(10)          In the tenth stage one is free from all passions except the subtle greed of the fourth type. Greed afflicts us. However, disturbance from the passion of greed is only occasional. Except this, there is no other disturbance. One is passionless and undisturbed.         As a wellwashed red vest retains the slightest tinge of redness, so the self is affected by the slightest passion of greed. This stage is called suksma-samparaya. Experiencing the slightest touch of greed, the soul can go in the direction of subsidence or of destruction of the karma. Except for such disturbance  the soul is passionless and calm. This state approximates to the state of perfect conduct (yatha khyata). But, one is still affected in the slightest degree by the passion of greed. “This subtle greed can be interpreted as the subconscious attachment to the body even in souls which have achieved great spiritual advancement.”  The soul which has advanced in the direction of subsidence of the karma that obscures right knowledge and right belief and right conduct, can rise to the eleventh stage of spiritual development. In the tenth stage one has advanced fairly well and one has in this stage a well-established and perfect practice of the moral life although sometimes it may be affected by slight disturbances of a passion like greed.

 

          (11)          The eleventh stage is called upasurrta moha, where even the slightest possible disturbance due to the passion of greed is overcome and all such disturbances are suppressed. One is free from all types of passions. This is the highest stage, in which the passions and other emotional disturbances that afflict the soul are suppressed. But. these passions are not altogether eliminated, they remain suppressed through pressure of the effort for the moral life and one is not altogether free from the enveloping influence of the karryza. except the deluding kurmas. The stage is, therefore, called ‘chadrnastha, as it is just covered by the other karmas, which, however, are not operative in this stage. Like the limpid water in the cold season, when the muddy turbulence of the rains goes to the bottom and leaves the upper surface of a pond clear and transparent, so one who has suppressed all passions and all the deluding karmas is able to remain calm and undisturbed and to control his passions with greater confidence. As all attachments are suppressed, it is also called vitarega.

 

          (12) it was seen that we can go either the way of annihilation of kurmas or the way of suppression of the karmas. One who goes the way of suppression of the karmas gradually destroys the different types of deluding karnurs, and the soul goes from the tenth stage of upasanta kasaya to the twelfth stage, in which the passions are altogether destroyed. The twelfth stage is called ksina moha, or Icsina kasaya. This is the highest stage of annihilation of the karmas, while in the eleventh stage we reach the highest stage of suppression of the karmas. This is upasantcc moha. The soul remains in this stage for one antarmuhurta. During this time, it is very much purified and destroys the karmas obscuring jilana and darsana and also the deluding karmas. The soul is now free from all the four types of ghnti karmas. All the passions disappear altogether.

 

          (13) When all the passions and the four types of ghati karnras are destroyed, one reaches the thirteenth stage of spiritual development. In this stage, one is nearer the absolute perfection only with some impediments in the way. This stage is called sayoga kevali. The conditions of bondage like mithyatva, pramadu, and passions are no longer operative. One is free from such bondage. However, the other condition, viz., the bondage of activity, still remains. It is not free from empirical activity and interest. It is not free from yoga; therefore, it is called savoga; but it has attained omniscience in the form of perfect knowledge and perfect intuition. The soul has become kevali. Therefore, this stage is called sayoga kevali. But one is still not free from embodied existence, because the four types of non-obscuring karma’s, like the vedaniyu which produces feeling, Zyu which determines the span of life, nama which determines the physical structure and nature of the body, and gotra which determines one’s individual status in life, are still operative. One is not free from bodily existence, because the dyu karma is still to be exhausted. Persons still go through the threefold activities of body, speech and mind. But there is no influx of the karma. In this stage, we find omniscient beings like the tirthankaras. the ganadharas and the samanya kevalins. They attain the enlightenment, but still live in this world, preaching the truth that they have seen.

          This stage can be compared to the stage of jivanmukti described by the other orthodox systems of Indian thought. Vedanta recognizes the state of jivanmukti. Vedanta sara describes this as the stage of the enlightened and liberated man yet alive. He is in the perfect state of deliverance. He may appear to be active in this world in many ways; yet at root, he is inactive. He is like ~ the man assisting a magician in a magical show, knowing that all that is shown is merely an illusion of the senses. He is unaffected by all that happens. Yet, the prarabdha karma of the individual destiny, which is responsible for what is, cannot be destroyed even at this stage. It has to exhaust itself, as these karma’s produce their effects of continued life. But not being replenished, they will die away. When Gautama, the Buddha, attained enlightenment, he wanted his enlightenment not to be known to others. But Brahma descended to the earth and inspired the Buddha to be the teacher of mankind, the teacher of the beings of this world and heaven. This stage is the stage of jivanmukti. And this is the stage of sayoga kevali of the tirtharikaras, ganadharas and .sumiunya kevalins when they preached their sublime knowledge to the people of this world. Zimmer compares this attitude of the kevalins to the function of the lamp. Just as the lamp that lights the room remains unconcerned with what is going on in it, so the self enacts the role of ‘lighting the phenomenal expersonality solely for the maintenance of the body, not for the pursuit of any good, any gratification of the sense or any kindly goal.

          (14)          The final stage of self-realization is the stage of absolute perfection. It is the stage of absolute liberation without any empirical activity attached to it. This stage is called ayoga kevali. Here, all the remaining karmas are also destroyed. Before entering into the final stage of absolute purity and liberation, the soul appears to prepare its way for the stoppage of all activity both gross and subtle. This stoppage of activity requires another activity as an instrument. The soul stops the gross activity of the sense organs and the activity of speech, mind and body. Then it stops the subtle activity of the mind, speech and body, like

the physiological processes of respiration and digestion. Then the soul enters into the third stage of scakla-dhyana, which is infallible and leads to the final liberation directly and immediately. At this level ofS’uk1a-dhj1a-na, even the subtle physiological activities and the subtle activities of the mind and body are stopped. The self becomes as motionless as a rock, being devoid of all bodily speech and mental activity. This is the highest stage

of sukla-dhyana. With the remaining karmas eliminated, the highest perfection is reached. Hence this is called ayntia kevali. The sell’ has attained peaceful perfection. The influx of karma is completely stopped and the self is freed from all karrnic dust. This state lasts only for a period of time required to pronounce five short syllables. At the end of this period the soul attains disembodied liberation. This state of crvo,;Jo kevali is also described as the state of Paralrrahmrr or Nircnijancr.

        Of the fourteen stages of’ self-development thus described, it is said that the gods and those who dwell in hell can attain the first four of the gunasthanas. They can get the vision of Truth, They can know what is right. But they cannot make the moral effort required for attaining the truth. The lower animals in this world can rise to the fifth stage of desavirata. Moral effort is possible to some extent. We get an account of the spiritual struggle of the tirtharikaras through the various forms of existence, in the forms of lower animals and gods, till they reached perfection. But the final liberation is only possible in the human existence. It is possible only for human beings to go through the fourteen stages of spiritual development and reach the highest state of perfection called kaivalya state.

          Radhakrishanan says that it is not possible to give a positive description of the liberated soul. The state of perfection is passively described as freedom from action and desires, as a stage of utter and absolute quiescence. It is a state of unaffected peace, since the energy of past kamna is extinguished. In this state, the soul is ‘ itself’ and no other. It is the perfect liberation. Zimmer says that, after its pilgrimage of innumerable existences in the various inferior stratification, the life-monad rises to the cranial zone of the microcosmic being, purged of the weight of the subtle karmic particles that formerly held it down. Nothing can happen to it any more; for it has put aside the traits of ignorance, those heavy veils of individuality that are the precipitating causes of biographical events. In the highest stage of perfection, the individuality, the masks, the formal personal features are distilled away. “Sterilized of colouring, flavour and weight, the sublime crystals now are absolutely pure-like the drops of rain that descend from a clear sky, tasteless and emasculate.”

          This is an account of the journey that a person has to make to attain perfection. These stages of the struggle for self-development are psychologically significant. It is not possible, here, to give parallels in psychological terms. Empirical psychology is concerned with the analysis of the nature and development of the empirical personality. Bahiratman can be compared to the ‘me’ of William James. Similarly, it is also possible to give a description of the antaratma in terms of the ‘I’ of William James to some extent.  Rational psychologists have shown the possibility of such a study. But psychology is not aware of the nature of the transcendental self the parmatman, and the nature of the development of the empirical self’ through various stages to reach the highest stage of the transcendental se/f. Such a language is foreign to psychology as a science. But, considered from the point of view of gunasthanas, the soul is in the empirical stage, the ‘me’, before it cuts the karma granthi and experiences the first dawn of the vision of the truth in the fourth stage. After it gets the vision, it makes moral efforts to attain the truth in the highest perfection. From the fifth stage onwards to the stage of chandamastha mural efforts are prominent. The self in these stages may be called antaratman, or the spiritual se/f, or of the ‘I’ of William James. On the attainment of omniscience, the soul struggles to free itself from the bond of wordly life. This is the struggle to reach the highest perfection. The self in the highest stage of perfection is in the fourteenth stage of ayoga kevuli, which is the consummation of self-realization. This is the transcendental. Self, a metaphysical concept of the self. One has to cross the stage of empirical self and also of inner self in order to reach the highest stage of transcendental self or paramatman.

           Prof. S. C. Nandimath compares the gunasthanas to the satsthalas of Virasaivism. The sthala and sthana are synonymous. The gunasthanas of Jainism have the same significance as the .sat-sthalas. Virasaivism has six stages, while Jainism presents fourteen stages through which the soul has to pass before it reaches perfection. However, the underlying principle in both seems to be the same. According to Virasaiva thought, the soul possesses ignorance because of veil of avid, n. It identifies the self with the things of the world. But sometimes, miraculously, there dawns an idea that the things of the world are not all. This idea increases one’s faith in the supreme power. This is the starting point. The first stages viz., bhakti-sthala, maheswara-sthala and pradesa-sthala are stages in self-development wherein the distinction between the self and the absolute iswara’ is still present. But later stages, like prattaliriga-sthala, and Jarana-.sthakc or the stage of self surrender and aikya .sthala leading to the final unity, gradually eliminate the distinction between jiva and isvara, finally to the fusion of jiva with the transcendental self’. Prof. K. G. Kundanagar, in his introduction to the Adi-Pvrarra, also says that the Jaina gunsthanas may be compared to the sat-sthalas of Virasaivism. It would be difficult to accept the interpretation given by S. C. Nandimath and K. G. Kundanagar because there appears to be difference in the Jaina and Virasaiva attitudes towards the problem. The sat-sthalas show the way towards the union with the Gad in the aikya sthala. For the Jainas there is no absorption with the Infinite even in the highest stage of self-realization. The Jainas are pluralists. They do not admit a reality beyond the individual selves. In Virasaivism h/rakti is an important factor for the realization of the self, which culminates in the union with God. It is through bhakti that the individual journeys through the stages of purification, self-surrender and the final stage of union. For the Jainas, bhakti has no place in the struggle for the realization of the self. The right attitude, (samyaktva), is to be coupled with the moral efforts in the way of self-realization. It is only the individual self-confidence, the Jainas say, that leads one on to the progress towards perfection. In my discussions with some  scholars of Virasaivism, I have come to realize the differences between the attitude of the two schools of thought. However, this problem needs greater consideration. It is not possible to discuss this problem in detail in the frame-work of this study.

          It is not possible to get a thorough understanding of these stages of development by instruction through books. It is necessary to be absorbed in the tradition of the religion for a better understanding of the problem. For instance, it is easier for a Jaina to understand the significance of gunasthanas than for a non-Jaina. Similarly, it is easier for a Virasaiva than for others to understand sat-sthalas.

          This is an account of the fourteen stages, or gunasthanas, of the spiritual development. The stages of spiritual development are psychologically significant, although empirical psychology will not be able to explain the significance of these stages. We should realize that ‘man is not complete; he is yet to be’. In what he is, he is small. He is occupied every moment with what he can get. But he is hungering for something which is more than what he can get. Tagore writes, “In the midst of our home and our work, the prayer rises ‘Lead me across!’ For here rolls the sea, and even here lies the other shore waiting to be reached ...... ”

 


CHAPTER IX

 

CONCLUSION

 

 The purpose of this treatise has been to present some problems of Jaina psychology. But no attempt has been made herein to build up a science of Jaina psychology; for, a positive science of psychology, in the sense in which the term is used to-day, was not possible at that early stage of knowledge. Psychological analyses were merely shades of the epistemological problem, and both, in turn, were parts of metaphysical investigation: However, the psychological theories and problems have been woven together here to present a coherent picture as far as possible.

 

The Idea of the Soul

          The idea of the soul has been a fundamental principle in the rational psychology of the Jainas. The existence of the soul is a presupposition in Jaina philosophy. It is a pratyaksa. The soul is described from the nominal and the phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, it is pure consciousness. Upayoga is the fundamental characteristic of the soul. Upayoga is interpreted, in this treatise, is home in the sense in which McDougall used the term. It is the purposive force which is the source of all experience. All the three aspects of experience-the cognitive, the cognitive and the affective-spring from it.

          Cetana is a fundamental quality of the soul. It is pure consciousness, a kind of flame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal, although it gets manifested in the course of the evolutionary process of life in the empirical sense. The empirical experience arises out it of the contact of the sense organs with the object.

          Thus, upaiyoga is a driving force which is purposive and which is responsible for experience. It expresses itself into jnana and darsana. This expression is possible in the light of cetana. Cetana is the background of the light of cognition’s-of Janna and darsana.

          The Jainas recognize three species of conscious experience-the cognitive;, the cognitive and the affective. They make a distinction in consciousness as knowing, feeling and experiencing the fruits of karma. As a rule, we have first feeling, then conation and then knowledge. McDougall’s view of the primacy of the attractive element in experience and especially in instinctive behavior may be mentioned in this connection. The Jaina thinkers were not unaware of the unconscious. The NaucJi sirtra gives a picture of the unconscious in the mallati:a rlustilrlta. The doctrine of kartna as analysed by the Jainas comes nearer to lung’s ‘Collective Unconscious’. lie says that it is possible to find the karmic factor in the archetypes of the un conscious.

          Prajnnpcrnasirtra recognizes the peculiar mental force called pasanaya, which is rendered as pasvatter. It connotes prolonged vision. It is interpreted, in this treatise, as menace, a psychic force which holds our experience and which later becomes the basis for new experiences.

 

The Jaina Theory of Mind

          The Jainas have developed a systematic theory of mind. Their approach to the problem has been a fusion of the synthetic and the analytic points of view. The Jainas say that mind is a quasi-sense organ, a no-indriya. Mind has two phases: the material phase, dravya manas, and the psychic, bhava manas. The material phase is a mental structure and is composed of infinite, fine, coherent befitting particles of matter meant for the mental function, manovarganas.

          Bhava manas is expressed in mental processes like thinking. C. D. Broad, in his Mind and its Place in Nature, presents a similar view in the distinction of the bodily and psychic factors of the mind. MciDoug ill also makes a distinction between the facts of mental activity and the facts of mental structure. He infers the structure of the mind from its functions.

          Regarding the problem of the relation between body and mind, the Jainas presented a sort of psycho-physical parallelism concerning the individual minds and bodies. Yet, they were aware of the interaction between the mental and the bodily. The empirical approach showed them that there is mutual influence between them. The Jaina theory was an attempt at the integration of the metaphysical dualism of jiva and a jiva and the fact of interaction of individual minds and bodies.

 

The Sense Organs and Sense Qualities

          The Jaina philosophers recognized two varieties of experience: sensory and extra-sensory. Sensory experience is indirect, it is conditioned by the sense organs and the mind, while extra-sensory experience is directly apprehended by the self’ without the help of the sense organs and the mind. For the sensory experience, the sense organs are the windows through which the self cognizes the external world. The mind does the function of organizing the impressions received through the sense organs in order to get a coherent experience.

          The Jainas have accepted five sense organs. Motor organs are not recognized as instruments of experience. The Jaina analysis of the physical structure (dravendmiya), and the psychic function (bhavendriya), has great psychological significance. The physical part is the organ itself. It has its subdivisions. It can be_ compared to the modern physiological analysis of the sense organs. The bhavendriya is divided into two parts: labdhi and upayoga. Labdhi is the manifestation of specific sense experience, and upayoga is the psychic force, the horme, which determines the specific experience.

          The problem of the contact of the sense organs with the external object is psychologically important, although it has a great epistemological bearing. The Jainas maintain that the visual organ, like the mind, is aprapyakari, because it does not come into direct physical contact with the object. The other four sense organs have direct physical contact with the object. Therefore they are prapvakad. But modern scientific analysis of the sense organ of sight shows that we should suppose that there is some form of contact of the eye with the object through the medium of light.

          The Jaina analysis of the sense qualities coming from the various sense organs has also great psychological importance. According to the Jainas, the visual sense quality is classed into five types of colour. Touch is of eight types, and smell is of two. There are five types of taste. There are seven fundamental sounds. Comparison with the modern analysis of sense qualities shows that the Jaina analysis has a psychological basis although not based on experimental investigation.

          Thus, the soul is the experiencing agent. It gets two types of experience-the sensory experience and the extra-sensory experience. The sensory experience is empirical experience gained through the sense organs and the mind. It is indirect. The extra-sensory experience is supernormal experience. The soul gets it directly without the help of the sense organs and the mind.

 

Sense Perception

          The Jaina analysis of sense perception is as complex and it is significant. The contact of the sense organs with the object, except in the case of the visual sense, is just a remote condition like time and space. The sense perception of a particular object does, in fact, involve psychic factors. The removal of psychic impediments in the destruction and subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karmas is a necessary factor in the sense perception. of an object. It is a negative condition. Selective attention is a positive psychic factor. It may be compared to the mental set of the western psychologists.

          The Jaina description of the stages of sense perception is a significant contribution to the psychology of perception, although it gives a predominantly epistemological picture. According to the Jainas, sense perception can be analysed into tear stages: (1) avargraha, the stage of sensation; (ii) iha, the stage of associative integration; (iii) avaya, perceptual judgment; and (iv) dharana, retention. Avagraha is a sensational stage. It is further divided into vyanjanavagraha, which may be rendered as the stimulus condition of the sense awareness, or the threshold of awareness; and arthavagraha, awareness, or the sensation itself. Iha involves the mental factor. It integrates the sense expressions. Avaya is clear cognition of the object involving perceptual judgment. Dharana is retention of what has been experienced. However, sense perception is a concrete psychosis involving these processes which are combined and fused to give a coherent experience. The Jaina description of sense perception gives a scientific and coherent picture of the psychological element in perception. This can be compared, to some extent, to the structuralist view of sense perception.

 

Other Sources of Sense Experience

          There are other sources of getting sense experience. They are: (i) dharana retention, which is also a condition of recollection, (ii) smrti, recollection; (iii) pratyabhijna, recognition, which gives determinates to sense experience, and (iv) anumana, inference, which is an indirect source of sense experience. Dharana can be described as a mental trace or mental disposition (sarirskswa) by which experiences cognized in a definite form by crvsya are retained. Such retention forms a condition of recall of the experience on a future occasion. Smrti is a form in which memory expresses itself. It is ideal revival of a past experience so far as it is merely reproductive. It arises from the stimulation of the mental disposition (vasana), which may be considered as equivalent to the samskara of the Jainas. Mental dispositions are the latent conditions of memory. The emergence of mental dispositions to the level of consciousness is due to (i) the external conditions consisting of the environmental factors, and (ii) internal conditions connected with the cognitive urge. The Jaina description of the conditions of memory may be compared to the laws of association in psychology. Regarding the internal conditions, the Jaina description comes nearest to McDougall’s view of memory. McDougall says that explicit volition, purpose or intention to remember greatly favours remembering and recollecting. In order to get clear recollection, it is necessary to remove psychic impediments like aversion to the object, fear and other painful experiences associated with it. Such a removal of psychic impediments was, in a sense, mentioned by the Jainas in terms of the removal of the veil of karma. But recollection does not give us a complete picture of memory unless recognition (pratyabhijna), as a factor operates. The Jainas give prominence to pratyabhijna as an important factor in experience. It is a synthetic judgment born of perception and recollection. The Jainas make upamana a form of recognition. Psychological analysis of recognition shows that recognition is a fusion of a percept and an image.

        Anumana (inference), is another source of knowledge. Inference has been recognized by all systems of Indian thought except the Carvaka, as a source of knowledge. The Jaina analysis of inference has great psychological value, although it is mainly epistemological. The distinction between inference for oneself (svartha) and inference for others ( parartha), is very important. Inference for others needs a syllogistic structure for expression. On this basis, Bhadrabahu contends that the extent of the constituent propositions depends on the ability of the person to whom it is addressed.

          Inference is a mental process. Validity of inference depends on psychological and logical grounds. It is based on the perception of the relation of the minor term to the middle term, and the recollection of the universal relation between the major and the middle term. McDougall showed that all deductive reasoning involves ‘appreciative’ synthesis. Similarly, the desire to know is an important condition of inference. Miss Stabbing said that inference involves both the constitutive and the epistemic conditions. The epistemic condition relates to what the thinker, who is inferring, knows.

 

Supernormal Perception

          The Jainas thought that knowledge due to the sense organs and the mind is not sufficient to comprehend the nature of reality. They accepted the possibility of immediate and direct experience without the use of the sense organs and the mind. This is pratyaksa. This is supernormal experience. All schools of Indian Philosophy, except the Carvakas, accept the possibility of such supernormal experience.

          The Jainas give three levels of supernormal perception: (i) avadhi, (ii) manahparyaya, and (iii) kevala. Avadhi may be compared to clairvoyance. It differs with different individuals according to their capacities. Human beings acquire this form of experience. But it is natural with beings living in heaven and hell. The Jainas have described different varieties of avadhi.

          Researches in extra-sensory perception show that clairvoyant cognition may differ with different individuals regarding intensity and durability of experience. The Society for Psychical Research has found many instances of this type. The psychic phenomenon called ‘French Sensitiveness’, which is sometimes called ‘psychometry’, may be regarded as a form of avadhi, although in psychometry the sense organs and the mind do play their part.

        Manahparyaya is cognition of the mental states of others. A certain physical and mental discipline is necessary for acquiring this experience. It is only possible for human beings of character, especially for homeless ascetics. The conditions for the possession of manahparyaya are that (i) the human being must have fully developed sense-organs and a fully developed personality; (ii) he must possess the right attitude; and (iii) he must be self-controlled and possess extra-ordinary power. Siddhasena Divakara is inclined to extend the scope of manahparyaya to lower animals possessing two or more sense organs. In this connection we may mention Dr. Rhine’s view that it is possible to find instances of the possibility of such perception in the case of lower animals, especially the vertebrates. But the traditional Jaina view does not accept such a possibility. Two varieties of manahparyaya-rjumati and vipulamati-have been recognized. Manahparyaya may be compared to telepathy.

          The Jaina analysis of avadhi and manahparyaya shows that avadhi may be called paranormal while manahparyaya supernormal cognition. Avadhi is possible even for lower animals and beings residing in hell, while man has to acquire it. But only gifted human beings possess manahparyaya. Even the gods residing in heaven may not possess it.

          In the West, interest in extra-sensory perception is increasing. It is being investigated on an experimental basis since the establishment of the Society for Psychical Research. The Duke University is foremost in this respect. Psychologists like McDougall have said that extra-sensory perception like clairvoyance and telepathy seems also in a fair way established. Dr. Rhine has done good work in extra-sensory perception. Prof. Myers cites many instances of telepathic intuition.

        Kevala is the highest form of experience. It is omniscience. It is pure consciousness. It intuits all substances and modes. Nothing remains to be known in omniscience. The Jaina view of omniscience may be compared to the Nyaya view of divine knowledge and the Yoga theory of divine perception, although the Jaina emphasis is on the individual soul. It is difficult to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of empirical methods of investigation which psychology and the empirical sciences follow. However, its logical possibility cannot be denied.

 

The Journey of the Soul

          The Jainas believe that the soul has an inherent capacity for self-realization. The realization of the self is a realization of the transcendental self and not of the empirical self. The soul has the tendency to free itself from the wheel of samsara, but this tendency is obscured by the veil of karma. The attainment of samyaktva, right attitude, is a condition of finding the way to self-realization.

          In its wanderings in the wheel of samsara, the soul sometimes gets the vision of the goal of liberation as also of the way to reach this goal. It feels an impulse to make efforts to reach this goal. This energy for effort is yathapravrtta karana. It is then set on the way to liberation. The struggle consists in the twofold process known as apurva karana and anivrtti karana. The process of apurva karana enables the soul to cross the obstacles of karma granthi while anivrtti karana leads it to the dawn of enlightenment.

          The way to self-realization is long and arduous. It takes many difficult stages before perfection is reached. The Jainas have mentioned fourteen stages in the struggle for perfection. They are called gunasthanas. The first four stages lead to the right vision (samyaktva), by removing the obscuration created by perversity of attitude. It is purely an intellectual process. It does not involve moral effort for self-realization. These four stages may be compared to the progressive development of the attitude of the prisoner in ‘the parable of the cave’ in Plato’s Republic. In the struggle for attainment of perfection, the soul undergoes the vicissitudes of moral life, sometimes going up the stage of moral development and sometimes coming down. This moral struggle starts with the fifth stage. The fourteenth gunasthana is the final stage of self-development. It is called the state of ayoga kevali. Thirteenth stage is the Kaivalya stage, and this is the final stage and it represents its last phase in life for a few moments only.

          Dr. Nandimath compares the guyasthanas to the sat-sthalas of Virasaivism. Prof. Kundanagar in his introduction to Adipurana, gives a similar view. The struggle for perfection in the fourteen stages of self development has great psychological importance, although psychology as a positive science will not be able to explain the significance of these stages.

          A study of the problems of psychology as presented by the Jainas is useful for a better understanding of the Jaina philosophy. These problems have been interpreted in terms of the concepts of western psychology, especially the rational psychology. An analysis of these problems in the light at once of ancient Indian thought and Western psychological thought gives a synoptic view of the nature and value of the problems that the Jainas presented.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

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Hering E. Wald, Theory of Light Sensation, Trans. from German by E. Rand, 1928.

Hiriyanna M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London,1932.

Hume David, A Treatise on Human Nature. Edition with Preliminary dissertation and notes by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, Vols. 1-2. London, 1874. Hunter I. M. C., Memory-Facts and Fallacies, Pelican Psychology Series, Penguin Books, 1957.

Jacobi H., Studies in Jainism, Ed. Jinavijaya sodhaka Karyalaya, Ahmedabad, 1946.

Jaini J. L., Outlines of Jainism, Cambridge, 1916.

James William, (1) Psychology, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1892. (2) Principles of Psychology, Vols. I & II. Macmillan & Co., London, 1951. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. I, No. 1, 1958.

Johnson W. M., Logic-Parts I & II, Cambridge University Press, London, 1922. Jung C. G., (1) Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, Tr, from the German by R.F.S. Hull, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1953. (2) Introduc tion to a Science of Mythology. Tr. R. F. C. Hull, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956.

Jwala Prasad, Indian Epistemology, Motilal Banarasidass, Lahore, 1939. Keith B., Indian Logic and Atomism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1921. Kuppuswamy, Hiriyanna Commemoration Vol.          Nature of Mind in Indian Philosophy.

Langley and Cheraskin, The Physiology of Man, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1954.

Locke John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. By A. C. Fraser Vols. 1-2. Oxford, 1894.

Luckasiewicz Jan., Aristotle’s Syllogistic. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1951.

McDougall William, (1) An Outline of Psychology 12 Ed., Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1948. (2) Body and Mind, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1911. (3) Physiological Psychology, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1908. (4) Riddle of Life, 2nd Ed., Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1939.

Miller J. C., Unconsciousness, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1942. Mind, April, 1930- Monist, Vol. XXXXI, 1936.

Morris C. W., Six Theories of Mind, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1932. Murphy G., An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, 3rd Ed., Kegan Paul, London, 1932.

Naidu P. S., The Hormie Theory, Central Book Depot, Allahabad, 1947. Nandimath S. C., Hand book of Virasavism, Literary Committee, Lingayat Education Association, Dharwar, 1941.

Nunn P. T., Education: Its Data and First Principles.

Plato, The Dialogues of Plato Trans: by B. Jowett, (1) The Meno. (2) The Phaedo, (3) The Republic, Trans: by Cornford F. M. Clarendron Press, Oxford 1951.

Price H. H., Perception, Methuen and Co., Ltd., London, 1950. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God, Oxford University Press, London, 1917, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 1926.

Radhakrishnan S., Indian Philosophy, Vols. 1-2, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1941.

Ranade R. D., Constructive Survey Agency Poona, 1926.

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Rand B., The Classical Psychologists, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912. Rhine J. B., New Frontiers of the Mind, Pelican Books, 1950.

Rhys Davids, (Mrs). (1) The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism, Luzac & Co., London, 1936. (2) Buddhist Psychology, 2nd Ed., Luzac & Co., London 1924.

Rogers A. K., A Student’s History of Philosophy, London, 1926.

Ross James, Groundwork of Educational Psychology, (New Edition), George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1951.

Russell Bertrand, (1) Problems of Philosophy. New and Revised Williams and Norgate, 1919. (2) The Principles of Mathematics. edition), George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1951.

Saksena S. K., Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy, & Bros., Banaras, 1944.

Seal B., Positive Science of the Ancient London, 1915.

Sinha J., Indian Psychology: Perception, Kegan Ltd., London, 1934.

Spearman C., Psychology Down the Ages. Vols. 1-2. Macmillan, London, 1937. Spencer, Herbert, The Principles of Psychology, 5th Edition, London, 1890. Stabbing L. S., A Modern Introduction to Logic, 6th Ed., Methuen & Co. Ltd.,

London, 1948. , Stevenson Sinelair, (Mrs.) The Heart of Jainism, Oxford University Press, 1915. Stout G. F., Manual,? of Psychology, Revised in collaboration with the author

by C. A. Mace, 4th Ed., Univ. Tutorial Press, London, 1929. Tagore Rabindranath, Sadhana, Macmillan, London, 1947.

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Tyrrell G.N.M., The Personality of Man, Pelican Books, 1946.

Vinacke L. E., The Psychology of Thinking, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1952. Ward James, Psychological Principles, 1952.

Washburn Margaret, The Animal Mind-The Edition, Macmillan Co., New York, 1936.

Weber, De Tactu, A Monograph, Translation in E. B. Titchener’s Experimental Psychology, 1934,

Woolworth R. S. and Marquis, Psychology, 5th Edition, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1947.

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NON-ENGLISH WORKS

Abhidhana Rajendra, Ed. Muni Rajendra Suri., Jaina Svetambara Samastha Samgraha.          (Vira Samvat, 2440.)

Anuyogadvara Sutra, with by Maladhari AS 1924.

Acaranga Sntra,Trans. by H. Jacobi, S.B.E., Vol. XXII.

Aptamimamsa (of Samantabhadra with Astasati and Astasahasri. NSP 1915) Avasyaka Sutra (with Niryukti by Bhadrabahu and Vrtti, by Malayagiri, AS 1928.)

Astasahasri (as in Aptamimamsa).

Aitareya Upanisad.

Bhagavadgita.

Bhagavati Sutra, Abhayadeva AS 1919.

Brhadaranyaka Upanisad.

Brahmasutra.

Chandoyga Upanisad.

Dhyanasataka by Jinabhadra with Haribhadra’s commentary. (ShriVinaya

bhaktisundaracarana Granthamala, No. 3, Jamnagar).

Digha Nikaya (PTS).

Dravyasamgraha by Nemicandra Siddhantacakravarti with the Vrtti of Brahmadeva. Ed.by S. C. Ghoshal (The Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. 1, Arrah 1917.)

Dasavaikalika Sntra (with Niryukti).

Isa Upanisad.

Jnana-bindu-prakarana (of Upadhyaya Yasovijaya, Singhi Jain Series, No. 16.)

Jaina-tarka-bhasa (of Upadhyaya Yasovijaya, Singhi Jaina Series No. 8.)

Katha Upanisad.

Karmagrantha, I to IV (of Devendrasnri. Atm ananda Jaina Granthamala, No. 85.)

Karmaprakrti with cnrni and the commentaries of Malayagiri and Upadhyaya

Yagovijaya, (1937.)

Kena Upanisad.

Labdhisara by Nemicandra Siddhantacakravarti. (Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, No. 8 NPS, 1916.)

Laghiyastraya, (Singhi Jain Series, No. 12.)

Majjhima Nikaya. (PTS edition.)

Mundaka Upanisad.

Nyaya-Sutra.

Nyayasntra-Bhasya of Vatsyayana.

Nyayasntra-Bhasya-Varttika of Uddyotakara.

Nyayamanjari of Jayanta (KSS No. 106, 1936.)

Nandi-Sntra (Candana Jainagama Granthamala, No. 2.)

Niyamasara, by Kundakundacarya (The Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. IX Lucknow, 1931).

Pancastikayasara, by Kundakundacarya (The Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III, Arrah, 1920).

Paramatma-prakaAa and Yogasara of Yogindudeva (Sri Rayacandra Jaina S’astramala, No. 10, 1937, Ed. A. N. Upadhye).

Pragastapada-Bhasya (with Vyomati and other commentaries. Sanskrit Series, 1930).

Prasatapada-Bhasya with Kandali (Sridhara prasada, Kashi, 1951.)

Prameyakamalamartanda of Prabhacandra, (NSP. 1941).

Pramana-mimamsa of Acarya Hemacandra (Singhi Jaina Series).

Prajnapana Sutra.

Satkhandagama with Dhavala commentary. Amraoti, 1939.

Samkhya-karika of Tsvarakrsna.

Samyutta-Nikaya (PTS).

Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya of Vijnanabhiksu.

Sarvarthasiddhi of Pujyapada Devanandi, acommentary on Tattvartha dhigama Sutra.

Sthananga Sutra (Ahmedabad, 1937).

Sntrakrtanga Sntra,Trans. By H. Jacobi, (SBE, Vol. XLV).

Tattvartharajavarttika of Akalanka Bhatta (Kashi, 1915).

Tattvartha-sloka-varttika of Vidyanandi (NSP. 1918).

Tattvartha-sntra of Umasvati (Motilal Ladhaji, Poona, 1926).

Tattvartha-sutra-bhasya with Siddhasenaganin’s Tika. Two Vols. (Seth Deva

canda Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhara Fund Series, Nos. 67 & 76).

Taittiriya Upanisad.

Uttaradhyayana-sntra, Trans. H. Jacobi. Visesavasyaka - bhasya, with gisyahita Granthamala, No. 35).