CONTENTS
PUBLISHER'S NOTE
We feel immense pleasure in bringing out this book `A Perspective in
Jaina Philosophy and Religion' by Prof. Ramjee Singh, vice-chancellor, Jaina
Visvabharati, Ladnun, Rajasthan (Deemed to be University) in the hands of
scholars, as 64th publication of Parsvanatha Sodhapitha. It is a collection of
his valuable research papers and articles, written on various aspects of Jaina
Philosophy and Religion, appeared in different journals, seminar proceedings,
felicitation and commemoration volumes. These have been classified under
sections ‑ Jaina view of life, Jaina Epistemology, Jaina Metaphysics,
Jaina Ethics, Jaina Psychology, Non‑absolutism and its relevance to
Jainism and Jaina‑Yoga.
We are extremely grateful to Prof. Singh, who did us a favor by giving
this work to the institute for publication. Prof. Singh, an eminent scholar of
international fame on Gandhism and Non‑violence, is also an authority on
Jaina studies, and has made a significant contribution to it. A true Gandhivadi
he follows its doctrine in word and spirit and practices in his life. We are
grateful to Dr. Ramanbhai C. Shah and other members of Shree Bombay Jaina
Yuvaka Sangh for providing grant of Rs. ten thousand for publication of this
book.
We are thankful to Prof. Sagarmal Jain, Director of Parsvanatha
Sodhapitha, who has been instrumental in obtaining this work for publication
and seeing it through the press. Our thanks are also due to Dr. Ashok Kumar
Singh, Research Officer, who has been associated with proof reading and
publication of this book. We are also thankful to Mr. S.K. Upadhyaya of Naya
Sansar Press for proof‑reading and fine printing.
13‑2‑1993 Bhupendra
Nath Jain
Nuchem Plastics Ltd.
Secretary
20/6 Mathura Road,
Pujya Sohanalala Smaraka
Faridabad.
Parsvanatha Sodhapitha
PREFACE
The basic ideology of Jainism has been close to my heart for the
following reasons ‑ firstly, I have found an intellectual basis of the
Gandhian principle of Ahimsa in the Jaina, theory of Anekantavada (Non‑absolutism);
secondly, I had, therefore started my initial research on Syavada‑Anekanta‑vada
which was later changed into the "Jaina Concept of Omniscience" on
the advice of my revered teacher late Dr. D.M. Datta, Thirdly, I have been
greatly benefited in my life from the association of several Jaina scholars and
saints, who have bestowed upon me their affection and kindness. Lastly, as a
student of Indology, I thought that it is better to devote my attention to
Jainology, which has been relatively a neglected discipline although it has
immense potentiality.
Jainology is an amalgam of Jaina philosophy, Religion and Culture. The
scope of the literature produced by Jaina masters and scholars are unlimited.
However, a systematic research on Jaina philosophy, Religion and Culture has
been very meager.
The present work is perhaps the first important contribution in this
comprehensive field born out of deep study and analysis. It is undoubtedly a
scholarly compendium of Jaina Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Psychology,
Religion and Culture. However, unlike an introductory outline, it is marked by
profundity and the typical synthetic approach to all problems. The book is
neither sectarian nor unsympathetic in this treatment but fully balanced.
This book will enrich the small shelf of books on Jainism in English of
every intelligent scholar and lover of Jainism.
My first work on The Jaina Concept of Omniscience was published by L.D.
Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad in 1974. In the meantime, I have prepared
several research papers on Jaina Philosophy, Religion and Culture, which were
presented to various national and international conferences. However, they have
been so arranged that the collection looks like a monograph.
My grateful thanks go to my friend and Director, Dr. Sagarmal Jain, of
Parsvanatha Sodhapitha, Varanasi, who agreed to publish it from his Institute.
Whatever deficiencies are there, they are mine, and whatever merit is found go
to Dr. Jain and the management of his Institute without whose help this work
would not have seen the light of the day.
15‑8‑1992 Ramjee
Singh
Address Vice‑chancellor
Bhikhampur, Jaina
Visvabharati
Bhagalpur ‑ 812 001. (
Deemed University )
Ladnun ( Rajasthan )
Jaina View of Life
[ 1 ]
(1) Life is a struggle for perfection. Philosophy should serve as the light house in this struggle of life. Hence, true philosophy, must be a philosophy of life. Our attention has until now been mainly directed towards the problems of reality and knowledge, God and Soul etc., but we have culture have got significance only in relation to man. Hence, Vyasa correctly said : "There is nothing higher than man" (nahi sresthataram kincit manusat)". Chandidas perhaps went a little further : "Man is higher than everything and nothing is more important than him" (Sabar upare manusa satya, tahar pretation regarded "man as the measure of all" (Hamo men sura). The Jainas, even denied God, because they believed in the potential divinity of man. This reminds us of the famous Vedic saying : "Those who know Brahman in Man knows the Being who is Supreme" (Ye puruse Brahman Viduste Viduh Paramesthinam : Atharva Veda, X.VII. 17).
(2) According to Jainism, man can attain divinity contained in the concept of Four‑fold Infinities (anantachatustaya). Thus, it shifted the emphasis from God to Man ‑ an outcome of the development of inwardness. Hence, the interest of Jainism has been centered mainly around man, his morality and destiny. Of the seven fundamental categories of Jaina philosophy, only two, the `self' and the `Non‑self' are dealt with from a metaphysical point of view, the other five are more corollaries. Asrava (inflow of karmic‑matter) is the cause of mundane existence and Samvara is the cause of liberation. Everything else is only its amplification.
(3) Our conduct cannot be isolated from our way of life. Truth and valuation are inseparable. Samantabhadra in his Yuktyanusasanam (Verse 15) says : "Without knowing the real nature of things, all moral distinctions between bondage and liberation, merit and demerit, pleasure and pain will be blurred."
(4) For Plato, Samskara and Bradley, philosophy, broadly, is the `knowledge of reality' for the logical positivist it is only `linguistic analysis'. However philosophy, to be true, must be philosophy of life, where we do not have a part‑view but the whole‑view or world‑view. "Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood, while empiricism could not see the wood in the trees" said C.D. Broad (Contemporary British Philosophy, Ed. J.H. Muirhead, Vol.1, 1924). These are the two different ways of approaching the problem but they are not the only ways. Hence, we should see the world steadily and as a whole. If we do not look at the world synoptically, we shall have a very narrow view of it Purely critical philosophy is arid and rigid.
(5) The Jaina view of life known as anekanta (Non‑absolutism) is nearer to such a synoptic view. To quote Whitehead, such an non‑absolutistic approach is "an endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted" (A.N. Whitehead : Process and Reality, 1929, p.4). The function of philosophy is not merely academic pursuit of knowledge and reality, it also serves as a way of life. It has the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue so that it may provide a principle to live by and purposes to live for. Hence, C.E.M. Joad options that "We must achieve a synoptic view of the universe" (C.E.M. Joad : A Critique of Logical Positivism, 1950, p. 29).
[ 2 ]
(1) The Jaina attitude of non‑absolutism is rooted in its attitude towards life. Life is dear to all. To do harm to others is to do harm to oneself. The Acaranga Sutra ( 1. 5. 5) declares: "Thou art he whom thou intends to tyrannize over." Hence a feeling of immense respect and responsibility for human personality inspires Jainism. It has upheld the worth of life very much, hence its main emphasis is on Ahimsa or non‑violence.
(2) However its concern for non‑violence is more due to ideological consciousness than emotional compassion. Unlike Buddhism Jainism does not view life as a transient and illusory phenomenon, nor it regards it as immutable like the Upanisad‑Vedanta philosophers. In fact, both absolute permanence and absolute impermanence is absolute non‑sense. Adhering to the common experience, Jainism regards the nature of reality as having the characteristics of origination, decay and continuance‑giving a non-exclusivists view.
(3) Secondly, Jainism believes in the potential divinity of man. Given freedom of development, every individual can attain the supreme spiritual progress. Hence, any interference means spiritual degeneration. Violence is nothing but interference with life, hence it must be eschewed in thought, word and deed. In this context, Anekantavada (non‑absolutism) is an extension of Ahimsa in the realm of thought and so is Syadvada a logical corollary in the field of speech. Anything should be viewed not from only one standpoint (ekanta) but from many, angles of vision. The real is a variable angles of vision, which will negate dogmatism and imperialism of thought. Ekanta, means the `only' point of view, whereas Anekanta implies the principle of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe.
(4) This Anekanta‑ideology is the spirit of synthesis (Samanvaya‑drsti) nurtured into the synthetic culture of India. In the Vedas and Upanisads, the ultimate reality is described neither as real (Sat) nor as unreal (Asat). Some described the reality is one, while others hold it as many. In fact, the ultimate reality as the same, though it is called by different names. Ajneyavada or Agnosticism of Sanjaya shows reconciliatory spirit through his Four‑fold or Five‑fold formula of denial, so the Vibhajyavada or the Critical method of Investigation of Buddha is contrasted with Madhyam‑pratipada which included Buddha to "treat prevalent opinions with all due consideration." Nagarjuna's Dialectics of Four‑fold Antinomies (chatuskoti) resembles Anekanta approach. The Bhedabheda system of Bharata Mimamsa and the Samkhya have an anekanta bias with respect to some of their ideas and methods. Therefore, Santaraksita attributes the concept of vaichitrya to the Mimamsa as well to the Samkhyas. Even the critique on the light doctrines of Gautama resemble the Anekantavada in its spirit an form although they are not as pervasive as they are in Jainism.
(5) Anekantavada is the heart of Jainism. It constitutes its moral original contribution to the philosophical speculation. However, Anekantavada‑syadvada has been more maligned than understood even by the great Vedantic and Buddhist Avaryas. It is misfortune that system like Advaita which realizes the inadequacy of logic to appreciate the evidence of experience as well as the probabilistic interpretation of multi‑valued logics, which can reconcile the apparent contradictions in the Anekantavada. Anekanta implies twin functions of analysis and synthesis known as conjunctive and disjunctive dialectics respectively or Nayavada and Syadvada.
(6) Viewed in the light of the doctrine of Anekanta, the reality reveals not merely as many (anantatmakam) but also as infinitely manifold (ananta‑dharmatmakam). The reality is possessed of infinite number of attributes and human knowledge is limited until it attains omniscience. Hence we cannot have the complete grasp of the whole reality or an absolute affirmation or complete negation of a predicate. To know is to relate, therefore our knowledge is essentially relative and to relate, therefore our knowledge is essentially relative and limited in many ways. In the sphere of application of the means of knowledge or in the extent of the knowable our thought is relative. The whole reality in its completeness, cannot be grasped by this partial thought. The objectivity of the universe reveals that the universe is independent of the mind which implies principles of distinction leading to the recognition of non‑absolutism.
(7) In absolute sense, a thing is neither real nor unreal, neither permanent nor evanescent but both. This dual nature of things is proved by a reductio‑ad‑absurdum of absolutism. Further, this is also the basis of the Law of Causation, because an `absolute real' can neither be cause nor an effect. However, an `absolute flax' cannot be the basis of operation for the Law of Causation. Similarly, the controversy between unity and plurality can be easily solved by the Anekanta logic, which affirms attributes in a unitary entity. A thing is neither an absolute unity nor an irreconcilable multiplicity. In fact, it is both multiplicity‑in‑unity. Similarly, both absolute existence and non‑existence are metaphysical abstractions.
[ 3 ]
(1) To say that a thing is neither real nor unreal, neither eternal nor non‑eternal, neither static nor mobile but partakes of the dual nature perhaps is an affront to the believes in the traditional Laws of Thought. No body rejects them but these abstract formulations are not suited to dynamic character of the universe. Our own observation and experience reveals that the two‑valued logic seems to be unreal. So far that abstract formulation of the Laws of Thought A is A (Identity),A is A (Contradiction), A is either A or not A (Excluded Midoh), they may be right. But their concrete formulations (A Radio is a Radio) admits of change. A real radio is constantly undergoing change, hence there is change according to space and time. Similarly, even change is meaningless without the idea of persistence. Hence the contradiction (A Skylab cannot both be and not be) is only national because `A Skylab' is a Skylab so long it works as a laboratory in the Sky but when it takes as a debris after degeneration, if it is not the same sky‑lab in the same condition. Hence, a Skylab can be both a Skylab and not a Skylab. There is no difficulty to accept this in actual experience.
(2) The denial of pre‑non‑existence and post‑non‑existence as part of a real leads to the impossibility of all theoretical and practical activity. Similarly, the denial of non‑existence of mutual identity (numerical differences) and absolute non‑existence is also impossible. If there is no difference, there will be no distinction, hence no independence between subject and object. If there is negation of identity, there is worse confusion. Hence the nature of reality can neither be exclusively identity nor multiplicity. As regards relations, no relation is meaningful if there is pure identity and no relation is possible between the two absolutely independent and different terms. Similarly regarding causal efficiency, the real cannot be either `absolute constant' nor can it be an `absolute variant' but a `variable constant'.
[ 4 ]
(1) It is asked, whether this kind of non‑absolutism is itself absolute or not. If it is former, there is at least one real which is absolute; if it is not, it is not absolute and universal fact. Whether non‑absolutism is itself absolute or relative depends upon the nature of proposition which is either complete (Sakaladesa) or incomplete (Vikaladesa). The former being the object of valid knowledge (Pramana) and the latter, two object of aspectal knowledge (naya). This means that the directive of non‑absolutism is not absolute unconditionally. However, to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the Jainas distinguished between the true non‑absolutism (Samyak‑Anekanta) and the false non‑absolutism (Mithya‑Anekanta). To be valid, therefore, non‑absolutism must not be absolute but always relative. When one attributes is stated as constitution the whole nature of the real and thus implies the of the `false absolute'. But Naya is not false though it is partial or knowledge from a particular standpoint.
(2) The nature of unconditionality in the statement "All statements are conditional" is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passage "I do not know myself" where there is no contradiction between knowledge and ignorance, or in the statement `I am undecided', where there is at least one decision : "I am undecided" the unconditionality is not at the level of existence, while at the level of essence (thought) anything is alternative. We do not live in the realm of thought or reason above. Behind reason, there is always the watershed of unreason or faith. The Jainas too have faith in their scriptures as anybody else has in his or her. Her is unconditionally. In each community, there is a special absolute. The absolutes themselves are alternation so far as they are possible (till we are on thought level), but I have chosen one and stick to it, it is more than possible, it is existence or actual. At this point, there may be a reconciliation between conditionality and unconditionality. On thought level, the statement "Everything is conditional", holds good but when we adopt the point of view of existence, we are led to rest with unconditionality.
[ 5 ]
(1) Ideologically, we cannot make one‑sided exposition. But in actual usage, whenever we make any particular statement (S is P or S is not P), it takes the form of a categorical proposition. Even a Hypothetical (If S then P) or a Disjunctive (Either S or P) is said to have a categoric basis and therefore, they can be converted into categorical propositions. But since our thought is relative, so must be our expression.
(2) There is another problem also ‑ how to synthesize the different angles of vision or internal harmony of the opposed predications (S is P, S is not P, S is both P and not P, S is neither P nor not P). It is, therefore, the Jainas prefix Syat (Somehow, in some respect) as a corrective against any absolutist way of thought and evaluation of reality. This is a linguistic tool for the practical application of non‑absolutism in words. Because of this prefix Syat and the relative nature of proposition, it is called Syadvada. But words are only expressive or suggestive (Vachaka or Jnapaka) rather than productive (Karaka). Thus the meaning is, however, eventually rooted in nature of things in reality and we have, therefore, to explore a scheme of linguistic symbols (Vachanavinyasa) for model judgments representing alternate standpoints. (Nayas), or a way of approach or a particular opinion (abhipraya) or view‑point (apeksa).
(3) This philosophy of standpoints bears the same relation to philosophy as logic does to thought or grammar to language. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object owing to the endless complexity of things. Every statement of a thing, therefore, is bound to be one‑sided and incomplete. Hence the doctrine of seven‑fold predication (Saptabhanga) in the logical consumption of the doctrine of relative standpoints (Syadvada). If we insist on absolute predication without conditions (Syat), the only cause open is to dismiss either the diversity or the identity as a mere metaphysical fiction. Every single standpoint designated in every statements has a partial truth. Different aspects of reality can be considered from different perspectives (Niksepa). This Naya is the analytic and Saptabhanga is the synthetic method of studying ontological problems.
If this form of statements, this doctrine insists on the correlation of affirmation and negation. All judgments are double‑edged in character‑existent and non‑existence. The predicate of inexpressibility stands for the unique synthesis of existence and non‑existence and is therefore `unspeakable' (avaktavya). Thus three predicates ‑ `existence', `non‑existence' and `inexpressibility' make seven exhaustive and unique modes of expression of truth.
[ 6 ]
(1) We are aware of various criticisms against Anekantavada‑Syadvada that they involve the fallacies of self‑contradiction (Virodha), Absence of Common Abodi (Vaiyadhikaranya), Infinite‑Regress (Anavastha), Confusion (Sanka), Exchange of Natures (Vyatikara), Doubt (Samsaya), Non‑apprehension (Apratipatti), Both sides (Ubhaya) etc. However, we do not want to go into details.
(2) We have considered the most formidable criticism that how far non‑absolutism of Syadvada is not absolute but relative. However, it is wrong to confuse the Pragmatic and Pluralistic realistic attitude of Syadvada with either Pragmatism of James‑Dewey either or with the objective relativism of the sophists or even with the relative absolutism of Whitehead or Bodies or with Einstenian relativity except in the most general attitude. Pyrroh's prefixing every judgment with a `may be' must not be identical Jaina `Syat'. The former degenerates into Agnosticism or Skepticism means in the minimum, absence of any assertion, whereas Syadvadins always assert, thought what they assert are alternatives ‑ each being valid in its own Universe of Discourse, which controls the interpretation of every word. This is the logic of Relatives.
(3) Perhaps on account of its catholicity of outlook Syadvada is branded as a form `eclecticism' or a `philosophy of compromise'. "Since an eclectic system is a loose piece of mosaic work, rather than an organized body of original thought, the term has come to be one of reproach." However, this is unjust to brand it as a `loose piece of mosaic work' or `odd collection of arbitrary half‑truths'. In fact the truths presented are alternative truths which are true in their own aspects. Of course, Syadvada rejects the `dispotic absolute truth' or the `block universe' or a `seamless coat'. Even in the synthesis achieved through the dynamics of Syadvada, there is `discriminative unity' rather than `secondless unit'. In short, absolutism in thought is rejected to avoid arbitrariness in action.
(4) To brand Syadvada as agnosticism or Skepticism like that of Sanjaya or of Pyrroh is again another injustice. The prefix `Syat' does not mean `perhaps' but `in respect of' a particular context. Each model truth is valid from its own standpoint. It is not a doctrine of `know nothingness' or `unknowability'. Each standpoint of the saptabhangi is definite in its own place. Syadvada statements are not `indefinite' (Belvalkar), but `indeterminate' (Hiriyana) which means that it cannot be defined absolutely. No single mode of expression is adequate to express the nature of reality. The various modes of truths are not merely many truths, but alternative truths, each being as definite as anything.
(5) Regarding the charge of `Self‑contradiction' against Syadvada by the great Vedantic and Buddhist Acaryas, I feel that the motive behind it must be extra‑logical. How one can believe that Dharmakirti will call Anekantavada as mere non‑sensical talk (Pralapamatra) in view of Jaina theory of dual character of universal and particular of a thing. He asks of all realities are sat, there would be no difference between cow and camel. Prajnakara Gupta and Arcaya point out that the triple charactered nature of reality having origination, destruction and permanence cannot exist together and hence is self contradictory. Sanmtaraksita thinks that there would be a commingling (Sankarya) and a confusion (Sandeha) in the dual nature of reality, the result of which would not be helpful to decide which is general and which particular.
Karnakagomin also refutes the dual characteristic theory of the Jainas
in his own way. In this famous treatise Refutation of Anekantavada
(Anekantavada Nirasa), Jitari says that one cannot have identity as well as
difference by the same nature.
Sankara and Ramanuja also point out to the violation of the law of
contradiction.
However, all these thinkers forget that the laws of thoughts should be
considered by the testimony of experience and not be pre‑conception.
Experience shows that a thing is real in own respect but not so in other
respect.
The triple character theory is supported through anvasthanupapannatva
hetu. From the realistic standpoint there is so much difference which could
indicate the separation between identity and difference. The reality is
synthism of identity‑in difference and each synthesis is a Jatyantara
(sui genesis). Akalanka points out that the Buddhists philosophers ignore the
formula Sarvobhavastudatasvabhati and tries to establish equality between curd
and camel.
In fact, Syadvada is against the formulations of formal two valued
logic. It avoids vicious intellectualism and the fallacy of exclusive
particularity. Thus Syadvada is a new dynamics of thinking which is based on
Catholicism and regard for truth seen from different angles.
JAINA AGAMAS AND INDIAN CULTURE
The Place of the Agamas in Cultural History of India
Language and Literature apart from art and architecture constitute the
most important records of the cultural history of a country. Hence, the study
of the Agamas is bound to reveal the most important observations of Jainism and
its contribution to Indian culture.
As we all know, the collective term given by the Jainas to their Sacred literature is called Agamas written in Prakrt just as the Buddhist Pitakas in Pali and the Brahmanical Vedas in Sanskrit. The Jaina Agamas like the Buddhist Pitakas contain the sermons of their founders. They were later on codified by their trusted disciples into the languages of the people just for the larger benefit of the masses. Thus the original Sacred Books of both the Jainas and the Buddhist were written in Prakrt, i.e., Ardhamagadhi and Pali respectively. Being missionaries, their mission was to interest not only the intellectuals but the common people and hence they used the language of the common man. The Jaina Agamas accord a very respectable position to Ardhamagadhi by calling it not only the language of the Aryans but also of the celestial gods. The Buddhist Trpitakas enjoin upon their followers to use the local dialect of the people for the propagation of their sacred teachings. This was nothing but a legitimate protest against the touch‑me‑not attitude of the Vedic scholars who would never descend down from their ivory tower of Sanskrit language and on the other hand they would look down upon the us of these languages of the people for imparting religious instructions. Prakrt and Pali were declared to be the languages of the outcasts or Mlechchhas. This shows their regard for maintaining the so‑called cultural purity by the priestly order to ensure their monopoly for ever. To be impartial, we cannot deny that there was some amount of animosity among the Jainas and the Buddhist scholars against the use of Sanskrit language at least at the critical stages which is amply reflected in the painful sight of some of Pali and Prakrt scholars maintaining linguistic isolationism as a result of which they remained unaware of the Indian heritage as depicted in Sanskrit language and literature. The Bhikkhus of the Hinayana cults of Buddhism in Burma and Ceylon are examples of such isolationism. Similarly, many eminent scholars of Sanskrit of that age remained unaware of the growth and development of ideas in the field of Pali and Prakrt languages. The cause of this linguistic animosity was also unhealthy religious rivalries which are demonstrated into the literature of the 7th and 8th centuries A.D. All these factors went to retard the growth of cultural synthesis in India at least for some time.
In this respect, the Jaina tradition has been rather liberal. Down from the days of Arya Raksit (2nd Century of Vikram Samvat) and Uma Swami (3rd Century of V.S. , there has been equal interest in Prakrt and Sanskrit so much so that both these languages became the common and combined treasures of the Jaina. Naya, the Jainas have adopted other regional languages also like Kannada and Tamil in South India, Gujarati and Marathi in Western India and even Hindi in Central India for the propagation of their religious teachings or literary pursuits.
Pt. Sukhalalji has divided the entire extent of Jaina philosophical literature broadly into four periods beginning with the Agamic period. Not withstanding the differences in the two tradition of Digambaras and Svetambaras, the Jainas generally agree that the Agamas constitute the inspired wisdom of Lord Mahavir, when he attained perfection and Omniscience. The sermons were later on codified by his chief disciples called Ganadharas. According to the Jaina tradition, there are only two types of persons, who are qualified to know the secrets of religion ‑ the Omniscient (Kevalin) who directly perceive everything of all places and of all times. Then lectures of sermons by the Kevalins themselves. They are called Sruta Kevalins. Acarya Yati Vrsabha has given the chronological account of the Missionary (Acarya) tradition of 683 years after the Nirvana of Lord Mahavir having 3 Kevalins, 5 Sruta Kevalins, 20 different orders of Acaryas.
According to the Svetambara tradition, the last compilation of the Agamas had been done at Valabhi after 980 years of the death of Lord Mahavir at the time of Devardhi, however the compilations of some of the Agamas were done at Pataliputra also which was after 250 years of Lord Mahavir’s death. The Agamic literature is vast and stupendous, comprising of 12 Angas, 12 Upangas, 4 Mulas, 2 Chulikas Sutras, 6 Cheda Sutras, 10 Prakirnakas etc. The commentation on these Agamas are called Niryukrtis and Bhasyas, which are in poetry style and those in prose style are called Curnis. Available Niryuktis, are said to be compositions of Bhadrabahu, the Second, which contain subtle philosophical discussion on the problems of existence of soul, analysis of knowledge and meaning etc. The Bhasyas contain the fuller accounts of all subjects. Sanghadas Gani and Jinabhadra are the two famous Bhasyakaras. Jinabhadra was a versatile genius, who has written practically on all subject under the sun. Sanghadas Gani has limited himself to the task of dealing with the problems of epistemology and the ethics of the Jain Sadhus. Among the Curnikaras, Jinadasa Mahattara is a notable figure. Curnis are shorter commentaries in prose on the pattern of Jatakas. In Sanskrit, the oldest commentaries of the Agamas is of Acarya Haribhadra (757‑857 V.S.) next to whom are Silanka Suri (8th Cent. V.S.) and Sandhacarya, Abhayadeva and Malladhari Hemacandra and last but not the least Malayagiri. All these scholars wrote their commentaries in Sanskrit and Prakrt but they were so vast and deep that shorter commentaries in the languages of the people was considered essential. Hence, we find the composition of many primers and Beginner in regional languages like Taba in Gujarati. Acarya Dharma Singh is said to be an important author of such Beginners and Primers.
According to the Digambara tradition, all the old Agamas are said to have lost except the 12th called Drstivada. They regard Bhadrabahu as the last Sruta Kevali, with him out of 14 Purvas, 4 were lost. After Bhadrabahu, the different Acaryas became the teachers of 11 Angas and 10 Purvas and the process of disintegration continued up till 683 years after Mahavir’s Nirvana. An important Acarya named Dharasena initiated his two most, able disciples, named Puspadanta and Bhutabali into the Agamas, who later on compiled the Sermons in the form of a monumental epics of religion called, Sat‑khanda‑gama in Prakrt. A contemporary of Acarya Gunabhadra compiled Kasayas‑Pahuda upon which Yati Brsabha wrote a commentary in Prakrt after he learnt it from Arya Mansku and Nagahasti. There are quite a few commentaries on these two monumental treasures‑Satkhandagama and Kasaya‑pahuda. The last of the commentaries on Satkhandagama called Dhavala is by Virasena, which comprises 72 thousand verses. The commentary on Kasaya‑pahuda, called Jayadhavala is equally monumental having 20 thousand verses written by Virasena and 40 thousand added by his disciple Jinasena. The final portion of the Satkhandagama is called Mahabandha which has 41 thousand verses. This has been composed by Bhutabali himself. Fortunately, all those three monumental Agamas are treasured at Mudabidri's temple library. Acarya Nemichand Siddhanta Sastri Chakravarti of the 10th century was supposed to be an authority on these three Agamas. He had composed Gommatasara and Labdhisara to give the essences of these Agamas. Todaramala has written commentaries upon Gommatasara and Labdhisara in Bhasa. Acarya Kunda‑kunda's Samayasara, Pravacanasara, Niyamasara and Pancastikaya‑sara are in acknowledged Prakrt works which are regarded as good as the Agamas by the Jainas. Jainacarya Umaswati wrote Tattvartha‑Sutra, which is regarded as the Veritable Bible of the Jainas by both the sects. The legend of the propagation of Jaina religion rests with the Tirthanakars and their disciples called eleven Ganadharas, who are said to have converted a community of 4411 Sramanas from whom the entire Jaina community has grown.
The Contribution of the Agamas
The Validity of Scriptural Knowledge ‑ Except the Carvakas, all systems of Indian Philosophy admit the validity of scriptural knowledge. In the Vedic tradition, the Vedas which are regarded as impersonal, constitute the highest authority of religion. In the tradition of the Sramanic culture of Buddhism and Jainism, the authority of scriptures rests with their prophets, who are supposed to be Omniscient as well above all desires and aversions. In the Jaina tradition, the validity of the scripture is accorded at par with direct perception since the scriptural knowledge is knowledge gained by the Omniscient being, who has directly perceived the reality. Thus scriptural knowledge is also definite and indubious like the omniscient knowledge. This is admitted by Samantabhadra in his Apta‑Mimamsa. It should also be noted that the knowledge and practice of Scriptures (Agamas) also leads to the attainment of Kevala‑jnana, so as to the knower of the Srutas are called Sruta‑kevalin. Anybody and everybody cannot be Sruta. In order to be a Sruta, he must fulfill the conditions of becoming desireless (Vitaraga) and he must destroy the Karmas which obscure the real nature of Sruta. Only then, such a Scriptural knowledge serves like the bliss.
According to the Vedic tradition, the Vedas manifest their own validity. Words used by us, according to them, denote things that can be cognised by other means of knowledge, and, if we cannot know them through other means, then those who utter them must be of unquestionable authority. So non‑Vedic utterances cannot possess any inherent validity. According to Prabhakara, such non‑Verbal knowledge is of the nature of inference because only the verbal cognition of the Vedas is strictly verbal. The Vedic thinkers adopt the doctrine of impersonate authorship perhaps to maintain is infallibility, because a person is liable to many defects. However, in order to prove the impersonal authorship of the Vedas, the Vedic thinkers; especially the Mimamsakas introduce a mystical theory of the eternality of the Vedas. They hold that the relationship between the word and its meaning is natural and not created by conversion. The purpose of the Mimasmsakas in rejecting the authorship of the Vedas to Gods is because God, who is incorporeal, has no organs of speech and hence he cannot utter words, and if He assumes the human form, then He is subject to all the limitations of material existence and hence his utterances will not be authoritative. Then there is no tradition of divine or human authorship of the Vedas. If it is said that the Vedas are human compositions because names of saints and seers occur, it may be said that the hymns deal with the eternal phenomena of nature and the names of persons have only symbolical significance and not any historical significance.
In tracing their Agamas to the utterances of Lord Mahavir, the Jainas have a more secured position. Firstly, since Mahavir is Omniscient (Kevalin) what he says must be true. Since, he is above desires (Vitaraga), what he says is free from any subjective prejudices. Lastly, since he is compassionate, what he says is for the benefits of the people. Thus the Jaina theory of scriptures as the sermons of Lord Mahavir is more intelligible rational. the adherence of one's faith in the personality of Lord Mahavir gives a religious color. Lastly, such a theory of scriptures having its source in the personality of a realized man raises the dignity and status of man to the status of God. Omniscience is not divine but human. It requires a Sadhana. Thus the Jaina doctrine of Agamas sets up everything in real and historical context, while the explanation of the impersonality of the Vedas is rather vague and ambiguous. However, it looses at one place‑by treating the Vedic authorship as impersonal, it implies that it is perhaps very‑very old and ancient because a person is after all a historical event. Here the Jaina reply is that since the truth contained in the Agamas are one, eternal and permanent, it is as old as anything. The objects of the knowledge are the one and the same for all. Hence their cognition is neither new nor old. Hence, there is an argument in the teaching of all Arhats. In this sense, the teachings are eternal and universal and hence impersonal. Thus, the line of demarcation between personal and impersonal authorship of the scripture gives way to a reconciliation. A prophetic utterance, in the sense, it is eternal and universal, is impersonal; however, since it comes from the mouth of a historical person, it is personal.
Agama and its Interpretation ‑ The statement of a trust‑worthy person is said to be Agama. Otherwise, words themselves are inert, lifeless and even ambiguous. Hence, the validity of Sabda rests with the person who uses them. Hence the interpretation of the Agamas depend both upon the Speaker and also upon the Audience. So far, the speakership of the Agamas is concerned, it is held to be the direct sermons of the Omniscient Lord, which have been compiled and codified by their chief disciples called Ganadhara. So far the interpretation of the Agamas from the point of view of the audience is concerned, it should be clearly noted that a certain amount of intellectual ability and moral preparation is needed for the appropriate grasp of the subject matter. In absence of such a preparation, the same Agama admits of different and even conflicting interpretations about one and the same subject, like the different interpretations of the Brahma‑Sutra and the Bhagavad‑Gita. The Jaina Agamas are the sermons of the Tirthankaras which have been correctly reported by the Sruta‑kevalin and the Ganadhara, who are also supposed to be Sruta‑kevalin and the Ganadhara, who are also supposed to be omniscient and also above all desires of love and hate, hence the validity of the Jaina Agamas is doubly raised because both the Source as well as the Course of the Agamas are pure.
The Place of Samayika ‑ There are three distinctive contributions of Jainism to Indian Culture ‑ Equality (Sama), Self‑control (Sama) and Dignity of labor (Srama). Equality or Samayika is said to be the heart of Jainism. In the Jaina religious scripture, Dvadasang or in the 14th Purva, the place of Samayika is the first and foremost among the six daily duties. Without the practice of Samayika or equality, there is no hope for any religious or spiritual realization. When a householder accepts the Jaina religion, he solemnly pledges to abide by the principle of equality. The whole of Visesavasyaka‑bhasya of Jinabhadra Gani is an exposition of this principle of Samayika. The three jewels of Jainism, i.e. Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct depend upon the principle of equality. The Gita calls it the inner poise or the evenness of mind (Samatvam), or equal mindedness (Sama Cittatvam or Samata) and such a man who attains this is called seer with an equal eye (Samadarsinah or Sarvatra‑sama‑darsana). This principle of equality must be reflected both in thought and action. In thought it is the principle of Anekanta, in action it is the principle of Ahimsa.
(a) Anekanta ‑ Anekanta is the application of the principle of equality in the sphere of thought. Thus it is not a philosophy but a philosophical standpoint just as there is the Advaitic standpoint of Sankara and the standpoint of the Middle path of the Buddhists. Anekanta literally means non‑absolution. Though the Anekanta Period in Jaina philosophical literature comes after the end of the Agamic period, the genesis of the Anekantic idea is already present in the Agamic literature. The famous Bhagavati Sutra refers to the important and interesting dreams that Lord Mahavira had just before attained Keval‑jnana. In one of the dreams, there is reference to `multi‑faced' or `multi‑colored' (citra‑vicitra) wings of Pansakholi which symbolizes the multi‑faced reality.
The Buddhist also have their doctrine of Vibhajyavada or `conditional expressions', which means that they discard one-sided view (ekansavada). However, the Buddhists believed in Vibhajyavada to a limited extent, where as the Jainas believe it to the full extent, so that it was finally developed into the Theory of Non‑absolutism (Anekantavada). In Buddhism, Vibhajya means division and Vibhajya Vyakarniya means answering a question by diving. While the Buddhists attribute the divergent attributes at the same time with regard to two different things, the genius of the Jainas is reflected in attributing the different attributes in the one and the same subject, of course, the contexts are different. This leads to the organon of Sapta‑bhangi and the multi‑valued logic of Syadvada. Even in the Vedas and Upanisads, the description of the reality is in terms of contradictory attributes, like real and unreal, mobile and immobile. Nasadiya Sukta, therefore, avoids to describe the reality either as real or unreal. Thus Anekanta seems to be a dynamic of thought‑reconciliation, through which we find an attempt at synthesis between apparently contradictory attributes of eternality and non‑eternity of the world or finiteness or infiniteness of the Jiva or difference or non‑difference between the body and the soul. Anekanta however, should not be understood to mean that reality is contradictory. It simply means that it has innumerable number of aspects and attributes which can be thoroughly comprehended only when we can put all of them together. This is ideal of perfection, which can be attained only when we become an omniscient. However, we can have the knowledge of one or other aspect if we are free from prejudice and bias. Thus, on the one hand it has its ideal of finality of knowledge, in reality it aims at aspectal knowledge or naya. As a corollary, we have to be cautious in our speech. Lord Mahavira explained every problem with the help of Siyavaya or Syadvada. Absolutism in speech and language is as bad as absolutism in thought. The Agamic stress on Anekanta and Syadvada is due to its great adherence to Ahimsa. Anekantavada or Syadvada is extension of the principle of Ahimsa on intellectual level. Jainas think that without non‑violence in thought, non‑violence in practice is impossible.
(b) Ahimsa ‑ Ahimsa follows as a logical corollary from the principle of Equality (Samya) of souls. The inequalities of physical and mental abilities are only accidental and they are due to the Karmas. How, since `life is dear to all and since everything has hot life', we have to accept the principle of Ahimsa as an important means of spiritual realization. To the Sramanic cult of Jainism, the means are as important as the ends. Our end is no doubt self‑realization or Moksa. Now, this self‑realization is impossible without the love of self and this love of self is nothing other than Ahimsa, since self resides in everything. Jainism looks upon the whole world as filled with life. Nothing is fallow or sterile, nothing is dead and inert. What to speak of living beings, even plants and every portion of matter have got life. Hence, respect for life is a spiritual act, it is a law of our being. If we forget it, life becomes well nigh impossible. `As we feel our pain, so we must feel the pain of others', says the Acaranga. The same truth is stated in Dasvaikalika where it is clearly said that `all beings desire to live, none want to die'. All our religions accept Ahimsa as a virtue but Jainas have worked out a complete philosophy of non‑violence, hence here Ahimsa is more due to rational consideration than emotional as we find in Buddhism and Christianity. The Jaina Ahimsa, embraced the whole universe and is not restricted to humanity. There we can find that Advaita Vedanta and others admit oneness of soul and practically removes the ground of mistrust and violence, which are the result of duality.
Nivarttaka Dharma ‑ Ahimsa together with Aparigraha constitute the ethical wholeness of self‑control or self‑restraint in social relationship, self‑control is the foundation of a higher moral life as in individual life, it is the basis of higher spiritual life. Except for the Mimamsakas, who believe in heaven etc. all the Vedic and non‑Vedic systems adopt Moksa as the Summum Bonum of life, which is a state of cessation of the wheels of existence. It is happiness (Sreya) rather than pleasure (Preya) which is the goal of life. Thus self‑purification (Atma‑suddhi) and not the acquisition of any earthly or heavenly pleasures, which is the aim of life. The obstacles in the forms of delusion, ignorance and craving must be rooted out by practicing the different vows or Vratas, throughout life. Hence, the agency is emphasized. In short, all these constitute the Nivarttaka Dharma or world‑withdrawing religion, which is said to be the heart of Jainism. It is bound to be individualistic, world‑withdrawing and self‑negating. Emphasis on renunciation, asceticism, penaneces etc. in the account of Sadhana given in the Acaranga is literally soul‑stirring. Like Buddha, Mahavira also presented a gloomy picture of the world. `The living world is afflicted, miserable' ‑ thus begins the second lecture of the first book of Acaranga.
FROM NESCIENCE TO OMNISCIENCE
Soul : The Basis of Science, Nescience & Omniscience
By overthrowing rational psychology in his `Critique of Pure Reason', Kant has disproved the very existence of the soul and thereby the doctrines of the immortality and simplicity of it. But what he lost in the `Critique of Pure Reason', he regained them in the `Critique of Practical Reason'. Lord Mahavira presenting the Purva‑paksa in the Visesavasyaka bhasya comes to the conclusion that the soul does not exist, but in the Uttar‑paksa, refutes all the arguments of the opponents and successfully establishes the existence of the soul. Eminent psychologists of today have been finding themselves helpless to do away with the hypothesis of the soul. "Modern man (is also) in the search of a soul." "The reality of self is obvious to the Introspectionist as the reality of the organism is to the Behaviorists." James supports it and his pupils, Calkins comes out strongly for a `psychology of selves'. Stern, Dilthy, Spranger and Allport have been endeavoring to build up a `science of personality'. The theory of soul holds that the principle of consciousness must be a substantial entity, psychic phenomena are activities and the activity is possible unless there exists an agent. Therefore William James regards its admittance `to be the line of least logical resistance'. Calkins holds that the self, far from being a metaphysical concept, is an ever present fact of immediate experience and fully worthy to be made the central fact in a scientific psychology. Huxley, Spencer and even Darwin have likewise admitted that the materialistic hypothesis involves grave philosophical errors.
In fact, nothing would be simpler than to start with sensation, which is as simple as simplicity, hence it is bound to be indivisible affection which does not imply a reflection even. Naturally, the subject of such sensations must then be a simple substances. "The ancients employed the term `should' to indicate their conceptions of a knowing substance that was partless and indestructible and therefore immortal." Words abound with references to the arguments for the existence of soul. It is due to the soul that a body appears to be living, the soul itself being the principle of consciousness. Udyotkara, the famous author of Nyaya‑Varttika, therefore observes that there is practically no un‑unanimity regarding the existence of soul.
Soul : Its Characteristics
Indian philosophers are agreed about the nature of the soul as possessing consciousness. Even the Carvakas regard Atman as Consciousness, which is a byproduct of the material body. The Buddhists also accept this position, with little difference. However, Jainism is very emphatic about the characteristic of soul as consciousness, which consists of jnana and darsana (knowledge and intuition). In the Tattvartha‑Sutra, the term for Cetana is given as Upayoga which includes bliss and power besides cognition and intuition. So very Jiva, in its natural condition possesses `four‑infinities'.
Karma : The Material Basis of Bondage
So infinite cognition, intuition, bliss and power belong to the soul in state of perfection. But the mundane souls are infected by something foreign, which obscures their natural faculties. This foreign elements is known as Karman. The Jaina conception of Karman is not `action' or `deed' as it etymologically means; it is an aggregate of very fine imperceptible material particles. This Doctrine of the Material Nature of Karman is singular to Jainism alone; with others karma is formless. The Jainas regard karma as the crystallized effect of the past activities or energies. But they argue that "in order to act and react and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies must have to be metamorphosed into forms or centers of forces." Like begets like. The cause is like the effect. "The effect (i.e. body) is physical, hence the cause (i.e. Karma) has indeed a physical form." But unless Karma is associated with the soul, it cannot produce any effect, because karma is only the instrumental cause and it is the soul which is the essential cause of all experiences. Hence the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Soul as the Possessor of Material Karma. But why the conscious soul should be associated with the unconscious matter ? It is owing to the karma, which is a substantive force or matter in a subtle form, which fills all cosmic space. "The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle‑matter." Moreover, the mundane soul is not absolutely formless, because the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Extended consciousness, like the Doctrine of Pudgala in Buddhism and the Upanisads and also to some extent in Plato and Alexander. While the Samkhya‑Yoga, Vedanta, Nyaya‑Vaisesikas and the Buddhists kept consciousness quite aloof from matter, the Jainas could easily conceive of the inter‑influencing of the soul and the Karmic‑matter, hence the relation between the soul and Karma became very easy. The Karmic matter mixes with the soul as milk mixes with the water or fire with iron. Thus the amurta karma is affected by murta karma as consciousness is affected by drink and medicine. This is the relation of concrete identity between the soul and the Karma.
Without the Karma Phenomenology, the diversity of the variegated nature and apparent inequalities among human beings and their capacities remain unexplained. Kalavada (Temporalism), Svabhavavada (Naturalism), Niyativada (Determinism), Yadrcchavada (Fortuism), Ajnanavada and Samsaya‑vada (Agnosticism and Scepticism), Bhautikavada (Materialism) and Maya‑vada (Illusionism) fail to satisfy us. Karma is the basis of Jaina psychology and the key‑stone supporting edifice of the Jaina ethics.
The Concept of Nescience
The link between the spirit and the matter is found in the Doctrine of the Subtle Body (Karma‑Sarira or Linga‑Sarira), a resultant of the unseen potency and caused by a Principle of Susceptibility due to Passions and Vibrations. The Doctrines of Constitutional Freedom of the soul and its Potential Four‑fold Infinities means that the Soul is intrinsically pure and innately perfect. It is due to Karma that it acquires the conditions of nescience. Nescience is opposite to science or knowledge, i.e., deluded and misguided. This Ignorance or Nescience is the "force which prevents wisdom shining from within, that is that which holds it in latency." The relation between the soul and the non‑soul is beginningless and is due to nescience or avidya, otherwise called Mithyatva, Ajnana, Mithya‑Jnana, Viparyaya, Moha, Darsana‑moha, Aviveka, Mala and Pasa etc. in different schools of Indian Philosophy. They are responsible for the worldly existence, or bondage, which is determined by the nature (Prakrti), duration (Sthiti), intensity (Anubhava) and quantity (Pradesa) of karmas. Jivas take matter in accordance with their own karmas because of self‑possession (Kasaya). This is known as bondages, the cause of which are Delusion (Mithya‑drsti). Lack of Control (Avirati), Inadvertence (Pramada), Passions (Kasaya) and Vibrational‑activities (Yoga).
The Jaina term for avidya is mithyatva, which is divided into categories and sub‑categories differently. According to Umaswami, it may be divided into abhigrahita and anabhigrahita; according to Pujyapada Devanandi it may be divided into Naisargika and Paropdesapurvaka, the last again sub‑divided into four sub‑classes. According to Kunda‑Kunda delusion (moha) may be divided into Mithyatva, ajnana and avirati, according to the Fourth Karma Grantha, mithya‑darsana is divided into ‑ abhigrahika, anabhigrahika, abhinivesika, samasvaika and anabhoga. However, the most popular division is of Pujyapada ‑ ekanta, viparita, vainayika, samsaya and ajnana with their numerous sub‑division. The five‑fold causes of bondage is sometimes reduced to two or three (mithya‑darsana, kasaya and yoga or simply kasaya and yoga) or four. In short, nescience or mithyatva is at the root of all evils and the cause of worldly existence. The Jainas do not like to bother about its whence and why. It is coeval with the soul, hence eternal and beginningless. Both the questions of the Self and Nescience are accepted as facts on the basis of uncontradicted experience. As the bondage is determined by the karmas. There are eight fundamental varieties of these karmas, i.e., jnanavaraniya, darsanavaraniya, vedaniya, mohaniya, ayu, nama, gotra and antaraya with their different sub‑divisions. Vidyananda Swami in his Tattvartha‑Sloka‑Varttika says that as Right Attitude, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct constitute the path to liberation, the anti‑thesis of this Trinity, i.e., Wrong Attitude, Wrong Knowledge and Wrong Conduct must lead to the bondage. If the very outlook is wrong, one cannot expect right knowledge and there cannot be right conduct without right knowledge. There is close relation between knowledge. Theory without practice is useless as practice without theory is blind. Knowledge enlightens, penances purifies and restraint protects. Even after attaining tattva‑jnana, the soul remains embodied for sometime to enjoy the fruits of its past sancit karmas. So on the psychological grounds, the Jainas reject the metaphysical position of all those who subscribe to the Doctrine of Unitary principle (i.e., Wrong knowledge alone) as the cause of the bondage.
The Concept of Omniscience
Definition and Analysis ‑ Omniscience or Keval‑Jnana is a kind of direct but extra‑sensory perception, "the perfect manifestation of the innate nature of the self, arising on the complete annihilation of the obstructive veils." which is gained by the destruction of Deluding, Knowledge obscuring, Belief obscuring and Obstructive Karmas, when the soul is free from all karmic‑matter owing to the non‑existence of the causes of bondage and to the shedding of all karmas, the subject‑matter of which is all the substances in all their modifications at all the places and in all the times. Nothing remains unknown to the omniscient.
On analysis of the concept of omniscience, we have to decide whether he is human or divine or both; whether the knowledge of an omniscient is simultaneous or successive; whether the power of omniscience is potential or actual; whether an omniscient knows all the objects or simply the most important objects, and whether he knows the past and the future as the present or as the past or future. To the Mimamsakas the term omniscient may either mean (1) the knower of the term `omniscience' or (2) complete knowledge of one thing such as oil or (3) knowledge of the entire world in a most general way or (4) perfect knowledge of one's own respective scriptural matters or (5) simply knowledge of respective things through the respective Pramanas as far as possible.
Historical Development and Comparative Estimate of the Concept of Sarvajnatva
The germinal concept of omniscience can be traced back to the Vedas where Varuna sits looking at all. In the Upanisads, the state of omniscience is the state of bliss or Turiyavastha. He who knows Brahman, knows everything. Atman being known everything is known. Hiranyagarbha is Sarvajna. Likewise in the Vedanta, the Brahman alone, who is one without a second, is omniscient. In Buddhism, omniscience is granted to the Buddha. True to their non‑metaphysical attitude, they do not bother about each and everything, but only about their Four Noble Truths, and their own religious observances etc. Prajnakargupta in his commentary on Dharamkirti's work has established the trio‑temporal‑spatial omniscience of Sugat and that state is attainable by any man free from attachment and taints. Santaraksita supports this. In idealistic schools of Buddhism like Sunyavada and Vijnanavada, the Concept of omniscience comes very near to that Upanisadic monism where all‑knowledge amounts to self‑knowledge. However to the Buddhists, who subscribe to the Doctrine of Momentary Stream of Consciousness, the fact of omniscience, extending to past and future becomes meaningless. The creating Isvara of Nyaya school is omniscience. Vaisesika regards God as omniscient besides other Yogic‑souls. Similarly, Alaukika Pratyaksa of the Nyaya school, Asamprajnata Samadhi of the Yoga, Jivan‑Mukti of Samkhya and Vedanta Turiyavastha of the Upanisads and Radhakrishnan's Religious Experience have very clear implications of omniscience, although they partly encroach on the realm of religious mysticism. According to the Nyaya‑Vaisesika, omniscience means knowledge of its seven principles, to the Buddhists, it implies the right knowledge of Panca‑skandhas, to the Vedantins it is the knowledge of the Brahman and to the Jainas it will mean the all comprehensive‑knowledge of the six categories. Excepting the Mimamsakas and the Carvakas all Indian systems believe in the possibility of human omniscience, however, the Sramanic culture insistence on human omniscience more than others to grant infalliability to their prophets, because on this depend the very life and death of their systems.
In short, the Doctrine of Omniscience follows as the sine qua non from the metaphysical, religious and psychological view‑points of each of the school. True to their realistic metaphysics, the Jainas conceive of omniscience as purely human and actual ‑ a direct knowledge of all knowable of all places and times. The Agamas and the logical treaties have equated Sarvajnatva with Dharmajnatva. Later Jaina thinkers like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalanka, Haribhadra, Vidyanand have separated the concept of omniscience from the idea of religious experience. With Acarya Kunda‑kunda Sarvajnatva is a dogma, a religious heritage, almost similar to the Advaitic and Upanisadic emphasis on treating Sarvajnatva as Atmajnatva. The names of other Jaina thinkers such as Umasvami, Anantakirti, Patrakesar, Prabhachandra, Abhayadeva Suri, Rajasekhara, Vadibh Singh Suri, Anantakirti, Manikyanandi, Pujyapada Devanandi, Santi Suri, Yasovijaya, Mallavadin, Vadi Deva Suri, Nemichandra, Hemchandra, Mallisena, Dharmabhusana , Devendra Suri, etc. are relevant.
Mimamsaka's Objections and Their Replies
The Mimamsakas try to show that omniscience cannot be established through any of the Pramanas. It cannot be established through Pratyaksa. Perception implies sense‑object‑contact during the present time and in the case of Kevala‑jnana, this is lacking. To this, we can say that the question of sense‑object‑relation is not always valid, because things are beyond the power of senses. Such invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time or things far beyond (like the Meru hill) became known as the object of direct perception, just like the knowledge of existence of fire in hill from the smoke is also the subject‑matter of perception. Here we may be reminded of the researches in para‑psychology and extra‑sensory perception including telepathy and clairvoyance. As for perception, we can say that only a type of perception which claims to know all things of all times and places, can definitely say that omniscient does not exist. But if there is such a type of all‑comprehensive perception it is no other than the omniscience. Similarly, omniscience cannot be established through Anumana, because we cannot think of a relation of universal concomitance between the Sadhya and the Hetu. Sabda Pramana also cannot prove it, because there is no infallibility of the Agamic authority to support it and the fallible Agamas are either created by omniscient or non‑omniscient. Now, if it is through omniscient, there is the fallacy of circular reasoning and if it is through non‑omniscient, there is fallacy of Contradiction. Upamana also cannot establish this, because it works on the basis of imperfect resemblance between two instances, but there is complete absence of any similarly with the objection that the Arhat is not omniscient because he is speaker like some vagabond, it is said "there is no contradiction between the speakership and the omniscience. With the perfection of knowledge, verbal skill is also perfected. However it may be retorted that Vitaraga Omniscience can not speak for speech is related with desire to speak, and a Vitaraga Omniscient is devoid of any desires. But as a matter of fact, this argument is fallacious. There is no relation between the two. An intelligent person even if he has desire, may not explain the Sastras and during swoon and dreams, where there is absence of desires, people are seen talking and uttering something. Similarly, when it is said that the proof of the omniscience follows from the final consummation of the progressive development of cognition, the Mimamasakas object to it and say that there must be a limit of all progress like that in any human activity. The Jainas reply that physical progress is different from mental progress. Knowledge is limitless and infinite. When the soul shines in full splendor it attains omniscience. To the objection that if an omniscient knows all the objects of the universe at one instant, nothing remains to be cognised by him in the next moment, hence the soul would turn to be unconscious having nothing to cognise; it is reported that it would have been so only if the perception of the omniscient and also this world‑order were destroyed in the following moment. But both of them are eternal. Hence it is foolish to hold that there is one single cognition. With respect to the objection that because the omniscient knows `everything', he might be tainted by the evils contained in them, it is replied that knowledge is different from active participation. One cannot be subjected to attachment and miseries simply in knowing them, because we cannot be called a drunker simply as we know about the different ingredients of the drink. Next, it is objected that we cannot think of an omniscient because through the world we find only ignorant persons. To this it is said that our ignorance cannot be our excuse. We cannot say that persons like Jamini etc. were ignorant of the Vedas because we do not find any such person at the present time. When it is argued that since the beginninglessness and endlessness are apparent in the state of omniscience, things must appear in that way, it is replied that the nature of reality does not change in perceiving them. Things appear as they are. When it is said that because the Agamas establish omniscience of the Arhat and omniscients also create Agamas, this is simply paradoxical, it is said that the Agamas of the present are profited by the past Agamas. The Mimamsakas say that omniscience may mean either successive or simultaneous knowledge of all objects. Now, if it is regarded as successive knowledge, omniscience becomes impossible since the objects of the world in the past, present and future are inexhaustible, hence the knowledge would also be ever‑complete. If the knowledge is regarded as simultaneous, there will be confusion and contradiction due to the presence of contradictory objects at the same time. Past and future are non‑existent at the present time, hence a knowledge about them would always be illusory.
Some Proofs for the Existence of Omniscience
We have to face these difficulties because we regard omniscience only as ordinary perception writ large. As a matter of fact omniscience is a form of direct simultaneous extra‑sensory‑perception where there is no scope for CONFUSION, ILLUSION or IGNORANCE. "Our phenomenal knowledge suggests the noumenal as a necessity of thought, but not known through the empirical Pramanas. Metaphysically, manifold and complete objectivity implies some extra‑ordinary perception. Psychologically, differences in intelligence etc. in human beings presuppose the possibility of omniscience, somewhere and in some body. Logically, on account of the lack of contradictory proof, it is established beyond doubt. According to the researches made by Sukhalal Sanghavi, the origin of all these proofs may by traced back to the Yoga‑Sutra of Patanjali. Knowledge like measure and quantity has got degrees, hence knowledge is bound to reach its final consummation. References about omniscience, in all other literatures, are after the date of the Yoga‑Sutra. In Jaina literatures, this argument was first of all advocated by Mallavadi, though the sources concerned are not exactly clear.
We can sum up the most formidable proofs of Akalanka Deva under the following three categories ‑ firstly, omniscience is proved because there is absolute non‑existence of any obstructive‑Pramanas against it. Akalanka tries to in the astronomical spheres, which indicates correctly about the future eclipses of the sun and moon. Lastly, omniscience follows from the essential nature of the soul as knower of all things. As the sun shines fully after the removal of the clouds, so the self knows everything when the knowledge‑obscuring‑karmas is completely liquidated. According to Virasena Svami, we can infer about the whole mountain after perceiving a part of it, so we can be sure of complete knowledge in self by perceiving partial knowledge. Samantabhadra has proved the existence through the reasoning based on Anumeyatva, or capable of being known through inference. Dharmabhusana explaining this says that `perception' does not mean only `actual perception' but also `object of knowledge'. Let us repeat with the author of Apta‑Pariksa, "when omniscience is proved by all the six Pramanas, who dare to reject it ?" None, perhaps none. Omniscience is perfectly consistent with the Jaina conception of knowledge as the removal of veil.
OMNISCIENCE : MISCONCEPTION AND CLARIFICATION
Meaning of the Term
There is a striking parallel between `Omniscient' and `Sarvajna' becaus we the Latin `Omnis' corresponds to the Sanskrit `sarva'. Even in ancient Indian languages like Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrt, etc. there are many equivalents of the term `Sarvajna', but the most commonly used term is `Sarvajna' itself. The etymological meaning of Sarvajna is governed by a particular rule according to which the affix `ka' comes after a verbal root that ends in long a, when there is no prefix preceding it and when the object is in composition with it (ato‑anupsarge kah). As the Pali and Prakrt grammars practically follow the rules of Sanskrit, the dictionary meanings of other important European languages like German, Russian, Italian, Spanish, French, English etc. are generally grounded on the Latin meaning. Thus literally, the term `Omniscience' means `all‑knowledge' or `knowledge of all'. But the terms `all' and `knowledge' are used or can be used in different contexts. Similarly the term `omniscient' has got both straight forward and idiomatic meanings. When we call a man `omniscient', we do not mean that he knows everything, we simply mean that he is very learned and he knows a lot. Thus there is a distinction between the `strict' and the `hyperbolical' meanings of the term. Then there are special meanings also that are determined by the philosophical and cultural background of a particular system.
It is clear that the lexical works do help to determine the meaning of a term but they cannot finally decide the meaning because they report only the existing usages. While retaining the lexical identity, the term may have different connotations, hence the meanings of the term `omniscience' also differ accordingly. For example, "the man who knows the word `all' may be `all‑knowing' in name." It means that the man who knows the meaning of `all' will also know what it signifies. But this is a meaning in name only for no one can prevent another person from giving a word any meaning he likes. The meaning of a term depends upon human stipulation. Secondly, a man may be called `omniscient', if he knows about everything of a given context (for example, the names of all dramas of Kalidas and Shakespear). This is precisely the hyperbolic or idiomatic meaning, when a versatile genius or highly learned man is described as `omniscient'. A third meaning of `all' may be understood in the sense of the epitome of the world included under the two categories, positive the Buddhists limit it to the knowledge of morality (Heya‑Upadeya) and to the Jainas, it is the knowledge of "all substances with all their attributes and modes in all times and in all places." (Sarva‑dravya‑guna‑Paryayesu).
Analysis of the Meaning of the term Omniscience
If we suppose that omniscience means the knowledge of `all substances with all their modes', we can ask : whether omniscience is false or true knowledge ? If it is false, it is sheer non‑sense but if it is true, we can further ask : "whether it is knowledge of only the important things or of all the things." If it is the former, it is not omniscience in the sense under study, if it is latter it raises a further question : Is it the knowledge of all the objects without or with their attributes. If we accept the first alternative, it will raise many complicated metaphysical issues, such as whether or not an object can be known without knowing its attributes or whether objects and their attributes are so separable in knowledge even if not in reality ? Thus, the second alternative is accepted which will imply `knowledge of objects with their attributes'. But on further analysis, it will raise another question : whether the knowledge is of all objects with some or all attributes ? If the former, the scope becomes limited, if the latter, there is another dilemma. Is such a knowledge restricted to some particular place or to all the places ? If we accept the first alternative, it becomes restricted in space but if we accept the second alternative, we are faced with a further problem : whether the omniscient knowledge (unlimited in space) covers the entire present only or the entire span of time ‑ past, present and future. If we accept the former, it is restricted to the present moment only but if we accept the second knowledge is successive or simultaneous ? If it be successive, there can be no omniscience for all the objects with all attributes and modes at all places and at all times can never be exhausted. But if it is taken to be simultaneous, there crops yet another difficulty : Is such a simultaneous knowledge obtained by a single act of cognition or by a series of cognitions ? The first alternative is unacceptable since then it would be impossible to distinguish between contradictory things and characteristics like heat and cold simultaneously through the act of one single cognition. But suppose, if it can be known through a single supernormal cognition brought about by communion, then there can be no means of cognition to vouch for such knowledge because it is not produced either by perception, inference or authority. But if we accept the second alternative, we can still ask : whether it is actual or possible ? If it is actual it would be difficult to conceive a state of knowledge obtained through several cognitions covering even mutually contradictory things. Then it is impossible to apprehend even in hundreds of thousands of years each one of the innumerable things and thus characteristics of all places and at all times. But to avoid this difficulty, if we suppose that such a knowledge is only possible we are again confronted with another problem. If it is possible to know all things and their attributes simultaneously, nothing will remain to be known by the omniscient being. In that case after having the knowledge, he would behave as an unconscious being, since he will have left nothing to cognate. Supposing, for the moment that we somehow try to overcome this difficulty, we shall still be beset with another problem : Whether past and future will be known as present or as they are, i.e., the past as past and the future as future. If we accept the first alternative, distinction of time will be lost because the past and the future will merge into the immediate present. But if we accept the second alternative it will imply that the omniscient being cognise the past and the future which are at present non‑existents. Thus, in both cases, our knowledge would be illusory and wrong.
Categorization
In order to avoid these difficulties involved in the analysis of the concept of omniscience, it has been interpreted to mean the knowledge "important and essential things through their important characteristics" and not of "each and everything in their numerical details." But it may be told that unless all the objects with all their attributes are known, how can the distinction between the `essential' and the `non‑essential' be made. Even if it be possible, some of the old difficulties will reappear. But supposing as it is, even then we can ask : what does this omniscience (as the knowledge of important things through their important characteristics) refer to ? To this question, there are some answers in Indian thought, but for my convenience, I shall choose only three for their elucidation and examination : (a) Omniscience as the knowledge of reality, (b) Omniscience as the knowledge of duty and (c) Omniscience as knowledge of the self. I shall take one by one :
(a) Omniscience as the Knowledge of Reality ‑ Suppose, omniscience means knowledge if reality, it is to be clarified : whether it implies the knowledge of the `transcendental reality' or the `empirical reality'. If it be the former it will mean difficulty in different systems of thought and metaphysics. But if we do not bind ourselves to any particular metaphysical stand‑point and instead vaguely hold the general view that omniscience means knowledge of the essential things, we are faced with a difficult task of explaining the status of the contingent and its relationship to the essential. The Samkhya for example, may say that the knowledge of the essential implies that of the contingent world. But if we admit that the knowledge of the essence does not contain the knowledge of the accident, we shall have to turn ourselves to the pluralistic‑realistic systems. However, if we accept the second alternative that omniscience is the knowledge of the empirical reality, there is perhaps then no need of philosophy as the different sciences are already doing the work. But no scientist ever makes any claim to omniscience. But suppose we do have knowledge of reality anyhow in any sense, there still remains a problem : whether it is knowledge of the temporal or non‑temporal reality ? If we accept the first position, we shall have to argue with science that omniscience is not possible. But if we accept the second view that the ultimate reality is far from spatio‑temporal limitations, we will be driven to an idealistic view of the universe. Thus, either we accept the views of science according to which omniscience is not possible or we accept the idealistic position, in which case again, there can be no unanimity.
(b) Omniscience as Knowledge of Duty ‑ Viewing those difficulties omniscience has been treated as the knowledge of duty (dharma), since our moral life and hence its knowledge is of supreme value to us. Here omniscience (Sarvajnata) will be equated with the knowledge of duty (dharmajnata). But even this religious‑ethical approach involves some difficulties : whether duty, referred to here, is duty in general (Samanya dharma) or duty in particular (Varnasrama dharma). If the first alternative is accepted, there may be conflicting lists, since duties vary from person to person and to the same person from time to time. If we adopt the second alternative, another difficulty will arise : whether the particular duty is private or public ? If the former, it may lead to narrowness and sectarianism; but if it is the latter, we have to explore some universal and eternal principles of duty, which is very difficult. Even the concept of `Universal Religion' is still an utopia.
(c) Omniscience as Knowledge of Self ‑ To simplify matter we can give up the dualistic approach of subject and object and identify the object with the subject. Here the knowledge of the object is identical with the knowledge of the subject. However, this meaning of omniscience as the knowledge of the Self is highly specialized and metaphysical because Sarvajnata is identical with Atmajnata."
Implications of Omniscience : Doubts and Difficulties
Those who argue for the existence of omniscience as a fact, rests on metaphysical postulates that knowledge is the self-functioning of the self. This is the theory of the innate possession of omniscience by every soul. What is needed is the actualisation of this potentiality. This is a contravertial question, whether there is soul or not and if there is, whether even potentially it is capable of of knowing everything. But if we accept these metaphysical postulates, there are serious moral implications. If one knows the future acts of human beings, there was no meaning in voluntary action. So Locke says about omniscience of God : "If God exists and is essentially omniscient, no human action is voluntary." Augustine also says :"If you say, God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But if there is necessity there is no voluntary choice of sinning but rather fixed and unavoidable necessity." To say that since God compels no man to sin, though he sees before‑hand those who are going to sin by their own will. God's omniscience cannot entail determinism on the analogy of an intimate friend having the fore knowledge of another's voluntary actions without affecting his friend's moral freedom, is not a very good argument. A person's knowledge about the future action of an intimate friend of his is at most a good guess and not a definite knowledge. To say that a man is free to do something which without knowing that it is within his power to do otherwise is not freedom but ignorance. What is foreseen is necessary and what is necessary is outside the scope of ethics. However, if it is said that "it is not because God foreknows what he foreknows that men act as they do, it is because men act as they do that God foreknows what he foreknow," will create awkward situation in which man's actions will determine God's knowledge. But suppose if it is the case of human omniscience it will mean that the knowledge of the omniscient being is not unfettered but determined by the actions of other men. But since different people perform different actions, it will create a difficult situation for the cognising mind. To say that the omniscient being believes in an infinitely large number of true synthetic propositions is vague and self‑contradictory, for this depends upon the belief at least in one proposition : "Nothing is unknown to him". But this is to admit his omniscience and hence it is like arguing in a circle.
Validation and Vindication
But such a `Vicious circularity as Fugel says, we cannot escape when we cannot validate any fundamental principle or ideal like this. J.S.Mill also says that "questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof" or as Carnap says that it is necessary always to distinguish between `question within presupposed frame' and `question concerning the frame'. In order to grasp this situation, a fundamental distinction often neglected and blurred, must be made between the two types of justifying principles or knowledge‑claims, namely, validation and vindication. Validation generally means a vigorous logical proof or `legitimizing of knowledge‑claims'. Vindication on the other hand, means the justification of an action, which is, though weaker than validation, is an equally respectable method, especially when we know that validation is impossible in matters of fundamental principles.
It seems that although the logicians have exhibited great diabolical skill in enunciating the concept of omniscience and arguing for its exemplification in reality the concept has not been made altogether clear or completely defensible. But apart from the rational approach, there is also another approach. It is sometimes called the approach of faith or the intuitional approach, which is applicable in matters of suprasensible and beyond space‑time objects. The non‑rational (ahetuvada) approach though different from the rational approaches (hetuvada) is not an irrational approach. After all, there are limitations to our reason as there are limitations to our senses. Thus, there are two separate fields of investigation, science and spirituality. Science deals with spartio‑temporal phenomena with the help of senses and common‑sense reasoning including scientific experiment. But there are other fields also, unexplored and also beyond the scope of scientific reach. It seems that there are different ways of knowing. True, there is the western emphasis on critical intelligence and eastern emphasis on creative intuition but there is universal recognition of the spirit in man. It is necessary to be reasonable and not logical. Our whole logical life grows on the foundation of a deeper insight. If intuitive knowledge does not supply us with universal major premises which we can neither question nor establish, our life will come to an end. Intuitions are not substitutes for thought. They are challenge to intelligence. This spirit of man or creativity of felt everywhere in artistic achievement and poetic genius, religious experiences and ethical life, in scientific genius and psychological life.
The concept of omniscience is such a concept, which can admit of vindication (justification actions) on the ground of faith which is supported by the seers having intuitional insight. Modern researches in the field of para‑psychology specially in clairvoyance, clair‑audience, precognition, telepathy etc. also support the knowledge which can be gained by transcending space‑time and the senses. The science of Yoga can be also examined in this direction. It has been the abiding spiritual ambition of man to extend the frontiers of his knowledge. The very attempt to put a limit, an absolute limit to our knowledge is unscientific. It was customary for the old philosophy to discredit the knowledge gained by the senses, as it was for an old fashioned theology to discredit the nature of the worth of the body. Both have proved to be erroneous. Human thinking with regard to goodness, duty and morality, art and beauty, "extends without assignable limit the knowledge of mankind." The growth of human knowledge has been a sort of progressive limitation of sceptical and agnostic attitude. Thus the possibility of omniscience is also contained in the ideal of knowledge or ideal of science. Even in the ideal of epistemological certainty without which all our claims to knowledge must be suspects" suggests that the quest for certainty in knowledge is indeed a quest towards omniscience. In reasoning, context is not seen simultaneously with the meaning which has to be the object of reflection and analysis. Thus reason cannot make prime discoveries. The miracle of mind is well‑known. What is needed is to unfold the gates of mind and extend the limitless horizon of knowledge.
SIX APPROACHES TO OMNISCIENCE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
The acceptance or non‑acceptance of the idea of Omniscience in a particular system of Indian Philosophy can provide us with a new principle of division of the Indian systems. There are those like the Buddhists, the Jainas, the Nyaya‑Vaisesikas, the Samkhya‑Yogins and the Vedantins who accept the idea of Omniscience either as a religious dogma or as an epistemological‑metaphysical principle. However, the idea is very important and fundamental both to the sastras and common usages. Its germinal concept can be traced back even to the Vedas.
However, the Carvakas, the Indian Agnostics, the Mimamsakas reject the very idea of omniscience. The Carvakas, for example will naturally reject such an assumption is direct sense‑perception. Hence, they cannot accept anything which is transempirical or transcendental like soul, God, Paraloka, Karmaphala (the consequences of good‑evil actions). If the existence of Atman or the eternal metaphysical subject is denied, the very idea of omniscience is put to a naught. Soul is supposed to be the substratum of knowledge and when this ground is lost, the entire edifice falls down. Attributes cannot exist without the substance.
The Indian Agnostics Sceptics accept a self‑imposed limitation to their knowledge, while the Nihilists by their attitude leave no room for any discussion upon this subject. Knowledge by its very nature is limited. However, refined and developed it might be, it cannot grasp all the complexion and substitution of the whole world in the past, present and future. The reality, to use Kant's words, is unknown and unknowable.
However, the worst critics of the doctrine of Omniscience, are the Indian Retreatists or Mimamsakas. Strangely enough, though they accept the unchallengeable authority of the Vedas and Pre‑birth etc., they openly and most avoided by deny the existence of the omniscience God. The reason is obvious and somewhat extra‑ontological but thoroughly practical. The Mimamsakas are essentially ritualists. To them rituals and their proper performances can guarantee us the highest good of life. So they in their enthusiasm to accord the means, all knowledge or the perfect knowledge. This may apparently look to be a very simple idea but really it involves many problems. Let us discuss a few of them.
All‑knowledge is rather a very vague term. We have to see whether this knowledge is to be taken denotatively or connotatively, i.e., whether an omniscient being knows all the objects with all their attributes numerically or through their important characteristics. Then if Omniscience means knowledge of Past, Present and Future, we have to know whether the Omniscience knows past and future as the present or past as past and future as future. In brief, whether Omniscient knowledge is simultaneous or successive, is an important question. Now, let us also discuss, who is an Omniscient ? Whether he is human or divine or both ? We know that there are references both about human and divine Omniscience in our religious and philosophical literature. But then, we have to find out the particular system that has laid the foundation of this idea and it would be more interesting to know the socio‑cultural causes for the emergence of this idea which is so much talked about in our books. Whether this idea is the product of pure philosophical speculation or a mere religious dogma or both ? It is generally argued that the idea, at first, evolved as a religious dogma but later on logical arguments were also advanced to defend its validity. This view finds its support in the fact that the validity or invalidity of the Vedas formed the main planck of all discussion for and against the idea of Omniscience. Connected with this, we have to discuss the relation between the idea and God and Omniscience. Apparently, we do not see any relation save and except the fact that Omniscience is regarded as a divine attribute of God, But in Indian Philosophy, both the theistic and the atheistic schools have supported the idea of Omniscience. For example, the theistic systems like the Nyaya‑Vaisesika and Yoga along with the atheistic schools like Samkhya, Jainism and Buddhism and purely metaphysical disciplines like the Upanisads and the Vedanta accept Omniscience. Of course, there are certain differences too. For example, the Nyaya‑Vaisesikas accept the idea of both divine and human Omniscience. However, Omniscience is a capacity of knowledge only among the Yogis and not ordinary average people. Nyaya‑Vaisesika do not regard Omniscience as a pre‑conditions of Moksa because the state of Moksa is the state of utter unconsciousness. Samkhya, Yoga and Vedanta also don’t insist upon attainment of Omniscience as a pre‑condition of Moksa as otherwise held by the Jainas.
Then there is yet another very important problem : the relation between the two very important and related concepts of Sarvajnata (Omniscience) and Dharmajnata is a product of the idea of Dharmajnata or vice versa. Buddhism is the veritable champion of Dharmajnata because Buddha’s Omniscience is the sense of Dharmajna or Margajna (Path‑leader). It senses that both these principles of Omniscience and revelation have got independent origins, although later on they have fused together. As pointed out earlier that the Buddhists, at first, subordinates the idea of Sarvajnata to the idea of Dharmajnata but later on, perhaps on account of the Jaina influences, we find separate and independent treatment of Omniscience even at the hands of the Buddhists. Lord Buddha becomes an Omniscience deity. However, this is interesting to know that the sectarian bias of each of the schools like the Jainas, Buddhists, Samkhyas lead than to think only their own perceptor as Omniscient and non‑else. This has naturally led the Mimamsakas to put them is a very awkward position. How is it that if all of them are Omniscientists, they differ so vitally.
Before, I take up a fuller discussion of the problem, I like to discuss broadly the six main approaches to the concept of Omniscience in Indian Philosophy.
The Approach of Worship
The Vedic Approach to the concept of omniscience is the Approach of Worship. There is a tendency to extol each of the many gods as the Supreme God, who is naturally the Creator of the universe and possessing the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience etc. However in the whole of the Vedas, the particular term Sarvajnata or Sarvanjanta never occurs, yet there are many words denoting the meaning of the said word, as can be inferred from the following expressions : Visva Vedas, Visva Vid, Visvani Vidvan, Sarvavit, Jatvedas, etc. However, throughout all these discussions, `Omniscience is a purely divine attribute. No where is found a single passage where it is human. However, there are prayer‑passages to the gods to grant infinite knowledge and strength. In the Vedic speculation, which is mostly primitive and crude, we find that each god at first is a symbol of Nature or a picture of the gross physical world as indicated by names. Hence, we find the concept of physical omniscience and physical omniscience as can be inferred from the following expressions : Sahasraksa, Visvatascaksuh, Visva‑Drastah, Visva‑carsane etc. Infact, this physical omnipresence forms the basis of their physical than psychological or mental, so much so that the power of vision is glorified more often than the power of mind. Such omniscience of Lord Varuna is evident. The words Pasyati, Prati‑pasyati, Maha‑pasyati and Sarvam‑pasyati, are very suggestive in this respect (The omniscience of Agni, Indra, Varuna, Vaka, Purusa, Soma, etc. Is referred here and there.).
Approach of Atmajnata
In the Upanisads, the concept of Sarvajnatva has been equated with the concept of Atmajnatva or Brahmajnatva. When `All this is Atman', we can conclude that `Atman being known everything is known'. It is a common assertion of the Upanisads that `By knowing the Atman, one knows everything'. However, Atman and Brahman are used synonymously, as expressed in the following. This `Self is the Brahman', `I am Brahman'. Like the expression `All this is Atman' we have the expression `All this is Brahman'. The famous Upanisadic dictums That thou art and `I am Brahman affirm this identification. This makes clear that the concept of Brahman is the primal and privotal concept of the Upanisads together with the concept of Atman. So like the conversation in the Brhadaranyaka, we also meet a similar conversation in the Mundak about Brahman when Saunaka inquires from Angira `knowing what one knows everything' it is replied that `It is Brahman'.
While the term `Sarvajnata' does not occur even a single time in the whole of the Vedas, it occurs for 31 times in the whole of 120 Upanisads but where as in the principal Upanisads the term denotes `knowledge about the self', in the minor Upanisads, we find references about the omniscience of God and other deities. We pass from the Vedic conception of Physical omniscience to the metaphysical omniscience of the Upanisads. Soul‑knowledge is all‑knowledge, hence the Upanisadic message : `Know thyself'. But this `soul‑knowledge' which is equivalent to `all‑knowledge' does not mean each and every details of the contingent world. It would simply mean the complete negation of nescience, the cosmicillusion, by fully grasping the underlying reality. Strangely enough, this Atmanic Approach to knowledge is common both to the Upanisads and some of the Jaina thinkers like Kunda‑kunda and Yogindu. Kunda‑kunda identifies Sarvajnata with Atmajnata meaning thereby that any ethics of self‑realization must aim at knowing the Self which is the highest principle of their metaphysics and morality. But at some places there is greater emphasis over Brahman or even the Creator God and His omniscience than this subject‑objectless Atman. Like the Vedic tradition, sometimes the Upanisadic seers also indulge in prayerful exhaultations to the deities. Omniscience of Visnu, Brahma and even Mahesh finds explicit references. Lastly, the concept of omniscience is also associated with the mystical syllable `Aum' which is the acne of spiritualistic cosmogony of the Upanisads. `Aum' is the world‑all and hence to know `Aum' is to know everything.
The Approach of Dharmajnata
The heterodox systems like Buddhism and Jainism have a religion without God but they would not like to miss the advantage that one gets in accepting God. God is omnipotent, omniscient etc. Hence what is said by God, acquires additional prestige and power. Hence as a substiitute of God, they have prophets who are also omniscients in. This is the simple law of spiritual sociology that necessity is the mother of invention. Instead of God or godeses, they strictly adhere to their respective religious dogmas. The basis of religion is ultimately faith. ‘The heart has reason of which reason has no knowledge', says Pascal. Tennyson in his `Memorium' has said `Believing where we cannot prove'. The need for believing is inherent in human nature. So we have nothing to say against the religious dogmas. "Religion ma sometime justifiably be taken in the Lucretian sense of superstition", says Galloway. But what of that ? `Religion is the poetry which we believe' ‑ as Santyana says in his Reason and Religion. Thus omniscience is demonstrated as a religious necessity, i.e., we pass from metaphysical determination to an ethical and volitional determination of knowledge. This spirit of the evangelic religions may also be traced back to the Mahabharat, where knowledge of Dharma is held as the supreme knowledge. Even in the Jaina Agamas, the concept of Sarvajnata has been equated with the conception of Dharmajna together with Sarvajna. Santaraksita also supports it.
Approach of Reason
Dogmas if lift to the private field should not be questioned, but if made public, they are bound to face postmortem examinations and hence the formal reasoning is bound to step in. So, we find quite a best of logicians who try to prove Omniscience with the rarest dialectical skill and logical acumen. Among the Buddhists, the names of Santaraksita (749‑770) and Prajnakargupta (about 10th century) are important. Among the Jainas, there is long and continued tradition of logicians who have tried to prove Omniscience with the help of arguments. The names of Umaswati (2nd Century), Siddhasena (5th Century), Samantabhadra (6th Century), Pujyapada (6th Century), Akalanka (7th century), Abhayedeva Suri (7th Century), Haribhadra (8th Century), Vidyananda (9th Century), Manikyanandi (9th Century), Anantakirti (11th Century), Prabhacandra (11th Century), Hemcandra (11th Century), Vadideva Singh Suri (12th Century), Mallisena (14th Century), Dharmabhusana (14th Century), Yasovijaya (18th Century) etc. are important in this connection.
Mixed Approach of Reason and Faith
Man has both head and heart, hence needs not only to be silent but also to be convinced, i.e. we want a synthesis of faith and reason, which is in conformity with the best traditions of Indian Philosophy. Bare reason is empty and blind faith is dangerous. So what is needed is an integral approach where we should learn to respect the intuitional experiences of the trusted and tried persons and also maintain the intellectual and logical standards. I think, this is the typical Jaina approach to the concept of omniscience. With the Jainas, the logical theory. The Agamas and the logical treatises equally try to establish the theory of omniscience. Lord Mahavira's omniscience is a religious necessity and possibility of human omniscience is a rare intellectual achievement of the Jaina Logicians in the face of terrific opposition from the side of the Mimamsakas.
The Yogic Approach
In the literature of Nyaya‑Vaisesika and also Samkhya‑Yoga and some of the Tantras, we find that there are yogic‑discipliness, which if perfected can enable us to have extra‑ordinary powers, such as extra‑ordinary perception, extrasensory perception, pre‑cognition etc. The Nyaya‑Vaisesika recognizes Alaukika Pratyaksa of which the Yogic intuition is one of the three varieties. Yogic perception differs from divine omniscience in that if the art of Yoga is perfected, we can achieve the redirection of our consciousness, which is brought about by practice and conquest of desire. The normal limits of human vision are not the limits of the universe. Asamprajnata Samadhi of Yoga indicates the possibility of human omniscience. Recent researches in the field of para‑psychology simply go to strengthen this position.
CONCLUSION
Of all the six approaches to the concept of omniscience in Indian Philosophy, the Jaina approach is most serious and sincere. This problem is a problem of life