Nyaya-Karnika

Vinay Vijay Maharaj

Translated by Mohanlal B. Desai

Naya-karnikâ is composed of two words, naya and karnikâ. Naya means a standpoint or an aspect of viewing a thing from that standpoint of aspect. Karnikâ means a pericarp, or the central point, of a flower. The thing which is to be viewed from different aspects is the pericarp or the central point, and the various standpoints from which it is viewed from the various petals surrounding the pericarp. Thus the title 'Naya-Karnika' is fully appropriate to the subject-matter of this book. Taken as a whole, Naya-karnikâ means a flower which has for its pericarp, or central point, the thing to be viewed; and for its petals the various standpoints from which it is to be viewed.

1. We offer our praise to Lord Vardhamâna, whose gospel is an ocean, with all kinds of nayas as so many streams flowing into it, by transcribing, in brief the various viewpoints called from it (the ocean-like gospel).

2. The standpoints are the non-distinguished (Naigama), the collective - generic (sangraha), the practical (v'yavahâra), the straight-expression (rejusûtra), the verbal (sabda), the subtle (samabhirûdha), and the such like (evambhûta).

3. All objects possess two kinds of properties, viz., (1) Sâmânya or the generalizing (general), and (2) visesa or the differentiating (specific) properties; the general expressing the genus (jati), etc., and the specific expressing the species, differences and distinctions.

4. By means of general properties in each of a hundred (hundred here means 'all') jars, one idea (that of jar-ness) is recognised, and by means of specific properties, people distinguish each individual-particular jar as their own.

Explanation:.Suppose there are lying here many jars; if we look at them from the standpoint of their general properties, we know only their jar-ness which is common to all of them: but if we view them from the aspect of their differentiating properties,

we notice their differences, since they are not all alike, some being large, some small, some of red colour, some of black, some belonging to A, some to B, and so on.

5. The non-distinguished (naigama), regards an object as possessing both the aforesaid (general and specific) properties; (because) no particular thing in nature is possessed of a general property unaccompanied with some specific property, nor even of a specific property unaccompanied with the general one common of its class.

Explanation: Naigama means that which does not consider (only) one aspect, that is, which regards both the sâmânya and visesa. This aspect of Naigama is true, because sâmânya is not irrelative of visesa or vice versa. In the third verse we saw that all objects are possessed of both general and specific properties.

6. The collective (sangraha) deals with the general properties alone of an object, while recognizing that there exists no visesa (specific property) apart from sâmânya (general property), i.e., both visesa and sâmânya are co-existing and coincident.Sâmânya, devoid of visesa, is like a khapuspa (sky-flower), quite a nonentity, i.e., existing "no where."

7. Not a single nimb, mango or any other tree is ever conceived, apart from (its general property) vegetable-ness. In the same way, fingers, etc., which are included in the idea of hands, etc., cannot be conceived of separately from the hands, etc.

Explanation: In this verse, the emphasis is on the fact that special qualities can have no existence without a substratum of general properties. No one has yet seen a mango plant which did not possess the general quality of tree-ness.

8. The practical (vyavahâra) takes into consideration an object as possessing specific properties only; as the specific, apart from the general, is a nonentity like a donkey's horns.

9. If one is asked to bring 'vegetable,' can one do so? Without the specification of particularity, e.g., mango, etc., such speech is vain.

Explanation: This is to illustrate the principle that general qualities have no existence of their own. If they did, we should have manhood, stupidity, wisdom, etc., existing apart from living beings- which is absurd.

10. No wound, bruise or scratch can possibly be healed by the application of the general property of poultice-ness or ointment-ness. The healing properties only inhere in specific poultices or ointments.

11. The straight expression (rijusûtra naya) does not trouble itself with the past nor the future aspect of a thing; it is only confined to the present and refers to the 'nijam,' i.e., the natural state.

Explanation: This standpoint does not consider the past because of its having ended, nor the future because of its having not arisen, but solely deals with the present and natural aspect of a thing because that alone is kâryakârin, i.e., useful for the moment.

12. Neither the past, nor the future, nor the non-natural qualities serve any purpose. They are false; [they are like] a sky-lotus (non-entity).

Explanation: The argument underlying the rijusûtra view point in that of immediate utility which naturally must be grounded upon the present aspect of a thing. For instance, it is of no use to a beggar in his present life if his son of a previous birth, or the would-be daughter-in-law of a future incarnation, i.e., re-birth, happens to be a ruling prince. In the same way, qualities not belonging to a thing would stand it in no good stead in the immediate concerns of life.

13. (The rijusûtra naya) recognises only the real natural state of a thing out of the four, the name- nâma niksepa, etc. in the same way, the succeeding nayas.

Explanation: A thing is recognised (1) by its name (nâma niksepa), (2) by its shape or image (sthâpanâ niksepa), (3) b the causes which bring in about (dravya niksepa), or (4) by its nature, i.e., the real, natural state (bhâva niksepa). Neither name nor shape, nor image, nor the causal antecedents can, however, be termed the true attributes of a thing. They are all its unreal, attributed qualities. The only natural attributes (bhâva niksepa) of a thing are those which really constitute its nature.

The Rijusûtra and the succeeding three nayas, viz., Sabda, Samabhirûdha and Evambhûta take cognizance of the fourth, of the bhâva niksepa only. They only study the real, natural aspect of things, and attach no importance to the unreal, attributed state, viz., name, shape- image, or casual antecedents. The Naigama, sangraha, and Vyavahâra, however, recognise all the aforesaid modes, or Niksepas.

14. The Sabha Naya treats synonymous words as all having the same sense, for instance, kumbha, kalasa, ghata, etc., are all exprissive of one and the same object (viz., a jar).

Explanation: The meaning is that the Sâbda Naya does not concern itself about the difference of synonymous words, but simply deals with them as if they were pure equivalents of one another.

15. The Sambhirûdha naya holds that, with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs: just as a jar (ghata) and a piece of cloth (pata) are different, so as a jar, a pitcher and a pot (kumbha, kalasa, and ghata, though synonyms) signify different things (according to their derivative sense: for instance, a ghata is that which makes a noise like ghat ghat, and so on).

Explanation: The meaning is that, while the S'abda naya would treat synonyms as equivalent words, the Samabhirûdha would distinguish them from one another on etymological grounds.

16. [For] if different synonyms (paryâyas) of a thing do not distinguish that thing, (there) can be no such (distinction) between a jar and a cloth, which have also different words (paryâyas) for them.

17. Evambhûta naya (the such-like standpoint) verily recognises an object denoted by a word only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function (as suggested by the derivative meaning of the word.)

18. [For] if a thing be really recognized, even when it does not fulfill its function, then why can cloth be not called a jar?

Explanation: If a thing is not in the state of performing its function, as expressed by the term at the moment of recognition, and still it be recognised as that thing, then even a jar can be called a cloth, though it is not in the state of discharging the function of a cloth. Etymologically, Evambhûta means 'true in its entirely to the work and the sense.' This means that all the qualities denoted by the word are prominent and on servable; the Samabhirûdha is also true to the word and the sense, but not entirely, some of the qualities being in the background or not yet realized. Similarly, the Sabhda is also true to the word and the sense, but not so true as the Samabhirûdha, since it throws a larger number of qualities into the background than the last-named standpoint. Thus each of these nayas is purer than each preceding one, although they all belong to the same type, more or less.

19. Each succeeding standpoint of these seven nayas is purer than the preceding one: each of them has a hundred sub-divisions; therefore there are seven hundred nayas (in all).

20. But if we include the subtle (Samabhirûdha) and such-like (Evambhûta) in the verbal (sabáa) standpoint, then there would be five standpoints, and the same could be divided into five hundred.

21. These (seven aspects) can be included in or grouped under [two, i.e., (1) the dravyâstika (which considers the common attributes of all the dravyas, that is to say the general properties of substances) and objects) and (2) the paryayastika (which deals with the specific attributes, qualities and conditions of objects) nayas. The former of these includes the first four, and the latter the last three. According to some Achâryas, the former includes the first three and the latter the last four.

22. Oh Lord! although all standpoints differ from themselves inter se, they collectively serve your Gospel, just as on earth kings, though hostile to each other, after having been defeated in military warfare serve at the lotus-like feet of, or pay homage to, the

Sovereign-Emperor.

23. Thus the Lord Mahâvira -- the moon among the Jinas or Kevalins -- was, with modesty, worshipped by means of flowers, in the form of words, explaining the significance of nayas (standpoints) by me, named Vinayavijaya, in order to satisfy the Guru (preceptor) Vijayasinha, a disciple of Vijayadeva Sûri, in the beautiful, auspicious seaport town of Dvipa (the present Diva in Kathiawad).