Atmanushasan
Atmanushasan,
by Acharaya Guna-Bhadra,
Translation and commentary by J. L. Jaini.
1928.
1. Pramana (valid knowledge) is the knowledge which illumines itself and other things without any obstruction: it is divided as Pratyaksa (direct knowledge or perception) and paroksa (indirect knowledge) as knowable are ascertained in two ways.
Commentary: This definition sets aside the view of those Buddhists [Yogacaras] who maintain that knowledge illumines itself alone, inasmuch as there is, according to them, no external object beyond it. The same definition is also in indirect opposition to
the doctrine of the naiyayika, Mimamsaka and others, who hold that knowledge illumines the external object alone, as it cannot illumine itself. The jainas maintain that it is only when knowledge illumines itself that it can take cognizance of the external object.
So according to them knowledge, like a lamp, illumines itself as well as the object lying outside it.
Those whose sight has been obscured by darkness often see many false images, such as two moons, etc.; men bewildered by sophism are found to believe that every thing is momentary, or the like. With a view to differentiate such kinds of false knowledge from pramana (valid knowledge), the phrase "without obstruction" has been used.
Pramana (valid knowledge) is divided here into pratyaksa (direct knowledge) and paroksa (indirect knowledge), including in the latter anumana (inference) and sabha (the verbal testimony). This division contravenes the conclusion of Carvaka that there is only one pramana, viz., pratyaksa (perception or direct knowledge), for, pratyaksa cannot be established as a pramana, except through the medium of the paroksa (Buddhists) who divide pramana into pratyaksa (direct knowledge or perception) and anumana (inference), without any notice of sabha (the verbal testimony).
2. Pramanas and the practical use made of them are well known: there appears no necessity for giving any definition of the pramanas).
3. The necessity here for giving the definition of the well-known pramanas is to remove the stupidity from the mind of stupid people.
4. Such knowledge that takes cognizance of objects, not beyond the range of the senses, is Pratyaksa (direct knowledge or perception); the other is known as paroksa (indirect knowledge), in reference to the manner of taking the cognizance.
Commentary: The words pratyaksa (direct knowledge) and paroksa (indirect knowledge) have been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely the fist for sense-perceptions, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient Jaina scriptures, however, pratyaksa (indirect knowledge) signified perfect knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the channels of the senses, while paroksa (indirect knowledge) signified knowledge derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception, inference and the verbal testimony.
5. The knowledge determinant of that which is to be proved (i.e, the major term, called in Sanskrit sadhya), derived through the mark (i.e., the middle term called in Sanskrit linga) which is inseparably connected with the same, is known as anumana (inference): being a pramana it is free from invalidity like perception (pratyaksa).
Commentary: Inference is of two kinds: (1) Svarthanumana, inference for one's own self, and (2) pararthanumana, inference for the sake of others. The first kind is the inference drawn is one's own mind after having made repeated observations. Suppose that having repeatedly seen in the kitchen and other places, that where there is smoke there is fire, and having realised in his mind that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke, a man afterwards goes to a hill and entertains a doubt as to whether or not there is fire in it. Instantly, when he observes smoke, and concludes in his mind that the hill has fire in it, as it has smoke on it. This is an inference for one's own self. The inference for the sake of others will be defined later on.
This definition of inference, says the commentator, sets aside the view of certain writers [such as Dharmakirti, the Buddhist] who maintain the non-perception (anupalabdhi), identity (svabhava) and causality (Karya) are the marks or grounds of inference, or of certain other writers who hold the effect (Karya) cause (Karana), conjunction (samyoga), co-existence (samavaya), and opposition (virodha) to be such marks or grounds. The division of inference as (1) a priori (purvavat, from cause to effect), (2) a posterior (sesavat, from effect to cause) and (3) from analogy (samanyato-drsta, perception of
homogeneousness, that is, the recognition of the subject as being referrable to some class, and as being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be predicable of the class) [as given in the Nyaya-sûtra of Aksapada Gautama] is also hereby set aside.
6. Since it is a pramana, pratyaksa (perception), too, is not invalid, for, "a pramana, is invalid" is an absurd expression.
Commentary: Some [Buddhists] who maintain that the world is true only from the practical or illusory point of view (lakasamvrti) but false from the transcendental or absolute standpoint (paramathika), consider perception (pratyaksa) to be merely illusory, and consequently invalid from the absolute standard of truth. But this view is opposed by the Jainas, who maintain that the world is real from all standpoints, and consequently perception is not invalid.
7. Owing to the impossibility of all phenomena (external objects) being invalid pramana is evidently a determinant of self and other things, and serves to establish both.
Commentary: The world is not an illusion: knowledge and its objects are all real.
8. Knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what are established by perception, is known as sabda (the vertal testimony).
Commentary: Sabha (the word or verbal testimony) is of two kinds, viz., (1) Laukika (the knowledge derived from a realible person), and (2) Sastraja (the knowledge derived from scripture).
9. The scripture (sastra) is that which was invented (or first known) by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instructions and which is
profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path.
Commentary: This definition sets aside the view of those [Mimamsakas] who maintain that the scripture [such as the Veda] is eternal and was not recomposed by any human being. the scripture could not have been called a verbal testimony [sabda or word), unless it embodied the words of any particular person or persons.
10. Like the decision for oneself, the production of a decision in others is called by the learned `knowledge for the sake of others' (pararthamana): speech is designated as such by metaphor.
Commentary: Knowledge is of two kinds: (1) knowledge for one's own self (svartha mana), and (2) knowledge for the sake of others (parartha mana). The second is defined as that which produces decision or belief (nisacaya) in others, i.e., which enables others to ascertain the nature of things. The "word" or "speech" (sabda or Vakya) comes under this class, that is, it is knowledge for the sake of others, for it produces decision in others. It is true the "word" itself is not knowledge, but being the medium through which knowledge is conveyed to others, it is figuratively identified with knowledge.
11. Perception and inference having disclosed objects with which we are familiar, and they being the means of communication to other people, both of them are knowledge for the sake of others.
Commentary: Perception and inference are as much knowledge for one's own self (svartha mana) as for the sake of others (parartha mana). They are called "knowledge for the sake of others," because the results of perception and inference arrived at by one's own self can be communicated to others through words.
12. A statement expressive of the object ascertained by perception is also called perception: it is so called being the cause of the object's manifestation.
Commentary: As the result of perception can be communicated to others through the word, the word itself is figuratively called perception. for instance, the deposition of a witness is taken by the judge as equivalent to perception, though in truth the judge has not perceived the fact deposed to.
13. A statement expressive of the reason (i.e., mark of the middle term, called hetu) which is inseparably connected with that which is to be prove (i.e., the major term, called sadhya) having been composed of the minor term (called paksa, signifying a side or place), etc. is called an inference for the sake of others (pararthanumana).
Commentary: In an "inference for the sake of others" the minor term (paksa), etc., must be explicitly set forth. The major term or "proven" (sadhya) is that which is to be proved. The middle term or reason (hetu, linga or sadhana) is that which cannot exist, except in connection with the major term or "proven" (sadhya or lingi). The minor term or abode (paksa) is that with which the reason or middle term (hetu) is connected, and whose connection with the major term (sadhya) is to be proved. In a proposition, the subject is the minor term (paksa), and the predicate the major term (sadhya). The following is an "inference for the sake of others":-
(1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term)- proposition (pratiņa);
(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term);
(3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, just as the kitchen (example, drstanta);
(4) so is this hill full of smoke (application upanaya):
(5) therefore, this hill is full of fire (conclusion, nigamana).
The above is a mediocre (madhyama) form of an "inference for the samek of others". Here the minor term (paksa), the major term (sadhya), the middle term (hetu) and example (drstanta) have been used. The worst (jaghanya) form of an "inference for
the sake of others "consists in a mere statement of the reason or middle term (hetu), besides the major term (shya) and the minor term (paksa), thus:-
(1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term);
(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term).
The best (uttama) form of an inference for the sake of others consists in the statement of the following ten parts or members (dasavayava): (1 proposition (pratijņa); (2) correction of the proposition (pratinņa-suddhi); (3) reason or middle term (hetu); (4) correction of the reason or middle term (hetu-suddhi); (5) example (drstanta); (6) correction of the example (drstanta-suddhi); (7) application (upanaya); (8) correction of the application (upanaya-suddhi); (9) conclusion (nigamana), and (10) correction of the conclusion (nigamana-suddhi). Any form containing less than ten members, down to five, is called mediocre (madhyama).
14. Paksa (the minor term) is that which is asserted to be connected with the (major term or sadhya, and is not excluded by perception, etc.; it is to be used here (in an inference for the sake of others) as exhibiting an above of the reason (i.e, the middle term, called hetu).
Commentary: Some philosophers hold that the minor term (paksa) is not an essential part of an inference. But this view, according to the Jainas, is untenable, it being absolutely necessary to state the minor term (paksa) in an inference.
15. Otherwise, owing to a misconception as to the abode of the reason (i.e., paksa or minor term) as intended by the disputant, his reason (hetu or middle term) may appear to his opponent as absurb.
Commentary: If any disputant does not explicitly state the minor term (paksa), his reason might be misunderstood by his opponent, e.g.:-
(1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term);
(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term).
The above inference, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form:-
(1) Full of fire (major term);
(2) because full of smoke (middle term).
Here the opponent might not at once recollect any abode or place (minor term, paksa) in which the fire and smoke abide in union, and might mistake a lake for such an abode. In such a case, the whole argument will be misunderstood. 16. A man who has come to behold the excellence of an archer will have to behold the opposite of it, if the archer hits without fixing an aim.
Commentary: Just as a clever archer, with a view to preventing his arrow from going to a wrong direction, fixes his aim before hitting, so a skillful disputant, in order to avoid being misunderstood, should, in stating an inference, mention the minor term (paksa) with which the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (hetu) are both connected.
17. The reason (or the middle term, i.e. hetu) may be used to show connection or the opposite of it; in either of these two ways, the sadhya (that which is to be proved) can be proved.
Commentary: The reason or middle term (hetu) can be used in two ways as follows: (1) the reason or middle term (hetu) may exist only if the major term (Sadhya) existed, such as in the proposition "here there is fire, because there is smoke," the smoke (middle term) may exist only if there is fire (major term); and (2) the reason or middle term (hetu) cannot exist if the major term (sadhya) does not exist, such as in the proposition "here there is fire, because otherwise there could not be any smoke," the smoke (middle term) could not have existed if there had been no fire (major term).
18. Where the inseparable connection of the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (sadhana or hetu) is shown by homogeneousness (sadharmya), the example is called a homogeneous one, on account of the connection (between those terms) being recollected.
Commentary: An example (drstanta) is a familiar case which reassures the inseparable connection (vyapti) between the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (hetu). It is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous (sadharmya), and (2) heterogeneous (vaidharmya). The homogeneous example is that which reassures the connection (vyapti) by homogeneousness (sadharmya), thus:-
(1) This hill is full of fire (major term);
(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term);
(3) just as the kitchen (homogeneous example).
Here the fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen.
19. The heterogeneous example is that which shows that the absence of the major term (sadhya) is followed by the absence of the middle term.
Commentary: The heterogeneous example reassures the connection (vyapti) by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term (sadhya) is attended by the absence of the middle term (hetu), thus:-
(1) This hill has no smoke (major term);
(2) because it has no fire (middle term);
(3) just as a lake (heterogeneous example).
20. Logicians maintain that to cite an example from outside is useless, as that which is to be proved (sadhya) can be proved through internal inseparable connection (antar-vyapti), even without such example.
Commentary: Internal inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) occurs when the minor term (paksa) itself as the common link on the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya) shows the inseparable connection between them, thus:- (1) This hiss (minor term) is full of fire (major term);
(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term).
Here the inseparable connection between the fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term), which is their common ground.
External inseparable connection (bahir-vyapti) occurs when as example (drstanta) from outside is introduced as the common link of the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya) to reassure the inseparable connection between them, thus:-
(1) This hill is full of fire (major term);
(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term);
(3) just as a kitchen (example).
Here the kitchen, which forms no essential part of the inference, in introduced from outside as the common link of the fire and smoke, to reassure the inseparable connection between them (the fire and smoke).
Some logicians [such as Vasubandhu] hold that which is to be proved, that is, the "proven" or the major term (sadhya), can be established by the internal inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) alone, so the pointing out of the external inseparable connection (bahir-vyapti) is superfluous. It is useless even when there is no internal inseparable connection. In the case of the internal inseparable connection being existent external inseparable connection is superflous, and in the case of the former being non-existent the latter is useless.
21. If that of which the major term or predicate (sadhya) is affirmed is opposed by evidence (linga), the public understanding, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term or thesis (Paksa-bhasa), of which there are many varieties.
Commentary: The semblance or fallacy of the minor term or thesis (paksabhasa) arises when one predicates of the minor term (paksa) that which is yet to be proved to the opponent, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with the public understanding or incongruous with one's own statement, thus:-
(1) "The jar is corporeal (paudgolika)" -this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.
(2) "Every thing is momentary" -this is a Saugata (Buddhist) doctrine which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved.
(3) "The general (samanya) and particular (visesa) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone" -this is opposed to perception.
(4) "There is no omniscient being" - this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference.
(5) "The sister is to be taken as wife" -this is inconsistent with the public understanding.
(6) "All things are non-existent" - this is incongruous with one's own statement.
22. The reason (i.e., the middle term called hetu) has been defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term (sadhya); the fallacy of the reason (hetvabhasa) arises from non-conception, doubt or misconception about it (the middle term).
Commentary: (1) This hiss is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term).
In this example "smoke" is the middle term or reason (hetu) which cannot exist, except in an inseparable connection (union) with "fire", which is the major term (sadhya).
23. That which has not yet been established in called "the unproved" (asiddha); that which is possible only in the opposite way is called "the inconsistent" (viruddha); that which can be explained in one way as well as in the opposite way is called "the uncertain" (anaikantika).
Commentary: Semblance of the reason or fallacy of the middle term (hetvabhasa) is of three kinds, as follows:-
(1) The unproved (asiddha) such as: "the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it has the generic property of lotuses." Here the reason, viz., the sky-lotus [which is unreal] has the generic property of lotuses, is unproved.
(2) The inconsistent (viruddha) such as: "this is flery, because it is a body of water." Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.
(3) The uncertain (anaikantika) such as: "all things are momentary, because they are existent." Here the reason alleged is uncertain, because `existence' may or may not be a proof of momentariness, for, an opponent might equally argue: "all things are eternal, because they are existent."
24. Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example (drstabhasa) in the homogeneous form, arise here from an imperfect middle term or from a defect in the major tern, etc.
Commentary: Fallacies of the homogeneous example (sadharmya drstanta-bhasa) arise from a defect in the major term (sadhya) or middle term (hetu) or both or from doubt about thus:-
(1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term), like perception (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the major term (sadhya), for perception is not invalid.
(2) Perception is invalid (major term), because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term), like a dream (homogeneous example).
(3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term), because he is not apprehended by the senses (middle term), like a jar (homogeneous example).
Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (sadhya and hetu), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.
(4) This person is devoid of passions (major term), because he is mortal (middle term), like a man in the street (homogeneous example).
Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.
(5) This person is mortal(major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions. (6) This person is not omniscient (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example).
Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and not omniscient.
Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (sadharmya-drstantabhasa), viz.:-
(1) unconnected (ananvaya), such
as: This person is full of passions (major term), because he is a speaker
(middle term), like a certain man in
Here, though a certain man in
(2) Of connection unshown (apradarsitanvaya), such as:-
Sound of non-eternal (major term), because it is adventitious (middle term), as a jar (example).
Here, though there is an inseparable connection between "adventitious" and "non-eternal," yet it has not been shown in the proper form, as:-
"Whatever is adventitious, is non-eternal, as a jar."
[Dignaga, the Buddhist, urged the necessity of converting the example into a universal proposition, with a view to show the connection between the middle term and major term in the proper form.]
(3) Of contrary connection (viparitanvaya), such as:- Sound is noneternal (major term), because it is adventitious (middle term).
Here, if the inseparable connection (vyapti) is shown, thus-
"Whatever is non-eternal, is adventitious as a jar," Instead of thus-
"Whatever is adventitious, is non-eternal as a jar," the example would involve the fallacy of contrary connection.
25. Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example in the heterogeneous form arise when the absence of the major term (sadhya) or the middle term (sadhana or hetu) or both, is not shown, or when there is a doubt about them.
Commentary: The fallacy of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmya-drstabhava) is of six kinds, thus:-
(1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term); whatever is not invalid is not a source of true knowledge, as a dream (heterogeneous example).
Here, the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term sadhya), for a dream is really invalid, though it has been cited as not invalid.
(2)Perception is non-reflective or nirvikalpaka (major term), because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term); whatever is reflective or savikalpaka, is not a source of true knowledge, as inference (homogeneous example).
Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (sadhana), for inference is really a source of true knowledge, though it has been cited as not such.
(3) Sound is eternal and non-eternal (major term), because it is an existence (middle term); whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (homogeneous example).
Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadhana), for the jar is both "eternal and non-eternal", and "an existence."
(4) Kapila is non-omniscient (major term), because he is a non-propounder of the four noble truths (middle term); who-ever is not non-omniscient is not non-propounder of the four noble truths, as Buddha (homogeneous example).
Here the example involves in the negative form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (sadhya), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient.
(5) This person is untrustworthy (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term); whoever is not un-trustworthy is not full of passions, as Buddha (homogeneous example).
Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (hetu), for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions.
(6) Kapila is not devoid of passions (major term), because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term); whoever is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as Buddha (homogeneous example).
Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadhana), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry.
Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmya-drstantabhasa), viz.:-
(1) Unseparated (uvyatireki): This person is not devoid of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term); whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker, as a piece of stone (homogeneous example).
Here, though a piece of stone is both "devoid of passions" and "not a speaker," yet there is no unavoidable separation (vyatireka vyapti) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker."
(2) of separation unshown apradarsita-vyatireka):
Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is adventitious (middle term); just as ether (example).
Here, though there is an unavoidable separation between "adventitious" and "eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form such as: "Whatever is not adventitious, is eternal, just as ether."
[Dignaga, the Buddhist, urged the necessity of converting the heterogeneous example into a universal negative proposition, with a view to point out the connection of the middle term and major term.]
(3) Of contrary separation (viparita-vyatireka):
Sound is not eternal (major term), because it is adventitious (middle term); whatever is eternal is not adventitious, just as ether (example).
Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been: "Whatever is not adventitious is eternal, just as ether. 26. Refutation (dusana) is the pointing out of the aforesaid fallacies in the reasoning of an opponent; but it is called a semblance of a refutation (dusanahasa) when the reasoning is really devoid of defects.
Commentary: A disputant is said really to refute his opponent, if the former can detect in the reasoning of the latter any of the fallacies aforementioned. But it will be a mere semblance of refutation, if he ascribes to his opponent fallacies which he has not really committed.
27. That which is characterised as free from all obstructions and shines as the absolute is called (supreme or transcendental) perception; it uninterruptedly illumines the nature of all objects.
Commentary: Perception (pratyaksa) is used in two senses; (1) supreme or transcendental (paramarthika) and (2) practical (vyavaharika). the practical perception consists of the knowledge acquired by the soul through the channels of the senses, such as the visual knowledge, auditory knowledge, etc. Transcendental perception is the knowledge acquired by the should direct,
through meditation, without the intervention of the senses or signs.
28. The immediate effect of pramana (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance; the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is bliss and equanimity, while that of the ordinary practical knowledge is the facility to select or reject.
Commentary: Pramana (valid knowledge) is of two kinds: (1) kevala, absolute and (2) ordinary. The immediate effect of both is the cessation of ignorance. the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is happiness and equanimity, while that of the ordinary knowledge is the facility which it affords us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable.
29. Since things have many characters (that is, may be conceived from many points of view), they are the objects of all-sided knowledge (omniscience); but a thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of naya (or one-sided knowledge).
Commentary: Objects, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, possess many different characteristics, and may be taken from different standpoints. They are understood in their entire characters by omniscience alone, while to take them from a certain standpoint is the scope of naya (the one-sided method of comprehension).
Naya (the one-sided method of comprehension) is of seven kinds, mentioned below:-
(1) Naigama (the non-distinguished) is the method by which an object is taken in its generic and specific capacities not distinguished from each other. for instance, by the term "bamboo" one may understand a number of properties, some of which are peculiar to its own species, while the remaining ones are possessed by it in common with other trees, such as a mango, jack, banyan, etc., without any distinction being may between these two classes of properties. The Nyaya and Vaisesika schools of philosophy follow the Naigama naya.
(2) Samgraha (the generic) is the method by which the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without any cognizance of the particular properties which, independent of the former, are non-entities, like-sky flowers. Thus, when we speak of a mango, jack or bamboo, we mean that it is a tree. The Advaita and Samkhya systems of philosophy follow the samgraha naya.
(3) Vyavahara (the practical) is the method by which the practical or particular alone, is considered, for the general without the particular is a non-entity, like the horn of a hare. On being asked to bring a tree, can anybody bring the tree in general? No, he can bring only a particular tree, such as a mango, jack or bamboo.
The Garvaka philosophy follows the Vyavahara naya.
(4) Rju-Sutra (the straight expression) is the method by which a thing, as it exists at present, is considered, without any reference to the past or future. It is useless to ponder over things as they were in the past or will become in the future. All practical purposes are served by the things itself, as it exists at the present moment. For instance, a man, who was formerly (in a previous birth) my son, is now born as a prince somewhere else; he is of no practical use to me now. So the Rju-Sutra recognises only the entity itself (bhava), and does not consider the name (nama), image (sthapanaa), or the constituent cause
(dravya). For instance, a poor cowherd, if he bears the name of Indra, does not thereby become the lord of heavens. An image of a king cannot accomplish the function of the king himself. The causes in me which will lead to my accepting a different kind of body in a future birth, cannot enable me to enjoy that body now. Some hold that the atoms alone are true, while practically it is the aggregates or lumps alone that the true. This is Rju-sutra, which is followed by the Buddhists.
(5) Sabda (the verbal) consists in using a word in a conventional sense, and not according to its etymological derivation. Thus the worked satru usually, or in its conventional sense, means "enemy," while etymologically "a destroyyer". the grammarians are the followers of this method.
(6) Samabhirudha (the subtle) consists in making nice distinctions among the synonyms, applying each name appropriately according to their etymological "a destroyer". The grammarians are the followers of this methods.
(7) Evambhuta (the such-like) consists in naming a thing only when it possesses its practical efficiency. Thus a man should be named sakra, if he actually possesses strength (sakti), implied by the name. the grammarians are the followers of this method.
30. The knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided nayas, is called Syavada-sruta.
Commentary: The sruta or scriptural knowledge is of three kinds, viz.: (1) false hearing or knowledge (mithya-sruta), such as that derived from the scripture of the bad Tirthikas; (2) hearing of the one-sided method (naya -sruta), that is, the knowledge derived from that part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from any particular standpoint; and (3) hearing of the all-sided method (syad-vada-sruta), that is, the knowledge derived from the part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from all-sided method) has been described in the previous verse. The syad-vada (knowledge of the all-sided method) is described below:-
Syad-vada, which literally signifies assertion of possibilities, seeks to ascertain the meaning of things from all possible standpoints. Things are neither existent nor non-existent absolutely. A thing may be said to exist in a certain way and to be non-existent in another way, and so forth. Syad-vada examines things from seven points of view, hence the doctrine is also called sapta-bhangi-naya (seven-fold paralogism). It is stated as follows: (1) May be, it is (Syadasti); (2) may be, it is, not (syad-nasti); (3) may be, it is , and it is not syad-asti-nasti); (4) may be, it is indescribable (syad-avyaktavyam); (5) may be, it is and yet indescribable (syad-astica avaktavyanca); (6) may be, it is not, and also indescribable (syad nasti ca avaktavyanca); (7) may be, it is, and it is not, and also indescribable (syad asti ca vasti ca avaktavyanca).
When a thing is to be established, we say "it is, when it is be denied we say "it is not". When a thing is to be established and denied in turn, we way "it is and it is not". When a things is to be established and denied simultaneously, we say, "it is indescribable". When a thing is to be establishment and yet described as indescribable, we say "it is, and yet indescribable." When a thing is to be denied and also declared as indescribable, we say "it is not, and also indescribable." When a thing is to be established and denied as well as declared indescribable at the same time, we say "it is and it is not, and also indescribable." Syad, which signifies "may be", denotes all these seven possibilities , that is, a thing may be looked at from one of the above seven points of view, there being no eighth alternative.
31. The spirit (soul of jiva) is the knower, doer and enjoyer, illumines self and others, undergoes changes of condition, is realised only in self-consciousness, and is different from the earth, etc.
Commentary: The soul (atman of jiva) has knowledge, and so is different from knowledge itself. as an enjoyer and doer, the should in the Jaina philosophy is different from that of the Samkhya philosophy. The soul by the Jainas is described as undergoing changes of condition. In this respect, it is different from that of the Nyaya and Vaisesika philosophy.
32. This system of pramana, etc. in beginingless and endless; though familiar to all persons in every day practice, it is yet explained here.
Commentary: This shows that the world, as conceived by the Jainas, is eternal.