Metaphysical Basis of Jaina Ethics


          DEPENDENCE OF ETHICS ON METAPHYSICS: According to Jainism, ontological discussions necessarily determine ethical considerations. The ethical inquiry derives its meaning from the metaphysical speculation. Our conduct and behavior are conditioned by our metaphysical pre­suppositions. The incentive to the progress of moral consciousness emerges from a deep and sound metaphysical theory which requires proper application of logic to experience. Samantabhadra argues that the conceptions of bondage and liberation, Punya and Papa, heaven and hell, pleasure and pain and the like lose all their relevancy and signi­ficance, if we exclusively recognise either permanence or momentariness as constituting the nature of substance.'  This statement clearly points to the dependence of ethics on metaphysics. Again, the affirmation that the momentary disintegration of all things renders impossible the financial transactions, the fact of memory, and the commonplace relations of the husband and the wife, the teacher and the taught and the like also indicates the subservience of ethical problems to the nature of being'. In the following pages, therefore, it is proposed to dwell, in the first place, upon the general nature of reality; and, secondly, upon the mode


          1 Brhatkathakosa, Intro. p. 12,  aslo Pravacansara. Pref. pp. 12-13.

2Apta-mimamasa,40-41,Yuktyanusasana.8-15, Ct. Syadvadamanjuri.27

3 Yuktanusasana. 16-17.


of its comprehension and representation, as it has a close bearing on our ethical discussions. Thirdly, the classification of substances along with a brief account of each one of them will be dealt with; and lastly, there will be represented the diverse ways of expressing the nature of the ethical ideal.

          GENERAL NATURE OF REALITY:          According to Jainism, metaphysical reality, objectively considered, embraces within its fold contradictions, but only in an apparent fashion;          they point just to the incompetence and inadequateness of human expression in language.' It has been considered as existent and non-existent,2 one and many,3 permanent and changing' etc. It is this aspect of Jaina philosophy which con­founds those philosophers who are habituated to think in an abstract way and apart from experience.          Owing to the predilections fostered by a priori logic, they represent the Jaina view of reality as incongruent, and so end either in the formulation of the absolutist doctrine of universal externalism or universal nihilism.          Jainism takes leave of such an inveterate habit of mind and adheres to the testimony of experience for solving metaphysical problems. Thus the Jaina differs from all absolutists in their approach to the unfoldment of the inner nature of reality.          Jainism weaves the fabric and structure of reality on the authority of indubitable experience and is not swayed in the least by the fascinations of a priori logic. Owing to this deep-rooted abhorrence of the abstract way of philosophising, the Jaina evaluates what is given in experience, and consequently advocates change to be as much ontologically real as permanence. Both are separable but only in logical thought. Being implies becoming and vice versa. Inconsistent as it may appear at the inception, there is no doubt that experience enforces it and logic confirms it. This conception of reality reminds us of the Greek philosopher Promenades who regarded `Being' as the sole reality wholly excluding of all becoming, as also of Heraclitus, for whom, permanence being an illusion, `Becoming' or perpetual change constitutes the very life of the universe.          It also makes us reminiscent of the Buddhist philosophy of universal flux and of the unchanging, static, permanent absolute of Vedanta.          But all these point to the one sided evaluation of experience.          It may be said that "if the Upanisadic thinkers found the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena and plurality,


          1 Yuktanusasana, 49.                   2 Aptamimamsa, 15.

          3 Ibid, 34.                                    4 Ibid., 56.


and the Buddha denounced everything as fleeting and sorrowful and pointed to the futility of all speculation, Mahavira adhered to the common experience, found no contradiction between permanence and change, and was free from all absolutism'."

          MEANING OF THE TERM 'EXPERIENCE':   It will not be out of place t0 mention the comprehensive meaning of the term `experience' adopted by the Jaina philosophers. The term `experience' has been construed in its comprehensive denotation as including all the five types of know­ledge, namely, Mati (Sensuous), Sruta (Scriptural), Avadhi (Intuition of material objects, or Clairvoyance), Manahparyaya (Intuition of mental modes) and Kevala (Perfect knowledge or Omniscience). The first two come under Paroksa, since they need external sense-organs and mind for their birth and the other three are classified under Pratyaksa, inasmuch as they are born independently of the sense-organs and mind. The last three types of knowledge are the privilege and prerogative of some selected few, namely, Yogis; but Mad and Sruta are given to all. Mati includes inference, memory, recognition etc. ; and experience includes Pratyaksa and Paroksa types of knowledge. Thus, Sensuous and In­tellectual knowledge are as much a part of `experience' as the transcen­dental one. Sensuous and intellectual experience are also real, though they do not possess the clarity of the transcendental one. Intuitive experience does not contradict the intellectual one, but only surpasses it in scope, extension and clarity.

          There is another way of understanding the meaning of the term, `experience'. Experience should not be understood to mean narrow em­piricism or sensationalism in the Lockian sense, nor mere rationalism in the Descartian sense, but it should be understood in antagonism to the Kantian sense. To make it more clear, according to Kant, "the understanding has different forms of conceiving or relating or connecting percepts ; they are called pure concepts or categories of the understand­ing, because they are a priori and not derived from experience".' But, according to the Jaina, the categories or the pure concepts are not only mental phenomena, but are also trans-subjective in character.          In other words, they are both subjective and objective.          Again, in accordance with Kant, "sensibility furnishes us with objects or percepts, empirical intuitions as he sometimes calls them".' and the universal forms are


          1 Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 18.

          2 History of Philosophy (Indian edition 1949)pp. 364,365.

          3 Ibid, p. 361.


contributed by thought or the understanding. But the Jaina does not accept this view and argues that the universal and the particular are given together in experience. In the words of Prof. SATXAXI MOOXEXJEE, "experience furnishes unanalysed data with the universal and the parti­cular rolled into one. Reflection only distinguishes the two elements, and this has been misconstrued to be the original contribution of thought"' It is in this extensive meaning that the term `experience' should be taken whenever used in the later course of our discussion.

          DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE: In consonance with the perspective adopted by the Jainas in their metaphysical speculation, substance is that which exists or that which is characterised by simultaneous origination, destruction and persistence, or that which is the substratum of attributes and modes'. At the outset these definitions of substance may sound as absolutely different from one another, but it may be noted that every one of these definitions is inclusive of the rest, since existence implies change and permanence from the view point of experience.3 Permanence signifies persistence of substance along with attributes, and change refers to fluctuating modes along with the emergence of the new modes and the disappearance of the old ones at one and the same time'. To illustrate, gold as a substance exists with its modifications and qualities. Now after making an ornament, gold as a substance is existent along with its attributes and what changes is the mode.          Thus existence which is inseparably bound up with substance (gold) accompanied by its attributes and modes necessitates the production of a new form, the cessation of the old one, and continuation of gold as such simul­taneously. In other words, substance, as inherently and essentially associated with endless qualities and modifications, is out and out in­conceivable without at the same time implying existence which in turn is endowed with the trio of simultaneous origination, destruction and persistence. The denial of the different aspects of the Jaina view of substance will lead us either to the Buddhist philosophy of universal change which disregards the underlying permanent being, or to the Vedantic monism which declares the accompanying change as appearance or illusory.          Thus "the Jaina conception of reality avoids the Scy11a of


          1 Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p.3.

          2 Panca, 10 , Prava, II, 3-4, Tasu. V. 29,30,38.

          3 Panca. comm. Amrta. 10.

          4 Ibid.


fluxism and the Charybdis of illusionism"'.          Thus nature of substance may now oblige us to think that things both material and mental are everlastingly existent.          Such a view of things cannot even pretend to conceive without falling into inconsistency the intervention of any eternal and self-subsistent maker, either personal or impersonal, for bringing into existence the diverse things of the world.

          SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY:          Substance as different from the general and specific qualities and modifications is not worthy of being so called. Things devoid of attributes and modifications are nothing but abstractions, and are unthinkable. Qualities are incapable of being existent by themselves even for a moment. They necessitate the simultaneous existence of substance, and are denied any isolated character; and they are themselves bereft of qualities.' "Qualities do not fly loose as abstract entities, and substance does not exist as an undetermined somewhat, a mere `that' to which they are afterwards attached. The idea of substance is the idea of qualities as unified and systematised"'. As regards the relation between them, we may say that they are non-separate and non-identical. Non-separateness results owing to their subsistence in the same spatial existences, and non-identity issues because of the fact that one is not the other. The assertion that substance is not quality and that quality is not substance serves only to emphasize the non­identical character of both substance and quality. It does not mean the absolute negation of substance in quality and vice-versa.' Thus the relation between Dravya and Guna (substance and quality) is one of identity-in-difference.          The difference between them is only the difference in point of nomenclature, number, characterizations, and purpose' and not difference with reference to spatial expense. "Neither being found without the other, they both stand in the relation of invariable concomit­ance or simultaneity with one another instead of being in relation of antecedence and consequence in time"'.          In other words, "the relation between substance and quality is one of coeval identity, unity, insepara­bility, and essential simplicity, the unity of substance and quality is not the result of union or combination'."


          1 Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism. p. 72     2 Tasu. V. 41.

          3 Idea of God.p.159. Cf. Sarvartha p. 310       4 Prava. II. 16.

          5 Aptamimamsa. 72.                                         6 Epitome of Jainism. p.24

          7 Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. p. 314.



          SUBSTANCE AND MODIFICATION:          Having considered the Jaina view of qualities, we now turn to the conception of Paryaya in Jainism. The notion of Paryaya is peculiarly Jainal. In conformity with the nature of substance as permanence in mutability, Paryaya alludes to the variable aspect of a thing which is due to the external and internal inducements. Every quality transmutes its state every moment; and this mode of being is called Paryaya which is incessantly transforming itself into the next, though the quality as such is never abrogated. It is on this account alleged that substance is in a state of perpetual flux.          However incessant and infinite the transformations may be, the underlying subs­tantiality and permanency can never part with existence. Substance and Paryaya are not to be distinguished like two different things, for it is substance through qualities which because of its flowing nature attains the qualification of Paryaya.          Substance and modes are neither exclusively identical nor exclusively different, but the relation is one of identity-in­difference, which is in perfect harmony with the non-absolutistic attitude upheld by the Jaina. Thus origination and destruction are applicable to Paryayas, and persistence to qualities along with substance.          It may be pointed out here that Paryaya also refers to the mode of the existence of substance.          Therefore, mode of existence and mutability constitute the meanings of Paryaya.          As a matter of fact, mutability is incapable of transgressing the mode of existence and vice versa. Hence Paryaya refers to both the meanings at one and the same time. Thus there is no substance (Dravya) without modification, and modification is inconceiv­able without substance.' According to Kundakunda, origination, destruction and continuance are in modifications and the latter are in substance. Therefore substance is the basis of these all.

          JAINA CONCEPTION OF PERSISTENCE AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GUNA AND PARYAYA : The Jaina conception of persistence is defined as that which accounts for recognition in the form of the proposition `This is the same". This is consequent on the fact that the essential nature of substance or quality, notwithstanding its mobility, is eternal and unchangeable.' Thus the continuously flowing nature of quality does not annihilate the quality itself, which, if admitted, would fail to account for memory and in consequence run counter to all our daily commonplace transactions. Continuance devoid of variability stands in direct antagonism to experience. Hence permanence is not the denial of change, but includes it as its necessary aspect. In the same way, qualities in the absence of modifications are incapable of being conceived. To distinguish Guna from Paryaya, in the first place, the infinite attributes of a simple and non-discrete substance are ever simultaneously present, but the inexhaustible modulations do not appear simultaneously, but only in succession. Secondly, qualities render the judgement of same­ness possible, while the judgement `This is not the same' is accountable only by making allusion to modifications. Thirdly, Gunas as such are to be interpreted as immutable in contrast to Paryayas which are regarded as mutable.          In other words, attributes of a substance are credited with the nature of perpetuation, while the originative and decaying designations are accorded to Paryayas.

        KINDS OF MODIFICATION:        Paryayas may be classified into essential modifications and non-essential ones.' The former imply pure modifi­cations of a substance and the latter are indicative of the impure modifi­cations of a substance. Vasunandi2 speaks of Paryayas as Arthaparyaya and Vyaiijanaparyaya. The former refers to the continuously flowing nature of a substance', while the latter signifies mode of existence of a substance.' Both the implications are quite consistent with the twofold meanings of Paryaya as already mentioned.          Each of these two kinds of Paryaya may be essential and non-essential.          Thus Dharma, Adharma, Space and time possess only essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyan­janaparyaya, while Jiva and Pudgala possess all the four types of Paryayas, namely, essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyanjanaparyaya, non­essential Arthaparyaya and non-essential Vyanjanaparyaya. The state­ment of Vasunandi and Devasena that the four substances, namely, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala possess only Arthaparyaya and not Vyafijanaparyaya probably implies the presence of essential Artha­paryaya and essential Vyanjanaparyaya and the absence of non-essential Vyafijanaparyaya and non-essential Arthaparyaya in them.' To illustrate the Paryayas of Jiva and Pudgala, the non-essential Vyaftjanaparyaya of Jiva alludes to its transmigratory existence which is of four kinds: human, hellish, celestial and sub-human. The non-essential Artha­paryaya of Jiva refers to the impure psychical states which are continuous­


1.     Alapapaddhati, p 20.@ Niyama. 14 2 Vasunandi Srava, 2,

2.     Vasunandi Srava, 25.

3.      Ibid.                         4. Vasunandi Srava, 25.

5. Vasunandi Srava, 27.: Alapapaddhati, p. 27.


ly taking place in the self in mundane form. The essential Vyanjana­paryaya of self is manifested in the disembodied state of existence and the essential Arthaparyaya signifies the flowing nature of pure states of self in the transcendental form. Similarly, Pudgala possesses these four kinds of Paryaya namely Skandha-form and the flowing nature in this form, Anu-form and the flowing nature in this form respectively.

        SUBSTANCE AND EXISTENCE: Of the infinite characteristics per­taining to a substance, the most comprehensive is existence. It com­prises all other characteristics within its purview. Judged from the standpoint of wholeness, substance, in a summary way, is existential in nature.' It is thus obvious that substance is indubitable, self-evident, therefore, existent from all eternity'. It is self-supported and complete in itself. Besides, it transcends our imperfect knowledge. In other words, it is unfathomable by our limited conceptions, since it has infinite characteristics 3.     It is of capital importance to note that if the nature of substance is comprehended otherwise, i.e., if existence is not regarded as its essential characteristic, substance will be either non-existing or isolated from existence. In the former case, the conclusion will be the the total extinction of substance, and in the latter case, the ascription of existence as such will be purposeless, inasmuch as substance gets capability of possessing its essential nature independent of, and in isolation from, existence, hence the inevitable result will the annihilation of existence.' Apart from this, the denial of the existential nature of things would lead us to acknowledge the emergence of things either from non-existence or from other sources which in turn require others and so on endlessly.' Hence substance and existence are indissoluble related like heat and fire, though they differ in nomenclature, number, characterisation etc. In other words, they have Anyatva (non-identity) and not Prthaktva (sepa­rateness). The former implies that neither the nature of substance is identical with the nature of existence, nor the nature of existence is identi­cal with the nature of substance.          And the latter means that substance and existence are not separate in respect of Pradesa or space-points, just as two separate things possess difference of Pradesa or space-points.' They have not difference of Prade'sa (Prthaktva) but difference of


1.     Panchadhyayi. I. 8. ; Tasu. 29.' Prava. II. 6,

2.     Pancadhyayi. I. 8.; Prava. II. 6

3.     Pancadhyayi. I. 8.

4.     Prava. II. 13 and Comm. Amrta.

5.     Pancadhyayi. I. 10, 11.

6.     6 Prava. II. 14 and Comm. Amrta.


 characterisation. To explain the difference of characterisation' (Anyatva), existence requires substance as its support, is devoid of other qualities, is itself one adjective out of other infinite adjectival characterisations of substance, is constitutive of substance, and is of the nature of origination, destruction and continuance. On the contrary, substance is bereft of any substratum, is accompanied by other illimitable characteristics, is a substantive with countless adjuncts, and is the subject of origi­nation, destruction and continuance.' Thus if any legitimate concept is requisite to reveal the relation between the two, it is identity-in-difference. The former refers to Pradesas and the latter, to characterisations.  The relation is unique, primary and underived.

          PRAMANA, NAYA, AND SYADVADA: After dwelling upon the onto­logical nature of reality as expounded by the Jaina philosophers, we now proceed to its source of knowledge and expression in brief.          It may be contended that, if the Anekantic reality is indescribable altogether, the path of liberation will be blocked, as nobody will be able to preach and propound'. According to Jainism reality is cognised by Pramana and Naya.4 Pramana refers to the grasping of reality in its wholeness, while Naya points to an aspect of infinitely-phased reality illumined by Pramana, thus the latter takes into consideration only a fragment of the totality.'          A thing embellishes itself with illimitable characteristics." The emphasis on the one and the cancellation of the other would irresis­tibly lead us to the biased estimation and Ekantic view of reality, which would affect our ethical conclusions as we have elsewhere said.' Pramana assimilates all the characteristics at once without any contradiction and animosity between one characteristic and the other, for instance, between one and many, existent and non-existent etc.    Of the unfathomable cha­racteristics, Naya chooses one at one moment, but keeps in view the other characteristics also. We may point out here that, though corres­ponding to the countless characteristics, there are countless Nayas, which, if summed together, are incapable of imparting knowledge as is given by Pramana. In other words, the aggregation of all the Nayas for constru­ing the notion of Pramana is inadequate. It is, therefore, to be admitted that the acquisition of knowledge by Pramana is an independent function


1 Ibid.                                                2 Prava. Comm. Amrta. II. 14.

3 Yuktyanusasana, 43.                            4 Ta. su I. 6.

5 Sarvartha. 1-6 .; Rajava. I. 6*33. 6 Syadvadamanjari, 22.

7 Ibid. 27


of the human mind. We can thus say that both Pramana and Naya are essential for the proper understanding of the nature of reality. Reality being the repository of infinite attributes, the apprehension of it from a particular angle of vision, i.e., Naya, which is objectively given and not subjectively contemplated, does not exhaust the whole of the multiphase reality. So, in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding that reality is exhausted by the employment of a particular Naya, every predication should be preceded by the word syat in order to make us aware of the possibility of other alternative predications. Hence it is known as the doctrine of Syadvada.          Syadvada is no doubt the logical outcome of Anekantavada, the doctrine of the multiple nature of reality. It is simply the mode of predication or communication envisaged by the Jaina to convey the knowledge of the multiphased reality. Thus Syadvada is the mode of expression, Anekantavada or Nayavada is the mode of cogni­tion. Syadvada is the expression of Anekantavada in language. We can­not do better than quote Prof. A. N. Upadhye for exposing the relation between Syadvada and Nayavada, "Syadvada is a corollary of Nayavada: the latter is analytical and primarily conceptual and the former is synthetically and mainly verbal. Syadvada will certainly look lame in the absence of Naya doctrine. Naya doctrine without Syadvada has no practical value. Syadvada in course of the process of assertion curbs down and harmonises the absolute views of individual Nayas.l" Jaina philosophers unanimously hold that in order to apprehend an aspect of a whole in its completeness or to do full justice to it, only seven (neither more nor less) forms of judgement are requisite, hence it is known as the doctrine of Saptabharlgi Vada.'­

          CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCE:          Jainism takes experience as its guide and resolves the whole of the universe of being into two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing, but independent categories of Jiva and Ajiva. The Ajiva is further classified into Pudgala (matter), Iharma (principle of motion), Adharma (principle of rest), lakes (space) and Kala (time). Hence reality is dualistic as well as pluralistic. But, according to the Jaina, plurality, considered from the synthetic and objective point of view of one existence, entails unity also. According to Kundakunda, in spite of the unique characteristics possessed by the different substances, exis­tence has been regarded as an all-comprising characteristic of reality


1 Prava. Intro. LXXXV.                                   2 Saptabhangitaranginil, p. 8.


which ends all distinctions.' The Kdrttikeyanupreksd recognised that all substances are one from the stand-point of substance, while they are dis­tinct and separate from their characteristic differences.' Samantabhadra also endorses this view by affirming that in view of the conception of one universal existence all are one, but from the point of view of substances distinctions arise.' Padmaprabha Maladharideva pronounces that Maha­satta pervades all the things in their entirety, but it is always associated with Avantarasatta which pervades only the particular objects.' In a similar vein, Amrtacandra speaks of the two types of Satta, namely, Sva­rnpasatta and Sadrasyasatta. The latter is the same as Rimanyasatta.5 In his Sap tabharigatararigina Vimaladasa discusses the problem of unity and plurality of existence in detail, and concludes that both the postula­tion of existential identity and the articulation of differences from the stand-point of different substances are logically necessary and justifiable." Thus Jainism gives credence to the recognition of existential oneness but not exclusively, since it is always bound up with plurality. This is quite consistent with the Anekantatmaka view of reality propounded by the Jaina philosopher. The sole warrant for the existence of one and many, unity and diversity, is experience which vouches for such a character of reality. Thus, Mahasatta will be associated with its opposite, namely, Avantarasatta. It may again be pointed out that this Mahasatta is not an independent something as may be conceived, but is invariably accom­panied by its opposite.' Kundakunda holds the nature of existence as one, immanent in the totality of substances constituting the universe, comprehending and summarizing the universe, having infinite modifica­tions, indicative of the triple characteristics of origination, destruction, and persistence and in the last as associated with the characteristics oppo­site to those mentioned above.' Hence unity, duality, and plurality-all are inseparably and inevitably involved in the structure of reality.

          MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM AS THE TWO EXTREMES: By recognizing both Jiva and Pudgala as substances Jainism steers clear of the two extremes of materialism and idealism which are radically opposed to each other. Materialism considers the universe as rooted in matter,


1 Prava. Comm. Amrta. II-5.                      2 Kartti. 236.

3 Aptamimamsa. 34.                             4 Niyamja. Comm. Padmaprabha. 34.

5 Prava. Comm. Amrta. II, 3, 5.                 6 Saptabhangitarangini. P. 78.

7 Panca. Comm. Amrta. 8.               8 Pancadhyayi. I. 15.

9 Panca. 8.


 while idealism imagines the mind or spirit to be fundamental and primary. The former lays stress on the recognition of the reality of matter and considers the mind to be an incident or accompaniment; the latter affirms that mind or spirit is to be reckoned as real and matter just an appear­ance. But according to Jainism, both matter and spirit are equally true, and either is warrantable if experience is allowed to be robbed of its significance.

          GENERAL NATURE OF SUBSTANCES: Notwithstanding the mutual interpenetrating of the six Dravyas and the accommodative nature of each, they never part with their original nature.' This statement is indicative of the fact that these Dravyas are incapable of transgressing their fixed number which is six. Therefore their reeducation or multiplication is an impossibility.' With the solitary exception of Kala Dravya, the remain­ing five are termed Pancastikaya for the simple reason of possessing many Pradesas.3 The word 'Kaya' should be understood only to connote `many' Pradesas.4 Jiva, Dharma, and Adharma own innumerable Pra­desas; :1ka"sa possesses infinite ones; Kala, one; but Pudgala possesses numerable, innumerable and infinite Pradesas.5 All the Dravyas except Pudgala are regarded as bereft of material qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, and only Jiva is said to possess consciousness. Hence Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala, are destitute of consciousness, and also of material qualities. Thus they should not be misapprehended as being comprised under the category of matter, but they come under a different category of non-sentiency-cum-non-inateriality. As for Dharma, Adhar­ma and Lukas, each of them is considered to be one, while Jiva and Pud­gala are infinite; and Kala is innumerable." Besides, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala are by nature non-active, and the remaining two are active.'

          NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF PUDGALA:          Having discussed the gener­al nature of six substances, we now proceed to deal with their specific nature. We start with Pudgala (matter). Matter, according to Jainism, is not something formless, indefinite, and absolutely featureless as conceived by Anaximander, nor is it to be regarded as non-being in the Platonic



1 Ibid.                                                2 Sarvartha. V. 4.

1        Panca. Comm. Amrta. 22; Panca. 102.; Prava. II. 43. ; Niyama. 34. The space occupied by one atom is called a Pradesa.

4 Sarvartha. V. 1.            5 Dravya. 25,; V. 8,9, 10..; Niyama. 35, 36.

6 Gomma. Ji. 587.; V. 6.           7 .; Panca. 98.


sense; i.e., as "a secondary, a dull, irrational, recalcitrant force, the un­willing slave of mind".' Nor does it admit of its being considered to be a sensation-complex, or a collection of ideas as signified by the subjective idealism of Barkeley. Apart from this, it is to be distinguished from the Prakrti of Samkhya. Jainism propounds matter in the realistic sense, and so its cognizance is based on its characteristic sense-qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, which are in the relation of invariable concomitance, i.e., one quality is never found in isolation but always, in a group of four, though in varying degrees of intensity.' The conception of matter is so comprehensive as to comprise under it the five substances of earth, water, air, light and Dravya-mind out of the nine substances admitted by the Vaisesika. Hence these five substances are easily assimil­able in Pudgala,3 since they emerge out of material atoms by varying combinations. The aforementioned four qualities of atom admit of numerable, innumerable and infinite classifications; but the principal kinds are regarded as twenty; namely, eight kinds of touch (soft, hard, heavy, light, hot, cold, viscous, and rough,' five kinds of taste (bitter, pungent, sour, sweet, and astringent);' two kinds of smell (fragrance and the reverse);' and five kinds of colour (blue, yellow, white, black and red).' The functions of Pudgala are: the five types of body,' the speech, the mind, the Karmic particles, the breathing including exhaling and inhaling, pleasure and pain, life and death, and the five senses.'

          KINDS OF PUDGALA :         The principal forms in which Pudgala (matter) exists, are Anu (atom) and Skandha (aggregate)." Binary to infinite aggregates are included in Skandha.ll An atom consists of only one Pradesa, is the terminus of divisibility of matter, is by itself without begin­ning, end or middle, is destitute of sound and is coupled with the qualities of taste, touch, smell and colour." Besides, it is indestructible and eternal, is responsible for the disruption of Skandhas by virtue of its segregation from them, is also the substantial cause of them and is the measure of time. 13 Again it is devoid of sound, but is the cause of sound; i.e., the combination of atoms may produce sound when they strike against other


1 History of Philosophy ( Edition 1949) p. 59.

2 V. 23, ; Sarvartha. V. 5.14.

2        Sarvartha. V. 3.

3        Ibid.

4        Ibid.

5        Ibid.

6        Five types of body are; audarkika (physical), vaikriyika (fluid), aharaka 9assimilative), taijasa (electric) and Karmana (karmic), see Ta. su. II. 36.

7        Panca. 82, ; Sarvartha. V. 19. 20.

8        Ta/ si/ V/ 25. ' Moua,a/ 20.

9        Sarvartha. V. 26.

10   Panca. 77.

11   Panca. 80


 aggregates of atoms.'          It possesses any one colour, any one taste, any one smell, but a pair of such touches as are not of contradictory nature; namely, cold and viscous, or cold and dry, or hot and viscous, or hot and dry.' The remaining touches, namely, soft and hard, light and heavy, are only manifested in the Skandha state of matter, and thus are not present in its atomic state. The qualities of viscousness (snigdhata) and dryness (ruksata) vary in degrees of intensity extending from the lowest limit to the highest, from one point to infinity.' The variations in the degrees of intensity may be ordinarily witnessed in the milk of she-goat, cow, buffalo, and she-camel in point of viscousness, and in dust (parilsu), gross-sand (kanika), and sand (.rarkara) in respect of dryness.'          Hence atoms are capable of existing with infinite variability in these two charac­teristics. These are responsible for atomic linking.' Thus, for explaining the combination of atoms this assumption excludes God or Adrsta as recognised by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school of thought, as also the primor­dial motion of atoms as advocated by Democritus. Though, according to the Jaina, atoms are active,' activity is not the cause of combination. It will not be amiss to say that those atoms which are at the lowest in the scale of viscousness and dryness are not given to combination either with one another or with other intensification's.' Besides, atoms which have equal degrees of viscousness and dryness also refuse to combine with one another.' But atoms which hold two degrees of viscousness and dryness in excess are given to interlining;          i. e., atoms with two degrees of visc­ousness and dryness are interlinkable with four degrees of the same in all respects. Similarly, this law holds good for other interlinkings.9        Be­sides, atoms which possess four degrees of viscousness or dryness are capable of transforming atoms having two degrees of viscousness or dry­ness into their own nature. l° Similarly, this holds good for all those atoms which have a difference of two degrees of viscousnss or dryness.          This theory thus avoids mere conjunction of atoms, but propounds their syn­thetic identification."

          We now proceed to Skandha. The aggregates of atoms exist in six different forms; namely, 1) gross-gross 2) gross 3) gross-fine 4) fine­gross 5) fine and lastly 6) fine-fine." 1) The class of matter which, when


1 Panca. 78, 79, 81.                             2. Ibid. 81., Niyama. 27. Comm. Amrta.

3 Sarvartha. V. 33.                              4 Ibid. 33.                 5 Gp,,a/ Ko/ 608.

6 Panca. Comm. Amrta. 98.             7 Sarvartha. V. 34.           8 Ibid. V. 35.

9 Ibid V. 36.                    10. Ibid. V. 37.          11 Ibid. V. 37.

12 Niyama. 21 to 24/



divided, cannot restore its original state without any extraneous help is termed gross-gross. The examples of which are wood, stone, and the like. 2) That which can be reunited on being divided without the intervention of a third something is called gross, for example, water, oil, etc.    3) Shadow, sunshine, etc. which are incapable of disintegration and grasp are subsumed under gross-fine. 4) The objects of touch, taste, smell and hearing are called fine-gross. 5) The Karmic matter etc. which are imper­ceptible by the senses are included into the category of fine. 6) The binary aggregates and the Skandhas smaller than the Karmic matter come under the next category of fine-fine. As we have said, the generation of sound is effected by the striking of Skandhas against one another. Thus Jainism takes exception to the view of Nyaya-Vaisesika which calls sound the quality of Akasa, inasmuch as it is capable of being sensed, which would not have been possible, had it been the quality of Akasa.

          Next comes the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala. None of the philosophical systems originated in the east and the west postulated the independent existence of the principle of motion (Dharma) and the principle of rest (Adharma). Besides, the idealistic thinkers have unhesitatingly brushed aside the reality even of space and time, since they find themselves in the meshes of irreconcilable contradictions. Kant regarded them as the forms of perceptions, which are imposed by sensi­bility upon things. Hence on account of the glasses of space and time attached to sensibility, the nominal reality escapes our grip and its attainment becomes a wild goose-chase. But the Jaina who relies upon the findings of experience absolves us from the creations of a priori logic by positing the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Kasai and Kala answering to the experienced motion, rest, allowance of room, and change respec­tively:

          We shall now throw some light on the nature of motion.          All the idealists are one in rejecting the reality of motion and in designating it as mere appearance, phenomenal, and unworthy of being intelligibly applied to thing-in-itself. The Elliptic philosopher Zeon was the first to raise a voice against the possibility of motion. But Jainism recognises the reality of motion. It is defined as the modification originating from the external and internal inducements, which make possible the traversing from one point of space to another.' The substances like Dharma,


1 Sarvartha. V. 7.; Panca. Comm. Amrta. 98.


 Adharma, Akasa and Kala are non-active and motionless in this sense, but Jiva and Pudgala are said to be the authors of motion; that is, these two Dravyas are capable of being active to the exclusion of others.' Activity is not a different, independent category, but a special modification of these two substances due to the external and internal causes.' Besides, it should be distinguished from the Arthaparyaya, which means motionless change possessed by all the six Dravyas, as has already been explained. The activity of Jiva is due to the external causal agency of Karman. Thus Siddhas, who have reached liberation, are non-active on account of the absence of Karman.3 The activity of Pudgala is due to the external agen­cy of Kala. It will remain perpetual, since unlike Karmic particles Kala can never be absent at any time. Thus the Pudgala unlike the Siddhas cannot be non-active.­

          AKASA:    That extent of space which is replete with matter, souls, time, principle of motion, and principle of rest is labelled Lokakasa or world space. This distinguishes it from Alokakasa or empty space where in none of the five substances abides.' Thus the former is recognised as being capable of providing accommodation to Jivas, Pudgala and to the rest of the Dravyas. That space is its own base and support, and does not call for any other substance to accommodate it is evident from the fact that there is no other substance of more vastness than this which may provide room to it. And even if it is conceded, it will implicitly lead us to the fallacy of regress ad infinitum.' Besides, it is imperative to note that, considered from the point of view of the thing-in-itself, all substan­ces exist in themselves. It is only said from the commonplace point of view that all substances are subsisting in space.' The principles of motion and rest are immanent in the entire physical space (Lokakasa) like the permeation of oil in the seed.' Despite the omnipresence of Dharma and Adharma in the Lokakasa and the existence of Jiva, Pudgala, and Kala therein, they never forfeit their respective specific nature.'

          DHARMA AND ADHARMA :          Dharma and Adharma are the indifferent conditions of movement and rest respectively.          Dharmastikaya is itself incapable of migration and of generating motion in other things, but is


1 Sarvartha. V. 7. ;                                       2. Rajava. V. 7/4, 2.

3 Panca. Comm. Amrta. 98. ; Rajava V. 7/14 to 16.

4 Panca. Comm. Amrta. 98 ;            5 Dravya. 20. ; Sarvatha. V. 12, Panca 90,91/

6 Rajava. V. 12/2 to 4.                         7 Rajava. V. 12/5 to 6.

8 Sarvartha. V. 13.                              9 Rajava. V. 16/10.


the sine qua non of the movement of Jivas and Pudgala by its mere exist­ence, just as water assists in the spontaneous movement of fish by its mere presence and not as the wind which has the capability to develop activity in certain things.' Similarly, Adharmastikaya does not persuade Jiva and Pudgala in motion to stand still, but becomes the passive condi­tion when they of their own accord discontinue to move, just as the shadow of a tree does not persuade a traveler to take rest under it.' Thus neither Dharmastikaya originates motion, nor Adharmastikaya stops it. Both of them are non-active conditions. Besides, these two principles are also responsible for the demarcation' of Lokakdsa and Alokakasa, inasmuch as they make possible the existence of Jiva and Pudgala only in Lokakasa. Besides, the residence of the Siddhas at the summit of the world also proves that space cannot account for motion and rest and the different principles like Dharma and Adharma must needs be assumed.'

          KALA :     We have frequently made reference to the underlying as­sumption of the whole Jaina philosophy that, though reality is incessantly subject to mutation, it sustains its identical character. Thus everyone of the substances without exception is credited with origination, destruc­tion and persistence. In the substances like Dharma, Adharma, Akasa, liberated soul and an atom of matter, the qualities are continuously changing in themselves.' The experience of change, however, in the mundane soul and in the gross matter is omnipresent and this is of neces­sity to be accounted for and should not be speculatively condemned as mere illusion.          In view of this, the Jainas realistically confer an existenti­al status on `time', and calls it substance to answer for the experienced change,' just as Dharma, Adharma and Akasa are calculated to -throw light on what may be called motion, rest and the providing of room.' Kant's statement is worthy to be noted when he affirms that it is impossi­ble to emancipate ourselves from the spatial and temporal ways of think­ing and speaking despite our best endeavors; but the Jaina, though honoring his thesis, refuses to acquiesce in the fact that space and time are contri­buted by sensibility, since according to him they are revealed in experience and are objectively ontologically true.   Just as space is its own support, so real time is conceived to be assisting its own change or modification


1 Panca. 85,88 and Comm. Amrta.                   2. Ibid 86.

 3 Panca. 87.                                            4 Ibid. 92, 93 and Comm. Amrta.

5 Prava. Comm. Amrta. II. 1.                     6 Niyama. 33.          7 Niyama. 30.



along with its being the condition of change in other substances constitut­ing the universe. Kala may be classified into real time (Parmartha Kala) and conditioned time (Vyavahara Kala).1 The former is the substance proper;' and Samaya, -wall are conditioned varieties of time.' The function of Parmartha Kala is Vartana; i.e., it passively helps the self­changing substances; and the functions of conditioned time are change, motion and the feeling of one's being young and old.' As has already been pointed out, Kala Dravya is deprived of the designation, `Kaya', inasmuch as it has only one Pradesa in the form of Kala Anu. These Kala anus are innumerable, and exist separately on each Pradesa of Lokakasa without being mixed with one another.' The unit of condi­tioned time is called `Samaya', which may be defined as the period required by the primary material atom to traverse with slow pace from one Pradesa of Akasa to the immediately next." It is practically incon­ceivable in life. It should be borne in mind that innumerable `Samayas' lapse in the opening of an eyelid.

          GENERAL NATURE OF JIVA (SELF):          The problem of self is the most fundamental problem in the domain of philosophy.          Since the dawn of philosophical speculation down to the present time, it has vexed, great philosophers and led them to formulate different conceptions consistent with the metaphysical outlook upheld by them. With Jainism though the probing into the nature of self is not a new enterprise, the special point of the Jaina view consists in substantiating the notion of self with­out blinking the loftiest mystical heights on the one hand and without condemning the unobstructed experience as sheer illusion on the other. The self, as an ontologically underived fact, is one of the six substances subsisting independently of anything else. The experience of knowing', feeling' and willing' immediately proves the existence of self: The Karttikeyanupreksa recognise that the self is to be regarded as possessing supreme significance among the substances and as having the highest value among the Tattvas. It is the repository of excellent characteristics.'-1 It is the internal Tattva. It is to be distinguished from the other substances which are merely external since they are without any knowledge of things to be renounced and accepted. " Kundakunda in the Pravacanasara calls it Muhartha (a great objectivity)." It is neither merely an immutable prin


1 Sarvartha. V. 22.                    2. V. 39.

3 Niyama. 31.                         4 Sarvatha. V-22.

5 Dravya 22.; Niyama. 32.     6 Prava. II. 47.

7 Acaranga. 1. 5. 5, p. 50.     8 Kartti. 183.

9 Ibid. 184.                               10. Kartti.

11 Ibid.                                     12 Kartti. 205.

13. Prava. II. 100.


ciple as advocated by the Vedanta , the Samkhya-Yoga and the NayaVaiseika, nor merely a momentarily transmutable series of psychical states as recognised by the Buddhist. But, according to the Jaina, it is a synthesis of permanence and change. Consciousness, according tot him, is its essential and distinguishing feature. The  Jaina, therefore, diversiform the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Purva-Mimamsa which regard consciousness as an adventitious attribute, as also from the Carvaka system which envisages consciousness as an epiphenmomenon of matter, something like the inebriating power emerged from the mixing of certain ingredients. The systems of thought like the Samkhya- Yoga and the Vedanta of Samkara and Tamanuja betray a fairer resemblance to the consideration  is  intrinsically associated with the self.


          In the Jaina writings we are confronted with the conception of self as variously dealt with. We may comprise these various ways under two objective points of view. First, there is the trancwcedetal view which represents the nature of self in its unadulterated state of existence; and secondly there is the empirical view which describes the nature of self in its corrupted form. At present, we propose to discuss the nature of self from the empirical stand-point. We postpone  the discussion from the transcendental view tot a later stage.


          NATURE OF EMPOIRICAL SELEF: First, the empirical self has been in a state of transmigration since an indeterminable past. It is on this account contended that the self originates and decays. But this is valid only from the Paryayaarthika point of view and not from the Dravyarthika one, which lays down indestructibility and  unproductively of the self. 1  Secondly, as we have said, the empirical self is in possession of non-essential Vyanjanaparyya and non-essential Arthaparyaya. It illumines the whole body by pervading in it just as the lotus-hued ruby illumines a cup of milk. 2    Thirdly the empirical self is considered by the Jaina as the doer of evil and good actions. Fourthly, it is also the enjoyer. To sum up the empirical self is bound by Karmas from an indefinite past, is the enhoyer of the self-performed good and bad actions, is the knower and the seer, and is associated with the triple nature of origination, destruction and continuance. Besides it possesses the narrowing and dilating characteristics, extends up to the limit of bodily dimensions and owns its specific characteristics of knowledge, bl9iss etc. 3 It may be otter here that Jainism recognises the metaphysical reality of infinite selves. We may point out in passing that the relation between the empirical self and the transcendental one is one of identity- cum difference; i.e there is metaphysical identity between the two states (empirical and superempieical) of the same self, but the difference is also undeniable in respect of Upadhis which have been persisting since an infinite past. The empirical self is potentiality transcendental, though this nominal state of existence is not actualised at present; hence the distinction is incontrovertible.


          KINDS OF EMPIRIAL SELEF, ONE SENSED EMPIRICAL SELVES: The empirical self is recognised by the Pranas which it owns. The minimum  number of Pranas possessed by the empirical self is four (one sense, one Bala, life-limit and breathing), and the maximum bumper is ten (five senses, three Balas, and breathing) 1  However encumbered with the cruel matter a self may be, it cannot obstruct the manifestation of consciousness to the full, just as even the most dense cloud cannot interrupt the light of the sun to its farthest extreme. The lowest in the grade of existence are the one-senesced Jivas. They possess four Pranas To make it clear, of the five senses, namely, the sense of touch, taste smell, colour and sound the one- senses Jivas possess obey the sense of touch; and of the three Balas, namely, the Bale of mind, body and speech, they have Olay the Bala of body, and besides they hold life-fold classification; 2  namely, the earth-bodied water-bodied fire-bodied, airbodied and lastly, vegetable bodied souls. The recognition of these one- sensed souls is fraught with great difficulty, since the four Pranas are to explicitly manifested, just as the Pranas of a man in the state of nimbuses, or just as the Pranas of a growing soul in the egg of a bird or in the embryonic state cannot be recognised owing to the lack of their explicit manifestation. 3


          TWO –SENSED TO FIVE-SENSED  EMPIRCAL SOULS : Having pointed out the various forms of existence of the one-sensed Jivas and the number of Pranas upheld by them, we now proceeded to the higher grades of existence. The two-sensed Jivas possess six Proceed to the higher grades of existence. The two sensed Jivas possess siv Pranas, i.e. in addition to the four Pranas of oe-sensed souls, they have two Organs more; namely, the sense of taste, and the Bala of speech: the three sensed souls have the sense of smell additionally: the four-sensed souls have the sense of colour besides the above; and lastly, the five sensed souls which are mindless are endowed with the sense of hearing in addition; and those with mind possess all the ten Pranas. 1  Thus the nimbers of Pranas possessed by one-sensed to five-sensed souls are four, six seven eight nine and ten respectively. The illustrations of the two-sensed souls are sea-snail, cowrie –shell –fish, conch-shell fish, earth- worm etc; of the three –sensed souls are louse, bug ant, 3  etc. of the four- senesced sound are gadfly, mosquito fly, bee, beetle dragon fly and butter fly; 4 of the five –sensed souls with ten Pranas are clestatil, hellish and human beings and some subhuman souls 5  and of the five-senseds souls with nine Pranas are old sensed ones are designated as non-rational or mindless (Asamijani) whereas the five-sensed sub –human beings may be rational or non-rational, but the celestial, hellish and human beings are necessarily rational. 7  The rational souls may be recognised by the capability of beings preached, of receiving instruction, and of voluntary action. 8 


          Having dealt with the nature and kinds of the empirical self, we now proceeds to discuss the nature of the ethical ideal, the Summum Bonum of human life. This will also make clear the nature of the transcendental self. Just as the validity of the existence of self is incapable of being impugned, so the existence of the highest good is unquestionable The empirical souls from the one-sensed to the four- sensed, as also some substrate of existence. They are not endowed with that type state of existence. They are not endowed with that type of understanding which may assist them in absolving themselves from the thralldom of Karman. Such being the overwhelming effect of Karman, their progress to the higher grades of existence is decided by 'time' But the human souls, being possessed of mind, can ponder over the objective to be aimed at for their beefcake and can achieve the highest good the possibility of the relisation of supermen good is the possibility of a free, sacred, immortal, human life which ends the transmigratory existence and its attendant evils. The Tirthamakaras are the concrete examples of such achievement.


1 Sarvartha. II-14            2. Panca. 114.            3. Ibid. 115

4. ibid. 116.                     . Panca. 17 and Comm. Amta.

6. Ibid. (In all thee eferences from 2 to 6 vide Chakravarti's translation of Pancastikaa.)                  7 Panca. Comm. Amrta. 117          8 Gomma. ji. 660.

          In the ethico-religio-philosohical- works of the Jainas the highest good is diversely formulated. Fed up with the kaleidoscopic transformations of the world, the Jaina acaryas have dived deep into the inert hidden regions of the spirit, and have expressed the highest good in different ways. But it may be noted here that all the formulations of the highest good convey identical meeting.


          LIBERATION SYNCHROOUS WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF KARMAS AS THE ETHICAL IDEAL :  First, the deliverance of self is deemed to be the highest good. Every Houma being ought to trended strenuous efforts to seek his own salvation from the miseries of the world. All the systems of Indian philosophy with the solitary exception of Carvaka acquiesce in recognising liberation as the ethical ideal, though they differ in the nature of ralisation. From the view point of the Jaina, it is not the identification of self with the Brahman, as contemplated by the Vedantin, but it is the attainment of Siddhahood wherein self- individuation is sustained. The Isutrakaranaga Items us that liberation is the best thing, just as the moon is the best among the stars 1 The Acaranaga pronounces that liberation is a thieved by a ma who does not feel disinterested in Self-denial 2  just as fire immediately burns the dry sticks, so the self established in itself forthwith annuls the filth of Karmas. 3  in the sate of final liberation the empirical self is metamorphosed into transcendental, permanent existence. 4  again, having totally annihilated the eight types of Karaman, and having experienced the supersensuous bliss that passes understanding, the empirical self becomes completely bereft of any collyriumi that may again cause bondage, and as such abides at the summit of the world without having abandoned  anything to be accomplished. 5


          PARAMANTMAN AS THE SUMMUM Bonum : Secondly, the ideal is also described as the attaint of Paramatman after one's passing through the state of Antaratman and renouncing the state of Bahiratman. 6  These three states of the same self may very well be compared with the three types of attitudes as recognised by Dr. CAIRD:  " Man looks outward before he looks inward and he looks a inward before he looks a upward" 7 


1 Skrya Kr. I. 11, 22.                          2. Acara. 1, 2, 2, p. 17.

3 Acara, 1, 4, 3, p. 39.                       4 Gomma. Ji. 68.

5 Ibid.                                                6 Mo. Pa. 7.

7 Evolution of Religion, II. 2. ( vide, Constructive survey of Upanisadic philosophy, p. 247.)


The Bahiratman sees outward; when it becomes Antaraman, it sees inward; and when it becomes Paramantaman, it is said to see upward. Thus the ralisation of the Paramantma amounts to the relisation of the highest good. Kundakunda, Yogindu and Pujyapadas the great proponents of the Jaina thought, converge on this point. They frequently speak of the realisation of Paramatman as the highest good. Here a word of caution is necessary the words Paramatman and Brahaman are synonymously used in the Jaina philosophical texts, but they should not be confused with the Upanisadic Brahman which is the cosmic principle. The Jaina gives credence to the existence of infinite Bhrahamans i.e. Oaranmatamans which are the consummately stages of spiritual evoaccording tot Janis, are identical, inasmuch as they are the two stages of the same entity. Thus every soul is potentially divine, and the manifestation of divinity is called Paramatmanhood. If this connotation implicit in the Jaina view of Paramantma is not conceded, that would constitute a virtual abandonment of the ontological pluralism of selves which it champions. Though Brahaman of the Upanisasds and Brahaman of the Jainas exhibit many resemblance's, yet they differ enormously In laying stress on this conception of Paramatman as the Summum Bouum, the goal of all human pursuance, we are committed tot the view that the religious ideal and the ethical ideal coalesce. The spiritual values and the ethical values are identical.

          NISCAYA NAYA AS THE ETHIAL IDEAL: TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE TRANSCENDS THE CONCEPTUAL POINTS OF VIEW WHERTHER NISAYA OR VYAVAHARA:  Thirdly, we encounter a different mode of exmpressig the ethical ideal. The Jails in order to expound this speak in the language of Nyayas. Kundakunda, the outstanding ethic-religious philosopher of the first century A.D. is conspicuous for using Niscaya Naya (Transcendental view) and Vyavahara Naya (Empirical view) as the language of spiritualism to make out the ethical ideal. The Niscyaya Naya which grapes the soul in its undefiled state of existence may very well sere as the ethic ideal to achieved in contradistinction to the Vyavahara Naya which describes the self as bound, impure and the like. No doubt, we are in the corrupt  form of existence from begin ingress past, but the Niscaya Nyaya reminds us of our spiritual magnificence and glory. It prompts the sullied self to behold its spiritual heritage. It endeavors to infuse and instill into our minds the impressiveness  of Suddha Bhavas after abundantly showing us the empirical and evanescent character of Subha and Asubha Buhavas that bid the soul to mundane existence. It does not assert that the soul is at present perfect but simply affirms that the self ought to attain the height illumined buy it has the force of 'ought' and not of 'is' but this force is vaikd for empirical selves. In the opening chapter of the Samayasara Kundakaunda summarises the implication of the aforementioned rowed Nayas by saying the every self has heard about, obscured and experienced the worldly enjoyments and consequential bondage, but the nature of the highest self has never been conprehended.1  Hence the former is Vyavaharanaya, while the latter is a allied Niscayanaya, which points to the potentiality of the empirical self to become pure and enjoy its unalloyed status. It is therefore averred that when the self has elevated itself to the domai of spiritual em-erence, the vyabahara Baya becomes false and the Niscaya Naya is seen to be genuine. In other words, we achieve the right to renounce the Vyahaara Naya only when we have accomplished the loftiest height of mystical experience. If we regard the yaahara Naya as untruthful at a low stage, Punya, Papa, bondage, and the necessity to do strenuous effort to achieve liberation would be of o avail. It may be noted here that the falsity of the Vyaahara Baaya aggects neither the existence of external objects nor the omniscience of the trancscedndental self which reflects the differences of the world as they are. In explaining the nature of the ethical ideal in terms of Byay Kundakunda advances a step further, and affirms that the transcendental experience surpasses all the conceptual points of view whether Niscaya or Vyavahara .2  The former represents the self as unbound and untouched by Karma's, while to latter, as bound and touched by the, but he who transcends these herbal points of view is allied Samayasara,3  the goal to be achieved. The self becomes pure consciousness, bliss and knowledge.


          It may be toed here that like the Paramaratha and Vyavahara Nayas enunciated by Kundakunda, Samukaraaraya, the great eminent of the Advaita doctrine, makes use of the Paramarathika and Vyaaharika view-points as the corner stones of his philosophy. But the two differwidely. The paramarthika view as advocated by Samkara negates the Paramarthika existence of other material and non-material objects of the world which in the view of the Jaina, here their own independent


1Samaya. 4.                     2. Samaa. 144.

3 Ibid. 141, 142.


existence. The  Vyayahara Naya of the Jainas simply points to  our slumbering state in the domai of spiritualism, and does not in the least touch the existential aspects of things. The Nisaya or Paramartha Naya simply seven to awaken the slumbering soul to attain its spiritual heritage. It does not pretend annul the external things by merespirital  outlook.


          SVASMAYA AS THE TRANSCENDENT OBJECTIE:  Fourthly, there is witnessed a different expression of the Summon Bonum. 'Svasmaya' is the sublime ideal to be aimed at it is the transcendent objective to be achieved. That self which is absorbed in the mundane modifications referring tot he four indo of transmigratory existence, and which does not believe that the substance is established is' Svasamaya' 1  The interminable stay of the self in Darsana (intuition) Jnana (Knowledge), and Caritra (Conduct also explains the implication of the term Svasamaya, which may be discriminated from Para-samaya wherein the self identifies itself with the body and the foreign psychical states of attachment and aversion and the like 2 in other words, Sa-samaya is the non-conceptual state of existence, the state in which all differenctiatons caused by the infinite characteristics disappear. It is the Advaita state of existence The Tattvanusamana  elucidated Advaita by pointing  out that the recognition of the soul as associated with something other is duality; while non-duality is relised by those who see their own self quite unattached to anything whatsoever 3  But this Adaita of Jainism should be trenchantly distinguished from the Advaita of Vedanta, wherein everything disappears except the Brahaman. The contention of the Jaina is that the existence of other substances is incapable of counter acting the mystic experience of the self; only the self must not experience conceptual duality or the plurality of finite characteristics inherent in it. The self submerges in itself after transcending all conceptual differcnceds of infinite attributes in the domain of spirit it is experiential, intuit, mystical state; and so escapes and eludes our conceptual discussions. Thus Joins has arrived at the conception of Advaita, though to of the Vedantic type, by proceeding from a different side and ackowledgeigng a different conception of reality.

          SUDDHA UPAYOGA AS THE GOAL:  Fifthly, the attainment of Suddhopayoga is the goal of human pursuance. Therein the self synchronically


1 Prava. II 2, 6.             2. Samaya. 2.          3Tattvanusasana, 177.


realises omniscience and happiness which are its cognate and adjective potencies receptively. We have seen that consciousness is the discriminative characteristic of the soul. It manifests itself in Upayoga, which flows from consciousness as the conclusion from premises. The Upayoga is of three kinds, namely Subha () auspicious , Asubha (inauspicious ) and Suddha ( pure) the self is said to possess auspicious Upayoga when it is absorbed in the performance of meritorious deeds of moral and spiritual nature. Hence the self acquires celestial births which it may be noted, are also a part and parcel of worldly career. Besides, when the self entangles it self in demertorous actions of violence, sensual pleasure, and the like, it is said to possess inauspicious Upayoga Ghence the self is led to the sub-human and hellish births. Both these auspicious and inauspicious Upaygas will again continue to activate the self in the never-ending wheel of misery Consequently, the assignment of the two Upayogas can nerve function as the Summum Bonum of human life. The Jaina, there fore makes an explicit pronouncement that so long as the self is a mated with these two types of Upayoga, it will been unfruitful dissipating its energies in pursuit of an mirages; and so the highest good will ever remain shrouded in mystery. But as soon as the self partsa company with these auspicious and inauspicious Upayogas, it joins hands with suddha upayoga. In other words, the experience of Suddha Upayoga automatically lobelias the Asuddha Udayoga (Subha ad Asubha ) to disappear, with the consequence that the transmigratory character of self evaporated in totality. Spiritually considering, we may say that both the impure Upayogas in  the form of virtue and vice prevet the soul from attaining the loftiest mystic heights, hence they should be equally condemned as unwholesome for the healthiest development of the spirit. But if the empirical self finds that it is difficult to rise to mystical heights, it should perform auspicious activities so as to achieve at least heavenly happiness but with the car knowledge that these performances however intensely and carelessly conducted will in no way enable it to relish the pure Upayoga. The inauspicious activities should by al means be disported, inasmuch as they will bring about thousands of hurt rending miseries. The pure consciousness which relinquishes the impure Upayogs associated with the empirical consciousness realises omniscience and such happens as is transcendental born of the self, supersensuous ,incomparable, infinite and indestructible 1. This Transcendent self as the transcendental ideal may also be designated as 'Svayambhu' 2  To make it clear, it is a state of self-sufficiency which requires no other foreign assistance to sustain itself. It is itself the subject, the object, the means for its achievement, it achieves for itself, destroys the extraneous elements and is the support of its infinite potencies. Hence the self manifests it original nature by transforming itself manifests it original nature by transforming sitself into six cases; it is at once the ammonite, the accusative, the instrumental , the dative, the ablative and the locative case respectively 3 The whole of our discussion may be summarised by saying that the ideal consists in the full manifestation of cognitive, affective and contain potencies inherent in the full manifestation of the cognitive, affective and contain potencies inherent in the soul we he of soar dwelt upon the former two, and now we shall turn to the last in brief.


          AGENCY OF PURE BHAVAS AS THE IDEAL: Sixthly, the ideal may be expressed in terms of activity. Kundakunda, the prominent exponent of Jina spiritualism has bequeathed to us the philosophy of doer and the deed. He proclaims that in whatever deeds the self may get itself engaged in the world, they are not the representatives of the self in its pure, undefiled and transcendent nature. The self in its real nature is Even the empirical self is not the doer of material Karams; it is simply the doer of impure dispositions(Asuddha Bhavas), by which the material particles transform themselves into various Karmas. No substance is capable of dog a things foreign to its nature. And since these impure dispositions do not pertain t the self in its original natural and are the results of Karmic association, the transcendent sled is denied the agency even of these empire dispositions. The denial of authorship material Karma's, nay, eve of asupisious and auspicious psychical states points to the supermundane, uncontaminated stetted of the self. There is o denying the fact that the empirical self has been the doer of impure dispositions since an indeterminable past; so it is the author of these dispositions. If this is to granted, it will make the position of the Samkhya which imputes al actions to the material Buddhi, and regards the principle consciousness as immutable. When the Jaina says that the empririal self is not the agent of impure dispositions, he simply persuades the _______________________

1 Prava. I. 19, 13.; Siddha Bhakti. 7.          2. Pragva. I. 16.

3 Prava. Comm. Amrta. I-16.


empirical self to look behind the Karmic veil. Hence here the chief point of reference is the self I its pure nature. The Jaina reads no contradiction in affirming that the enlightened self which has become familiar with its true nature manifests the pure modes and thereby becomes the substantial agent of those modes, and in affirming that the ignorant self because of its erroneous indentifiation with the alien nature develops injure depositions, and there by it allied their agent. 1  Just as from gold obey golden things can be produces pure modifications and the ignorant self produces impure ones. 2  When the ignorant self becomes enlightened, it starts generating pure modifications without any discongruity. Thus the self is simply the doer of its won states ad to the doer of anything else whatsoever. The empirical self is the author of impure psychic states on account of its association with the Karmas. But if we advance a step further and reflect transcendentally, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the pure self cannot be the author of these impure psychical states because they are foreign to its association with the Karmas. But if we advance a steep further and reflect transcendentally, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the pure self cannot be the author of these impure psychical states because they are foreign to tits nature. Thus the transcendental self is the doer of transcendental Bhavas. Besides it is also their enjoyer. Consequently it may be asserted that the manifestation of cognitive potencies is the manifestation of the genuine nature of self, which is the same as the realisation of the ideal.


          REALISATION OF SVARUPASATTA AS THE TERMINUS OF SELF-DEVELOPMENT:  Seventhly, the ethical ideal may also be expressed in metabphsical terms. The realisation of the self's Svarupasatta, or the manifestation of intrinsic characteristics and modification of the self, or the expression of the self's original origination' destruction and continuance is the ethical ideal no doubt, the self or the expression of the self's ogigial origination' destruction and continuance is the ethical ideal. No doubt, the self is existent, but its existence is mundane and corrupt from the beginning's past. The self is to acquire existence, but what is to be acquired is simply the purity of existence. Drama, Adharma, Akasa and Kala are the pure existents. Pudgala in the au form is pure and in the Skandha form is impure, but the self exists in the defiled state of existence. It is, in the empirical state, cahracterising itself with impure modification and qualities, and consequently impure, but the self exists in the defiled sate of existence, it is in the empirical sate, quintile impure origination, destruction and continuance originate. Bu its won strenuous efforts transcendental modifications and qualities , and pure origination, destruction and continuance are to be revealed . In this


1 Samaya. 128, 129.                         2. Ibid. 130, 131


state also, self realises its true substantiality. This again is the same as the Siddha state, Paramatmanhood, disembodies liberation, Sa Samaya etc; hence the metaphysical ideal, the ethical ideal and the religious idea are perfectly identical.

          PANDITA-ANDITA MARANA AS THE ETHICAL SUMMUM BONUM: Eighthly, the Jainas also proclaim the ideal in terms of death in order to reveal the nature of the ethical Summum Bonum. According to them the goal of the aspirant's one-pointed endeavor ought to be the attainment of the Pandita-pandita Marana (sublime death) to the utter exclusion of Pardita Marana, the Bala-Pandita Marana, the Bala Marana and the Bala-Bala Marna. These five types of death 1  have been enumerated by keeping in view the different stages. 2 of spiritual advancement. The lowest and the most detestable kind of death (Bala-Bala Marana) occurs to that man who leads the life of utter perversion 3  The highest sort of demise (Pandita-Pandita Marana) is exemplified in the consummate lives of embodied omniscient beings when they part with their body 4  Those souls which havecrowned themselves with spiritual conversion, bt have remained incapable of observing patria owes in their life-time succumbed to Bala Marana.5  This is to be distinguished from the Bala-Pandita Marana 6  which is the destiny of those who give themselves to patria vows gate beings spiritually obverted. The saints observing complete vows enjoy Pandita Mara.7  All these types of death except the Pandita- Pandita Marana are pregnant with future possibility of birth; hence they may be designated as emporia deaths. And these are required to bediatinguishe from the death of transcendent type or the Pandit-Pandita Marana wherein the mundane life is cast aside Thus this latter tube departure is a of the happiest kind, and consequently it requires or paramount devotedness. This sort of soul's release from bodily confinement appears before us as an illustration of Chula to death Here the inevitability of death has been proerlyment with.


          AHIMSA AS THE GOA: Ninthly, the ethical highest good also finds its expression in the realisation of perfect Ahimsa. Ahimsa is so center in Jaime that it may be incontrovertibly called the beginning


1 Bhaga. Ara. 26.

2. We shall deal with the stages of spiritual advancement in the sixth chapter.

3 Ibid. 30.

4 Bhaga. Ara. 27.                 5. Ibid. 30.                 6 Ibid. 2078              7 Ibid. 29.

and end of Jaina religion. The statement of Samantabhadra that Ahimsa of all living beings is equivalent to the relisation of Parama Brahama sheds light on the paramount halter of Ahimsa .1  The whole of the Jana Acara is a derivation of this principle All is are the illustrations of Himsa. The Sutrakritanga  exhorts us to regard Ahimsa as the quintessence of wisdom 2  Since Nirvana is not other than Ahimsa, one should cease to injure all living beigs.3  The Aaranaga produces that one should neither deprive any liking beings of life, nor rule over him not torment him bore exit him 4  This is tantamount to saying that Ahimsa is the pure and eternal Dharama 5 All living beings from the one –sensed to the five-sensed are basically like our owe self 6  Hence it is not justifiable to injure them, to rule over them, and to torment them 7  All this is from the Vyabahara point of view. The Niscaya view tells us that the Atma which is Apramatta is Ahimsa the appearance of any sort of passion of surface of self is Himsa, and the self in its pure form is Ahimsa 9  The perfect and the absolute Ahimsa is possible oly in mystical relisation which is further identified with the terminus of all ethic endeavors.


          KNOWLEDGE-CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE END:  Lastly, the attainment of knowledge-consciousness (Jnaa Cetana) ought to be the end of aspirant's endeavors in contrast to action-consciousness (Karma Cetana) and result consciousness (Karamaphala Cetana) 10  The attribution of consciousness to the auspicious and inauspicious psychical assets occasioned by Karmas is called action-consciousness; and the confusion of consciousness with enjoyment of the duality of pleasure and pain is termed result-of the misunderstanding regarding the inherent nature of things. Hence they need by abjured in the interest of ascending the supraethica plane of life. The five type of one sensed souls are the illustrations holding result-consciousness; the two- sensed to five-sensed souls exemplify those having predominantly action-consciousness; ans. the sold devoid of ten Pranas experience


1 Svayambhu. 17.               2. Sutra. Kr.; 1.11.10.

3 Sutra. Kr. 1.11.11.          4. Acara. 1.4.1. p. 36. 5. Ibid.

6. Dasavaika. X. 5.  7. Acara. 1.5.5. p. 50.

8 Haribhadra, Astaka. 7 (vide. Muni Nathamal : Ahimsa Tattva Darsana. p. 4. )

9 Puru. 44                        10. Panca. 38.; Prava. II. 31.     11. Prava. II. 32.


 knowledge- consciousness. 1  Thus knowledge-consciousness is the full-fledged ad legitimate manifestation of consciousness. The Arhat or Siddha state is the state of knowledge-consciousness, the state of omniscience and bliss. 2 


          PROGRAESSIVE  REALISATION OF THE END :  We shall end this chapter by saying that the ideal is realised progressively. The first step consists in the development of the firm conviction as to the distinctness of the self and body. In other words, the resolute belief convinces the aspirant that he is essentially the pure self as absolutely different from the bodily or sensuous vesture and the dual psychical states. In the second step, after the emergence of right belief and right knowledge, he proceeds to wipe out the obstructive elements to the full which hamper the realisation of the pure self. The third step slows as a logical consequence of the second; namely the pure self is realised and not only believed as different from the not- self thus, the achievement of right, belief, right  knowledge and right conduct is same as the realisation of the Atman, 3 which is regarded summarily as the ethical Summum Bonum. The next hatter will be devoted tot he exposition of the nature of the first step. The rest of the steps of experience will be dealt with in the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters respectively.