Jivaraja Jaina Granthmala, No. 20
JAINA
VIEW OF LIFE
BY
T. G. Kalghati, M.A., Ph.D.
Reader in Philosophy, Karnatak University,
and Principal, Karnatak Arts College, Dharwar
General Editor
Dr. A. N. Upadhya
& Dr. H. L. Jain and Pt.
Kailaschand Shastri
Published by
LAL CHAND HIRACHAND DOSHI
Jaina Sanskriti Samraksaka Sangha, Sholapur.
First Edition 1969
Second Edition 1984
GENERAL EDITORIAL
In this brochure are presented eight essays on
different aspects of Jainism. The Anekanta attitude is really the saviour of
philosophical positions which are-being pushed to the brink of extinction by
extremists. Syadvada and Nayavada, the
two wings of Anekanta, are the effective instruments for bringing out the
secrets of reality by reconciling extreme alternatives. Jainism accepts both
Spirit and Matter as real. The spirit or Atman has been subjected to deeper
analysis in the three-fold distinction of bahir-, antar- and parama- atman. It
is an embodiment of knowledge. the fivefold classification (mati, sruta,
avadhi, manahaparyaya and kevala) of which is of special interest for an
epistemologist. The concept of Kevala-jnana envisages an ideal type of
knowledge for the functioning of which there are no temporal and spatial limits. Karma, as conceived in jainism, is a subtle
variety of matter which is in association with spirit from beginningless
time. It has evolved itself into an
automatically functioning Law and shapes the destiny of the spirit. It is by
the termination of the Karmic association through austere life and self
concentration that the Atman passes through various stages of spiritual
progress (gunasthana) and attains its innate nature, the fullest effulgence of
knowledge. This course of progress is the veritable path of religion, full of
rigorous discipline in thought, word and act: this constitutes the ethical code
of Jainism, based on Ahimsa which is the highest criterion for judging the
mutual relations in the realm of living beings. It is by correctly
understanding reality and by leading the life of self-discipline, according to
the stage to which one belongs, that one realizes the highest spiritual status,
summum bonum.
Thus it will be seen how these essays, though independent in themselves,
have an inherent connection between them. They give us in brief the Jaina View
of Life and should enable readers to appreciate an important undercurrent of
India's phiIosophical heritage.
Dr. T. G. Kalghatagi is a keen investigator in
philosophy. It is extremely good of him to have brought his equipment in the
philosophical study to bear upon Jainism in its various aspects. We are
thankful to him for giving this volume for publication to the Jivaraja Jaina
Granthamala.
Within a short time after the death of our earlier
President, Shriman Gulabchand H]Rachand Ji (on 22-1-1967), the Sangha suffered
an irreparable loss (on 23-6-1968) in the sad demise of Shriman Manikchand
Virachandaji who worked hard for the Sangha from its inception. His zest for
life, courage of conviction and firm actions were a strength to the Sangha.
We are grateful to our President, Shriman Lalchand
Hirachandaji for his enlightening guidance in all our deliberations. Heavier
responsibilities have devolved on the broad shoulders of Shriman Walchand
Devchandaji who is helping us in every way for the progress of the Granthamala.
We are so thankful to him.
Kolhapur,
Jabalpur
A. N. Upadhye
H. L. Jain
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
Man is 'homo sapiens'. He has built civilizations and destroyed them too. Magnificent empires were built, mighty in their day. It was difficult to doubt their power. But their day is done and their courts 'the lion and the lizard keep'. We have seen the phenomenal advancement of science in our own day. As we gaze at the incredible rapidity of scientific progress we are losing touch with the spiritual side of man. We are on cross-roads of life, between two worlds; ' one dead and the powerless to be born' . We see everywhere social and political chaos. There is distrust and frustration, and for a decade or more we have lived on the brink of another world war more disastrous than the earlier too, which would mean total destruction of human race. Whether it would mean pralaya we do not know. But when it comes we can only see the broken bits of civilization, if we are to survive this catastrophe. And all this is due to a wrong approach to the understanding of the problems of life and experience.A new kind of a materialism is being emphasised today where in we pay exclusive attention to material comforts and ignore the higher values. But to understand life and nature we have to transcend the narrow partial points of view and adopt a synoptic view of life. We have to realize that others' points of view have also to be considered and respected. Dogmatic approach of looking at the problems leads to intolerance and then to violence. Jainas have preached the synoptic view of life in their theory of Anekanta. It emphasises the catholic outlook towards life. Intellectual nonviolence, respect for other points of view are the key-note of this doctrine, and that would be a panacea for all the ills of our social
and political life today. Jainism is an ancient religion which prevailed even before
Vardhamana Mahavira, the twenty-fourth and Parsva the twentythird
Tirthamkaras. It is a pre-Aryan
religion coming from the Sramana current of thought, and sramana thought was
prevailing in India long before the Aryans came to this country The antiquity
of Jainism as reflecting the Pre-Aryan thought of the upper class of
North-Eastern India has now been established beyond dispute. Jaina tradition is
unanimous in making Rsabha the first Tirthamkara as the founder of Jainism.
Long before the Aryans reached the Ganges or even Sarasvati. Jainism had been
taught by prominent saints or Tirthamkaras, prior to the historical twentythird
Parsva of the eighth or ninth century B. C.
Many Western scholars like Jacobi Vincent Smith Forlong and Zimmer have
accepted the Pre-Aryan prevalence of Jainism.
Radhakrishnanaccepts the view that Jainism prevailed in India even
before Parsva and Vardhamana, the last two Tlrthamkaras. Hiralal Jain has interpreted the mention of
Kesi and Kesi Rsabha in the Rgveda as referring to the first Tirthamkara. When
Buddhism arose Jainism was already an ancient sect with its stronghold near
about Vaisali which was visited and admired by Buddha.
The Anekanta outlook of the Jainas pervades their
entire philosophy and life. The whole texture of Jaina philosophy and ethics is
woven in the Anekanta attitude. We have accordingly analyse in this treatise
some of the conceptions in Jaina philosophy and ethics as rejecting the
Anekanta outlook. Jiva has been considered from the noumenal and the phenomenal
points of view. From the noumenal point of view, it is pure and perfect, and
from the phenomenal it is the agent and the enjoyer of fruits of Karma. Our
experience can be graded into levels as the sense and the supersensuous
experience. Jiva in its empirical existence is involved in the wheel of Samsara
through the Yoga (activity). This involvement is beginningless, though it has
an end. The end is freedom from the wheel of life and the attainment of
Moksa. For this we have to remove the
Karma that has accrued to the soul. The Jainas have worked out an elaborate
theory of Karma almost making it a science. The Anekanta view pervades the
analysis of Karma. Karma is a substantive force. It is material in nature. It consists of fine particles of matter
which are glued to the soul as soot to the surface of the mirror. The influx of
Karma leads to bondage of Jiva to the wheel of life. This bondage of soul to
Karma is determined by the i) nature (prakrti), duration (sthiti), intensity
(anubhagha) and quantity ( pradesa) of Karma. Karma has its psychological
aspect also in the Bhava karma.
Moksa is to be achieved through the triple path of
right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. The belief in the Tattvas
is the right faith, knowledge of the real is right knowledge and freedom from
attachment and aversion is right conduct. The path of virtue is the path which
leads to self-realization. The five Vratas are fundamental for the Jainas.
However, the practice of the Vratas and the ethical life have been graded in
two levels as duty of a muni (ascetic) and the life of sravaka (lay follower).
'The purpose is to realize the highest gradually and with ease. In this
analysis of ethical concepts we find the application of the spirit of Anekanta.
The same can be found in their interpretation of
Ahimsa as an ethical principle. The Jaina attitude to the conception of God
expresses the spirit of Anekanta. The Jainas are against the Theistic
conception of God. But each soul in its pure and perfect form, is divine. Still
the 'Tirthamkaras are worshipped not because they are gods but because they are
human, yet divine -- to be kept before us as ideals for emulation. Apart from
the worship of the Tirthamkaras, we find a pantheon of gods as a social
survival and a psychological necessity.
Life is to be considered as a struggle for
prefection. We do not get ready made views. We have to look at life through
many coloured glasses and as a “vale of soul making". This is the picture
of Jaina outlook on life as presented in this book. It may, perhaps, give a discrete picture. The
purpose has been to see some of the problems in the light of synoptic point of
view as expressed in the Anekanta.
The metaphysical elements of Jainism have not been
discussed in detail as the main object of this work has been to present the
Jaina view of life. However, principle of asrava, bandha, samvara and nirjara
have been incidentally woven in the texture of the scheme while describing the
entanglement of the soul in samsara and the efforts to attain Moksa. Jiva and
Moksa are the prius and the end of the noumenal world. We have studied them at
length.
This problem has been engaging my attention for some
time past, and it has developed in the form of this book at the inspiration and
guidance of Dr. A.N. Upadhye of Kolhapur. I gave a synopsis of this work in my talk at the Jaina Boarding at
Kolhapur during the Paryusana festival in 1963. I have made use of two chapters
from my earlier book Some Problems in Jaina Psychology. I am grateful to the
Registrar, Karnatak University, Dharwar for permitting me to use this material
from my previous book I have incorporated in this book some of my articles
already published in different philosophical Journal by retouching them here
and there to form a part of this book.
I am grateful to the Editors and Publishers of these
Journals for their permission to use my articles in the book. I must express my
gratitude to the late Professor Charles A. Moore, of the University of Hawaii,
Honolulu (U. S. A.) for permitting me to use my article Thc Doctrine of Karma
in Jaina Philosophy published in Philosophy
East and West, a Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought, Volume XI,
Numbers 3 and 4 July,October-1965. I have intended, in this book, to weave out
some of my papers published earlier so as to bring out a coherent picture of
the Jaina view of life as expressing the Anekanta outlook. I must express my
sense of profound gratitude to Dr. A.
N. Upadhye for all the encouragement and guidance he has given me. I thank the
authorities of the Jaina Samskrti Samraksaka Sangha, Sholapur, for publishing
this work. I thank my colleague Shri S. R. Gunjal, M.A., M.Lib.Sc. for
assisting me in going through the proofs.
Dharwar
31.3 69.
T. G. KALGHATGI
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
I have pleasure in presenting the second edition of
the Jaina View of Life. I am greatful to the scholars of the Jaina Studies for
their kind appreciation. In this edition I have revised some portions of the
papers included in the first edition. I have added the following papers in this
edition – 1. Right understanding – some hurdels, published in studies in Indian
Philosophy (L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1981) and 2. Jaina Mysticism
published in the procedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress 1961 - 1965.
I am greatful to The Jaina Samskrit Samrakshaka
Sangha, Solapur for having got the book published in the second edition. I sincerely thank M/s. Manohar Printing
Press, Dharavad specially Shri Ravi Akalwadi, for the dareful and fine printing
of the book.
‘Ratnatraya’
Savanur Nawab Plots
Dharwad 580008
20-2-1984
T. G. Kalghati
Ret. Professor of Jainology and Prakrits
University of Mysore.
SYNOPTIC PHILOSOPHY:
Meaning of philosophy -- philosophy in India -- historical survey -- a priori way leading to Absolutism far removed from the common sense -- empiricist way -- logical positivism -- leading philosophy to the brink of extinction -- the way out to be found in the synoptic philosophy as expressed in the Anekanta view of the Jainas.
1. Plato and Aristotle have traced the beginnings of
Philosophy to the feeling of wonder which arises in the mind of man when he
contemplates on the nature of things in the world.[1] But wonder at the level
of primitive men is in the instinctive stage and does not give rise to higher
speculation. It is only at a higher
level when man has gained command over nature does philosophy begin. It is the
fruit of society's maturer age. As Hegel said, philosophy makes its first
expression when experience and thought have fully matured in their process. The
owl of Minerva does not start upon its flight till the evening twilight has
begun to fall.
Philosophy is a reflection on experience in order to
comprehend the ultimate reality. We may say it is a synoptic view of life. It
is, in the lines of Mathew Arnold, to see life steadily and to see it whole. In
a narrower sense it is academic pursuit of the solutions of the ultimate
problems of life.
Philosophy is not merely an unusually obstinate
effort to think consistently, not a construction of a super-strucure of
thought, nor is it a mere collection of noble sentiments. For Plato and Bradley philosophy was the
knowledge of reality, of that which is. For the Logical Positivists the
function of philosophy is only linguistic analysis. Philosophy, however, would
not be complete except as a synoptic view of life, as a world view. In this
sense alone can philosophy be a guide to life.
In India, philosophy was and has been well grounded
in life. It has permeated the lives of
the people. It has never been a mere academic pursuit nor a luxury of the
mind. It was intimately connected with
life. It is to be lived. Mundaka
Upanisad speaks of 'Brahma Vidya' as the basis of all knowledge.[2] Kautilya
makes philosophy the lamp of all sciences. Philosophy has been called darsana
in the sense of the spiritual perception and vision of the seers, and the
highest triumphs of philosophy are possible only to those who have achieved in
themselves a purity of the soul.[3]
Realization of the Atman is the highest end in
Philosophy[4], there is no other way. In this sense, philosophy is darsana and
intimately connected with life.
2.
Philosophic enquiry has proceeded in two directions: i) The first uses a priori
and deductive methods. It is analytic in approach and is the way of the
rationalists. ii) The second adopts
inductive methods and is the empiricist way. In ancient Indian thought,
philosophic speculation relied on Sruti and Smrti.
The course of philosophy has been long and arduous. From Plato and the Upanisads to the present day, philosophers have sought to find solutions to the perennial problems of philosophy, and by pursuing
the one way or the other have reached either the
summits of speculation removed from human experience, or have ultimately faced
the impossibility of metaphysical speculation.
i) We may first consider the a priori approach to
the study of philosophy. In Western thought, deductive and a priori methods
were first used by Parmenides and his desciple Zeno, who made, for the first
time, a distinction between sense and reason. The philosophic speculations of
Plato were largely based on a priori methods. He abstracted sense from reason
and built a world of ideas independent of the physical world. In the Middle Ages of Europe, philosophy was
sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive
methods. In the modern Age, Descartes and Spinoza built systems of rationalism.
From cogito ergo sum he went on to heaven and looked at the physical world with
confidence, which is, indeed, a way far removed from that of common sense. Descartes split the-world into two
substances distinct from each other and postulated a God separate from each of
them. Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between God and the world on
the basis of mathematical deduction. The result is, Spinoza's Substance became
a lion's den to which all tracks lead and from which none returns. In Hegel and
Bradley we go much further away from common sense. We see the superstructures of philosophic speculation, and we are
left in the world of appearance only to gaze at the ivory towers in which these
philosophers lived. Thus the a priori speculative method led us far from the
madding crowd to the dizzy heights of the 'Absolute '.
In India, we were saved from the separation of the
speculative and the practical, because philosophy, with us, is essentially
spiritual: "it takes its origin in life and enters back into life."
[5] In Samkara we come to a great speculative system. Still, we do not feel
ourselves strangers here, as we are not cut off from the ideals of life.
"Samkara presents to us the true ideal of philosophy, which is not so much
knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual
freedom."[6]
ii) Empiricism uses a posteriori and inductive
methods. In the Theaetetus, Socrates
explains the Protagorean doctrine that knowledge is through perception, and
shows the impossibility of arriving at any objective truth. For the Sophists,
Sense experience was the only source of knowledge; while Gorgias asserted the
impossibility of any knowledge or communication whatever.
In ancient Indian thought the Carvakas led us to a
similar conclusion. For them, Lokayata is the only sastra and perceptual
evidence the only authority.[7] This would logically lead to scepticism and
nihilism; but they did not go to the whole length, because their immediate aim
was to break down the ecclesiastical monopoly and still assert the spiritual
independence of the individual. The Buddhist empiricism was to have gone the
way of Gorgias in the Madhyamika School, but for the predominance of the
ethical ideal and the goal of nirvaa. Nagarjuna's philosophy is 'now nearer to
scepticism and now the mysticism'.[8] The rigour of logic would have led him to
nihilism, but for; his spiritual fervour and thirst for nirvana.
English empiricism repeats this logical movement but
does not save itself from its own conclusions. We can see the empiricist method
steadily marching from Locke to Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley denied matter, and
Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid, summing up the
English empiricist movement, states that ideas, first introduced for explaining
the operations of the human understanding, undermined everything but them
selves, pitifully naked and destitute, "set adrift without a rag to cover them."[9]
Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go on further without a
radical reconsideration of its fundamental position.
But the Human tendency has been recently revived, by
the Cambridge philosophers, who brought philosophy to the brink of extinction.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus discusses problems of meaning, the nature of logic,
facts and propositions and the task of philosophy. It states: 'What can be said
at all can be said clearly, and where of one cannot speak, there one must be
silent'. 'The world is the totality of facts not of things'. There must be
simple entities called objects because there are names, and there must be
narrles because propositions have a definite sense. Names have no sense except
in the context of propositions; and propositions are related to facts as '
pictures of facts' . He states that all the-truths of logic are tautologies,
and logical proofs are only mechanical devices for recognizing categories.
Mathematics consists of equations, and the propositions of mathematics are also
without sense. The metaphysician talks nonsense in the fullest sense of the
word, as he does not understand "the logic of our language".
Metaphysical suggestion is like the composition of a new song. We are told that
he made no essential change in his attitude towards the aim of philosophy.[10]
Russell writes that the influence of the Tractatus on him "was not wholly
good", and that the philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations remains
to him completely unintelligible.[11]
Logical Positivism is a philosophical movement emanating from 'The Vienna Circle' . It was a thorough going empiricism backed by the resources of modern logic and tempered by exaggerated respect for the achievements of Science.[12] Ayer's Philosophy is the logical outcome of Hume's empiricism. Like Hume, he divides all genuine propositions into two classes i) a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics, which are analytic and therefore necessary and certain; and ii) propositions concerning empirical matters of fact which may be probable but never certain and need to be tested by the verification principle. No statement which refers to a 'reality' transcending the limits of all possible sense experience can possibly have any literal significance. Ayer shows that the Logical Positivist charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the under-standing in a field where it cannot probably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant.[13] A metaphysician talks nonsense, because he is deceived by grammar. Thus, Logical Positivists claim that they have completely overthrown speculative philosophy.[14]Philosophy, to them, is only logical
analysis; not a theory, but an activity. Its
function is analysis, Logical clarification of concepts, propositions and
theories proper to empirical science. Thus, philosophy is identified with
logical syntax, the higher-level discussion of language, and the perennial
problems of philosophy are dismissed as nonsense. Philosophy classes are,
accordingly, converted into super-grammar classes.
However, Logical Positivism has ceased to become a
fashionable philosophy today, because
i) its attack on meta-physics has damped the vigour and chastened the
style of its remaining adherents, and ii) its approach to language is
unnecessarily rigid and doctrinaire. Even Ayer is doubtful about carrying
through the programme of phenomenalism[15] and uneasy about the verification
principle. [16]
Still, the impasse that Logical Positivism has
reached is unfortunate, because:
i) The doctrines of Logical Positivism have led to
dogmatism and intolerance; so that metaphysical questions are dismissed as
unworthy of attention of sensible men.[17] Theories like the verification
principle, the emotive theory of ethics and logical construction are simply
announced as if they formed a part of revelation denied to other philosophers
except Hume.[18]
ii) Sense experience, as the criterion of truth, has
led to solipsism, as it did in the case of the Sophists and Hume. Sense experience is private and cannot be
communicated. The more radical among
them, like Carnap and Neurath, were hence led to physicalism, which is nearer
to behaviourism in psychology.
iii) For logical Positivists, as for other
empiricists, sense experience is the only criterion of knowledge. Modern
Psychical Research, on the other hand, affirms the possibility of extra-sensory
experiences. In addition, there are certain other experiences, like the
speculation, moral and aesthetic. The
problem of supersensuous experience is not new to us in India. All schools of
Indian philosophy, except the Carvakas and Mimamsakas, believe in it.
Supersensuous experience transcends the categories of time, space and
casuality: " Our sense organs are narrowly specialized to serve biological
and practical ends, and our normal consciousness is also largely
specialized.[19] In the face of these facts, it would be narrow and fanatical
to insist on sensory experience and the verification principle as the only
criteria of knowledge. Like the men
chained against the walls of the save in The Republic, the empiricists refuse
to see beyond what they would like to affirm.
iv) Moreover, for the Logical Positivists tbe
verification principle has been a dogma and a commandment. But tbe principle of
verification is not a self-evident statement, -nor is it capable of
verification by sense experience. The logic of the analytic philosophy is
itself based on a metaphysic, certain presupposltions about the universe.[20]
v) Nevertheless, the effects of Logical Positivism have been serious.
It has engendered a negative climate of opirltion,
and was likely to shatter the old beliefs in the social, moral and religious
spheres with nothing else to fill the gap except analysis of propositions. It
has produced a 'waste land of mind, of which T. S. Eliot's poem is at once a
description and, by implication, a denunciation.[21]
3. A survey of the course of philosophy in the past
shows that philosophy continually faced this impasse. The a priori deductive method took us to the lion's den. At the
height of its speculation, it built superstructures of philosophy and was cut
off from common sense. The empiricists were led to solipsism and to the feverish
denial of metaphysics.
To save philosophy from this impasse, we have to
adopt a synoptic view towards the problems of philosophy. We should realize
that reality is complex and life is a many-coloured dome. Idealism was unable
to see the trees in the wood, while empiricism could not see the wood in the
trees.[22]These were two ways of approaching the problem; but they are not the
only ways, nor were the approaches absolute.
This is the synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life
steadily and see it whole. Broad says, "If we do not look at the world
synoptically we shall have a very narrow view of it". He thinks that a
purely critical philosophy is arid and rigid.[23]
The Jaina view of anekanta comes nearer to this
approach. Anekanta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problems.
Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. It is the
symbolisation of the fundamental non violent attitude. It emphasizes the
many-sideness of truth. Reality can be looked at from various angles.
Whitehead's fundamental attitude in philosophy is
essentially the same as the anekanta view of life. Whitehead' defined
speculative philosophy as the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary
system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can
be interpreted.[24]
We have to note that the function of philosophy is
not merely an academic pursuit of reality. It is a way of life. Philosophy has had the dual purpose of
revealing truth and increasing virtue. Philosophers have sought to provide a
principle to live by and purposes to live for. For this practical end,
philosophers have striven to achieve a synoptic view of the universe.[25] The
consciousness of the finiteness of our being makes us yearn for the beyond, in
the spirit of the Upanisads, from the unreal to the real, from darkness to
light, and from death to iternal life.[26]
For this, we have to look to the spiritual
experience of the great seers. Broad says there is one thing which speculative
philosophy must take into most serious consideration and that is the religious
and mystical experiences of mankind.[27] It is they who are in constant touch
with the innermost depth of life and to them we are to look for guidance. Such
'enlightened ones' or 'sages' are the first-hand exponents of philosophy.[28]
REFERENCES:
1. Aristotle: Metaphystis, i, 2
2. sarva-viya-pratistha.
3. RADHAKRIISHNAN (S): Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p.
45.
4. Brhadaranyaha ll. IV-5 atma vare drstavyah.
5. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol (1945)
P. 25 2.
6. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol, II,
(1947) P.447
7. Prabodhacandrodaya, Act II.
8. RADHAKRISHNAN(S): Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p.
644.
9. REID: Works, p. 109.
10. STENIUS (Eric) : Tractatus-A critical exposition
of its main lines of thought (1960) p. 226.
11. RUSSELL (B) : My Philosophical Development
(1959) pp. 216-217.
12.. Encyclopedia of Western Philosphy and
Philosphers. Edited by URMSON (J.C.)
(1960).
13. AYER .(J.A) : Language, Truth and Logic, p. 35.
14. AYER, (J.A) : Language, Truth and Logic, p. 48.
15. AYER, (J. A.): Philosophical Essays (1954) No.
142.
16. AYER, (J. A.): Language, Truth and Logic (1946),
Preface to second edition.
17, JOAD (C. E. M.): A Critique of Logical
Positiuism, p. 149.
18. JOAD (C. E. M ): A Critique of Logical
Positivism, p. 29.
19. TYRRELL ( G. N. N.) : The personality of men
(Pelican) p. 265.
20. RADHAKRISHNAN(S.) : The Ineternational Insitute
of Philosophy and indian Philosophical Congress. Entretiens edited by N.A NILE.
21. JOAD (C> E> M>) : A Critique of Logical
Positivism, p. 149.
22. BOARD (C.D.) : Contemporary British Philosphy,
ed. MUIRHEAD (j. H.) Vol. I (1924),
Critical and Speculative Philosophy.
23. PASSMORE (Joan) : A Hundread Years of
Philosophy, (1957) p. 350
24. Process
and Reality (1929) Part I, Chapter I, p. 4 and Adventures of Ideas (19330 p.
285.
25. JOAD (C. E. M. ) : A Critique of Logical
Positivism, (1950) p. 29.
26. asato ma sad gonaya; tamaso majyotir gamaya;
mrtyor ma amratam gamaya.
27. Contemporary British Philosophy: edited by
MUIRHEAD (J. H.) (1924) Critical ond
Speculative Philosophy.
28. HUXLAY ALDOUS: The Perennial Philosophy, (1959)
10, 11.
APPROACH TO REALITY:
Introduction -- meaning of Anekanta -- historical survey -- development of the Theory of Anekanta -- Nayavada -- analysis of the Nayas -- Syadvada as a logical expression of Nayavada -- Syadavada analysed -- criticism of the theory some observations—Right Understanding – some Hurdels.
I. Jainism is realistic and pluralistic. Its
philosophy is based on logic and experience. Moksa is the ultimate aim of life.
lt is realised by the three fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and
right conduct.[1] Right knowledge is possible by the right approach to the
problems of Life. Anekanta, the Jainas
believe, gives us the right approach to looking at the various problems of
life. Anekanta is the symboliation of the fundamental non-violent attitude of
the Jainas. It is the expression of intellectual non-violence.
In surveying the field of Indian philosophy,
Dr. Padmarajiah mentions five types of
philosophy considered from the point of view of the nature of reality. They
are:
l. Philosophy of Being Samkara represents this
school of thought of identity.
2. Philosophy of Becoming (change or difference)
Buddhism presents this view.
3. Philosophy subordinating difference to identity
i) The Samkhya, ii) Bhedabhedavada and iii) Visistadvaita hold this attitude.
4. Philosophy subordinating identity to diflerence
i) The Vaisesika, ii) Dvaita of Madhvacarya gives this view.
5. Philosophy coordinating both identity and
difference The Jaina view of reality presents this attitude.
Jainism meets the extremes and presents a view of
reality which comprehends the various sides of reality to give a synthetic
picture of the whole. It recognises the principle of distlnction and develops
the comprehensive scheme of Anekanta realism. Anekanta is the 'most consistent
form of realism as it allows the principle of distinction to run its full
course until it reaches its logical terminus on the theory of manifold reality
and knowledge.[2]
Anekanta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problems. It emphasizes a catholic outlook towards all that we see and experience. lntellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. lt arose as an antidote to the one-sided and absolute approach to the study of reality of the philosophers at that time. It arose out of the confusion of the conflicting views of the philosophers and religious men on the problem of the nature of reality. The Upanisadic philosophers sought to find the facts of experience. This search gave rise to many philosophical theories. Buddhism tried to present a fresh and a different approach in the Madhyama-pratipada Drsti. The Anekanta view presents a coherent picture of the philosophies, pointing out the important truths in each of them. It looks at the problem from various
points of view. The cardinal principle of the Jaina
philosophy is its Anekanta which emphasizes that 'there is not only diversity
but that real is equally diversified.'[3]
II. Although Anekanta was a special feature of the
Jaina point of view, it is possible to say that some other schools of thought
were aware of the view. In Buddhist philosophy the phrase majjhima magga bears
the same significance as Anekanta. Pandit Sukeialalji Sanghvi, in his
introduction to the Sanmati Tarka, says that the doctrine of Anekanta and the
madhyama marga have great resemblance in the fundamental idea underlylng
them.[4] Anatmavada of Sanjaya, Vibhajjavada, madhyama pratipada which induced
the Buddha to treat all prevalent opinions with respect may be mentioned as
expressions of Allekanta attitude. Similarly Bhedabheda-vada of Bhartrprapanca
is referred to as Anekanta.[5] Gautama, the Buddha, faced the confusion of
thought presented in his time about the ultimate nature of reality. He was
silent about these problems. In Dlgha Nikaya, Gautama says 'It is not that I
was, I was not, it is not that I will be, I will not be; it is not that I am, I
am not.' The Buddha describes his attitude to Manavaka as Vibhajjavada.[6] This is similar to Anekanta, although it is
not so clearly defined and developed. No specihc words suggesting the doctrine
of Anekanta are found in the philosophic literature of ancient lndia. lt is
suggested that the doctrine of evolu-tion as propounded by the Samkhya school
implies the-Anekanta attitude.[7] However, the Jainas perfected the doctrine
and systematized it. The Buddhist philosopher SantaraKsita makes mention of the
Anekanta of the Vipra-mimamsakas, Nigghantas and Kapila Samkhyas. Among the
Jaina exponents Mahavira practiced the attitude and is supposed to have
expressed it in the Syadvada.
A clear expression of the Anekanta attitude is seen
in Mahavira's discussions with his disciples. ln the Bhagavatt sutra, there is
a dialogue between the Mahavira and his disciple Gautama.
"Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or
non-eternal?"
"The souls are eternal in some respects and
non-eternal in some other respects. ..
They are eternal, O Gautama,
from the point of view of substance and non-eternal
from the point of view of modes."
Again, the problem of body and mind was answered by
Mahavlra as -- "The body, O Gautama, is identical with the soul and not
identical with the soul in different respects." [8]
The application of the principle of Anekanta can be
seen in their analysis of the metaphysical question concerning the categories.
The Jaina theories of atoms, of space and soul, to mention a few instances,
illustrate the pervading influence of the Anekanta viewpoint. Atoms are of the
same kind: they can yet give the infinite variety of things. Pudgala has certain inalienable features,
but within limits it can becorne anything through qualitative
differentiation. The transmutation of
elements is quite possible in
this view and is not a mere dream of the
alchemist.[9]
Space is another instance of a manifold real. It is
un-corporeal and formless, yet divisible [10] and its divisibility is a
spontaneous feature. Abhayadeva develops the concepts of manifoldness of space
as a polemic against the Naiyayika view of space as one and partless. The souls
are individual centres of experience. Like the Leibnizian monads the soul
mirrors the entire universe within self as a unique centre of experience. The
universe it mirrors is infinitely complex; and its experimental powers must be
manifold commensurate with the complicity of the experienced universe.[11]
In the Anga literature of the Jainas the doctrine of
Anekanta was briefly and incidentally discussed. But in the commentaries of the
Jaina scripture written in Prakrit it has -received greater attention. But when
the Sanskrit language found a place in the Jaina literature, it occupied an
important position. The commentary on the Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati gives an
exhaustive description of the problem.
Later, a systematic exposition of the doctrine was given by Jaina
scholars like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena Divakara, Mallavadi, Pajyapada,
Akalanka, Vidyanandi and others.
The Anekanta view does imply the principles of
reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe, as given by Kant,
although this principle is more implied than expressly stated in Jainism.
In Kantianism as in Jainism, the principle of
reciprocity goes beyond the 'coexistance' or the inter-relatedness of the
substances and explains the 'dynamical community' among them.[12] But the Jaina
is a thorough-going realist.
Anekanta-vada is a theory of reality which asserts the manifoldness and
complexity of the real. In apprehending the complexity of the universe, it has
crystallised itself into the two-fold dialectic of Nayavada and Syadvada; and
they are complementary processes forming a normal and inevitable development of
the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics.[13]
lII. Anekanta emphasizes that the truth is many
sided. Reality can be looked at from
various angles. Two doctrines result from the Anekantavada: i) Nayavada and ii)
Syadvada. Nayavada is the analytic
method investigating a particular stand-point of factual situation. Syadvada is
primarily synthetic designed to harmonise the different view points arrived at
by Nayavada. Nayavada is 'primarily conceptual' and the Syadvada is synthetic
and mainly verbal,[14] although this sometimes maintained that conceptual is
also verbal and the verbal method is so much changed with epistemological
characters. The distinction between the conceptual and the-verbal has mainly a
reference to the fact that points of view have to be expressed in language and
predicated in specific forms so as to embody them. The concept is formed from
this point of view.
Naya refers to the point of view one takes when one looks at the object. A naya is defined as a particular opinion or a view-point of looking at an object. It expresses a partial truth about an object as known by a knowing subject.[15] The Jainas give the example of the b
lind men and the elephant. The blind men feel the animal and describe it, each in his own
way. Similarly, we look at objects and describe them in our own way from
different angles. Other view-points are also recognized; and they need to be
recognized with each in the scheme of a fuller and more valid knowledge which
is the sphere of Pramana.
The Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme
consisting of seven ways to looking at reality. There was a problem whether the
seven Nayas can be reduced in number.
There are three traditions. The first tradition adopts seven Nayas. The
second eliminates Naigama Naya and reduces the-list to six. In the third tradition we have five, as
Samabhi rudha and Evambhuta Naya have been subsumed under Sabda Naya. Umasvati
is largely responsible for the first and the third traditions. In the Digambara
version of the Tattvartha-sutra seven ways have been mentioned, but the
gvetambara version gives five Nayas as mentioned in the third tradition.[16]
The different points of view are the Nayas.
Various Nayas have been mentioned. As shown above Umasvati
first-mentions five Nayas and then adds the subdivisions.[17] The Agamas have
mentioned two points of view : Samgraha Naya, the point o£ view of the
universal, the synthetic point of view and ii)Paryayika Naya, the view-point of
the particular, the analytic point of view. Siddhasena Divakara in his Sahmati
Tarka adopted the two points of view and distributed the Nayas under two heads.
He described the six Nayas. But the
generally accepted classification of Nayas is seven fold. Three of them refer to objects and their
meaning, and the others to the words. In the first category we get three: i)
Samgrahs Naya, ii) Vyavahara Naya, and iii) Rjusutra Naya. Siddhasena Divakara
says that Samgraha and Vyavahara are subdivisions of the Dravyarthika Naya.[18]
Samgraha Naya gives the synthetic point of view. It gives, as
Radhakrishnanpoints out, the class point of view. In this, we seek to approach
the unity amidst the diversity by finding the common element in the variety
presented in the world. Absolute monism is the conclusion of this point of
view. Exaggerated emphasis on the
universal would lead to Samgrahabhasa; and Samkhya and Advaita schools of
philosophy are notable instances.[19[ The absolute emphasis on the one and
unity dismissing all diversity as appearance, is the position of the
absolutists. The Jainas maintain that
such a point of view, if it is taken in the absolute sense, presents a partial
point of view.
Vyavahara Naya is the empirical point of view. It is
the analytic point of view. It emphasises the diversity in the universe
presented in the experience. We know things in their details and emphasize
their individuality. The attitude of the pluralists and the materialists is the
outcome of the view.
Rjusutra Naya is narrower than the Vyavahara
Naya. It looks at an object at a
particular point of time, and does not see the continuity of the thing. The
Jainas say that the Buddhist philosophy of Ksanikavada is an example of
the-Rjusutra Naya.
Naigama Naya refers to the end or the purpose involved in the action. We interpret an activity with reference to the-end for which
it is done. For instance, a man who is carrying
water and firewood will say that he is cooking if he is asked what he is doing.
Siddhasena Divakara adopts a different point of view. Naigama Naya comprehends
both the generic and specific qualities.
Another interpretation of Naigama Naya involves
non-discrimination between the generic and the specific elements of an object.
For example, when we state "The Bamboo grows here in plenty" the
generic and the specific features of the bamboo are not within the focus of our
attention. The-principle of configuration and the result suggested by Gestalt
School of Psychology holds good in this case.[20]
The non-distinction is not, however, absolute and if
the-distinction is asserted absolutely there would be a fallacy of
Naigamabhasa.
Paryayarthika Naya is the analytic point of view
referring to the words: and their meaning. It is a verbal interpretation of the
terms used. It has three subdivisions: i) Sabda Naya, ii) Samabhirudha Naya and
iii) Evambhuta Naya. Sabda Naya
consists in looking at the functional; importance of the terms. The name has a
function calling to our mind the object implied by the name However, we very
often forget that the meaning of a term is relative and varies with different
contexts. We emphasize that the meaning is fixed. That gives rise to fallacies.
Samabhirudha Naya is the application of the Sabda Naya. It refers to the-roots
of words. For instance, raja as a person who shines is different from the nrpa,
a person who rules over men and protects them.
Evambhuta not only sees the difference between words with their
different etyrnologies; but it sees the difference between one and the same
word, if it does not signify the meaning denoted by the root in the vord. For
instance, there is a difference between raja. Then he is shining and raja when
he is not shining. In this we give a word a fixed meaning, something by usage. For instance, a 'nut' has come to mean in
English a showy man.
The Cambridge philosophers and analytic school of
philosophy in the present day assert the exclusive application of the form of
Paryaya Naya to express Sabda-nayabhasa.
In Evambhuta Naya we restrict the meaning of the
word to the very function connected by the name. It is a specialized form of
the Samabhiradlla. For instance, a building will be called a house as long as
it is used for residential purposes.
But if it is used for office purposes, it will not be appropriate to
call it a house.
Thus, each Naya or point of view represents one of the many ways from which a thing can be looked at. The Nayas remind us that our points of view looking at the things are relative, and over-emphasis on one point of view as absolute and the only point of view would be a mistake. It would give an abhasa, or appearance of truth, only. It gives rise to, the wrong point of view. According to the Jainas, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Sam. khya, Advaita Vedanta and the Buddhist systems adopt one of the Nayas; but they believe that their point of view is absolute and unerring. However, they prevent only partial truths. The Jainas point out that the controversy regarding causation presenting different views like the asatkaryavada and the satkaryavada, are one-
sided and partial. But an object can be described in
different ways. For instance, a gold necklace will be gold if we consider the
substance out of which it is made; but if it is looked at from the point of
view of the modifications, it may be described differently. Similarly, each
Naya has a different extent. Naigama
Naya has the greatest, and the Evam. bhuta Naya the least, extent. Naigama
dealswith the real and the unreal, Samgraha with the real. Vvavahara deals with
part of the real. Rjusutra refers to the present condition of the real, and
gabda only to the expression of the real, Samabhirubha a reference to the
particular expression. Evambhuta applies to the present activity.
IV. Syadvada is the logical expression of the
Nayavada. The various points of view
from which the reality can be looked at gives the possibility of a
comprehensive view of reality. Such a
view needs expression for the sake of clarity and communication. This has been
possible by means of seven fold predication. It is called Saptabhangi, because
of its sevenfold predication. It is the formulation of the doctrine of the
possibility of apparent contradiction in a real whole. The real may as well
contain contributions without affecting the nature of the real, because the
contradictions arise only because we take partial views of reality. According
to the Jainas, other Darsanas present only the gleams of the broken light,
while the Jaina view visualises the whole truth in its different aspects.
Nayavada and Syadvada are varieties of Anekantavada. Syadvada is complementary
to the Nayavada. Nayavada is analytic
in character and Syad-vada is synthetic.
It investigates the various shades of the truth given by a Naya and
integrates them into a consistent comprehensive synthesis. Dasgupta suggests
that the relation between them expresses the many alternatives indicated by the
Syadvada for any and every Naya.[21] In the Syadvada all the aspects of truth
are woven together into the synthesis of the conditioned dialectic.
Some have raised a controversy as to whether
Syadvada is synonymous of Saptabhangi or of the entire Jaina philosophy. It is true that Syadvada has an important
place in Jaina philosophy, but it can not be equated with the entire Jaina
philosophy. Prabhacandra states that Syadvada is synonymous with
Saptabhangi.[22] However, this is just a scholastic problem and is needless
from the philosophical point of view[23]
Syadvada is that conditional method in which the modes, or predications
(bhangah) affirm (vidhi), negate (nisedha) or both affirm and negate severally
and jointly in seven differcnt ways a certain attribute (bhava) of a thing
(vastu) without incompatibility (avirodhena) in a certain context
prasnavasat.[24] Reality is complex and
its nature cannot be expressed in an unconditioned position. Absolute
affirmation and absolute negation are both erroneous.[25] And the 'syat' would
mean 'in a certain sense' or 'from a certain point of view'.[26] In this sense
Syadvada warns us against building a dogmatic structure of reality in a single
concept or judgement. That would be logical dogmatism (nirapeksavada) as
against the sapeksavada expressed in Syadvada.
It is difficult to decide which is the earlier of the two-Nayavada seems to be earlier, because Umasvati in his 'Tatvartha-sutra
describes the kinds of Nayas, but makes no mention
of the Svadvada and the sevenfold prepositions. Yet it is possible that it existed long before him. Buddhist
Suttas mention the doctrine in an erroneous way as the doctrine not of the
Nigganthas but of some recluse and Brahmins. In the earlier literature of the
Jaina canon there are only a few passages in which there is a reference to
Syadvada. They occur in the Bhagavati-sutra, in which it is expressed in the
form of three propositions. Among the other early references, Bhadrabahu's
Sutrakrtanga Niryukti is prominent. The developed form of the doctrine in the
form of the seven-fold propositions is well described in Paiicastikdyasara of
Kundakundacarya and Aptamtmamsa of Samantabhadra. Siddhasena Divakara, Akalanka
and Vidyanandi are among the later writers who have given a systematic
exposition of the doctrine.
Syadvada shows that tbere are seven ways of
describing a thing and its attributes. It attempts to reconcile the
con-tradiction involved in the predications of the thing. It is possible to
describe a thing in seven ways.
1. Syad asti asserts the existence of the thing. The
word syat is difficult to translate. It is very often said that it connotes
'perhaps' or probability. But it would be more appropriate to say that it
refers to the special context. syat
would then mean 'in the context'. From the point of view of the substance,
place, time and nature, we may say that a thing is. For instance, the jar
exists, as it is made of clay in a particular place and time. Thus substance
(dravya), attribute (bhava), time (kala), and space (ksetra) from the context
of these relations existence and other attributes are predicated. A house
exists, i.e., it is a house as build up and as long as it is occupied for the
purpose of residence.
2, But the affirmation of an attribute necessarily
involves the negation of its opposite; and such a negation is a logical
necessity. Then we get the predication syad nasti. It means in the (other) context the thing does not exist. The jar does not exist if it is to mean that
it is made of metal. The house is no
longer a house if it be used as a go down.
The existence of the house is denied in different contexts. Thus, if existence and non-existence are to
be understood in different relations and contexts, there would be no opposition
between them. One is a necessary concomitant of the other. These predications
are necessary and compatible in another sense. The affirmation of existence and
denial of non-existence are meant to rebut the possibility of unqualified and
absolute existence and nonexistence. Thus the predications are logically
necessary.
The importance of this predication lies in the
irrefutable statement of the non-existence of a thing in the other context.
'Non-existence or non-being is a determinate fact with a content and not a
void'.
It would not be correct to say that one first and
the second predications involve contradiction, because i) they are mutually
complementary and ii) the two predications are not absolute assertions. The
definition itself includes the clause 'avirodhena'.[27]
It is very often contended that the contradictions,
absolute existence and non.existence, are not objective facts, as no existence
is known to have absolute existence and absolute non-existence as its
characteristics. The opposition is unreal and the predication of the unreal
opposition is not necessary. But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it cannot be
denied that it is possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a
thing though not on to logically real. The predications are therefore logically
necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non
existence.'[28] The Vedantist believes in the absolute existence of the one
reality. The Sunyavadin does not believe in the existence of the absolute. The
Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different contexts. The first
two predications are logically valid and psychologically necessary, as they
serve to exclude absolute existence and absolute non-existence. The mention of the word syad functions as a
necessary condition and works as a corrective against the absolute way of
thought. We may here refer to the logical opposition of Hegel, who said that affirmation
and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity, for they are the
aspects of the same reality. However,
the reference would be limited to the dialectical process, because the Jaina is
a realist and believes in the validity of empiricai experience.
3. The third predication is syad asti nasti: 'It is,
it is not'. This refers to different contexts simultaneously. For instance, in
a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain other sense the jar does not
exist. The building is a house in so far as the purpose of the construction was
for residence. 'But it is not a house
as it is actually used as a go down. It is very often maintained that the
predication is a mere summattion of the first two. But the Jainas would appeal
to experience and say that it gives a separate and necessarg predication. It
refers to a separate entity arising from the two but not the summation of the
two. For instance, a garland of flowers may be said to be flowers, as it
contains flowers, and also not merely flowers at the same time, because the
flowers enter into a new relation with each other to form a whole. Similarly,
in the description of the soul and the ultimate-reality contradictory
predicates have been made.[29]
4. The fourth is a new predication. It expresses the
indescribability of a thing. It is syad avaktavyam. It is possible that the
real nature of the thing is beyond predication, or expression in the form of
words. For instance, in the case of the jar, it exists in the svadravya,
svarupa, svakala and svaksetra and no existence is predicated in the the
paradravya, pararupa, para ksetra and parakala. Yet its nature may be such that
it cannot be easily described.
It is contended that the fourth predication is only an abbreviated form of affirmation in megation. The third predication shows the successive presentation, while the fourth givesthe simultaneous presentation of the two. But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it is still logically necessary because it presents the facts of experience, that
existence and non existence are equally possible to
be predicated in the same degree. Moreover, experience shows that the
inexpressible asserts that the attributes are existing together, and a new
element has arisen due to the synthesis. For instance, intoxicating liquor may
be formed due to the combination of jaggery and ghataki flowers. But it is not a mere combination of the
elements. It has in itself an identity of its own which cannot be described
easily. In metaphysical; speculation, the 'unknowable' of Herbert Spencer may
be likened to predication of this type.
Prof. Bhattacharya [30] writes,
'The given indefinite' -- 'the unspeakable' or avaktavya as it has been called,
as distinct from the definite existence.
presents something other than consecutive togetherness: it implies
saharpana or co-presentation, which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate
distinction of being and negations. The common sense principle implied in its
recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is
inexpressible by a single positive concept.[31]
The primary modes of predication are three: syad
asti Syad nasti and syad avaktavyam. The other four are obtained by combining
the three.
The third predicate asti nasti offers successive
presenta-tion. In the fourth predication 'inexpressible' (avaktavyam) we get
the expression of simultaneous predication.
Dr. Padmarajiah discusses the
four stages through which the concept or 'inexpressible' has developed: i) The
naive negative attitude in the Rgveda as expressed in the song of creation
(Book V, 129). ii) A positive attitude as expressed in 'sadasadvareyam' in the
Mundaka Upanisad. It conceives with being and non-being as irherent in reality,
owing to the positive character, this tendency has been discussed is the
Acbhaya phase of the concept. iii) The third phase is the logically
sophisticated phase of the 'negative tendency' as shown in the expression like
sa esa neti neti (Br. Up. lV 5-15) In this phase here is the clear awareness of
the inexpressible nature of the ultimate as efforts to express the reality
would be beset with contradictions. The Vedanta conception of anirvacaniya the
Buddha's avyakrta and Nagarjuna s conception oi the ultimate as being
catuskoti-vinirmukta came under this stage. iv) The last phase in 'the
dialectical evolution' of the idea of the inexpressible is expressed in the
avaktavya of the Syadvada. It is a relativistic (sapeksa view and not the
absolute view as presented in anirvacanlya.
The Jaina states that sat and asat, in these combinations, are
inevitable and distinctive feature of our objective experience.[32] Again the
avaktavya may show the inability to embody, within one symbol, the two
fundamental aspects of reality with equaprominence. But this limitation is
itself a necessary step in the dialectual movement of Syadvada.
K. C. BHATTACHARYA states ' If the inexpressible is objective as given,
it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At
the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence. It
is a category by itself.[33]
5. The fifth predication is formulated as syad asti avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own contexts (dravya, rupa, kala and ksetra)
a thing is and is indescribable. It asserts the copresence of the two
attributes, existence and inepressibility. Both are real and necessary
attributes. Existence relates to an object in the context of substance in
respect of its internal determinations. Inexpressibility is an attribute which
relates substance, in relation of identity and distinction, to its changing
modes.
6. The sixth Proposition expresses the negative
aspect together with inexpressibility. It is syad nasti avaktavyam. In the context, it is not and is
indescribable. In relation to the paraaravya pararupa, paraksetra and parakala
it is not: it is indescribable.
7. The seventh proposition asserts existence,
non-existence and inexpressibility. It reads: sltad, asti, nasti,
avaktavyam. In the contexts, it is, is
not and is inexpressible. With
reference to the sva-rupa, sva-dravya, sva-ksetra and sva-kala it exists, and
with reference to the para-dravya, para-rupas, para-ksetra, para-kala non
existence can be predicated. Yet, in its real nature it may be such that it
cannot be easily described. As Mukerji says, this predication gives a fuller
and a more comprehensive picture of the thing than the earlier ones. The
predicated attribute is a synthesis of the three attributes; still, it is not a
mere summation of the attributes. It brings out the inexpressibility of a thing
as well as what it is and what it is not.
Affirmation and negation and inexpressibility are
the three fundamental predications. This implies that all negation has a
positive basis. Even imaginary concepts like the sky flower possess a positive
basis in the two reals, the sky and flower, although the combination is unreal.
All things which are objects of thought are in one sense, and are not in
another sense.
V. The doctrine of Syadvada has been criticized in
various ways:
1. It is said that the theory of sevenfold
predication can only be the cause of doubt and not of certainty, the assertion
of contradictory predicates implies that the present predicating is in doubt.
BELVALKAR says that Syadvada is sceptical and non-committal in its attitude.
With this diagnostic and negative attitude one cannot have any dogma; and
Samkaracarya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system when
he says "As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act
of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirtham. kara (Jina) teach
with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the
matter of which is altogether indeterminate.[34] Prof. Hiryanna makes Syadvada
a variety of scepticism. If all our
knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say the old Indian critics like
Sam. kara, amanuja etc.), the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this
conclusion would be to admit, at least, one absolute truth; and to admit it
would leave the doctrine with no settled view of reality and thus turn it into
a variety of scepticism.[35]
But it may be pointed out that the conditions of doubt are not present
in this assertion. For instance, a man sees a tree
in the dusk and doubts whether it is a man or a branchless tree. This is due to
the lack of determination between -the specific features of the object as the
perception is faulty. But in the case
of the sevenfold presentation the attributes of existence and non-existence are
each defined by their specific determinations. The condition of these
determinations makes doubt impossible.
2. It is said that the sevenfold predication of the
Jainas is beset with contradictions. Affirmation and denial of the attribute in
the same object is not logically possible. It would be a selfcontradiction. In
this context we may refer-to the criticism of Samkara and Ramanuja. Samkara's
criticism can be analyzed into three stages. 1) He tries to point out the
intrinsic impossibility of the predication because of the inherent
contradictions involved in it. Mutually contradictory and conflicting
attributes cannot exist together. But if we take into consideration the
different contexts referred to, we may say that the contradictions can be
easily reconciled. In experience we get examples of existing conflicting attributes.
For instance, the branches may be in motion but the tree does not move. The
same individual may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. 2) He
points out the futility of the doctrine because the doctrine is indefinite. The
unlimited assertion that all things are of non-exclusive nature gives
indefinite assertion like syad asti and syad nasti. Hence a man who holds such
a doctrine of indefinite context does not deserve to be listened to any more
than a drunken man or a mad man.
Recent writers on Indian philosophy have re-iterated
the entire charge made by gamkara and Ramanuja and have shown that it is a kind
of eclecticism, 'a putting together of several partial truths' without a proper
synthesis. It is therefore characterized as a sort of compromise
philosophy. The half-hearted attempt of
Jaina enquiry as expressed in.
Saptabhangi stops at giving partial truth together and does not attempt
to overcome the opposition implied in them by a proper synthesis.
But if we mean by definiteness unconditional and
absolute assertion, then the 'indefiniteness' of the doctrine is a logical
necessity. As Radhakrishnanpoints out [36] the criticism of the Saptabhangi
doctrine as of no practical utility is an expression of personal opinion and as
such need not be considered.
Samkara also says that the Saptabhangi doctrine is
inconsistent with the other views of Jaina philosophy. The assertion of
existence, non-existence and indescribability are alike applicable to the
doctrine of the soul and the categories. Similarly, the final release may exist
and not exist and may be indescribable.[37]
The dialectic of Syadvada is inconsistent with the Jaina philosophy. It could not have sprung from the same teacher and the same philosophical background. "As a mere 'anaikantika' (sic) theory of predication, the Syadvada must return upon itself and end in doubting
the doubter himself.[38] Prof. Radhakrishnanafter
mentioning the strong points of Syadvada, says "Yet in our opinion the
Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means 'the hypothesis of
the absolute') and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their
own logic".[39] But in the Saptabhangi tarangini we read a counter
argument: If the final release and heavenly bliss are eternal and existing,
where is the chance for samasara and the attempt to obtain moksa? If the other
alternative is the only truth, what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal
which is impossible to attain? Radhakrishnanpoints out that the Saptabhangi
doctrine is not in consistent with the other views of the Jainas. It is a
logical corollary of the Anekantavada. All that the Jainas say is that
everything is of a complex nature and the real reconciles the difference in
itself. Attributes which are contradictors in the abstract co-exist in the
world of experience.
Ramanuja also pointed out that contradictory
attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong
to one thing any more than light and darkness. However, he seems to accept the
distinction between dravya and paryfiya, substance and modes. He also sees that
the substance has permanence; paryaya implied change.
But the predications give severally partial truths.
The truths presented by them are alternative truths from different points of
view; and the seven predications would present a complete comprehensive picture
of reality. It is neither scepticism nor agnosticism, for each individual truth
is valid. It is supplemented and harmonized by the other predication into a
single comprehensive picture of reality, as we get a harmony in orchestra by
the combination of different notes.
With all their criticisms, BELVALKAR makes Syadvada
a most searching characteristic. Radhakrishnan observes "Samkara and
Ramanuja criticized the Saptabhangi view on the ground of the impossibility of
contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing". After quoting the relevant passage from
Ramanuja he proceeds to say: "The Jainas admit that a thing cannot have
self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense. All that
they say is that everything is of a complex nature, and reconciles differences
in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in life
and experience. The tree is moving in that its branches are moving and it is
not moving since it is fixed to its place in the ground." [40]
VI. In Western thought, at the time of the Greeks, when there was intellectual confusion due to the conflicting theories presented by the different philosophers, several approaches to problems were