Philosophy[4], there is no other way. In this sense, philosophy is darsana and intimately connected with life.

2. Philosophic enquiry has proceeded in two directions: i) The first uses a priori and deductive methods. It is analytic in approach and is the way of the rationalists. ii) The second adopts inductive methods and is the empiricist way. In ancient Indian thought, philosophic speculation relied on Sruti and Smrti.

The course of philosophy has been long and arduous. From Plato and the Upanisads to the present day, philosophers have sought to find solutions to the perennial problems of philosophy, and by pursuing

the one way or the other have reached either the summits of speculation removed from human experience, or have ultimately faced the impossibility of metaphysical speculation.

i) We may first consider the a priori approach to the study of philosophy. In Western thought, deductive and a priori methods were first used by Parmenides and his desciple Zeno, who made, for the first time, a distinction between sense and reason. The philosophic speculations of Plato were largely based on a priori methods. He abstracted sense from reason and built a world of ideas independent of the physical world. In the Middle Ages of Europe, philosophy was sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. In the modern Age, Descartes and Spinoza built systems of rationalism. From cogito ergo sum he went on to heaven and looked at the physical world with confidence, which is, indeed, a way far removed from that of common sense. Descartes split the-world into two substances distinct from each other and postulated a God separate from each of them. Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between God and the world on the basis of mathematical deduction. The result is, Spinoza's Substance became a lion's den to which all tracks lead and from which none returns. In Hegel and Bradley we go much further away from common sense. We see the superstructures of philosophic speculation, and we are left in the world of appearance only to gaze at the ivory towers in which these philosophers lived. Thus the a priori speculative method led us far from the madding crowd to the dizzy heights of the 'Absolute '.

In India, we were saved from the separation of the speculative and the practical, because philosophy, with us, is essentially spiritual: "it takes its origin in life and enters back into life." [5] In Samkara we come to a great speculative system. Still, we do not feel ourselves strangers here, as we are not cut off from the ideals of life. "Samkara presents to us the true ideal of philosophy, which is not so much knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual freedom."[6]

ii) Empiricism uses a posteriori and inductive methods. In the Theaetetus, Socrates explains the Protagorean doctrine that knowledge is through perception, and shows the impossibility of arriving at any objective truth. For the Sophists, Sense experience was the only source of knowledge; while Gorgias asserted the impossibility of any knowledge or communication whatever.

In ancient Indian thought the Carvakas led us to a similar conclusion. For them, Lokayata is the only sastra and perceptual evidence the only authority.[7] This would logically lead to scepticism and nihilism; but they did not go to the whole length, because their immediate aim was to break down the ecclesiastical monopoly and still assert the spiritual independence of the individual. The Buddhist empiricism was to have gone the way of Gorgias in the Madhyamika School, but for the predominance of the ethical ideal and the goal of nirvaa. Nagarjuna's philosophy is 'now nearer to scepticism and now the mysticism'.[8] The rigour of logic would have led him to nihilism, but for; his spiritual fervour and thirst for nirvana.

English empiricism repeats this logical movement but does not save itself from its own conclusions. We can see the empiricist method steadily marching from Locke to Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley denied matter, and Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid, summing up the English empiricist movement, states that ideas, first introduced for explaining the operations of the human understanding, undermined everything but them selves, pitifully naked and destitute, "set adrift without a rag to cover them."[9] Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go on further without a radical reconsideration of its fundamental position.

But the Human tendency has been recently revived, by the Cambridge philosophers, who brought philosophy to the brink of extinction. Wittgenstein's Tractatus discusses problems of meaning, the nature of logic, facts and propositions and the task of philosophy. It states: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly, and where of one cannot speak, there one must be silent'. 'The world is the totality of facts not of things'. There must be simple entities called objects because there are names, and there must be narrles because propositions have a definite sense. Names have no sense except in the context of propositions; and propositions are related to facts as ' pictures of facts' . He states that all the-truths of logic are tautologies, and logical proofs are only mechanical devices for recognizing categories. Mathematics consists of equations, and the propositions of mathematics are also without sense. The metaphysician talks nonsense in the fullest sense of the word, as he does not understand "the logic of our language". Metaphysical suggestion is like the composition of a new song. We are told that he made no essential change in his attitude towards the aim of philosophy.[10] Russell writes that the influence of the Tractatus on him "was not wholly good", and that the philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations remains to him completely unintelligible.[11]

Logical Positivism is a philosophical movement emanating from 'The Vienna Circle' . It was a thorough going empiricism backed by the resources of modern logic and tempered by exaggerated respect for the achievements of Science.[12] Ayer's Philosophy is the logical outcome of Hume's empiricism. Like Hume, he divides all genuine propositions into two classes i) a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics, which are analytic and therefore necessary and certain; and ii) propositions concerning empirical matters of fact which may be probable but never certain and need to be tested by the verification principle. No statement which refers to a 'reality' transcending the limits of all possible sense experience can possibly have any literal significance. Ayer shows that the Logical Positivist charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the under-standing in a field where it cannot probably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant.[13] A metaphysician talks nonsense, because he is deceived by grammar. Thus, Logical Positivists claim that they have completely overthrown speculative philosophy.[14]Philosophy, to them, is only logical

analysis; not a theory, but an activity. Its function is analysis, Logical clarification of concepts, propositions and theories proper to empirical science. Thus, philosophy is identified with logical syntax, the higher-level discussion of language, and the perennial problems of philosophy are dismissed as nonsense. Philosophy classes are, accordingly, converted into super-grammar classes.

However, Logical Positivism has ceased to become a fashionable philosophy today, because i) its attack on meta-physics has damped the vigour and chastened the style of its remaining adherents, and ii) its approach to language is unnecessarily rigid and doctrinaire. Even Ayer is doubtful about carrying through the programme of phenomenalism[15] and uneasy about the verification principle. [16]

Still, the impasse that Logical Positivism has reached is unfortunate, because:

i) The doctrines of Logical Positivism have led to dogmatism and intolerance; so that metaphysical questions are dismissed as unworthy of attention of sensible men.[17] Theories like the verification principle, the emotive theory of ethics and logical construction are simply announced as if they formed a part of revelation denied to other philosophers except Hume.[18]

ii) Sense experience, as the criterion of truth, has led to solipsism, as it did in the case of the Sophists and Hume. Sense experience is private and cannot be communicated. The more radical among them, like Carnap and Neurath, were hence led to physicalism, which is nearer to behaviourism in psychology.

iii) For logical Positivists, as for other empiricists, sense experience is the only criterion of knowledge. Modern Psychical Research, on the other hand, affirms the possibility of extra-sensory experiences. In addition, there are certain other experiences, like the speculation, moral and aesthetic. The problem of supersensuous experience is not new to us in India. All schools of Indian philosophy, except the Carvakas and Mimamsakas, believe in it. Supersensuous experience transcends the categories of time, space and casuality: " Our sense organs are narrowly specialized to serve biological and practical ends, and our normal consciousness is also largely specialized.[19] In the face of these facts, it would be narrow and fanatical to insist on sensory experience and the verification principle as the only criteria of knowledge. Like the men chained against the walls of the save in The Republic, the empiricists refuse to see beyond what they would like to affirm.

iv) Moreover, for the Logical Positivists tbe verification principle has been a dogma and a commandment. But tbe principle of verification is not a self-evident statement, -nor is it capable of verification by sense experience. The logic of the analytic philosophy is itself based on a metaphysic, certain presupposltions about the universe.[20]

v) Nevertheless, the effects of Logical Positivism have been serious.

It has engendered a negative climate of opirltion, and was likely to shatter the old beliefs in the social, moral and religious spheres with nothing else to fill the gap except analysis of propositions. It has produced a 'waste land of mind, of which T. S. Eliot's poem is at once a description and, by implication, a denunciation.[21]

3. A survey of the course of philosophy in the past shows that philosophy continually faced this impasse. The a priori deductive method took us to the lion's den. At the height of its speculation, it built superstructures of philosophy and was cut off from common sense. The empiricists were led to solipsism and to the feverish denial of metaphysics.

To save philosophy from this impasse, we have to adopt a synoptic view towards the problems of philosophy. We should realize that reality is complex and life is a many-coloured dome. Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood, while empiricism could not see the wood in the trees.[22]These were two ways of approaching the problem; but they are not the only ways, nor were the approaches absolute. This is the synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life steadily and see it whole. Broad says, "If we do not look at the world synoptically we shall have a very narrow view of it". He thinks that a purely critical philosophy is arid and rigid.[23]

The Jaina view of anekanta comes nearer to this approach. Anekanta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problems. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. It is the symbolisation of the fundamental non violent attitude. It emphasizes the many-sideness of truth. Reality can be looked at from various angles.

Whitehead's fundamental attitude in philosophy is essentially the same as the anekanta view of life. Whitehead' defined speculative philosophy as the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.[24]

We have to note that the function of philosophy is not merely an academic pursuit of reality. It is a way of life. Philosophy has had the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue. Philosophers have sought to provide a principle to live by and purposes to live for. For this practical end, philosophers have striven to achieve a synoptic view of the universe.[25] The consciousness of the finiteness of our being makes us yearn for the beyond, in the spirit of the Upanisads, from the unreal to the real, from darkness to light, and from death to iternal life.[26]

For this, we have to look to the spiritual experience of the great seers. Broad says there is one thing which speculative philosophy must take into most serious consideration and that is the religious and mystical experiences of mankind.[27] It is they who are in constant touch with the innermost depth of life and to them we are to look for guidance. Such 'enlightened ones' or 'sages' are the first-hand exponents of philosophy.[28]

REFERENCES:

1. Aristotle: Metaphystis, i, 2

2. sarva-viya-pratistha.

3. RADHAKRIISHNAN (S): Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 45.

4. Brhadaranyaha ll. IV-5 atma vare drstavyah.

5. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol (1945) P. 25 2.

6. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol, II, (1947) P.447

7. Prabodhacandrodaya, Act II.

8. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 644.

9. REID: Works, p. 109.

10. STENIUS (Eric) : Tractatus-A critical exposition of its main lines of thought (1960) p. 226.

11. RUSSELL (B) : My Philosophical Development (1959) pp. 216-217.

12.. Encyclopedia of Western Philosphy and Philosphers. Edited by URMSON (J.C.) (1960).

13. AYER .(J.A) : Language, Truth and Logic, p. 35.

14. AYER, (J.A) : Language, Truth and Logic, p. 48.

15. AYER, (J. A.): Philosophical Essays (1954) No. 142.

16. AYER, (J. A.): Language, Truth and Logic (1946), Preface to second edition.

17, JOAD (C. E. M.): A Critique of Logical Positiuism, p. 149.

18. JOAD (C. E. M ): A Critique of Logical Positivism, p. 29.

19. TYRRELL ( G. N. N.) : The personality of men (Pelican) p. 265.

20. RADHAKRISHNAN(S.) : The Ineternational Insitute of Philosophy and indian Philosophical Congress. Entretiens edited by N.A NILE.

21. JOAD (C> E> M>) : A Critique of Logical Positivism, p. 149.

22. BOARD (C.D.) : Contemporary British Philosphy, ed. MUIRHEAD (j. H.) Vol. I (1924), Critical and Speculative Philosophy.

23. PASSMORE (Joan) : A Hundread Years of Philosophy, (1957) p. 350

24. Process and Reality (1929) Part I, Chapter I, p. 4 and Adventures of Ideas (19330 p. 285.

25. JOAD (C. E. M. ) : A Critique of Logical Positivism, (1950) p. 29.

26. asato ma sad gonaya; tamaso majyotir gamaya; mrtyor ma amratam gamaya.

27. Contemporary British Philosophy: edited by MUIRHEAD (J. H.) (1924) Critical ond Speculative Philosophy.

28. HUXLAY ALDOUS: The Perennial Philosophy, (1959) 10, 11.

APPROACH TO REALITY:

Introduction -- meaning of Anekanta -- historical survey -- development of the Theory of Anekanta -- Nayavada -- analysis of the Nayas -- Syadvada as a logical expression of Nayavada -- Syadavada analysed -- criticism of the theory some observations—Right Understanding – some Hurdels.

I. Jainism is realistic and pluralistic. Its philosophy is based on logic and experience. Moksa is the ultimate aim of life. lt is realised by the three fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.[1] Right knowledge is possible by the right approach to the problems of Life. Anekanta, the Jainas believe, gives us the right approach to looking at the various problems of life. Anekanta is the symboliation of the fundamental non-violent attitude of the Jainas. It is the expression of intellectual non-violence.

In surveying the field of Indian philosophy, Dr. Padmarajiah mentions five types of philosophy considered from the point of view of the nature of reality. They are:

l. Philosophy of Being Samkara represents this school of thought of identity.

2. Philosophy of Becoming (change or difference) Buddhism presents this view.

3. Philosophy subordinating difference to identity i) The Samkhya, ii) Bhedabhedavada and iii) Visistadvaita hold this attitude.

4. Philosophy subordinating identity to diflerence i) The Vaisesika, ii) Dvaita of Madhvacarya gives this view.

5. Philosophy coordinating both identity and difference The Jaina view of reality presents this attitude.

Jainism meets the extremes and presents a view of reality which comprehends the various sides of reality to give a synthetic picture of the whole. It recognises the principle of distlnction and develops the comprehensive scheme of Anekanta realism. Anekanta is the 'most consistent form of realism as it allows the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus on the theory of manifold reality and knowledge.[2]

Anekanta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problems. It emphasizes a catholic outlook towards all that we see and experience. lntellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. lt arose as an antidote to the one-sided and absolute approach to the study of reality of the philosophers at that time. It arose out of the confusion of the conflicting views of the philosophers and religious men on the problem of the nature of reality. The Upanisadic philosophers sought to find the facts of experience. This search gave rise to many philosophical theories. Buddhism tried to present a fresh and a different approach in the Madhyama-pratipada Drsti. The Anekanta view presents a coherent picture of the philosophies, pointing out the important truths in each of them. It looks at the problem from various

points of view. The cardinal principle of the Jaina philosophy is its Anekanta which emphasizes that 'there is not only diversity but that real is equally diversified.'[3]

II. Although Anekanta was a special feature of the Jaina point of view, it is possible to say that some other schools of thought were aware of the view. In Buddhist philosophy the phrase majjhima magga bears the same significance as Anekanta. Pandit Sukeialalji Sanghvi, in his introduction to the Sanmati Tarka, says that the doctrine of Anekanta and the madhyama marga have great resemblance in the fundamental idea underlylng them.[4] Anatmavada of Sanjaya, Vibhajjavada, madhyama pratipada which induced the Buddha to treat all prevalent opinions with respect may be mentioned as expressions of Allekanta attitude. Similarly Bhedabheda-vada of Bhartrprapanca is referred to as Anekanta.[5] Gautama, the Buddha, faced the confusion of thought presented in his time about the ultimate nature of reality. He was silent about these problems. In Dlgha Nikaya, Gautama says 'It is not that I was, I was not, it is not that I will be, I will not be; it is not that I am, I am not.' The Buddha describes his attitude to Manavaka as Vibhajjavada.[6] This is similar to Anekanta, although it is not so clearly defined and developed. No specihc words suggesting the doctrine of Anekanta are found in the philosophic literature of ancient lndia. lt is suggested that the doctrine of evolu-tion as propounded by the Samkhya school implies the-Anekanta attitude.[7] However, the Jainas perfected the doctrine and systematized it. The Buddhist philosopher SantaraKsita makes mention of the Anekanta of the Vipra-mimamsakas, Nigghantas and Kapila Samkhyas. Among the Jaina exponents Mahavira practiced the attitude and is supposed to have expressed it in the Syadvada.

A clear expression of the Anekanta attitude is seen in Mahavira's discussions with his disciples. ln the Bhagavatt sutra, there is a dialogue between the Mahavira and his disciple Gautama.

"Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?"

"The souls are eternal in some respects and non-eternal in some other respects. .. They are eternal, O Gautama,

from the point of view of substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes."

Again, the problem of body and mind was answered by Mahavlra as -- "The body, O Gautama, is identical with the soul and not identical with the soul in different respects." [8]

The application of the principle of Anekanta can be seen in their analysis of the metaphysical question concerning the categories. The Jaina theories of atoms, of space and soul, to mention a few instances, illustrate the pervading influence of the Anekanta viewpoint. Atoms are of the same kind: they can yet give the infinite variety of things. Pudgala has certain inalienable features, but within limits it can becorne anything through qualitative differentiation. The transmutation of elements is quite possible in

this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist.[9]

Space is another instance of a manifold real. It is un-corporeal and formless, yet divisible [10] and its divisibility is a spontaneous feature. Abhayadeva develops the concepts of manifoldness of space as a polemic against the Naiyayika view of space as one and partless. The souls are individual centres of experience. Like the Leibnizian monads the soul mirrors the entire universe within self as a unique centre of experience. The universe it mirrors is infinitely complex; and its experimental powers must be manifold commensurate with the complicity of the experienced universe.[11]

In the Anga literature of the Jainas the doctrine of Anekanta was briefly and incidentally discussed. But in the commentaries of the Jaina scripture written in Prakrit it has -received greater attention. But when the Sanskrit language found a place in the Jaina literature, it occupied an important position. The commentary on the Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati gives an exhaustive description of the problem. Later, a systematic exposition of the doctrine was given by Jaina scholars like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena Divakara, Mallavadi, Pajyapada, Akalanka, Vidyanandi and others.

The Anekanta view does imply the principles of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe, as given by Kant, although this principle is more implied than expressly stated in Jainism.

In Kantianism as in Jainism, the principle of reciprocity goes beyond the 'coexistance' or the inter-relatedness of the substances and explains the 'dynamical community' among them.[12] But the Jaina is a thorough-going realist. Anekanta-vada is a theory of reality which asserts the manifoldness and complexity of the real. In apprehending the complexity of the universe, it has crystallised itself into the two-fold dialectic of Nayavada and Syadvada; and they are complementary processes forming a normal and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics.[13]

lII. Anekanta emphasizes that the truth is many sided. Reality can be looked at from various angles. Two doctrines result from the Anekantavada: i) Nayavada and ii) Syadvada. Nayavada is the analytic method investigating a particular stand-point of factual situation. Syadvada is primarily synthetic designed to harmonise the different view points arrived at by Nayavada. Nayavada is 'primarily conceptual' and the Syadvada is synthetic and mainly verbal,[14] although this sometimes maintained that conceptual is also verbal and the verbal method is so much changed with epistemological characters. The distinction between the conceptual and the-verbal has mainly a reference to the fact that points of view have to be expressed in language and predicated in specific forms so as to embody them. The concept is formed from this point of view.

Naya refers to the point of view one takes when one looks at the object. A naya is defined as a particular opinion or a view-point of looking at an object. It expresses a partial truth about an object as known by a knowing subject.[15] The Jainas give the example of the b

bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb lind men and the elephant. The blind men feel the animal and describe it, each in his own way. Similarly, we look at objects and describe them in our own way from different angles. Other view-points are also recognized; and they need to be recognized with each in the scheme of a fuller and more valid knowledge which is the sphere of Pramana.

The Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme consisting of seven ways to looking at reality. There was a problem whether the seven Nayas can be reduced in number. There are three traditions. The first tradition adopts seven Nayas. The second eliminates Naigama Naya and reduces the-list to six. In the third tradition we have five, as Samabhi rudha and Evambhuta Naya have been subsumed under Sabda Naya. Umasvati is largely responsible for the first and the third traditions. In the Digambara version of the Tattvartha-sutra seven ways have been mentioned, but the gvetambara version gives five Nayas as mentioned in the third tradition.[16] The different points of view are the Nayas. Various Nayas have been mentioned. As shown above Umasvati first-mentions five Nayas and then adds the subdivisions.[17] The Agamas have mentioned two points of view : Samgraha Naya, the point o£ view of the universal, the synthetic point of view and ii)Paryayika Naya, the view-point of the particular, the analytic point of view. Siddhasena Divakara in his Sahmati Tarka adopted the two points of view and distributed the Nayas under two heads. He described the six Nayas. But the generally accepted classification of Nayas is seven fold. Three of them refer to objects and their meaning, and the others to the words. In the first category we get three: i) Samgrahs Naya, ii) Vyavahara Naya, and iii) Rjusutra Naya. Siddhasena Divakara says that Samgraha and Vyavahara are subdivisions of the Dravyarthika Naya.[18] Samgraha Naya gives the synthetic point of view. It gives, as Radhakrishnanpoints out, the class point of view. In this, we seek to approach the unity amidst the diversity by finding the common element in the variety presented in the world. Absolute monism is the conclusion of this point of view. Exaggerated emphasis on the universal would lead to Samgrahabhasa; and Samkhya and Advaita schools of philosophy are notable instances.[19[ The absolute emphasis on the one and unity dismissing all diversity as appearance, is the position of the absolutists. The Jainas maintain that such a point of view, if it is taken in the absolute sense, presents a partial point of view.

Vyavahara Naya is the empirical point of view. It is the analytic point of view. It emphasises the diversity in the universe presented in the experience. We know things in their details and emphasize their individuality. The attitude of the pluralists and the materialists is the outcome of the view.

Rjusutra Naya is narrower than the Vyavahara Naya. It looks at an object at a particular point of time, and does not see the continuity of the thing. The Jainas say that the Buddhist philosophy of Ksanikavada is an example of the-Rjusutra Naya.

Naigama Naya refers to the end or the purpose involved in the action. We interpret an activity with reference to the-end for which

it is done. For instance, a man who is carrying water and firewood will say that he is cooking if he is asked what he is doing. Siddhasena Divakara adopts a different point of view. Naigama Naya comprehends both the generic and specific qualities.

Another interpretation of Naigama Naya involves non-discrimination between the generic and the specific elements of an object. For example, when we state "The Bamboo grows here in plenty" the generic and the specific features of the bamboo are not within the focus of our attention. The-principle of configuration and the result suggested by Gestalt School of Psychology holds good in this case.[20]

The non-distinction is not, however, absolute and if the-distinction is asserted absolutely there would be a fallacy of Naigamabhasa.

Paryayarthika Naya is the analytic point of view referring to the words: and their meaning. It is a verbal interpretation of the terms used. It has three subdivisions: i) Sabda Naya, ii) Samabhirudha Naya and iii) Evambhuta Naya. Sabda Naya consists in looking at the functional; importance of the terms. The name has a function calling to our mind the object implied by the name However, we very often forget that the meaning of a term is relative and varies with different contexts. We emphasize that the meaning is fixed. That gives rise to fallacies. Samabhirudha Naya is the application of the Sabda Naya. It refers to the-roots of words. For instance, raja as a person who shines is different from the nrpa, a person who rules over men and protects them. Evambhuta not only sees the difference between words with their different etyrnologies; but it sees the difference between one and the same word, if it does not signify the meaning denoted by the root in the vord. For instance, there is a difference between raja. Then he is shining and raja when he is not shining. In this we give a word a fixed meaning, something by usage. For instance, a 'nut' has come to mean in English a showy man.

The Cambridge philosophers and analytic school of philosophy in the present day assert the exclusive application of the form of Paryaya Naya to express Sabda-nayabhasa.

In Evambhuta Naya we restrict the meaning of the word to the very function connected by the name. It is a specialized form of the Samabhiradlla. For instance, a building will be called a house as long as it is used for residential purposes. But if it is used for office purposes, it will not be appropriate to call it a house.

Thus, each Naya or point of view represents one of the many ways from which a thing can be looked at. The Nayas remind us that our points of view looking at the things are relative, and over-emphasis on one point of view as absolute and the only point of view would be a mistake. It would give an abhasa, or appearance of truth, only. It gives rise to, the wrong point of view. According to the Jainas, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Sam. khya, Advaita Vedanta and the Buddhist systems adopt one of the Nayas; but they believe that their point of view is absolute and unerring. However, they prevent only partial truths. The Jainas point out that the controversy regarding causation presenting different views like the asatkaryavada and the satkaryavada, are one-

sided and partial. But an object can be described in different ways. For instance, a gold necklace will be gold if we consider the substance out of which it is made; but if it is looked at from the point of view of the modifications, it may be described differently. Similarly, each Naya has a different extent. Naigama Naya has the greatest, and the Evam. bhuta Naya the least, extent. Naigama dealswith the real and the unreal, Samgraha with the real. Vvavahara deals with part of the real. Rjusutra refers to the present condition of the real, and gabda only to the expression of the real, Samabhirubha a reference to the particular expression. Evambhuta applies to the present activity.

IV. Syadvada is the logical expression of the Nayavada. The various points of view from which the reality can be looked at gives the possibility of a comprehensive view of reality. Such a view needs expression for the sake of clarity and communication. This has been possible by means of seven fold predication. It is called Saptabhangi, because of its sevenfold predication. It is the formulation of the doctrine of the possibility of apparent contradiction in a real whole. The real may as well contain contributions without affecting the nature of the real, because the contradictions arise only because we take partial views of reality. According to the Jainas, other Darsanas present only the gleams of the broken light, while the Jaina view visualises the whole truth in its different aspects. Nayavada and Syadvada are varieties of Anekantavada. Syadvada is complementary to the Nayavada. Nayavada is analytic in character and Syad-vada is synthetic. It investigates the various shades of the truth given by a Naya and integrates them into a consistent comprehensive synthesis. Dasgupta suggests that the relation between them expresses the many alternatives indicated by the Syadvada for any and every Naya.[21] In the Syadvada all the aspects of truth are woven together into the synthesis of the conditioned dialectic.

Some have raised a controversy as to whether Syadvada is synonymous of Saptabhangi or of the entire Jaina philosophy. It is true that Syadvada has an important place in Jaina philosophy, but it can not be equated with the entire Jaina philosophy. Prabhacandra states that Syadvada is synonymous with Saptabhangi.[22] However, this is just a scholastic problem and is needless from the philosophical point of view[23] Syadvada is that conditional method in which the modes, or predications (bhangah) affirm (vidhi), negate (nisedha) or both affirm and negate severally and jointly in seven differcnt ways a certain attribute (bhava) of a thing (vastu) without incompatibility (avirodhena) in a certain context prasnavasat.[24] Reality is complex and its nature cannot be expressed in an unconditioned position. Absolute affirmation and absolute negation are both erroneous.[25] And the 'syat' would mean 'in a certain sense' or 'from a certain point of view'.[26] In this sense Syadvada warns us against building a dogmatic structure of reality in a single concept or judgement. That would be logical dogmatism (nirapeksavada) as against the sapeksavada expressed in Syadvada.

It is difficult to decide which is the earlier of the two-Nayavada seems to be earlier, because Umasvati in his 'Tatvartha-sutra

describes the kinds of Nayas, but makes no mention of the Svadvada and the sevenfold prepositions. Yet it is possible that it existed long before him. Buddhist Suttas mention the doctrine in an erroneous way as the doctrine not of the Nigganthas but of some recluse and Brahmins. In the earlier literature of the Jaina canon there are only a few passages in which there is a reference to Syadvada. They occur in the Bhagavati-sutra, in which it is expressed in the form of three propositions. Among the other early references, Bhadrabahu's Sutrakrtanga Niryukti is prominent. The developed form of the doctrine in the form of the seven-fold propositions is well described in Paiicastikdyasara of Kundakundacarya and Aptamtmamsa of Samantabhadra. Siddhasena Divakara, Akalanka and Vidyanandi are among the later writers who have given a systematic exposition of the doctrine.

Syadvada shows that tbere are seven ways of describing a thing and its attributes. It attempts to reconcile the con-tradiction involved in the predications of the thing. It is possible to describe a thing in seven ways.

1. Syad asti asserts the existence of the thing. The word syat is difficult to translate. It is very often said that it connotes 'perhaps' or probability. But it would be more appropriate to say that it refers to the special context. syat would then mean 'in the context'. From the point of view of the substance, place, time and nature, we may say that a thing is. For instance, the jar exists, as it is made of clay in a particular place and time. Thus substance (dravya), attribute (bhava), time (kala), and space (ksetra) from the context of these relations existence and other attributes are predicated. A house exists, i.e., it is a house as build up and as long as it is occupied for the purpose of residence.

2, But the affirmation of an attribute necessarily involves the negation of its opposite; and such a negation is a logical necessity. Then we get the predication syad nasti. It means in the (other) context the thing does not exist. The jar does not exist if it is to mean that it is made of metal. The house is no longer a house if it be used as a go down. The existence of the house is denied in different contexts. Thus, if existence and non-existence are to be understood in different relations and contexts, there would be no opposition between them. One is a necessary concomitant of the other. These predications are necessary and compatible in another sense. The affirmation of existence and denial of non-existence are meant to rebut the possibility of unqualified and absolute existence and nonexistence. Thus the predications are logically necessary.

The importance of this predication lies in the irrefutable statement of the non-existence of a thing in the other context. 'Non-existence or non-being is a determinate fact with a content and not a void'.

It would not be correct to say that one first and the second predications involve contradiction, because i) they are mutually complementary and ii) the two predications are not absolute assertions. The definition itself includes the clause 'avirodhena'.[27]

It is very often contended that the contradictions, absolute existence and non.existence, are not objective facts, as no existence is known to have absolute existence and absolute non-existence as its characteristics. The opposition is unreal and the predication of the unreal opposition is not necessary. But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it cannot be denied that it is possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a thing though not on to logically real. The predications are therefore logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non existence.'[28] The Vedantist believes in the absolute existence of the one reality. The Sunyavadin does not believe in the existence of the absolute. The Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different contexts. The first two predications are logically valid and psychologically necessary, as they serve to exclude absolute existence and absolute non-existence. The mention of the word syad functions as a necessary condition and works as a corrective against the absolute way of thought. We may here refer to the logical opposition of Hegel, who said that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity, for they are the aspects of the same reality. However, the reference would be limited to the dialectical process, because the Jaina is a realist and believes in the validity of empiricai experience.

3. The third predication is syad asti nasti: 'It is, it is not'. This refers to different contexts simultaneously. For instance, in a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain other sense the jar does not exist. The building is a house in so far as the purpose of the construction was for residence. 'But it is not a house as it is actually used as a go down. It is very often maintained that the predication is a mere summattion of the first two. But the Jainas would appeal to experience and say that it gives a separate and necessarg predication. It refers to a separate entity arising from the two but not the summation of the two. For instance, a garland of flowers may be said to be flowers, as it contains flowers, and also not merely flowers at the same time, because the flowers enter into a new relation with each other to form a whole. Similarly, in the description of the soul and the ultimate-reality contradictory predicates have been made.[29]

4. The fourth is a new predication. It expresses the indescribability of a thing. It is syad avaktavyam. It is possible that the real nature of the thing is beyond predication, or expression in the form of words. For instance, in the case of the jar, it exists in the svadravya, svarupa, svakala and svaksetra and no existence is predicated in the the paradravya, pararupa, para ksetra and parakala. Yet its nature may be such that it cannot be easily described.

It is contended that the fourth predication is only an abbreviated form of affirmation in megation. The third predication shows the successive presentation, while the fourth givesthe simultaneous presentation of the two. But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it is still logically necessary because it presents the facts of experience, that

existence and non existence are equally possible to be predicated in the same degree. Moreover, experience shows that the inexpressible asserts that the attributes are existing together, and a new element has arisen due to the synthesis. For instance, intoxicating liquor may be formed due to the combination of jaggery and ghataki flowers. But it is not a mere combination of the elements. It has in itself an identity of its own which cannot be described easily. In metaphysical; speculation, the 'unknowable' of Herbert Spencer may be likened to predication of this type. Prof. Bhattacharya [30] writes, 'The given indefinite' -- 'the unspeakable' or avaktavya as it has been called, as distinct from the definite existence. presents something other than consecutive togetherness: it implies saharpana or co-presentation, which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negations. The common sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept.[31]

The primary modes of predication are three: syad asti Syad nasti and syad avaktavyam. The other four are obtained by combining the three.

The third predicate asti nasti offers successive presenta-tion. In the fourth predication 'inexpressible' (avaktavyam) we get the expression of simultaneous predication. Dr. Padmarajiah discusses the four stages through which the concept or 'inexpressible' has developed: i) The naive negative attitude in the Rgveda as expressed in the song of creation (Book V, 129). ii) A positive attitude as expressed in 'sadasadvareyam' in the Mundaka Upanisad. It conceives with being and non-being as irherent in reality, owing to the positive character, this tendency has been discussed is the Acbhaya phase of the concept. iii) The third phase is the logically sophisticated phase of the 'negative tendency' as shown in the expression like sa esa neti neti (Br. Up. lV 5-15) In this phase here is the clear awareness of the inexpressible nature of the ultimate as efforts to express the reality would be beset with contradictions. The Vedanta conception of anirvacaniya the Buddha's avyakrta and Nagarjuna s conception oi the ultimate as being catuskoti-vinirmukta came under this stage. iv) The last phase in 'the dialectical evolution' of the idea of the inexpressible is expressed in the avaktavya of the Syadvada. It is a relativistic (sapeksa view and not the absolute view as presented in anirvacanlya. The Jaina states that sat and asat, in these combinations, are inevitable and distinctive feature of our objective experience.[32] Again the avaktavya may show the inability to embody, within one symbol, the two fundamental aspects of reality with equaprominence. But this limitation is itself a necessary step in the dialectual movement of Syadvada.

K. C. BHATTACHARYA states ' If the inexpressible is objective as given, it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence. It is a category by itself.[33]

5. The fifth predication is formulated as syad asti avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own contexts (dravya, rupa, kala and ksetra)

a thing is and is indescribable. It asserts the copresence of the two attributes, existence and inepressibility. Both are real and necessary attributes. Existence relates to an object in the context of substance in respect of its internal determinations. Inexpressibility is an attribute which relates substance, in relation of identity and distinction, to its changing modes.

6. The sixth Proposition expresses the negative aspect together with inexpressibility. It is syad nasti avaktavyam. In the context, it is not and is indescribable. In relation to the paraaravya pararupa, paraksetra and parakala it is not: it is indescribable.

7. The seventh proposition asserts existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. It reads: sltad, asti, nasti, avaktavyam. In the contexts, it is, is not and is inexpressible. With reference to the sva-rupa, sva-dravya, sva-ksetra and sva-kala it exists, and with reference to the para-dravya, para-rupas, para-ksetra, para-kala non existence can be predicated. Yet, in its real nature it may be such that it cannot be easily described. As Mukerji says, this predication gives a fuller and a more comprehensive picture of the thing than the earlier ones. The predicated attribute is a synthesis of the three attributes; still, it is not a mere summation of the attributes. It brings out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as what it is and what it is not.

Affirmation and negation and inexpressibility are the three fundamental predications. This implies that all negation has a positive basis. Even imaginary concepts like the sky flower possess a positive basis in the two reals, the sky and flower, although the combination is unreal. All things which are objects of thought are in one sense, and are not in another sense.

V. The doctrine of Syadvada has been criticized in various ways:

1. It is said that the theory of sevenfold predication can only be the cause of doubt and not of certainty, the assertion of contradictory predicates implies that the present predicating is in doubt. BELVALKAR says that Syadvada is sceptical and non-committal in its attitude. With this diagnostic and negative attitude one cannot have any dogma; and Samkaracarya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system when he says "As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirtham. kara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate.[34] Prof. Hiryanna makes Syadvada a variety of scepticism. If all our knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say the old Indian critics like Sam. kara, amanuja etc.), the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit, at least, one absolute truth; and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view of reality and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism.[35]

But it may be pointed out that the conditions of doubt are not present

in this assertion. For instance, a man sees a tree in the dusk and doubts whether it is a man or a branchless tree. This is due to the lack of determination between -the specific features of the object as the perception is faulty. But in the case of the sevenfold presentation the attributes of existence and non-existence are each defined by their specific determinations. The condition of these determinations makes doubt impossible.

2. It is said that the sevenfold predication of the Jainas is beset with contradictions. Affirmation and denial of the attribute in the same object is not logically possible. It would be a selfcontradiction. In this context we may refer-to the criticism of Samkara and Ramanuja. Samkara's criticism can be analyzed into three stages. 1) He tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of the predication because of the inherent contradictions involved in it. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together. But if we take into consideration the different contexts referred to, we may say that the contradictions can be easily reconciled. In experience we get examples of existing conflicting attributes. For instance, the branches may be in motion but the tree does not move. The same individual may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. 2) He points out the futility of the doctrine because the doctrine is indefinite. The unlimited assertion that all things are of non-exclusive nature gives indefinite assertion like syad asti and syad nasti. Hence a man who holds such a doctrine of indefinite context does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a mad man.

Recent writers on Indian philosophy have re-iterated the entire charge made by gamkara and Ramanuja and have shown that it is a kind of eclecticism, 'a putting together of several partial truths' without a proper synthesis. It is therefore characterized as a sort of compromise philosophy. The half-hearted attempt of Jaina enquiry as expressed in. Saptabhangi stops at giving partial truth together and does not attempt to overcome the opposition implied in them by a proper synthesis.

But if we mean by definiteness unconditional and absolute assertion, then the 'indefiniteness' of the doctrine is a logical necessity. As Radhakrishnanpoints out [36] the criticism of the Saptabhangi doctrine as of no practical utility is an expression of personal opinion and as such need not be considered.

Samkara also says that the Saptabhangi doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of Jaina philosophy. The assertion of existence, non-existence and indescribability are alike applicable to the doctrine of the soul and the categories. Similarly, the final release may exist and not exist and may be indescribable.[37]

The dialectic of Syadvada is inconsistent with the Jaina philosophy. It could not have sprung from the same teacher and the same philosophical background. "As a mere 'anaikantika' (sic) theory of predication, the Syadvada must return upon itself and end in doubting

the doubter himself.[38] Prof. Radhakrishnanafter mentioning the strong points of Syadvada, says "Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means 'the hypothesis of the absolute') and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their own logic".[39] But in the Saptabhangi tarangini we read a counter argument: If the final release and heavenly bliss are eternal and existing, where is the chance for samasara and the attempt to obtain moksa? If the other alternative is the only truth, what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is impossible to attain? Radhakrishnanpoints out that the Saptabhangi doctrine is not in consistent with the other views of the Jainas. It is a logical corollary of the Anekantavada. All that the Jainas say is that everything is of a complex nature and the real reconciles the difference in itself. Attributes which are contradictors in the abstract co-exist in the world of experience.

Ramanuja also pointed out that contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing any more than light and darkness. However, he seems to accept the distinction between dravya and paryfiya, substance and modes. He also sees that the substance has permanence; paryaya implied change.

But the predications give severally partial truths. The truths presented by them are alternative truths from different points of view; and the seven predications would present a complete comprehensive picture of reality. It is neither scepticism nor agnosticism, for each individual truth is valid. It is supplemented and harmonized by the other predication into a single comprehensive picture of reality, as we get a harmony in orchestra by the combination of different notes.

With all their criticisms, BELVALKAR makes Syadvada a most searching characteristic. Radhakrishnan observes "Samkara and Ramanuja criticized the Saptabhangi view on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing". After quoting the relevant passage from Ramanuja he proceeds to say: "The Jainas admit that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense. All that they say is that everything is of a complex nature, and reconciles differences in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in life and experience. The tree is moving in that its branches are moving and it is not moving since it is fixed to its place in the ground." [40]

VI. In Western thought, at the time of the Greeks, when there was intellectual confusion due to the conflicting theories presented by the different philosophers, several approaches to problems were